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Abstract 
This thesis challenges the traditional view of national contract laws as facilitative regimes and 
argues that contract law on the national level has been progressively re-oriented to perform an 
efficiency-driven regulatory function. To develop the argument the thesis studies the contract 
law remedial regime of two common law and one civil law jurisdiction – the US, England and 
Bulgaria, in two specific contracts – the sale-of-goods and the construction contract. The 
introductory chapter puts the main theme in context and outlines the project. Exploring the 
limits of promissory theory and neoclassical economics, the second chapter develops an 
innovative interdisciplinary methodology joining the new institutional economics with the 
comparative law method. The third, fourth and fifth chapters offer taxonomies of remedies, 
types of contracts and remedial effects to set the stage for a meaningful comparison across the 
different legal traditions. Since economic theory has advanced most in the study of incentives 
generated by damages, the third chapter focuses on the latter remedy and shows that the 
common law classification of damage measures (expectation, reliance, restitution), on which 
traditional law-and-economics accounts are based, can be applied to study a civil law 
jurisdiction like Bulgaria. Distinguishing discrete and long-term contracts and demonstrating 
that the differentiation between sale-of-goods and construction contracts in the compared 
national legal systems does not necessarily go along the lines of the discrete/long-term 
distinction in economics, the fourth chapter argues that the positive comparison should be 
made with an eye on the market for substitute performances even if the compared factual 
scenarios are classified under different legal categories in the different jurisdictions. For the 
uninitiated, the fifth chapter reconstructs and criticises the standard economic model 
rationalising damages as incentives. The final chapter applies the approach developed here to 
contractual termination. The exemplary analysis identifies trends in the compared legal 
systems and suggests that all of them converge in charging the termination remedy with a 
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Chapter I Introduction 
Remedies are usually placed at the very end of a signed agreement only after the parties have 
enumerated their contractual obligations. Moreover, many contracts exhaust only the actions 
which constitute performance, leaving out the effect on parties' duties of a number of 
(sometimes quite probable) contingencies or the consequences of various forms of non-
compliance. Indeed, parties write incomplete contracts and often omit negotiations over 
delicate matters. Often they try first to deal with a problem arising in the course of a 
transaction amicably, and keeping lawyers out of it. Why then is it important to look at 
contracts through remedies? 
'In one sense, every legal dispute is about remedies.'1 A party is much more concerned with 
how much money he2 will have to pay if he loses the case or how much he will collect if he 
wins than with questions such as whether there was a breach of contract. To be precise, 
remedies may be imposed even if it turns out that parties are not bound by an enforceable 
contract. In fact, we call the consequences of breach "remedies" precisely because contracts 
are incomplete. If they were to specify what should happen in each and every state of the 
world, there would be no reason to speak of their performance and breach. After all, such 
contracts would fully describe all possible contingencies and all steps that should follow 
them. Still, in some cases when it comes to commercial transactions that are not routine, in 
which large sums are at stake and sophisticated players are involved, parties try to plan 
attentively and as completely as possible. Contracts providing for such transactions are often 
distinguished for subtle, ingenious schemes and carefully spelled out governance 
mechanisms, by which parties attempt to control their fate. Partners do not simply describe 
their rights and obligations, they make an effort to regulate their relationship by incentivising 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Hermalin, Avery Katz and Richard Craswell, ‘Contract Law’ in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven 
Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics, vol 1 (First edn, Amsterdam/London: North-Holland 2007) 99. 
2 For the sake of simplicity, throughout the thesis a contractual party will generally be denoted as 'he', which, 
depending on the circumstances, may mean an individual, a firm, or a firm's decision maker. In this sense, 'he' 
will often substitute 'she' or 'it' for the sole purpose of consistency. In addition, by a 'promisor' I mean a 
contracting party who is or may be in breach while by a 'promisee' I mean a party who is or may be harmed by 
breach. In the course of the thesis they will also be referred to, respectively, as 'breacher' and 'non-breacher'. For 
the sake of clarity, the promisor/breacher will be denoted as 'he' and the promisee/non-breacher as 'she'. The 
parties to the contract for sale of goods will be referred to as 'seller' and 'buyer' and the parties to the construction 
contract – as 'constructor' and 'client'. In both of these contracts, as in the majority of contracts, one party is 
required to provide a commodity (good or service) while the other party is required to pay money. For this 
reason, I will refer to a party who provides a commodity as 'Seller' and to a party who pays money – as the 
'Buyer'. 
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one another to do or to refrain from doing something. In the parties' endeavour to attune their 
behaviour, remedies can serve as valuable instruments creating a number of effects on the 
players' interaction.  
Remedies are of central importance to contract law also on a larger scale. Since the seminal 
Coase theorem it became clear that liability rules can be used as tools for assigning property 
rights in a way that maximises societal welfare. With costless transactions the initial 
allocation of rights cannot affect the operation of the economic system since resources will 
always travel to their most efficient use. Yet in the real world, transaction costs may often be 
sufficiently high to exceed the eventual gains and therefore to prevent bargaining altogether. 
In such cases, the property right, so to speak, sticks where it hits and determines the behaviour 
of market actors. Thus, in a world of positive transaction costs the challenge becomes to 
construct the "rules of the game"3 (or, in the language of the thesis, remedies) that correct 
deficiencies without the cost of intervention outweighing the benefit. This challenge has 
already emerged on the European level where until recently the approach to the harmonisation 
of contract law was not remedy-oriented. Generally, the acquis tackles only specific problems 
in cross-border trade leaving enforcement to the national contract laws of Member States. The 
Commission's Proposal for an optional Common European Sales Law, however, purported to 
offer "a self-standing and complete set of rules for sales transactions",4 including rules on 
remedies. This begs the question of how remedial rules in European contract law should be 
structured.  
The research also focuses on remedies for methodological reasons. In the analysis of diverse 
legal systems remedial rules supply the concept of property rights with real meaning. The 
organisation of property rights and remedies fluctuates from one legal system to another. 
Different arrangements of property rights may be protected by the same remedy or the same 
property rights may be shielded by different remedies affording a different degree of 
protection depending on whether they are structured as (in the language of Calabresi and 
                                                 
3 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) 4. 
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Common European Sales Law to Facilitate Cross-
Border Transactions in the Single Market, COM(2011) 636 final, Brussels, 11.10.2011, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0636:FIN:en:PDF 7 (hereafter "Communication for 
Common European Sales Law"). 
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Melamed)5 property rules or liability rules. Thus, remedies become a means of exploring 
various institutional environments characterised by different property right structures. No 
matter the legal tradition, in which property rights are embedded (common law or civil law), 
remedies provide them with actual content, define their limits and give them value permitting 
a more rigorous comparison. With the abundance of national legal arrangements, remedies 
offer the chance for a deep look at the very operation of a legal system, a look that goes 
beyond the façade of the doctrinal discourse. 
The thesis digs into the law of monetary damages, the primary remedy for breach of contract 
in common law systems and a subsidiary but still widely used remedy in civil law systems. 
Depending on the interest protected, on the mode of calculation and on their applicability by 
default or by a clause in the parties' agreement, damages are denoted with different names in 
the different jurisdictions.6 Yet the concept is the same, the party does not receive what he 
bargained for but does receive compensation, usually in the form of a certain monetary 
amount. The key reason to choose damages as the main subject of the research is that they 
allow us to see the problem of enforcement not only through the desirability of the promised 
behaviour but also through the joint effect of a broad set of incentives that affect the parties' 
conduct.7 In addition, the thesis juxtaposes damages to specific performance in light of the 
different weight given to each remedy in civil law and common law systems.  
The starting point of the project is that contract law can be viewed not only as a facilitative 
but also as a regulatory device. In this sense remedies for breach of contract perform not only 
a market-building function but also contribute to market regulation. The thesis aims at 
comparing the remedial schemes of three legal systems in the contract for sale of goods and 
the construction contract in order to uncover the balance between the facilitative and 
regulatory role of remedies struck in each jurisdiction. The goal is to understand better the 
reasons for the differences in the national remedial allocation and to highlight particular 
problems which could be overcome by transplanting foreign solutions. Another aim of the 
project, related to the first one but still separate and independent from it, is to formulate 
                                                 
5 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Havard Law Review 1089. 
6 For the different measures of damages, see in detail infra Section C. of Chapter III. 
7 Richard Craswell, ‘Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises’ in Peter Benson (ed), The Theory of 
Contract Law New Essays (First edn, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2001). 
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guidelines for a scheme on the European level recognising and incorporating both functions 
of contractual remedies.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section A sets out the background on the basis of which 
the entire project is designed. Section A.1 and Section A.2 are devoted to contract law's 
function to create and, respectively, to regulate a market. Section A.3 concentrates on the 
specific character and reinforced regulatory function of European contract law. After these 
introductory points Section B turns the focus to the research project at hand. Section B.1 
outlines the scope of the project in terms of the types of contract compared. Section B.2 
justifies the choice of the selected jurisdictions. The chapter then concludes and outlines the 
way forward. 
A. Background 
Before indulging in the empirical analysis, some preliminary matters require attention. To 
compare the contract damages and specific performance in the considered national 
jurisdictions and to evaluate the similarities and differences as well as the possibilities for 
designing a remedial model on the European level, it is first necessary to draw the background 
picture against which the thesis should be read. In this respect, it will be helpful to set out the 
different functions of contract law in order to determine a common viewpoint when exploring 
the different legal systems. 
1. Contract law's function to create a market 
The traditional view holds that the very raison d'être of contract law is to facilitate trade. If 
exchange generates gains not only for the parties taking part in it but also for society, the role 
of contract law should be to maximise the number of contracts, to make contractual 
transactions so habitual that their amount constructs an operating market. The fundamental 
principles of modern contract law embodying this market creation function are freedom of 
contract and the binding force of contract. They are the starting point expressing the basic 
approach to contract as a manifestation of the free choices of the parties which will be 
enforced by the law. Yet, though essential, these categories of principle tell us little about the 
mechanism by which contract law fulfils its function to foster trade and create a market. 
When it comes to a simultaneous exchange, contract law is of little relevance. Such spot 
transactions (commercial or consumer) allow parties to enjoy the gains from trade and 
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resources to move to a more valued use without the need of a formal contract. This, however, 
changes when instead of exchanging goods or services for money, parties exchange promises 
with regard to their future behaviour. If transactions are characterised by such an 
intertemporal element, contracts become valuable for three reasons: coordination, 
implementing deferred exchange, and encouraging specific investment.  
Coordination 
By coordinating their behaviour, commercial players can achieve more than on their own. The 
road to cooperation, however, is paved with doubt, distrust, and uncertainty. In a deferred 
exchange, self-interest dictates non-performance either because there is no guarantee your 
partner will perform, or because once he has performed, you will be better off not fulfilling 
your own promise. In this sense, it is the role of contract law to provide a stable framework 
which changes the parameters of the game and encourages parties to coordinate where 
coordination does not emerge spontaneously. Trust alone is not sufficient to create a market 
when it comes to large, open communities in which the fear of social exclusion cannot 
prevent uncooperative behaviour.8 In this respect a contract remedy rule acts as a correlating 
device.9 It specifies to all players that in the particular environment of non-instantaneous 
exchange, the gain is higher if they cooperate rather than appropriate.10 Sharing a belief that it 
will be more beneficial to foreclose the latter opportunity, parties consider each other's 
promises credible. Thus, by making promises enforceable, contract law fosters cooperation. 
Bound to honour their commitment, parties overcome the prisoner's dilemma and engage in 
trade.11 
                                                 
8 On the importance of trust, see Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study’ (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 55, 58-59; Ian Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term 
Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern 
University Law Review 854, 858. For a more recent argument in socio-legal studies emphasising the role of 
trust, see Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (First edn, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 1999) 102-
111. Collins himself admits that trust alone will rarely be sufficient to form a market, especially considering that 
the level of social trust in some countries is traditionally low. Yet, he asserts that it is the combination of trust 
and non-legal sanctions that is crucial in market creation.   
9 Herbert Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2009). 
10 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Fifth edn, Pearson/Addison-Wesley 2008) 206. 
11 Douglas Baird, ‘Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts’ (1990) 19 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 583. 
 6 
In a non-laboratory environment, contracts achieve much more stable results with regard to 
coordination than focal points12 or the announcement of intentions.13 Certainly, the presence 
of formal contracting does not automatically mean that state enforcement (awarding damages 
or specific performance) is always necessary. Many agreements are self-enforcing14 or can be 
enforced by reputational sanctions.15 In addition, in societies that are not built on the rule of 
law, illegal remedies such as intimidation and physical aggression, as practiced by mafia or 
racketeer groups for example, play a similar role. This account, however, deals with court 
enforcement which facilitates contracting in the anonymous market where self-enforcement 
and reputation fail16 and which, compared to extra-legal and illegal arrangements, entails at 
least two advantages: the ability of the enforcer to expropriate the profit is constrained by rule 
of law and the costs of enforcement are distributed among all society members.17 
                                                 
12 Focal points are solutions people will be inclined to resort to in the absence of communication. They indicate 
"each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do." Thomas Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict (Fifth edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1976) 57. 
13 It is suggested that in case of cheap talk, i.e. communication between players which does not directly affect 
their payoffs, coordination can be achieved if parties announce their intentions in advance. Joseph Farrell, 
‘Cheap Talk, Coordination and Entry’ (1987) 18 The Rand Journal of Economics 34. 
14 Even if reciprocity is suggested to extend the self-enforcing range of contracts, experimental scholars 
conjecture that as a contract enforcement device, it works only in two-person experiments with perfect 
information while losing its effect in a similar-to-market environment with information deficiency. See Robert 
Scott, ‘A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1641; Colin 
Camerer, Behavioural Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (New York: Russel Sage Foundation; 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2003). Despite parties' reliance on self-enforcing 
arrangements, formal contracting still matters since contract terms facilitate the work of self-enforcement 
mechanisms (the threat that the contractual partner will terminate the relationship and no longer do business with 
the breacher). See Benjamin Klein, ‘The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships’ in Eric 
Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications (First edn, 
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press 2002). 
15 To stimulate performance, however, reputational sanctions also presuppose relatively small business 
communities or industries with established trade associations able to stigmatise a disreputable contracting 
behaviour. See Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ (2003) 113 
Yale Law Journal 541, 557. 
16 In short, self-enforcement mechanisms and reputation sanctions are not effective when the expected gain from 
breach exceeds the losses from retaliation and ostracism. For example, the losses of social expulsion tend to pale 
where the community is small compared to the size of the market. Eric Brousseau, ‘Contracts: From Bilateral Set 
of Incentives to the Multi-Level Governance of Relations’ in Jean-Michel Glachant and Eric Brousseau (eds), 
New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First edn, Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press 
2008) 63. In addition, self-enforcement and reputation are constrained by the costs associated with them. 
Hostages are costly as they have to be chosen not to incentivise opportunistic behaviour on the side of the 
hostage taker and are particularly expensive when they need to be sufficiently valuable to prevent large-scale 
deviations. Retaliation by a party who, unlike a judge, does not have authority to resolve disputes may be 
difficult to tolerate and, hence, may entail costs related to upsetting the cooperative equilibrium. Also, 
information asymmetries exist even within business communities where information dissemination is, too, 
imperfect. Robert Scott, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts’ (2009) 75 California Law Review 
2005, 2039-2040, 2043; Brousseau 63.  
17 Brousseau 38-39. 
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Implementing deferred exchange 
Contract law promotes trade not only because it spurs cooperation where suspicion in the 
partner's strategy thwarts it. It also facilitates exchange where its value depends on future 
uncertain states of the world. Such a transaction cannot take place on the spot market and 
mandates some advance commitment.18 The typical example is an insurance agreement which 
may be beneficial for both parties at the time of contracting but not at the expiration of the 
agreement. While the main motivation to execute an insurance agreement is that a risk-averse 
party transfers risk to a less risk-averse player, the very need to contract for future delivery 
does not depend on parties' sensitivity to risk. For example, it might be that risk-neutral 
parties enter into a forward agreement, each party believing that the market price will change 
in its favour. In case a drastic change of the price ensues, at the time of performance one of 
the parties will prefer not to have executed the transaction at all. The fact that parties are 
bound by an enforceable commitment, however, makes trade possible when future 
contingencies can alter their ex post utility from the transaction. In the more general case 
contract law facilitates exchange any time when one of the parties performs before his partner. 
Structuring trade so that it consists of separate instalments, the time of delivery of which is 
matched with a respective payment from the counterparty, raises transaction costs and may 
not always be possible.19 
Of course, constraining one's behaviour for the future and drafting a forward agreement is 
also costly. Yet, even when the market is thick and economic players will be able to purchase 
the desired good or service in a spot transaction, they still engage in transactions for future 
delivery whenever their disruption costs outweigh the costs of contracting. When the stakes in 
a transaction are large enough that an adverse development can put the promisee out of 
business, the enforceable contract provides him with an insurance against unfortunate events 
in volatile markets.20 
Encouraging specific investment  
Contract law also encourages trade by allowing parties to make advance investments which 
will enhance the value they will obtain from exchange. Neither of the parties will be willing 
                                                 
18 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 9. 
19 Ibid 10. 
20 Schwartz and Scott 562-565. 
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to sink in resources, which he cannot recoup, if he is not sufficiently assured that the other 
party will perform. If the Seller has not received the Buyer's enforceable promise, he will 
hardly invest in tailoring commodities to the Buyer's needs, even though in this way he can 
increase his profit. The specific investment would give the Buyer an incentive to demand a 
renegotiation of the price in order to extract a greater portion of the contractual surplus and 
the Seller would be forced to agree. Otherwise, not being able to resell on the spot market, he 
would lose even more. Thus, the absence of an enforceable contract ensuring that the Seller 
will recover his sunk costs may stop him from investing and consequently prevent trade from 
taking place at all.21  
The Buyer can also invest in the envisaged exchange in order to enjoy fully his utility from 
the transaction. But when these investments are relation specific, the Buyer will not make 
them without having struck an enforceable deal since he would not want the Seller to take 
advantage of his reliance and force less favourable terms afterwards.22 A remedy which 
compensates the Buyer for his accrued investment will incentivise him to take steps to 
increase his gain. Thus, contract law motivates parties to make value enhancing investment23 
which on in its own turn augments the volume and intensity of trade. 
In sum, contract law makes the risk of loss acceptable to economic players. By reducing it to 
a level which is lower than the probability of profit, they stimulate parties to overcome their 
fear of opportunism and to enter voluntarily into transactions. Removing to a great extent the 
uncertainty impeding trade and permitting the production of specialised products, enforceable 
contracts allow parties and society to enjoy the benefits of exchange. Trade becomes 
widespread and a market, i.e. a forum where exchange takes place, is created. Besides playing 
a crucial role in facilitating exchange, contract law can also contribute to its regulation. I 
address this function below.  
                                                 
21 In this model, the investment made by the seller is not taken into account upon renegotiation since at that time 
it has already been sunk. There is some evidence that in bargaining individuals do not completely ignore sunk 
costs which increases the investing party's payoff and consequently his incentive to invest. In addition, a 
dynamic bargaining game suggests that in the absence of an enforceable contract, staging investment raises a 
party's incentive to invest. This experimental evidence is yet to be confirmed. Even if without an enforceable 
contract the possibility for hold-up might not always result in underinvestment, it still occurs often enough to 
make a strong case in favour of contractual remedies. Ibid 561. 
22 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 10-11; Schwartz and Scott 559-562. 
23 See in this sense also Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (First edn, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2004) 362. 
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2. The contract law's function to regulate a market 
In both Europe and the US the traditional stance envisages a strict separation between private 
law and regulation. In Europe private law is seen as protecting established individual rights by 
securing property entitlements and enforcing private arrangements while regulation is 
constrained to promoting certain economic and social policies, the latter protecting particular 
social groups. In the US the Chicago school posited contract law as a basic precondition for 
the creation and sustenance of a free market. Any public regulation is viewed as apt to 
misbalance the efficient market and, therefore, should be employed solely to correct market 
failures which contract law proved to be unable to address.24 In the eyes of private lawyers, 
both in Europe and across the Atlantic, contract law and regulation use profoundly different 
governance techniques: the former is general, private, facilitative, decentralised and operates 
ex post, the latter is particularistic, public, directive, centralised and operates ex ante.25 
New developments, new perspectives 
The viewpoints, described above, however, omit mounting evidence about the progressive 
blurring of the rigid public-private divide, starting in the last quarter of the 20th century.26 This 
blurring has entailed a two-way process: on one side, market-based mechanisms are 
increasingly being used to correct market failures;27 on the other side, a considerable body of 
                                                 
24 Hugh Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: In 
Search of the Philosopher's Stone’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 213, 216-217. Collins, 
Regulating Contracts 7, 57. Hugh Collins, ‘Governance Implications for the European Union of the Changing 
Character of Private Law’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir-Watt (eds), Making European Private Law: 
Governance Design (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008) 276-277. Wolfgang Kerber, ‘European System of Private 
Laws: An Economic Perspective’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir-Watt (eds), Making European Private 
Law: Governance Design (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008) 67-69. 
25 Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (First edn, Oxford: Clanderon Press 1994); 
Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: In Search of 
the Philosopher's Stone’ 216-217. 
26 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir-Watt (eds), Making European Private Law: Governance Design 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008). 
27 For the relationship between civil liability in tort and administrative regulation as complementary regulatory 
devices, see Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘A Coordinated Approach to Regulation and Civil Liability in European Law: 
Rethinking Institutional Complementarities’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European 
Private Law (First edn, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2006). In the field of contract law, specific 
principles for the protection of weaker parties and for particular types of agreements such as consumer, 
employment and standard form contracts were developed. Collins, ‘Governance Implications for the European 
Union of the Changing Character of Private Law’ 278.  
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private regulation, either complementing, or substituting public regulation, has evolved.28 As 
an implicit rebuttal of the traditional public-private opposition, a number of innovative modes 
of governance, mixing in a different manner state law, private regulation and market solutions 
have developed.29 As a result, gradually, the Pigouvian model of centralised regulations and 
the Coasian model of decentralised enforcement of property rights by courts have come to be 
seen not as alternative but as complementary models of institutional control, the scope of 
which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It became clear that no legal system exclusively 
uses one or the other approach to steer the market. Rather each legal system relies on a 
different combination between the two models with a number of institutional factors 
determining the specific mixture.30 
This has led to the insight that contract law may also be viewed as an instrument to regulate 
markets.31 Within this approach regulation is defined as a functional concept meaning any 
system of rules intended to govern the behaviour of its subjects which performs the essential 
functions of all regulatory systems: standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement.32 Truly, on 
the national level this aspect of contract law's character continues to be contested.33 Yet, a 
close look at, for example, the legal doctrines of fraud, mistake, lack of capacity, duress, or 
                                                 
28 For the role of private regulation in European contract law, European tort law and unfair competition law, see 
Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Private Regulation in European Private Law’ EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2009/31, Robert 
Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series-01 . 
29 Kerber 70-72. See also Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Rethinking Private Regulation in the European Regulatory Space’ in 
Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), Reframing Self-regulation in European Private Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International 2006). 
30 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of MIchigan Press 1997) 
63-67. 
31 Collins, Regulating Contracts; Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ in Christine Parker and others (eds), 
Regulating Law (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004) For an argument against adopting such an 
approach Jane Stapleton, ‘Regulating Torts’ in Christine Parker and others (eds), Regulating Law (First edn, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004). 
32 Collins, Regulating Contracts 7, 65. Black also defines regulation as a "sustained and focused attempt to alter 
the behaviour of a subject according to identified purposes with the intention to produce a broadly identified 
outcome or outcomes which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour- 
modification." Julia Black, ‘Regulatory Conversations’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 163, 170. On the 
different definitions of regulation, see Collins, Regulating Contracts 7; Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving 
General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: In Search of the Philosopher's Stone’ 216; 
Terence Daintith, ‘Chapter 10 Regulation’ in Richard Buxbaum and Ferenc Mádl (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law vol XVII State and Economy (First edn, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck); Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997) 3-5. 
33 Both Hans Micklitz and Norbert Reich bring up the German debate on the nature of contract law. Hans-W. 
Micklitz, ‘Regulatory Strategies on Services Contracts in EC law’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir-Watt 
(eds), The Regulatory Function of European Private Law (Cheltenham/Nothampton: Edward Elgar 2009); 
Norbert Reich, ‘Transformation of Contract Law and Civil Justice in the new EU Member Countries: The 
Example of the Baltic States, Hungary and Poland’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of 
European Private Law (First edn, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2006). 
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undue influence reveals that they can all be interpreted as substantive limitations on freedom 
of contract, which remedy situations of market failure.34 The regulatory function is also said 
to be encoded in general clauses related to 'good morals' and 'public policy'.35 From this 
standpoint what differs between jurisdictions is the degree to which contract law is charged 
with a regulatory function, not its presence or absence. 
Such a perspective is also adopted by this thesis where the regulatory function of contract law 
is defined as its ability to address market failures.36 Three types of market failures have been 
distinguished in the literature: (i) market power; (ii) information asymmetries; and (iii) 
externalities.37 Nowadays, situations of weak competition are typically cured by competition 
law. Due to the principle of privity, in the case of externalities the affected third parties 
generally cannot rely on contract law remedies but must resort to devices provided by tort, 
property, criminal law or by the traditional business regulation measures. Thus, in national 
contract law information asymmetries are the most important.38  In this respect, the research 
starts from the assumption that the rules of contract in unregulated markets can be used as 
regulatory instruments. The regulatory dimension of the body of contract rules developed 
within regulated markets (energy, telecommunications, banking, etc.) remains beyond the 
scope of the project. Even if I do not think that the regulatory function is the prevailing or the 
sole function of contract law, I believe the application of a regulatory lens is an intelligible 
and promising activity39 which expands the dominant understanding of contract law 
exclusively as a facilitative device. In this respect, remedies with their ability to allocate 
losses and gains and to rank property rights by means of the offered degree of protection 
appear as a productive ground for research.  
                                                 
34 Collins, Regulating Contracts 59. Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 52-57. 
35 Reich 272. 
36 Cafaggi and Muir-Watt, Making European Private Law: Governance Design 2. This definition differs from 
the definition adopted by Hugh Collins who associates the regulatory function of private law with distributive 
justice. See Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: 
In Search of the Philosopher's Stone’ 219. For an argument in the American doctrine that US contract law also 
has regulatory role in the sense that it reflects not only the pursuit of individual autonomy but broader social 
concerns such as fairness, decency, trust and cooperation, see Jean Braucher, ‘Contract versus Contractarianism: 
The Regulatory Role of Contract Law’ (1990) 47 Washington and Lee Law Review 697.  
37 Cooter and Ulen 226-231. 
38 Private information allows resources to be allocated efficiently and motivates exchange. In this sense 
asymmetric information is not harmful per se. After all, enforcement of contracts based on information 
asymmetries incentivises discovery of productive information. Ibid 296. However, when a party to the contract 
systematically cannot acquire information or can acquire it only at prohibitively high costs (e.g. consumers), 
resources cannot move to more productive uses and measures correcting the asymmetry are justified.  
39 See Stapleton 126 who argues that Collins' arguments do not warrant the adoption of regulatory perspective to 
private law. 
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The regulatory function of remedies seems much more established in the field of tort40 where 
there was a debate regarding the appropriate type of liability rule: strict liability or negligence. 
A similar debate did not take place in contract law, where scholars never advocated that the 
breacher be excused from liability in case of efficient breach. Instead they relied on the fact 
that enforcement of the promise may not involve performance of the promised actions but the 
payment of damages and argued for, so to speak, strict liability of the non-performing party 
no matter whether his breach was justified by an increased cost of performance or not.41 The 
threat of such a monetary award, especially if based on the proper damage measure, would 
give the breacher the incentive to perform only when it is efficient. Law and economics, 
however, has long since moved beyond this initial model in which the efficiency of contract 
enforcement depends solely on the efficiency of the promised actions. The most recent 
economic theory considers remedies for breach of contract as inducing a whole set of 
incentive effects on the parties' behaviour and evaluates enforcement with respect to the joint 
effect from the alteration of all these incentives.42 Such a view of remedies as incentives and 
not as sanctions43 challenges the positivistic understanding which has exerted a profound 
influence on both civil law and common law systems. Yet, it fits nicely with the regulatory 
approach considering contracts as subjecting parties to a number of legal rules (agreed, 
default and mandatory) that modify their incentives just like any other regulatory regime 
does.44 
Default rules and mandatory rules 
It might seem odd that default rules, as the bulk of legal rules in contract law are, can exercise 
a regulatory function. Usually, for private lawyers, it is mandatory rules that are associated 
with pursuing regulatory goals while defaults are viewed as a device meant to minimise 
transaction costs leading to contractual incompleteness.45 But besides the negative 
                                                 
40 Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Fifth edn, New Haven: Yale 
University 1977); Steven Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation for Safety’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal 
Studies 357; Cafaggi, ‘A Coordinated Approach to Regulation and Civil Liability in European Law: Rethinking 
Institutional Complementarities’. 
41 See in this sense Craswell 22, 23. 
42 Ibid 28, 30-32. 
43 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russel and Russel 1961). 
44 Craswell 33. 
45 This is the conventional justification for the existence of contract defaults. Parties write incomplete contracts 
because their costs to negotiate and draft a contractual term often exceed the gains from solving the particular 
contractual problem (especially when the risk of the contingency materialising is small). Devising an efficient 
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cost/benefit balance, informational asymmetry is another reason for which parties leave gaps 
in their contracts. Asymmetric information prevents actors from conditioning the contract on 
such important variables such as the cost and value of performance46 and often information is 
purposefully suppressed by a player to gain a strategic advantage towards his contractual 
partner.47 In addition to mandatory rules,48 default rules, called "penalty defaults",49 which 
provide stimuli for efficient disclosure of information, are also summoned to combat this 
market failure. They are deliberately attuned to what the majority of the parties would 
disfavour in order to incentivise the informed party to negotiate around the default, thus 
disclosing information which would be relevant for the counterparty ex ante when he has to 
decide on entering into the contractual relationship. A default with such an "information-
forcing"50 effect is the rule which provides that in case of breach a party can recover only the 
damages that are foreseeable to the other party. This default gives an incentive to the 
promisee to disclose the magnitude of his loss to the promisor.51 In this way the latter can take 
efficient precautions against breach and set the price more accurately.52 Penalty defaults can 
also be purposefully devised to encourage the disclosure of information which would be 
                                                                                                                                                        
term, the parties bear the cost but would likely not reap the full gain since other agents would probably copy the 
term. Where contracting costs prevent parties from writing complete contracts, it is efficient that lawmakers 
supply them with contract terms because the costs of their creation will be smaller than the total social gain from 
their use in many transactions. In large markets, economic actors' heterogeneous preferences imply that publicly 
supplied contract rules should be defaults so that parties who dislike them are still able to devise their own 
solutions. Schwartz and Scott 595-596; Alan Schwartz, ‘The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State’ 
in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First 
edn, London/New York: Routledge 2007) 109-110. 
46 Informational asymmetry is present when the information is either unverifiable (i.e. a party can observe it but 
cannot verify it to a third party such as a court at a cost lower than the gain derived from proving it) or 
unobservable (i.e. a party cannot observe it at all). Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law’ 605. With information asymmetry writing an incomplete contract is a better alternative for the 
parties than disclosing information (cost and value) they want to keep private or having enforcement depend on 
facts that are not observable or verifiable in court. 
47 If by not revealing information to his contractual partner, the party remains pooled with a larger class of 
parties wrongly considered by his partner to be similar, the party manages to negotiate a price that is cross-
subsidised by the class of players to which he does not belong. Disclosing information and separating from the 
cross-subsidising pool will reduce the informed party's portion of the contractual surplus, so the party may prefer 
to forego the increase in value resulting from the efficient equilibrium in order to keep his share of the surplus 
larger. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 87, 94, 99-100. 
48 Such mandatory rules are present within the doctrines of fraud, failure to disclose, frustration of purpose, 
mutual mistake. Cooter and Ulen 228-230. 
49 Ayres and Gertner. 
50 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 88. 
51 Ayres and Gertner 101-104. 
52 Parties themselves can also create penalty defaults. For example, by inserting in the proposed contract a clause 
which disclaims consequential damages, the promisor induces the promisee to negotiate away the disclaimer and 
thus disclose the extent of consequential damages she would suffer in case of breach. Schwartz and Scott, 
‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 598, footnote 116; Schwartz, ‘The Enforcement of Contracts 
and the Role of the State’ 115, footnote 3.  
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relevant for courts ex post when they interpret the contract. In this case, they deter inefficient 
gaps in contracts, penalising the parties for externalising their negotiation costs on courts 
when having the court decide a dispute would be more costly than explicitly agreeing on an 
issue ex ante.53 
It should be kept in mind that a penalty default will not foster disclosure of information when 
the penalty it imposes is too small compared to the value generated by the rent-seeking 
behaviour of the informed party. The party may particularly appreciate his informational 
advantage when he does not have bargaining strength in a bilateral monopoly setting,54 when 
disclosure would reveal valuable private information related not only to the particular 
contract55 or when disclosure along one dimension would also allow inferences about other 
unverifiable or unobservable matters.56 In addition, penalty defaults may also have a negative 
effect on parties' incentives to search for and collect information.57 In any case, what is 
important at this preliminary stage of the research is that when the adopted regulatory strategy 
is not command-and-control but rather incentive-based, contract default rules can also 
perform a regulatory function.58  
                                                 
53 In such cases, defaults refusing to enforce the parties' agreement and thus set against both parties appear more 
efficient than defaults disciplining only one of them. In addition to being easy to enforce and to incentivising 
both players to reveal information, non-enforcement defaults do not induce opportunism. In contrast, a penalty 
default directed against only one of the parties stimulates opportunistic behaviour by the other who may try to 
bind the party subject to the penalty in an unfavourable contract. An example of a penalty default designed to 
incentivise both parties to negotiate on an issue ex ante in order to save the larger litigation costs ex post is UCC 
§ 2-201(1) according to which if the parties have not determined the quantity of the goods sold in their contract, 
the latter is not enforceable. Ayres and Gertner 95-98. Unless otherwise indicated, the thesis refers to the official 
text of and comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, which is current through the July 2011 meeting of the 
National Conference of Commissioners and the May 2011 meeting of the American Law Institute. 
54 Jason Johnston, ‘Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules’ (1990) 100 Yale 
Law Journal 615. 
55 Omri Ben-Shashar and Lisa Bernstein, ‘The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law’ (2000) 109 Yale Law Journal 
1885. 
56 Barry Adler, ‘The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 1547. 
57 Ayres and Gertner 107. 
58 Besides penalty defaults, other types of default terms can also have regulatory function. The default 
interpretation by which courts fill the gap when they strike down a contractual term, intended to mute a 
mandatory rule, has a deterrent effect when it imposes a penalty worse than the mandatory term itself. Such 
penalising default interpretation may prove to alleviate a possible under-deterrent effect of a mandatory term 
considering that the number of litigations involving similar contracting-around endeavours is far from the actual 
number of agreements in which mandatory terms are simply neglected. In addition, the so-called "strong 
defaults", introducing specific formalities which must be followed to contract out of them, are intended to 
dissuade economic players from escaping them. Courts can also create strong defaults by requiring parties to use 
specific language to contract around a default term without stating what this language is. When courts have 
continuously refused to recognise parties' attempts to reach a contractual outcome that differs from a default 
without indicating the sufficient conditions, the cost to contract out of a default becomes so large that the default 
turns out to be a quasi-mandatory rule. Compelling the use of specific language, courts can force a party to 
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If this is the case, the question arises of how the law should intervene: by a default or by a 
mandatory rule considering that the latter's principal rationale is to regulate.59 A default rule 
has some deterrent effect since due to transaction costs many parties stick with it even if they 
would have been better off contracting out. For example, it has been argued that parties do not 
opt out of defaults (or standardised terms) as a result of cognitive and socio-psychological 
limitations60 as well as network externalities, the latter determining the value of standardised 
terms in business by the number of their users.61 This is the idea upon which rests the so-
called "central-command approach", which advocates that defaults should be set so that they 
are substantively efficient.62 While sticky, default rules can still be altered by parties who 
want to create their own terms, so they have been supported as a softer regulatory method to 
alleviate problems of bounded rationality.63  
In this respect, a distinction between business-to-business and business-to-consumer 
transactions should always be borne in mind. Mandatory rules can be justified when one of 
the parties is not sophisticated.64 For such a party it is, generally, inefficient to sink resources 
into becoming acquainted with all contractual details when the expected gain from 
understanding a contract clause concerning an unlikely event is smaller than the cost of 
understanding, (i.e. the time and effort spent in reading and comprehending the provision or 
the amount spent for a consultation with a lawyer). In this case, the offeror will be better off 
inserting in the contract a clause that maximises his own benefit but not the contractual 
                                                                                                                                                        
divulge information to his counterparty and to the courts themselves. Such explicit language can alert the less 
informed party about his legal rights. It can also drive economic players to separate in different groups where 
only the group of those receiving sufficiently high gains will not be discouraged from contracting around the 
default. Ibid 120-127. 
59 Mandatory terms are called upon to correct market failures. The prohibitions of fraud and duress can be 
viewed not only as being based on informational asymmetry concern but also on externality concern since the 
party uses them to extract a bigger portion of the contractual surplus, externalising the enforcement costs of this 
redistribution to society. The doctrine of unconscionability tends to be invoked in the context of situational 
monopolies or information deficit. Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 609-
610; Cooter and Ulen 230-231. 
60 Russel Korobkin, ‘The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules’ (1998) 83 Cornell Law Review 608.60 It 
has recently been argued that Korobkin's endowment effect is not relevant with regard to commercial 
transactions in which sophisticated, experienced business parties exchange goods for money, both specifically 
held for the purpose of trade. Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 596-597, 
footnote 113. 
61 Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or the 
Economics of Boilerplate)’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 713. 
62 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 87-88. 
63 Colin Camerer and others, ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioural Economics and the Case for 
Asymmetric Paternalism’ (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1211.  
64 Russel Korobkin and Thomas Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioural Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1051. 
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surplus. Since the offeree will not invest in understanding the provision, there is no point in 
the offeror stipulating a term that is more favourable to the offeree; in any case, the latter will 
not appreciate such benevolence.65 In comparison with consumers, however, firms are more 
able to allocate resources in order to alleviate cognitive limitations and to ensure a detailed 
review of contracts. Also, they are not pure contract-takers but can bargain to achieve more 
favourable contractual terms. In this sense, firms are not as inadequate as individuals in 
protecting their interests. For this reason, a rigorous use of mandatory rules to shield them 
against the challenges of business cooperation may incentivise them to under-invest in their 
contractual arrangements instead of leading to efficient contracting.66 That is why, the softer 
method of regulation supplied by defaults may be more appropriate in business-to-business 
relationships.  
In any case, mandatory rules should be used carefully. Restricting party autonomy as well as 
the variety of offers on the market, they limit the means of the parties to maximise contractual 
surplus. They also imply a trade-off between the correction of the market failure and the costs 
associated with the regulatory measure. Thus, mandatory rules should be brought into play 
only in case of positive cost/benefit balance and when the problem in the market mechanism 
cannot be adequately resolved by default rules.67 
Setting a good default depends on the purposes for which the default is provided: to save on 
parties' cumulative transaction costs, in which case the default should be designed according 
to what the majority of parties wants,68 or to pursue regulatory goals such as inducing 
information revelation, in which case the default should be devised as a penalty default. But 
whatever the rationale of the particular default, it must be drafted either as a standard or as a 
rule.69 The choice between the two implies certain trade-offs which are relevant for the level 
of generality with which defaults should be formulated. 
                                                 
65 Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contracts’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 
211; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 42-45. 
66 Brousseau 49-50.  
67 Filomena Chirico, ‘The Function of European Contract Law - An Economic Analysis’ in Filomena Chirico 
and Pierre Larouche (eds), Economic analysis of the DCFR: the Work of the Economic Impact Group within 
CoPECL (München: Sellier European Law Publishers 2010) 24. 
68 On the "transaction-cost-reducing approach", advocating majoritarian defaults, see Charles Goetz and Robert 
Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 69 Virginia Law Review 
967, 971; Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 596-597. 
69 The content of a rule is specified in advance. In contrast, the content of a standard is specified only ex post. 
Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 557. For example, 
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Because of their precision, default rules rarely fit various sets of contracting parties. The cost 
of creating ex ante efficient rules for all party types, however, would prove so large that it 
would deplete the primary cost justification for setting defaults in the first place. With party 
heterogeneity, broad default standards are easier to design since they would apply to many 
contexts and the drafting cost would likely not exceed the social gain.70 Multi-factored 
standards are also apt to accurately reflect the underlying legal principle. Bright-line rules, on 
the other hand, may prove to be under- or over-inclusive: not capturing conduct that is in 
compliance with the underlying rationale or inviting strategic behaviour which formally 
satisfies the rule's requirements.71 Yet, despite their advantages with regard to ex ante cost and 
accurateness, standards are difficult to administer ex post. Unlike rules, they do not give clear 
guidance to parties and courts, which makes them costly to interpret and apply. As the 
policing of opportunism becomes harder, standards encourage strategic behaviour by the 
parties for whom the market changes unfavourably and increase the likelihood of judicial 
error due to the complicated factual inquiry and the large discretion delegated to the court. 
Thus, the correct ex ante expression of the underlying principle may be offset by the 
frequency of ex post process errors, the risk of which is especially high when the correct 
application of the standard depends on facts that are not observable or verifiable to a court.72 
In short, the development of new market-based regulatory techniques, as well as the evolution 
of economic and regulatory theories, led to the inference that contract law has not only a 
facilitative but also a regulatory function. Inducing incentive effects on market actors, the role 
of contract law goes beyond creating a market and stretches to the direction of the latter, i.e. 
to correcting its failures. Acting as tools by which contract law operates as a regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
what is "reasonable" in the particular circumstances is decided by court after the controversy has already arisen. 
An example for a rule would be a default term requiring a contract breacher to pay damages equal to the 
difference between the contract and market prices. See UCC § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or 
Repudiation. 
70 Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 598-601. 
71 Robert Scott and Jody Kraus, Contract Law and Theory (Fourth edn, Matthew Bender & Co 2007) 259-260, 
383-384, 691. 
72 Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 601-608; Scott and Kraus, Contract 
Law and Theory 383-384. The difficulty to create efficient default rules and the problems related to default 
standards have driven Schwartz and Scott to proclaim the legal default project unsuccessful. As commercial 
parties contract around existing default standards, transaction costs increase instead of the other way around. For 
this reason, Schwartz and Scott argue that the state should sharply decrease the supply of defaults in order to 
force parties to draft more complete contracts. Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law’ 594-609. It must be pointed out, however, that their argument concerns only commercial parties and is 
based on evidence originating solely in the US. In the case of diversity of contracting parties, Ayres and Gertner, 
on the other hand, argue in favour of penalty defaults. Ayres and Gertner 116-117.  
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instrument, both mandatory and default rules exhibit particular weaknesses, constituting 
limitations to contract law's regulatory capacity. In this respect, the received wisdom makes a 
distinction between rules and standards as well as between consumer and business 
transactions. Still, considering that in the last century the world has continuously swung 
between heavy market regulation and intense liberalisation, it is important that we improve 
our comprehension of the available less interventionist techniques to steer the market and of 
the regulatory tools provided by contract law itself. This need becomes imperative with regard 
to the reinforced regulatory function of European contract law and the recent ambitions of the 
Commission to push the Common European Sales Law through the bureaucratic and political 
labyrinths of the European Union. 
3. The regulatory function of European contract law 
While the regulatory function of contract law at the national level is still contested, there is a 
growing consensus among scholars about the regulatory function of European contract law 
(ECL).73 The concept of ECL first emerged at the end of the 20th century74 and since then the 
body of rules encompassed by it has been evolving particularly fast. Today ECL is defined as 
including the European (primary and secondary) legislation and case-law, private 
international law and the common legal traditions of Member States concerning contract law 
matters.75 The substantive scope of ECL is not identical to that of national contract laws. ECL 
embraces business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions, but not transactions 
between parties who both act in non-professional capacity. On the other hand, it comprises 
consumer protection, which in some Member States stays out of the ambit of contract law, as 
well as public interest business regulation that affects contract formation and content (e.g. 
block-exemption regulations, rules in public procurement, intellectual property).76 
That the relationship between ECL and regulation is different than in national legal systems is 
indicated by the very organisation of ECL. While in national regimes contract, together with 
                                                 
73 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir-Watt (eds), The Regulatory Function of European Private Law 
(Cheltenham/Nothampton: Edward Elgar 2009). 
74 Conor Quigley, European Community Contract Law (First edn, London: Kluwer Law International 1997); 
Stefan Grundmann, Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht - das Europäische Recht der Unternehmensgeschäfte 
(nebst Texten and Materialen zur Rechtsangleichung) (First edn, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1999). 
75 Cafaggi and Muir-Watt, Making European Private Law: Governance Design 290. 
76 Stefan Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ (2001) 9 European Review of Private Law 505, 
511-512. 
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tort and property, constitutes a core field of private law, European private law is designed 
according to policy areas: consumer protection, banking, telecommunication, etc. This is 
coupled with the purposive character of the rules of ECL, in which harmonisation legislation 
is adopted with the goal to improve the functioning of the internal market,77 to build consumer 
confidence.78 Establishing the internal market, the four freedoms expanded private autonomy 
and market freedom across borders. But when their negative integration effect proved to be 
inadequate, the focus shifted to secondary law, positive integration measures.79 The European 
regulations and directives all bear the characteristics of the regulatory technique: they are 
particularistic (applying only to particular sectors or only to consumer transactions) and goal-
oriented (consistently emphasising the need to reduce barriers to cross-border trade).80 The 
objective set out by harmonisation measures can be readily translated into a goal to remedy 
market failures.81 In business-to-business transactions European rules fight restrictions of 
competition (e.g. in the anti-trust field, in public procurement and legal protection of 
computer programmes).82 Many sector and non-sector specific directives, on the other hand, 
aspire to correct information asymmetries in business-to-consumer contracts.83 The policy 
                                                 
77 See e.g. Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects 
of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, Official Journal L 171/12 of 07.07.1999 (hereafter 
"Consumer Sales Directive"); Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 
2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), Official Journal L 
149/22 of 11.06.2005. 
78 Ibid. See e.g. also Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 
Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market, COM(2006) 841 final, Brussels, 10.01.2007 (2.6.2).  
79 Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’, 510, 517-518.  
80 See in this sense Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European 
Legislation: In Search of the Philosopher's Stone’ 217. 
81 Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ 515, 518-521; Stefan Grundmann, ‘European Contract 
Law(s) of What Colour’ [2005] European Review of Contract Law 184, 193-194. Hans Micklitz also 
understands ECL as a tool by which the Commission strives to shape the market order rather than implement 
distributive concerns, see Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘The Concept of Competitive Contract Law’ (2005) 23 Penn State 
International Law Review 549. 
82 See e.g. Commission Regulation 461/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor 
vehicle sector, Official Journal L 129/52 of 28.05.2010  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts, Official Journal L134/114 of 30.04.2004 Directive 2009/24/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, 
Official Journal L 111/16 of 05.05.2009. 
83  See e.g. Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package 
tours, Official Journal L 158/59 of 23.06.1990 (hereafter "Package Travel Directive"); Council Directive 
85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business 
premises, Official Journal L 372/31 of 31.12.1985 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, Official Journal L 
144/19 of 04.06.1997; Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
 20 
design and the aim-rooted, instrumental nature of the ECL legislation allow us to infer its far 
more intense regulatory function than that of national contract law.84   
In the name of completing the internal market, the Commission identifies the cases of market 
failure and sets about remedying them through harmonisation. Carried through the Member 
States' legal orders, these ECL measures restrict party autonomy and in practice re-regulate 
the national contract regimes.85 Ironically, the preambles of consumer directives often 
explicitly state that they by no means impinge on domestic contract rules.86 Yet, they often 
regulate topics covered by classic contract law such as mistake, fraud, duress, duties to 
inform, culpa in contrahendo,87 non-conformity of goods sold,88 etc.89 The fact that the 
ambiguous constitutional foundations of the European Union's competence in the field of 
contract law90 make the Commission put forward the legislative measures as technical and 
regulatory cannot hide their interference with areas habitually regulated by national contract 
regimes. In addition, the lack of public/administrative competence on the European level 
promoted the adoption of regulatory mechanisms based on private law tools, particularly 
contract. Thus, an abounding body of contract law was developed in regulated markets to 
ensure more efficient provision of public goods and services.91 ECL has also led to the 
extraction of contracts in financial markets from national general contract law.92 What is 
                                                                                                                                                        
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, Official 
Journal L 145/1 of 30.4.2004 (hereafter "MiFid Directive").  
84 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The Making of European Private Law: Regulation and Governance 
Design’ EUROGOV Working paper, 20 March 2007 <http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/ep13.pdf> accessed 
17.09.2012. 
85 Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ 514, 516. 
86 See e.g. Consumer Sales Directive; Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
87 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive; Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts, Official Journal L 95/29 of 21.04.1993 (hereafter "Unfair Terms Directive"). 
88 Consumer Sales Directive. 
89 See in this sense Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European 
Legislation: In Search of the Philosopher's Stone’ 215. 
90 Stephen Weatherhill, ‘Reflections on the EC's Competence to develop a "European Contract Law"’ (2005) 13 
European Review of Private Law 405; Stephen Weatherhill, ‘European Private Law and the Constitutional 
Dimension’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (First edn, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2006) 79-106. 
91 See e.g. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity, Official Journal L 176/37 of 15.07.2003 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, Official Journal L 176/57 of 15.07.2003. 
92 See MiFid Directive; Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating 
conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive, Official Journal L 241/26 of 
02.09.2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards record-keeping obligations for investment 
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more, besides the overt harmonisation through secondary legislation, an indirect and not so 
evident harmonising process takes place through spill-overs from a harmonised field of 
national law to another field that is not affected by the obligation of transposition but is still 
reorganised for the sake of coherence.93 A salient example is the copying of the order of 
remedies as established in the Consumer Sales Directive in German law for all sales contracts 
and even for general contract law.94 In other words, although on their face unharmonised 
areas of contract law are not subject to scrutiny under the fundamental freedoms, in regulating 
market failure, ECL encroaches on facilitative law allegedly left entirely to domestic contract 
regimes. 
To be sure, despite being regulatory in character, ECL still has market freedom as its starting 
point.95 It vests private parties with much power to organise their relationships and sets the 
limits to national regulation with respect to cross-border transactions. It is also increasingly 
moving toward issues of contract formation, standards of performance and breach of contract, 
i.e. issues traditionally dealt with by national contract default rules in order to enable 
contracting.96 Still, it has been claimed that it reshapes the concept of private autonomy as it 
appears in the different Member States and reinforces the trend toward materialisation of 
contract freedom. A hypothesis viewing European Private Law (including ECL) as an 
emerging "self-sufficient private legal order, enshrining a new order of values" and oriented 
towards a "gradual substitution of national private legal orders", has come into being.97 This 
hypothesis fits nicely with the developments in private law on the European level: the calls of 
the European Parliament to draft a European Code of private law,98 the drafting of a Common 
                                                                                                                                                        
firms, transaction reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and defined 
terms for the purposes of that Directive, Official Journal L 241/1 of 02.09.2006. 
93 For more on this issue, see Walter Van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer at the European Level’ in 
Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (First edn, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2006).  
94 On this issue, see Stefan Grundmann, ‘Regulating Breach of Contract - the Right to Reject Performance by the 
Party in Breach’ (2007) 3 European Review of Contract Law 121. 
95 Grundmann, ‘European Contract Law(s) of What Colour’ 194-196. 
96 Consumer Sales Directive; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'), Official Journal L 178/1 of 17.07.2000 . 
97 Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’ European Regulatory Private Law Project; 
http://blogseuieu/erc-erpl/ accessed 18.09.2012. 
98 Parliament Resolution of 26 May 1989, Official Journal C 158/400 of 26.06.1989; Parliament Resolution of 6 
May 1994, Official Journal C 205/518 of 25.07.1994. 
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Frame of Reference and revision of the acquis communautaire,99 the proposal for a regulation 
on an optional Common European Sales Law (CESL).100  
For the first time on the European level, the proposed regulation on CESL contained a full-
blown regime of a particular contract type integrating facilitative defaults and regulatory 
concerns. The very title of the 2011 Communication of the Commission stated the intention 
that CESL facilitated cross-border transactions in the single market.101 This time the 
Commission did not focus its efforts on specific information and competitive weaknesses of 
the market, nor did it limit itself to a particular sector or to business-to-consumer 
transactions.102 Pointing out that the various differences between national legal systems 
increased information and negotiation costs for businesses and consumers, discouraged them 
from entering into cross-border transactions, and reduced the range of products available to 
consumers, the Commission stated that legal diversity in the many unharmonised areas of 
contract law constituted a barrier that hindered cross-border trade. In other words, the concept 
of market failure was expanded to reach also conventional market freedom issues, and the 
solution proposed was an optional "single set of uniform and comprehensive contract law 
rules" which would stand as an alternative to domestic contract regimes.103  
For the first time CESL also contained a fully developed system of contractual remedies. 
Until the CESL proposal, remedies were not at the centre of European legislation. Substantive 
                                                 
99 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European contract law 
COM(2001) 398 final, Official Journal C 255/1 of 13.09.2001; Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council - A more coherent European contract law - An action plan, COM(2003) 68 
final, Official Journal C 63/1 of 15.03.2003 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council - European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, COM(2004) 651 final, 
Not published in the Official Journal; Commission Report of 23 September 2005: First Annual Progress Report 
on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review, COM(2005) 456 final, Not published in the Official Journal 
Commission Report of 25 July 2007: Second Progress Report on the Common Frame of Reference [COM(2007) 
447 final - Not published in the Official Journal], all available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l33158_
en.htm. 
100 Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0052_en.htm; Opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper from the Commission on policy options for progress 
towards a European contract law for consumers and businesses COM(2010) 348 final, Official Journal C 84/1 of 
17.03.2011; European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on policy options for progress towards a European 
Contract Law for consumers and businesses (2011/2013(INI)), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0262; 
Communication for Common European Sales Law; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council for a Common European Sales Law, COM(2011) 636 final, Brussels, 11.10.2011, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF. 
101 Communication for Common European Sales Law. 
102 Note that even the Consumer Sales Directive was interpreted as containing mainly information rules. 
103 Communication for Common European Sales Law 2, 7. 
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rules in this respect have been limited mainly to withdrawal and cancellation rights. The 
Consumer Sales Directive imports replacement and repair rights as well as price reduction but 
only to the extent that this would improve the position of consumers on the Single Market. 
With regard to liability between sellers in the value chain, it refers to remedies under national 
law.104 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive does not comprise a system of remedies at 
all, again relying on the one(s) provided on the national level. Damages have been squarely 
excluded from the ambit of harmonisation measures with the exception of incidental mentions 
that Member States shall ensure compensation.105 Due to the instrumental character of the 
rules, until the proposed regulation on CESL no general approach to remedies had been 
developed in ECL.  
Although currently withdrawn, the proposed optional CESL put on the table the issue of 
introducing an entire, horizontal scheme of remedies on the European level. Supposedly such 
a remedial scheme should reflect the fact that it makes inroads in an area traditionally 
reserved for national contract acts and at the same time aims at solving European market 
deficiencies. In the broader debate on making ECL, it has already been suggested that the 
differences between the regulatory and the classical private law technique can be overcome by 
generalisation of acquis rules.106 That proposition, however, has met with criticism on the 
ground that an automatic translation of rules found in consumer and sectoral measures may 
turn exceptional solutions into general ones.107 The discussion points at the difficulty of 
designing rules that incorporate both the facilitative and the regulatory function of contract 
law. This challenge loomed large with respect to the remedial rules of the CESL and has not 
receded despite the announced scaling down of the project. 
The process of construction of ECL is under way and so is the process of its 
reconceptualisation. The instrumental nature of the rules adopted to achieve certain goals 
                                                 
104 See Art. 3 and 4 of the Consumer Sales Directive. Note also that the directive omits any details about the 
measurement of the price reduction remedy leaving these to the national laws of the Member States. 
105 See Art. 5 (1) and (2) of the Package Travel Directive: "Member States shall take the necessary steps to 
ensure that the organizer and/or retailer party to the contract is liable to the consumer for the proper performance 
of the obligations arising from the contract…" "With regard to the damage resulting for the consumer from the 
failure to perform or the improper performance of the contract, Member States shall take the necessary steps to 
ensure that the organizer and/or retailer is/are liable unless…" 
106 Grundmann suggested the rules in the Consumer Sales Directive and the Electronic Commerce Directive can 
be generalised in the process of development of ECL. See Grundmann, ‘European Contract Law(s) of What 
Colour’ 201-204. 
107 Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: In Search 
of the Philosopher's Stone’ 220-221. 
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together with their organisation around policy fields rather than traditional private law areas 
determine the growing academic consensus about the intense regulatory function of ECL. A 
new complementarity between contract law and regulation, differing according to the 
regulated activity, has emerged on the European level. Under the overarching goal of reducing 
barriers to cross-border trade, the regulatory strategies on the European level have departed 
from the conventional demarcation between enabling and mandatory rules and have been 
progressively approaching matters traditionally covered by facilitative contract law on the 
national level. The expansive interpretation of the concept of market failure has led the 
Commission to propose an optional horizontal measure like the CESL dealing not only with 
issues of market deficiency but also of market freedom. This put forward the challenge of 
integrating default rules with regulatory objectives. 
B. Project in focus 
National and European contract law are often characterised as fundamentally different: the 
former – based on private autonomy and freedom of contract, the latter – grounded in 
remedying the failures of the internal market. While I do think that there are major differences 
between ECL and national contract laws, I also consider this view to overstate the 
dissimilarities between the functions of contract law on the domestic and the supranational 
level. Another stance accepts the mentioned interpretation of ECL but sees national private 
laws as having moved towards distributive justice.108 My hypothesis is that in correspondence 
to the crisis of the regulatory state, contract law on the national level has been progressively 
reoriented to perform efficiency-driven regulatory functions.109 A historical analysis will 
search to identify whether such a change in function has ensued. Where each jurisdiction 
finds different equilibrium between the facilitative and the regulatory function of contract law, 
the research, as a matter of description, will explore, through the role of damages and specific 
performance, the balance struck between the two functions in each of the analysed legal 
systems. As a normative claim, I advocate the use of contractual remedies as a regulatory 
                                                 
108 Alessandro Somma, Temi e problemi di diritto comparato, vol IV: Diritto comunitario vs. diritto comune 
europeo (First edn, Turin: Giappichelli 2003) Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract 
Law from European Legislation: In Search of the Philosopher's Stone’. 
109 For such a hypothesis, see also Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law: Governance 
Design’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir-Watt (eds), Making European Private Law: Governance Design 
(First edn, Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar 2008) 295. 
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response to the failures of the European market and draw guidelines for a remedial scheme 
employing both contract law functions to promote a competitive market. 
The analysis starts from the different facilitative and regulatory effects damages and specific 
performance can have on the contractual relationship and then tests the hypothesis by 
analysing case-law of the chosen jurisdictions. Among the market failures, the focus is on 
asymmetry of information. The examination is carried out along the distinction between 
business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions, asking the question of whether in 
the national court practice the two remedies can be rationalised not only as facilitative but 
also as regulatory devices. Another important issue to be investigated is how contract law 
performs its functions through standards,110 considering their lack of specificity as well as the 
judges' lack of specialised expertise and lack of information to choose between alternative 
legal standards.111 Exploring the case-law on damages and specific performance, the project 
aims at identifying the driving forces behind intra-jurisdictional changes and inter-
jurisdictional differences of remedial allocation. It also seeks to discern principles that could 
be used and problems that could be avoided in devising the structure of remedies in ECL. The 
scope of the project will be further elaborated by identifying the types of contract (Section 
B.1) as well as the jurisdictions that will be scrutinised (Section B.2).  
1. Types of Contract Compared 
The project brings under the spotlight damages and specific performance in sales of goods 
and construction contracts. The types of contract compared are not chosen at random. 
The sale transaction has great importance both legally and commercially. Starting from 
Roman times many founding issues of contract law, including liability for defects, have been 
modeledmodelled with reference to the contract for sale. In both civil law and common law 
systems it has served as the basis for the development of remedies for defective performance 
in contracts for work and labour of which construction contracts are a typical 
                                                 
110 See supra Section A.2. Default rules and mandatory rules of this Chapter. 
111 Judges do not have the capacity to undertake the profound inquiry necessary to evaluate the functioning of the 
market. Moreover, they are presented with a highly distorted picture of its operation since they can observe how 
it works and responds to the legal regime in force only through the legal disputes initiated before them. Also, the 
self-referential feature of the legal reasoning process constrains them whenever, as a result of non-compliance or 
change in the economic and social conditions, adjustments are needed. See in this sense Collins, Regulating 
Contracts 65-66, 82-85. 
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representative.112 The commonness of the contract for sale of goods and its significance in 
economic terms has led to considerably detailed regulation and abundant court practice on the 
national level as well as to early international efforts toward harmonisation. The most recent 
example of these efforts is the already mentioned Commission's Proposal for CESL.  
The other type of contract under comparison, the construction contract, is also intentionally 
selected. Most legal systems had encountered difficulties in distinguishing contracts for sale 
of goods from contracts for work and labour where the object to be delivered was to be 
produced by the promisor himself. And as already mentioned, the two types of contract bear a 
close relationship with regard to defects liability. Yet, there are also important differences 
between them. While in lawyers' minds, the sales contract usually describes a one-shot 
exchange that is settled more or less immediately, the construction contract habitually implies 
continuous obligations. The prolonged length of the transaction entails different duties related 
to the provision of information and cooperation as well as the high risk of price increase and 
difficulties to determine in advance the extent of the work and the quantities of materials 
necessary for its execution. In addition, the contract for sale of goods and the construction 
contract differ with regard to the time when the remuneration of the contractor is due and the 
risk allocation in case of destruction or deterioration of the work. Thus, it can be expected that 
in both common law and civil law systems these substantial dissimilarities between the two 
types of contract have also been reflected in the remedies of damages and specific 
performance. 
Construction contracts also belong to a broad class of contracts, the service contracts, that has 
recently begun to emerge as antithetical to sales contracts. At this point a note on terminology 
needs to be made. In this work the term "construction contract" is used with its classical 
meaning as a contract under which one of the parties, the constructor, undertakes to construct 
or repair or in any other way improve a building or other immovable. Construction contracts 
fall into a generic category of contracts, generally referred to, on the international level, as 
                                                 
112 Although originating in sales law, the remedies of contract cancellation and price reduction have been 
transferred to contracts for work and labour in those legal systems which, like the Bulgarian one, have been 
strongly influenced by Roman law. The same is valid for rules relating to the seller's warranty against defects of 
quality in common law systems. See in this sense Werner Lorenz, ‘Chapter 8 Contracts for Work on Goods and 
Building Contracts’ in Konrad Zweigert (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Specific 
Contracts, vol VIII (First edn, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, and Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alpen a/d Rijn 
1980) 56-57. 
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"contracts for work and labour",113 a term that serves to unify the diverse and sometimes 
inconsistent terminology used in the national legal systems.114 In EU law, however, due to the 
vocabulary developed in relation to the four freedoms, contracts for work and labour were 
assimilated by the concept of service contracts. Consequently, in this thesis they are also 
termed "contracts for services". Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that at present service 
contracts are regulated on the European level by a number of scattered provisions that do not 
amount to comprehensive harmonisation but cover only specific questions.115 As a result, the 
concept remains fairly blurry. Since no positive definition is set out, the notion of services is 
rather defined by exclusion: it entails economic operations that do not constitute sale of goods 
or employment.116 Thus, the category of service contracts in EU law appears particularly 
broad, often broader than the category of contract for services under national law. While a 
similar trend toward generalisation can be observed in Anglo-American law,117 in Bulgaria 
contracts for work and labour, encompassing the construction contract, are distinguished from 
contracts for services under which the contractor is not obliged to achieve a certain result but 
merely to perform a particular job.118 From the perspective of comparative analysis, such 
                                                 
113 Ibid; Axel Metzger, ‘Contract for Work and Labour’ in Basedow Jürgen and others (eds), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of European Private Law, vol I (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 383-385. 
114 Under Bulgarian law the construction contract is a type of manufacture contract (договор за изработка). In 
English law a construction contract is classified as a "contract for work and labour" (Atkinson v. Bell (1828) 8 B 
& Cr 277, 108 ER 1046) or "contract for work, labour and materials"(Clark v. Bulmer (1843) 11 M & W 243, 
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contract" for goods and services (Langhals v. Holt Roofing Co. 47 Ohio App 3d 114, 547 NE2d 401 (6th Dist 
Lucas County 1988)). 
115 See Art. 56, 57 (ex Art. 49, 50 TEC) of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 
115/70 of 09.05.2008; Art. 5(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
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2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market, Official Journal L 376/36 of 27.12.2006; Book IV, Part C "Services" of Christian von Bar and others 
(eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law; Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) Outline Edition (First edn, Munich: Sellier 2009), (hereafter "DCFR" or "the Draft"). 
116 See in more detail Florian Möslein, ‘Service Contracts’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), The Max Planck 
Encycopedia of European Private Law, vol II (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 1548-1551. 
117 See UK ST 1982 c. 29 The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 in force in England; Richard A. Lord, 
‘Chapter 26 The Statute of Frauds: Contracts for the Sale of Goods V. Exceptions and Exclusions from the 
Statute’ in 9 Williston on Contracts § 26:20 Contracts for Services (Fourth edn, Thomson Reuters 2011). 
118 Decision №1560 of 13.02.2007, adm. c. №9860/2006, VI adm. d. of the Supreme Administrative Court; 
Decision №1332 of 06.02.2006, adm. c. №11484/2005, VI adm. d. of the Supreme Administrative Court; 
Decision №756 of 06.04.2010, adm. c. №4232/2009 of Administrative Court – Sofia. The usual examples given 
are the contract for medical services and the contract for legal services whereby the doctor, respectively the 
lawyer, receive remuneration no matter whether the patient is cured or the court dispute has a favourable 
outcome. See in the same sense Polya Goleva, Law of Obligations (Sofia: Feneya 2008) 250-251. Occasionally 
Bulgarian courts use the terms "contract for work and labour" and "contract for services" interchangeably 
(Decision №4862 of 09.05.2006, adm. c. №1000/2006, VI adm. d. of the Supreme Administrative Court; 
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conceptual distinctions are by no means unimportant; yet, this is not the proper time to go into 
the specifics. What is relevant for the purposes of the research at this stage is that the choice 
of the construction contract as a subject of investigation is also determined by its affiliation 
with a category of contracts that is perceived as opposing the contracts for sale. 
Such opposition also has economic dimensions since services appear to have surpassed goods 
in their overall proportion of economic activity. According to the most recent data provided 
by the European Commission, the service sector, including construction, "is contributing more 
to economic growth and job creation worldwide than any other sector."119 Within the EU 
alone the services sector accounts for three-quarters of the GDP and for over three-quarters of 
the jobs.120 From this point of view the all-inclusive, or almost all-inclusive, concept of 
services contracts that has emerged on the European level seems to be in line with a more 
general tendency in the economic development of the Western world. This tendency implies a 
transformation of the very tissue of capitalist economies which are woven less and less of 
one-time purchases of property and more and more of long-term leasing of an increasing 
number of services.121 This begs a deeper research of service contracts and their remedial 
devices. 
I must admit some other problems of the day have also directed my attention to construction 
contracts (as a sub-type of contracts for services). The current financial debt crisis was 
preceded by a boom in real estate development and construction. A great deal of the economic 
growth in young developing market economies (such as my home country Bulgaria) was 
generated not by the financial but by the construction sector, which naturally performed its 
activity on the basis of construction agreements executed on a daily basis. The subsequent 
credit crunch and decline in real estate prices forced the construction industry to face the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Decision №10530 of 28.1.2005, adm. c. №8807/2004, I adm. d. of the Supreme Administrative Court) or refer to 
a broader notion of services contract (Decision of 07.12.2010, c. c. №3317/2010 of Regional Court – Plovdiv) 
thus blurring the professed distinction. Still, with regard to construction contracts, it is universally accepted in 
Bulgarian law that they are contracts for work and labour and no particular issues with regard to their 
delimitation from contracts for services arise. On the other hand, the contract for services must not be confused 
with the employment contract since the service provider is not employed in the enterprise of the counterparty and 
cannot be imposed with a disciplinary sanction. See Decision №1332 of 06.02.2006, c. c. №11484/2005, VI 
adm.d. of the Supreme Administrative Court. The same distinction applies in English law between contracts for 
the supply of services and contracts of service. See Part II Section 12(2) of The Supply of Goods and Services 
Act 1982. 
119 See the European Commission's website http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/economic-
sectors/services/, (Last updated on 01.08.2007. Last accessed on 01.08.2012)   
120 Ibid. 
121 Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism, Where All of Life is a Paid-for 
Experience (First edn, New York: J. P. Tarcher/Putnam 2000). 
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challenge of cutting transaction costs and increasing efficiency. In this respect it will be 
interesting to see whether the current state of contract law and the prescribed contractual 
remedies in different jurisdictions adequately respond to these problems encountered by 
business.  
In short, the contract for sale of goods and the construction contract were selected for 
comparison because historically the former has influenced the shaping of the latter's remedial 
scheme but nevertheless the two types of contract manifest a sufficient number of differences 
that should be reflected in the remedial allocation. In addition, the economic significance of 
the contracts also played a role. 
2. Jurisdictions under Comparison 
Subject to comparison will be the law of the United States, England and Bulgaria. It is evident 
from the outset that the jurisdictions under comparison are not chosen along the lines of the 
legal family doctrine. It is thus important to point out the considerations which played a role 
when selecting them.122 
                                                 
122 In recent years the doctrine of legal families has attracted a great deal of criticism especially after the wooden 
way in which it was used in the Legal Origins strand of the New Comparative Economics School. See Rafael La 
Porta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1131; Rafael La Porta 
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others, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’ (2004) 112 Journal of Political Economy 445. The doctrine was inspired 
by the taxonomic project in biological sciences but comparative scholars have achieved little agreement on the 
criteria of classification. Perhaps the most well-known set of distinctive factors, defining the style of legal 
families, are the ones identified by Zweigert and Kötz: historical background and development, the predominant 
and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, distinctive institutions, legal sources and the way they are 
handled and ideology. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to comparative law (Third rev. edn, 
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made proves that separation of legal systems into legal families is a static exercise which cannot capture the 
development and interaction of legal systems and which is extremely prone to self-centred attitudes. The 
taxonomic difficulties are perfectly exemplified by the Bulgarian legal system, which as it will be seen below, 
cannot be allocated in its entirety to the Romanic or to the Germanic legal family. The existence of mixed legal 
systems also constitutes a challenge to the legal family doctrine. For this reason, one of the most prominent 
scholars, working on the classification project, pointed out that legal families are solely "didactic devices" which 
are meant to enable a better understanding of beginners but which an experienced comparatist may either not 
use, or use with great caution. René David and John Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Third 
edn, London: Stevens 1985). From this perspective it might be better to speak of legal traditions as intertwining 
flows of normative information that shape dynamic, multi-layered legal systems remaining far from ideal types. 
H. Patrick Glenn, ‘A Concept of Legal Tradition’ (2008) 34 Queen's Law Journal 427; H. Patrick Glenn, 
‘Chapter 12 Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2006). A note on terminology might be useful at this point. Besides "legal family" and "legal tradition", the 
concept of "legal culture" has also recently achieved much popularity. However, as a term, it is quite fuzzy and 
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Since the two main legal traditions of the Western world, common law and civil law, exhibit 
remarkably different attitudes toward remedies, both of them need to be represented in the 
comparative exercise. The main focus on damages, determined by the number of induced 
incentives affecting market players'’ behaviour, tilted the choice in favour of common law 
countries which employ damages as their primary remedy. Yet, despite the fact the origin of 
US law can be traced to the English legal system, they have subsequently taken distinct 
historical paths, developing "deep-level structural differences".123 In this sense, divergence in 
their approach toward contractual remedies can also be expected. On the other hand, it has 
been suggested that European and US legal culture can be distinguished in terms of values, 
with Europe having a less instrumental view of law, a more strongly autonomous private law, 
stronger protection for the weaker party in contract law, and a stronger accent on human 
dignity and privacy.124 From this perspective, a juxtaposition between two common law 
systems, one American (the US) and one European (England), and a civil law system 
(Bulgaria) may reinforce the idea that when scholars generalise distinguishing between more 
and less efficient legal systems, it is more appropriate to differentiate between the US and 
Europe, rather than between the common law and the civil law tradition.  
The choice of Bulgaria as a civil jurisdiction under comparison is determined not only by the 
fact that this is the legal system I know best and the absence of a language barrier permits me 
to consult the primary sources.125 In the process of its evolution, modern Bulgarian contract 
                                                                                                                                                        
employed in relation to different issues. Sometimes the three mentioned concepts are even used interchangeably 
creating some confusion in the literature. Most often "legal culture" denotes the aggregate of values, ideas, 
attitudes, practices, etc. which underlies a society's outlook toward its law. Ralf Michaels, ‘Legal Culture’ in 
Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, vol II (First edn, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). This is the meaning with which the notion of legal culture will also be 
used in this thesis. 
123 Stefan Vogenauer, ‘Common Law’ in Basedow Jürgen and others (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
European Private Law vol I (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). In Vogenauer's opinion the 
pronounced disparities between US and English law make it particularly misleading to speak about 'Anglo-
American law'. After comparing the case law, the legislative techniques, the role of the judge and advocate and 
the legal training, Atiyah and Summers also reached the conclusion that the differences in legal reasoning 
between US and English law are so great that the English legal system with its much more formal style is closer 
to the continental civil law systems than to that of the US. Patrick Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and 
Substance in Anglo-American Law - A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal 
Institutions (First edn, Oxford: Clanderon Press; New York: Oxford University Press 1987).   
124 Michaels 1061. 
125 Bulgaria is the only Eastern European country which does not have a civil code. The attempts of drafting one 
date back to the 1930s but for various reasons the idea has never been carried out to a successful end. During the 
1950s the codification work came to a halt because it had to wait for the socialist reorganisation of the economy 
to be finalised. It was feared that a code would be difficult to adapt to the fast changing economic relations and 
would become an obstacle to economic development. As this was seen as a transition period, separate statutory 
acts codifying the law of property, obligations and contracts, family law and the law of succession were adopted. 
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law has become the intersection point of heterogeneous legal traditions which makes it a 
particularly intriguing subject for research. Most of the provisions of the former 1892 Act on 
Obligations and Contracts126 ("1892 Contracts Act") constituted a literal translation of the 
1865 Italian Codice Civile, the latter itself inspired by the French Code Napoléon.127 The 
                                                                                                                                                        
It is also not without significance that at the time the role of the Parliament as the supreme legislative organ and 
of the statute as the primary regulatory act was to a great extent degraded. Due to the experimentation with new 
economic mechanisms the government preferred fast and flexible legislation which was largely adopted by the 
Council of Ministers in the form of acts which did not have the rank of statutes and many of which were not 
even promulgated in the State Gazette. In addition, the Bulgarian codification was postponed so that it conforms 
to the new civil code, being prepared in the USSR, which was supposed to become a model for the civil 
codifications in all socialist countries. There was resurgence of the work on a civil code in the 1960s but no 
entire draft was produced. Priority was given to preparation of the new 1971 Constitution with which the civil 
code subsequently had to comply. The construction of the new economic system also continued to be under way. 
A draft of a civil code, preceded by a broad academic discussion, was finally brought into being in 1978 by a 
group of prominent Bulgarian civilists organised by the Ministry of Justice. However, the draft was not 
introduced in the Parliament since the adoption of an Economic Code (ultimately not prepared) was considered 
to be more important for the country. Although renowned Bulgarian scholars continued to argue in favour of a 
civil code, no concrete steps were taken until 1999 when the Ministry of Justice put forward for discussion a new 
(and for now the last) draft of a civil code. Yet, the latter had been put together very hastily and was not 
welcomed by the academic circles due to its bad structure and editing as well as its lagging behind the civil 
theory and legislation in the developed western jurisdictions. A civil code is still perceived as a necessity among 
many Bulgarian legal scholars; yet, currently no organised efforts are being made in this direction. The previous 
failures of the codification work, the doubtful quality of a great deal of the legislation adopted after the 
democratic changes in 1989, the attitude among the new generation of Bulgarian legal scholars, who often feel 
the time of civil codifications has passed, and among the legal practitioners, for whom the adoption of such a 
fundamental legal act will create a lot of costs, have shaped a critical mind-set towards the idea. For more on the 
historical development and the current discussion on a civil code in Bulgaria, see Vladimir Petrov, ‘Development 
of the Idea on Civil Law Codification in the Republic of Bulgaria’ in Malina Novkirishka-Stoyanova and Tencho 
Kolev (eds), Roman Law and Modern Codifications (First edn, Sofia: "St. Kliment Ohridski" University Press 
2008); Tsanka Tsankova, ‘Civil Code? Let Us Start a Discussion’ in Malina Novkirishka-Stoyanova and Tencho 
Kolev (eds), Roman Law and Modern Codifications (First edn, Sofia: "St. Kliment Ohridski" University Press 
2008) Still, despite the absence of a civil code, there is a broad academic agreement on the system of Bulgarian 
civil law as it currently stands. Although many of the parts of the system are dispersed among several legal acts, 
the Bulgarian civil law clearly follows the Pandektensystem. It has a general part including the general 
provisions on persons and on civil relationships, then property law, law of obligations, law of intellectual and 
industrial property, family law and succession law. Currently commercial law is contained in a separate statute 
and is not embedded in the general obligations act. See Vitali Tadjer, Civil Law of National Republic of 
Bulgaria. General Part, vol 1 (First edn, Sofia: Science and Art 1972); Mariya Pavlova, Civil Law. General Part 
(First edn, Sofia: Sofi-R 2002). 
126 Act on Obligations and Contracts, promulgated State Gazette №268 of 01.01.1892, repealed State Gazette 
№275 of 22.11.1950. 
127 It has been claimed that the reason for which the Bulgarian legislator chose the Romanic legal tradition was 
that the latter coincided better with the level of social development of the country. In 1892, when the first 
Contracts Act was passed, Bulgaria had just asserted its independence from the Ottoman Empire and was 
predominantly a rural country. Thus, preferences naturally went to the Romanic legal family which, and 
especially the Italian Codice Civile, largely reflected the interests of farmers, unlike the German civil code, 
which was directed to the interests of businessmen. Dimitur Tokushev, History of the New Bulgarian State and 
Law 1878-1944 (First edn, Sofia: Sibi 2008) 177-178. That such a consideration played a role is, of course, 
highly probable but most likely it was not the only determinative factor. In fact, while preparing the 1892 
Contracts Act the Bulgarian legislator could not really draw on a German model of unified civil code since the 
BGB had not been passed, yet. At that time only the First Draft of the German civil code had been published, 
and this, being fairly technical, complex and abstract, was probably not very attractive to Bulgarian jurists who 
had not yet been exposed to the influence of the German Pandect school. Rather, the choice was to be made 
between the French Code Civil and the Austrian Civil Code, the other influential codification existing at the 
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currently effective Bulgarian Act on Obligations and Contracts128 ("Contracts Act") also 
largely copied the legal solutions of the 1942 Italian Civil Code, which remained closely 
connected to French law; yet, it was also affected by the German legal tradition due to its 
major influence on the Bulgarian legal scholarship of the time.129 In force as of 1951, the 
Contracts Act, however, was also bound to integrate the principles of socialist law and 
planned economy.130 After the beginning of the democratic changes in 1989, the Contracts 
                                                                                                                                                        
time. Of these two, Code Civil was distinguished for its clear, intelligible and succinct language as well as for 
embodying the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, which were very appealing to a small nation 
emerging from five centuries of foreign oppression. In addition, the Romanic legal family was possibly preferred 
because Bulgarian merchants had already been familiar with the Ottoman Commercial Code, itself based on the 
French Code de Commerce. Deeply rooted in Code Civil, the Italian Codice Civile of 1865 was considered one 
of the most modern codes of its time. It had all the civilizing and linguistic advantages of the French prime 
source, which made it very appropriate for a young state such as Bulgaria that was still building its own 
institutions. As a result, the 1892 Contracts Act straightforwardly copied the Codice, adopting the principles of 
freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda, as well as the consensual principle of transferring ownership and 
risk at the time of concluding the agreement irrespectively whether the thing sold was actually handed to the 
buyer. More likely than not, the choice was also motivated by political considerations. Avoiding direct 
transplantation of the Austrian or French codification, and borrowing the code of the new Italian kingdom, the 
Bulgarian legislator circumvented the political risks that could have arisen from potential exasperation of Russia, 
or any other of the Great Powers, which were particularly sensitive towards their spheres of influence. Valentin 
Braykov, The Sale Contract - Companion of Civilization (First edn, Sofia: Sibi 2014) 20-35. 
128 Act on Obligations and Contracts, promulgated State Gazette №2 of 03.01.1950, in force since 01.01.1951, 
last amended State Gazette №50 of 30.05.2008.  
129 In particular the rules on non-performance of the Contracts Act occupy a middle ground between the French 
and the German legal traditions. The institutions of preliminary contracts, right of retention, representation, 
default of the creditor follow the German model. 
130 The proclaimed aim of the Contracts Act was to contribute to the construction of socialism and to the 
execution of the state economic plan (former Art. 1). Three main principles, which decisively differentiated 
socialist civil law from that of the western capitalist states, were interwoven in the provisions of the Contracts 
Act. First, civil relationships had to conform to society's interest. The primacy of societal interest meant that 
citizens could exercise their contractual rights only for the satisfaction of their needs and not in contradiction to 
the interest of the socialist society (former Art. 4). Secondly, closely connected to this principle was the principle 
of social justice which served as a criterion for the interpretation of legal norms. Contractual rights and 
obligations were to be exercised in conformity with the socialist morals based on the requirements of social 
justice. Thirdly, under the principle of state planning of contractual relations, the planning acts were a source of 
contractual obligations (former Art. 5, 6, 7). Contract had the function to assist the execution of the plan which 
constituted the basis and the limit of the contract content. Contracts not conforming to the economic plan were 
null and void (former Art. 26 (1)) and socialist organisations had to exercise their contractual rights in 
conformity with the plan (former Art. 3). See Tadjer 37-40 It must also be mentioned that the Contracts Act 
revoked the Commercial Act effective until 1951 to pronounce the end of dual regulation in Bulgarian private 
law. Differentiation between persons (citizens and socialist organisations) was carried out within the Contracts 
Act with socialist organisations enjoying some privileges on the basis of the principle of supremacy of state 
property. Yet, the principle of private law unity was not pursued consistently. Besides the Contracts Act 
applicable to all persons, special laws were passed regulating particular contracts between socialist 
organisations: e.g. the Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations with regard to contracts for sale, 
contracts for work and labour and for services, Regulation on Capital Construction with regard to the 
construction contract. Ibid 25-27 Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations, promulgated State Gazette 
№85 of 01.11.1963, revoked State Gazette №18 of 02.03.1992; Regulation on Capital Construction, 
promulgated State Gazette №44 of 01.06.1951; Regulation on Capital Construction, promulgated State Gazette 
№98 of 11.12.1973, revoked State Gazette №55 of 15.07.1980; Regulation on Capital Construction, 
promulgated State Gazette №55 of 15.07.1980, revoked State Gazette №16 of 27.02.1987. In addition a special 
state arbitration court was created to resolve contractual disputes between socialist organisations. The aim was to 
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Act was not repealed in its entirety. Based on classic civil code models, its reform was limited 
to the elimination of socialist elements without touching on the main legal institutes.131 In this 
sense the strong influence of Italian law continues to this day.  
Throughout the 20th century the foreign influence on Bulgarian contract law was not confined 
solely to the Romanic legal tradition. German law inspired a number of amendments to the 
former 1892 Contracts Act and somewhat indirectly also affected the current Contracts Act. 
Its impact, however, is most visible on Bulgarian commercial law.132 The Bulgarian 
Commercial Act of 1897133 literally reproduced the provisions of the Hungarian Commercial 
Act (1875) and the Hungarian Act on Bills of Exchange (1876), which followed the German 
precedent. Only some of its parts were borrowed from the Romanian Commercial Act (1887) 
which in its own turn replicated the Italian Commercial Act (1883).134 The influence of 
                                                                                                                                                        
achieve quick, business-like settlement of any disagreements as well as to endorse the principle of planning and 
contractual discipline. Despite its law enforcement competences, the state arbitration court was not included in 
the general court system and its acts were not subject to control from the Supreme Court. Act on State 
Arbitration, promulgated State Gazette №127 of 31.05.1950, revoked State Gazette №85 of 15.10.1991; Dimitur 
Tokushev, The Judiciary in Bulgaria: from Antiquity to the Present (First edn, Sofia: Sibi 2003) 318-320; In 
other words, despite the refutation of dualism, differentiation of economic legislation from civil legislation was 
initiated but in the end not fully implemented. Although in 1984 the State Council took a decision for the 
preparation and adoption of an Economic Code which was never drafted. Lyubomir Popov, ‘Forty Years Of 
Socialist Civil Law’ (1984) 4 Legal Thought 34. 
131 The amendments of the Contracts Act comprised mainly three groups of issues. First, the possibility for 
external interference, including administrative and court interference, in the process of conclusion of the 
contract, its content and consequences was sharply limited. All references to the state plan as an act regulating 
the economy as well as all provisions on contracts concluded in execution of the plan were deleted. Secondly, 
freedom of contract was expanded. The borders of party autonomy are now determined by the law and the good 
morals. The plan no longer sets its limits. Morality continues to be a criterion for the validity of contracts but the 
term (previously "socialist morals") is liberated from its class connotation. Thirdly, the unequal treatment of 
citizens and enterprises was done away with. The Contracts Act is shaped as general civil law since a separate 
Commercial Act is promulgated. In this sense the unified contract system is obliterated and separate contract 
models are differentiated depending on the legal position of the parties: merchants or non-merchants. The regime 
of certain types of contracts (such as the commission and the spedition contracts, the contract of carriage, the 
insurance contract) as well as of negotiable instruments is removed from the Contracts Act and is incorporated in 
the Commercial Act. See Ognyan Gerdjikov and Tanya Buzeva, ‘The Amendments and Supplements to the Act 
on Obligations and Contracts’ (1993) 2 Contemporary Law 15; Krasen Stoychev, ‘Change in Trends or Trends 
towards Change in Contractual Legislation?’ (1995) 3 Legal Thought 49; Act on Amending and Supplementing 
the Act on Obligations and Contracts, promulgated State Gazette №12 of 12.02.1993  
132 The debate on the choice between a unitary or dual model is common in most civil law jurisdictions during 
the 20th century. In contrast, such a debate did not take place in common law jurisdictions. Since the English law 
merchant was integrated into the common law as early as the 18th century, common lawyers do not draw the 
distinction between general private and commercial law. Still, in the US the commercial law on sale of goods 
was taken out of the judge-made common law and codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. See in this sense 
Jan Peter Schmidt, ‘Code Unique’ in Basedow Jürgen and others (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
European Private Law, vol I (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). 
133 Commercial Act, promulgated State Gazette №114 of 01.01.1897, revoked State Gazette №78 of 28.09.1981. 
134 Most of the provisions in Part I "Merchants", Part IV "Commercial Books" and Part XII "On Cheque" as well 
as the entire part on bankruptcy were borrowed from the Romanian Commercial Act. Tokushev, History of the 
New Bulgarian State and Law 1878-1944 203-204. 
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German commercial law was particularly strong in the process of drafting the currently 
effective Commercial Act,135 although the law of France, Spain and the European directives 
also played a role.136 
Last but not least, in the frame of its obligations as an EU candidate, Bulgaria was obliged to 
harmonise its contract law with the acquis and transplant the EU consumer protection 
directives in the national legal system. Thus, in 2006 Bulgaria adopted the Act on Protection 
of Consumers137 which has since has undergone a number of amendments in order to stay in 
line with the evolving European secondary legislation in the field. As a result, the Contracts 
Act remains the lex generalis in Bulgarian contract law and applies to the extent the 
Commercial Act and the Act on Protection of Consumers do not prescribe anything to the 
contrary.138 In sum, Bulgarian contract law of today has emerged under the influence of at 
least four different legal models – the Romanic, the Germanic, the socialist and the 
supranational European one. Needless to say, the symbiosis of the various borrowed legal 
solutions is a slow ongoing process that does not develop without tensions and irritations but, 
alas, so far remains in the shadow of the dynamics in more prestigious legal systems.  
                                                 
135 Commercial Act, promulgated State Gazette №48 of 18.06.1991, in force since 01.07.1991, last supplemented 
State Gazette №22 of 24.03.2015 supplemented, in force as of 01.01.2017. 
136 As the current French Code de Commerce, the Bulgarian Commercial Act has chosen a mixture of the 
objective system (under which applicability is determined by the nature of the legal transactions) and the 
subjective system (where the parties' status as merchants is decisive). The Commercial Act is applicable to 
certain transactions which are regarded per se as commercial, no matter whether the protagonists are merchants 
or not (Art. 286 (2)). In addition, it is applicable to commercial transactions entered into by a merchant in the 
course of his business (Art. 286 (1)).  
137 Act on Protection of Consumers, promulgated State Gazette №99 of 09.12.2005, in force since 10.06.2006, 
last amended State Gazette №18 of 01.03.2011. The idea of consumer protection came to Bulgaria in the 1980's 
but was not immediately reflected in the legislation. Until the adoption of the Act on Protection of Consumers, 
the remedies available to consumers were those provided for in the Contracts Act. Indirectly, the interests of 
consumers were also protected by the Act on Standardization, promulgated State Gazette №48 of 19.06.1964, 
revoked State Gazette  №55 of 18.06.1999, in force since 19.09.1999; the Act on Contracts between Socialist 
Organizations and other legislative acts that did not have the rank of a statute. In this sense, see Zlatka Sukareva, 
Civil Law Protection of Consumers (First edn, Sofia: Feneya 2001) 42-43. 
138 This means that the Contracts Act has subsidiary application to commercial transactions (Art. 288 of the 
Commercial Act). For example, the provisions on performance and non-performance of the Contracts Act apply 
to commercial transactions to the extent the Commercial Act does not contain a special provision (as for example 
on liquidated damages). An inverse relationship also exists between commercial law and general contract law. A 
number of legal solutions located in the Commercial Act also find application in general contract law (e.g. on 
force majeure, on economic impossibility). It must also be pointed out that the Commercial Act regime applies to 
both parties even if the transaction is commercial only for one of them (Art. 287). When one of the parties is a 
consumer the provisions of the Act on Protection of Consumers are also applicable. In case of conflict between 
the Commercial Act, the subsidiary Contracts Act and the Act on Protection of Consumers, the act ensuring a 
higher level of protection to consumers applies (§1 of the Act on Protection of Consumers). 
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Although Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, it remains a largely under-researched legal system 
which was not adequately covered even by the latest comparative projects within the Union. 
Bulgarian academics started participating in the drafting process of the DCFR only in 2007 
when the project was already well under way. Bulgaria is hardly mentioned in the 
comparative notes following the Draft's articles, which means that it only had limited 
involvement in the comparative work preceding the Interim edition. Nevertheless, it belongs 
to the group of Eastern European countries whose contract regimes can be demarcated within 
the larger tradition of the continental civil law countries as such, which only recently 
developed their commercial and consumer protection law and consequently miss (or have 
underdeveloped) court practice on a number of legal issues that have long been debated in the 
Western countries. Since the variety of European legal systems139 makes indulging in a 
comprehensive comparative exercise increasingly difficult and even impossible to undertake 
in a single doctoral thesis, the choice was made to direct attention to an unexplored civilian 
system instead of to the usual civil jurisdictions which have already been intensively 
researched.140 As a legal system that has become a crossroads for diverse legal influences 
from the civil law tradition, on one hand, and from national and supranational models, on the 
other hand, and as a young market economy with needs that are different to those of 
developed markets, the Bulgarian jurisdiction is particularly fit to be compared with 
established contract legal systems that are and radically different in their approach contract 
legal systems, regulating much more mature and sophisticated markets. It can be expected 
that its inclusion in the comparative analysis may help in contrasting the role of remedies not 
only between the US and Europe but also within Europe between English law and a 
continental legal system of a new Member State.141 
Relying on the English/continental law, old/new Member State distinctions, the comparison 
includes EU jurisdictions that – in the context of European contract law – can be presumed to 
                                                 
139 Four types of national contract regimes can be distinguished within the EU on the basis of common history, 
the sources of law recognised and the predominant mode of legal thought: common law systems (England, 
Ireland, Cyprus), traditional civil law countries (within this group there are jurisdictions with a code based on the 
Code Napoleon and jurisdictions with a code more based on the German model), the Scandinavian Member 
States (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the Eastern European countries. See in this sense Jan Smits, 
‘Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal Market’ in Jan Smits (ed), The Need for a European 
Contract Law (First edn, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2005) 156-157. 
140 Ironically, in an informal conversation Prof. Andras Sajo once said that Bulgaria was not an "academically 
recommended country". Presumably he meant that the lack of rigorous academic research regarding the 
jurisdiction made it a difficult subject for a young researcher.  
141 Vogenauer.  
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be as far removed as possible with regard to their approach to remedies. The market data also 
shows that Bulgarian and UK businesses stand far apart with regard to their capacity to avail 
themselves of the internal market.142 A European horizontal contract law instrument, on the 
other hand, would offer a single set of contract rules precisely in order to overcome the legal 
barriers impeding citizens and businesses from taking full advantage of the single market.143 
Setting aside the controversy about the actual impact of legal diversity on cross-border 
trade144 and assuming that the common legal framework affects the businesses' propensity to 
trade abroad and the product choice available to consumers, England and Bulgaria appear as 
appropriate dissimilar laboratories to study remedies in order to make inferences about the 
way they should be structured on the European level. 
Once the argument proceeds with regard to the EU level, the choice of the US as one of the 
jurisdictions under comparison becomes less straightforward. In terms of size the US is the 
economy which can be best compared to the EU. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
constitutes a regional sales regime which has led to substantial uniformity in the commercial 
laws of the different states.145 It is not surprising that in the Communication for CESL as well 
                                                 
142 According to the Eurobarometer surveys, Bulgaria is among the countries in which businesses are the least 
likely to be involved in cross-border business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions while the UK is 
among the countries in which businesses are most inclined. 82% of Bulgarian companies said they were not 
likely to be involved in selling or buying cross-border while 39% (well above the average) of the British 
companies, participating in the survey, are trading with more than three countries. See Hungary The Gallup 
Organization, Flash Eurobarometer Series #320. European Contract Law in Business-to-Business Transactions. 
Analytical Report Conducted Upon the Request of the DG JUSTICE-A-2: Civil Law and Contract Law 
(http://eceuropaeu/public_opinion/flash/fl_320_enpdf, 2011) 13-14. Bulgarian companies are also the least likely 
to be involved in cross-border retail sales (64%). In UK, on the other hand, 57% of the companies are already 
trading with consumers in more than three countries. Hungary The Gallup Organization, Flash Eurobarometer 
Series #321. European Contract Law in Business-to-Consumer Transactions. Analytical Report Conducted 
Upon the Request of the DG JUSTICE-A-2: Civil Law and Contract Law 
(http://eceuropaeu/public_opinion/flash/fl_321_enpdf, 2011) 15-16. 
143 Communication for Common European Sales Law; European Commission -  Fact Sheet, Questions and 
answers – Digital Single Market Strategy, 06.05.2015, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
15-4920_en.htm. Last accessed on 25.09.2011. 
144 The survey carried out by the Oxford Institute for European and Comparative Law in collaboration with 
Clifford Chance was indicative of the relevance but not conclusive on the magnitude and weight of transaction 
costs stemming from legal diversity for cross-border trade. The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: 
Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice (St fan Vogenauer and Stephen 
Weatherill eds, First edn, Hart Publishing 2006)  See Smits for a sceptical view on the importance of private law 
difference for the imperfect functioning of the internal market. While noting the inconclusiveness of the above-
mentioned survey Gomez and Ganuza, on the other hand, are of the opinion that the transaction costs from legal 
fragmentation are not so negligible. Fernando Gomez and Juan-José Ganuza, ‘The Economics of Private Law 
Harmonised Law-making: Mechanisms, Modes and Standards’ in Roger Brownsword and others (eds), The 
Foundations of European Private Law (First edn, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2011).  
145 Truly, the UCC has brought about strong convergence between the contract law systems of the different 
States but it also allows each State to meet the local circumstances by modifying the official text. 
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as in the press releases,146 the Commission refers to the UCC as the legal act which makes the 
economic area of the 50 states much more an internal market than the aggregate of EU 
Member States is.147 In this sense, the UCC can provide lessons for structuring the remedial 
provisions on the European level. These lessons may not be limited to appreciation of 
particular efficient legal solutions and recommendations for their borrowing. They may also 
contrast the context of the two sales regimes in order to enable conclusions about the ways by 
which a European measure can offer new attractive advantages to traders. A new equilibrium 
between the facilitative and regulatory function of remedies could be such an advantage. 
In short, the choice of jurisdictions gives the opportunity for comparison which contrasts an 
American and a European common law jurisdiction, a European common law jurisdiction and 
an unexplored civil law jurisdiction as well as the US and the European legal tradition. In this 
selection of jurisdictions England and Bulgaria serve as national legal systems embracing the 
tradition on which a European sales regime should be designed. The UCC, on the other hand, 
is an external yardstick, a competitive regime from which a sales measure on the European 
level should learn and differentiate. 
Conclusion and the way forward 
In the ongoing process of developing European Contract Law, there continues to be a large 
gap between the traditional view of national contract laws as facilitative regimes and the 
European vision of contract law as an enterprise of a more regulatory nature. This project 
aims at bridging these two sharply different understandings and building a basis on which a 
European scheme of contractual remedies can emerge. The main question the thesis seeks to 
answer is to what extent contractual remedies should be used as regulatory devices on the 
European level. Breaking with the illusion that contract law is apolitical, the account 
comprises both positive statements and prescriptive policy proposals but unlike the Principles 
of European Contract Law, the Acquis Principles and the DCFR, it strives to keep them 
clearly separated. The normative claim is argued for only after extensive descriptive-
comparative scrutiny of the remedies in the selected legal systems. In addition, the empirical 
study strives to capture both tradition and change. On one hand, it pays tribute to the national 
                                                 
146 European Commission, Common European Sales Law to Boost Trade and Expand Consumer Choice. Press 
Release (Justice Newsroom http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/news/20111011_en.htm Last updated on 
03/02/2012. Last accessed on 04/08/2012 2011). 
147 Communication for Common European Sales Law 2, footnote 1.  
 38 
English and Bulgarian tradition, on which ECL should grow, and contrasts the US tradition, 
which comprises an influential competing contract regime. On the other hand, it considers the 
changes that took place in contract law during the 20th century: its materialisation and 
employment as a regulatory tool. Thus, taking on board different relevant aspects, the project 
moves on to meet the challenge of drawing guidelines for a European remedial scheme. 
Despite its reliance on primary texts and court decisions, the project employs the innovative 
interdisciplinary methodology of comparative law and economics which allows going beyond 
the surface of judicial discourse and thus differentiates this study from previous research.148 
Recognising that in the case of Bulgaria judges traditionally do not overtly discuss policy 
reasons, the research builds on the lessons of New Institutional Economics in order to assess 
the actual local impact of legal mechanisms. In this way the thesis incorporates not only 
century-old divergent legal traditions but also the modern paradigms of today's contract law: 
commercial and consumer contracts, spot and long-term contracts. It does not only point at 
differences among legal systems but also looks for arguments outside comparative law to 
suggest a manner in which to deal with these differences.  
Still, such concise statements require further elaboration on the way the adopted methodology 
relates to the objective of the thesis. For this reason, having described the project in detail, I 
move on to Chapter II in which I elucidate the reasons for the choice of comparative law and 
economics as well as its basic premises. The thesis then unfolds as follows. Chapter III 
juxtaposes damages across jurisdictions to show that the damage measures, analysed by 
economists in terms of incentives, are common to the three legal systems under comparison. 
Chapter IV turns to the sale-of-goods and construction contracts, investigates the factors 
which determine their position on the spot/long-term spectrum and links the latter distinction 
to the issue of damages. Chapter V illuminates in detail the effects generated by damages only 
to conclude that, though enlightening, the economic model of incentives is inadequate from 
both a positive and normative perspective. Chapter VI, then, sets out on applying the 
methodological approach, defended by the thesis, to the termination remedy. It explores the 
                                                 
148 By contrast, Collins relies heavily on the actual wording of English court decisions and argues for the 
development of a hybrid form of legal reasoning which combines assessment of individual rights and 
consequentialist policy considerations. Collins, Regulating Contracts 50-53; Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ 
22-23; Collins, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: In 
Search of the Philosopher's Stone’ 223; Collins, ‘Governance Implications for the European Union of the 
Changing Character of Private Law’ 277. 
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relationship between the Seller's incentive to meet his obligations as to quality and the scope 
of the Buyer's right to terminate the contract. The thesis then concludes.  
However, let us start with the methodological issues.  
 40 
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Chapter II Comparative Law and Economics  
The research employs the comparative law and economics method.1 So far, comparative 
studies on remedies have not used economic analysis.2 Or if they have relied on law and 
economics, they have focused almost entirely on American law, not benefiting from a 
comparative element. In the absence of examples applying such methodology to the selected 
subject matter, particularly when it comes to such ambitious work,3 it is essential to spell out 
the reasons that justify this choice. The justification below develops in several steps: in 
Section A the easier question of why another approach has not been chosen is answered; in 
Section B the recourse to efficiency as an evaluative standard is accounted for; in Section C 
the preference for a particular economic school of thought is clarified; and in Section D the 
important role comparative law has in the research is illuminated. The chapter then 
concludes. 
A. Why not promissory theory of contract? 
As already explained, the evaluation of remedies will be carried out not only across 
jurisdictions but also across types of contract. From a legal point of view, the contract for 
sale of goods and the construction contract represent classic examples of relationships with, 
respectively, simultaneously discharged obligations and continuous obligations. It is no 
surprise that future contracts, as opposed to such in which simultaneous exchange takes 
place, bring up different and more difficult legal problems. Their diffusion in modern times 
has spurred a substantial amount of legal literature which focuses on the promissory basis of 
contract (a promise made in return for a benefit or another promise), theorises on the reasons 
                                                 
1 Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998); Mattei, Comparative Law 
and Economics; Florence Faust, ‘Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of Law’ in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2006). 
2 Guenther Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ in Arthur von Mehren (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol VII Contracts in 
General (First edn, The Hague: Mouton; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1976). 
3 Indeed, studies on remedies from a comparative law and economics perspective have been carried out only 
with regard to particular remedy (e.g. penalty clauses) without encompassing the entire institutions of damages 
and specific performance across types of contracts. See Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics, Chapter 7 
Second Study on Comparative Efficiency: Penalty Clauses.  
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for engaging in promises and the justification of their enforcement by law.4 A promissory 
theory of contract has also been used as the starting point that determines a common angle 
for comparing the remedial rules in sale of goods law of jurisdictions in the civil and 
common law tradition.5 Arguably the most important, and certainly the most prominent, 
systematic work of this body of philosophical contracts scholarship is Charles Fried's 
Contract as Promise.6 However, despite the intuitive appeal and unifying force7 of Fried's 
piece, this thesis will not rely on it since economic analysis fits better the objective of the 
project. This is true not only with respect to the general task that each of the theories sees as 
its own but also with respect to the particular methodological features that distinguish 
promissory and economic theory. To unpack this general statement I first start with the 
overall agenda of each theory and then turn to the more concrete methodological differences. 
It was already pointed out that the objective pursued by the thesis is to make normative 
suggestions for the design of a remedial scheme on the European level, a scheme that is so far 
missing but which the Commission started devising with the proposed CESL. In this respect, 
law and economics provides a systematic way of thinking about law reform. For the latter to 
be carried out in a consistent and non-fragmented way, legal rules should be structured in 
view of the incentives they are going to produce. These incentives will change human 
behaviour and if attuned properly will lead to the desired results. Such a consequentialist 
analysis allows more informed decisions about the nexus between the options on hand and the 
outcome sought. It raises awareness about the consequences and trade-offs that follow from a 
policy choice and therefore is capable of providing answers to my normative question of to 
what extent contractual remedies should be used as regulatory devices on the European level.  
The promissory theory, on the other hand, has not been developed with legal reform 
aspirations. Fried's primary goal is rather to justify contract law as a morally and politically 
                                                 
4 Patrick Atiyah, Promises, Morals and the Law (Oxford: Clanderon Press 1981); Charles Fried, Contract as 
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1981). 
Other deontic theories have been developed by Peter Benson and Randy Barnett. For an excellent comparison 
between Fried's and Benson's theories with economic contract theories, see Jody S. Kraus, ‘Philosophy of 
Contract Law’ in Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal 
Theory (New York: Oxford University Press 2002). 
5 Vanessa Mak, Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law (First edn, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2009) 7-14. 
6 Fried. 
7 Fried claims that the promissory principle establishes contract law as an integrated, distinct body of law, 
separate from other private law areas. Ibid 5-6. 
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legitimate institution and to prove its distinctiveness from other areas of law.8 According to 
him, a contracting party is morally obliged to keep his promise simply because he has 
voluntarily and intentionally undertaken it. Inspired by the Kantian injunction to treat human 
beings as ends in themselves and not as means, Fried grounds this obligation in the respect for 
individual autonomy and in trust. In his view, the legal enforcement of this moral obligation 
justifies contract law and determines it as a coherent body of law situated in the domain of 
liberal individualism.9 In this sense, Fried implicitly denies any instrumental outlook on law. 
With personal autonomy as the paramount value, his promissory theory entails that 
individuals are free to define their obligations and their rights should not be subordinated to 
collective ends.10 From this perspective, it a priori rejects the possibility to invest contract law 
with regulatory goals. That is why, law and economics with its underlying consequentialist 
logic matches better the objective of this thesis.   
The above fundamental difference between Fried's promissory theory and economic theory 
translates into concrete methodological traits that further justify the choice of economic 
analysis with regard to this project. These derivative dissimilarities are: first, the different 
emphasis on positive analysis; secondly, the different attitude towards borders between areas 
of law; and thirdly, the perspective taken on shaping legal rules. 
First, though seeking to answer a normative question, the research will contain a substantial 
positive part analysing the structure of contractual remedies (damages and specific 
performance) in the selected jurisdictions, detecting differences and similarities between legal 
systems and explaining the reasons for them. In this sense, the envisaged case studies in the 
thesis will compare different remedial arrangements and collect knowledge of their impact in 
diverse institutional environments. This intention coincides with the central task of positive 
law and economics to investigate which of the available legal alternatives induces the 
incentives and, respectively, behaviour that will lead to the desired results. Only then, on the 
basis of this scrutiny and assuming the achievement of an optimal level of contracting as a 
goal, will existing legal rules be criticised and normative suggestions made. The 
positive/normative distinction in legal-economic analysis fits well with the project idea to 
                                                 
8 In this sense see Kraus 703-705. 
9 Fried 5, 35. 
10 Ibid 5, 35. 
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build the remedial scheme on the European level based on the experience already obtained on 
the national level. 
Fried, on the other hand, degrades the positive task with respect to the normative one. Once 
he has found the promise principle as the justificatory principle of contract law, he examines 
classic contract cases to see whether the doctrine invoked can be understood in its terms. Any 
doctrine that can constitute a counter-example to his contract-as-promise claim is neutralized 
either as a doctrine that is not genuinely contractual,11 or as one that is inconsistent and 
therefore not subject to explanation by any theory.12 Preoccupied with defending contract law 
from the legacy of legal realism and of critical legal studies, from claims about its 
assimilation to tort and from communitarian attacks, Fried posits it as the emanation of certain 
values and dismisses any contract doctrines (and their cases) that cannot be explained as 
exclusively devoted to defending them. In this way he limits the pool from which he draws 
his legal data disallowing the falsification of his claim. Refusing to deconstruct the 
incompatible contract doctrine and look beyond its plain meaning, he fails to search for 
alternative principles that would explain the court cases decided under it. To be sure, such an 
approach does not create the appropriate atmosphere for devising a law reform. It underrates 
the role of positive analysis as a tool which could reveal the rationale behind seemingly 
inconsistent court decisions and renders the empirical testing of the normative principle 
unconvincing. Certainly, law and economics also fails to explain all the legal data available 
but, still, it appears to cast a broader net since it does not reject whole contract doctrines as 
unfit.13 Thus, the more balanced ratio between positive and normative in legal-economic 
analysis greatly influenced my methodological choice with respect to this research. 
Secondly, disowning the doctrines (and the cases under them) that do not fit his account, 
Fried draws rigid boundaries between law areas. This does not coincide with the starting point 
of the thesis implying increasing dilution of the borderlines between private and public, 
between contract law and regulation. Legal-economic analysis, on the other hand, is not 
obsessed with doctrinal distinctions. It does not seek to establish the different justificatory 
principles that distinguish different bodies of law. It uses legal doctrines as a starting point to 
sort the abounding legal data but then deconstructs them to search for the underlying 
                                                 
11 According to Fried, when in promissory estoppel recovery is limited to reliance damages, this is not liability in 
contract but in tort. Ibid 24. 
12 This is Fried's conclusion in relation to the consideration doctrine. Ibid 35. 
13 In this sense, see also Kraus 713, footnote 54. 
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economic logic without much regard to legal classifications. To which area of law (e.g. 
contract or tort, private or public law) the rule belongs, inducing a particular incentive, is a 
question that remains largely irrelevant as the principle of efficiency may very well bring 
together rules from traditionally distinct areas of law.14 If some authors contend that contract 
doctrines should not be used to regulate, i.e. to correct market failures such as monopoly 
power or imperfect information, this is because, in their opinion, contract law cannot supply 
efficient rules in this respect,15 and not because employing the doctrines for such purposes 
violates so fundamental a principle of contract that they can only be associated with another 
body of law. Since economic analysis proves more flexible and does not rule out from the 
outset the premises that contract law may be viewed as a regulatory instrument, it appears 
more suitable for the project than promissory theory. 
Thirdly, another methodological commitment of law and economics is also particularly 
attractive with regard to this research: the ex ante perspective which allows the shaping of 
legal rules in order to affect the actors' prospective behaviour. In fact, the ex ante/ex post 
distinction is pointed as a characteristic divide between economic theory and deontic theories. 
From an ex post perspective (looking at contract law after the dispute has occurred), a 
remedial rule would be selected on the basis of the litigants' pre-existing rights and with 
regard to its effect on the allocation of existing burdens and losses between the parties in the 
concrete dispute. By contrast, from an ex ante perspective (before any disagreement has 
materialised) the legal rule would be designed with regard to its prospective effect on 
incentives and the social desirability of one's conduct in response to these incentives. As 
Fried's theory embraces an ex post perspective, it has been accused of failing to provide 
guidance for formulating the content of default rules.16 
                                                 
14 In this sense, see also ibid 691-694, 699-700. 
15 Schwartz, ‘The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State’; Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory 
and the Limits of Contract Law’. 
16 Richard Craswell, ‘Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising’ (1989) 88 Michigan Law 
Review 489. Craswell reasons that in case of a contractual gap the parties have simply not agreed on their rights 
and duties. Thus, the ex post perspective, implied by Fried's theory, cannot provide directions to a court as to the 
content of the default rule which should fill the incomplete agreement. Ibid 515-516. In other words, the critique 
relates to the perspective courts should adopt in adjudication when there is a gap in the parties' contract (an issue 
which this thesis does not purport to resolve) and not to the standpoint (taken in the thesis) with regard to 
reforming existing contract regimes or devising a new one. In the context of legal reform which has prospective 
effects, an ex ante perspective is not problematic. Fried himself concedes that gap-filling defaults can be subject 
to change, but to protect individual autonomy such change can only relate to the future. Nevertheless, on a more 
general basis, the ex ante/ex post distinction concerns the two ways contract rules can be evaluated and designed. 
Thus, the issue has implications with regard to the positive analysis of national remedial rules as well as the 
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To be more accurate, despite its general ex post perspective, contract-as-promise theory is not 
so inadequate in instructing the choice of default rules. According to Fried, the promise 
principle governs the content of interpretative  default rules while the content of 
interpolative ones is directed by non-contract law.17 The problem is rather that he simply 
proscribes the pursuit of any other value besides respect for the parties' individual rights.18 
Even when he finds that an issue is in the domain of non-contract law, Fried endorses the ex 
post perspective so that the legitimate expectations of the parties are not upset by collective 
ends such as efficiency, altruism, or redistribution. Such considerations can be taken into 
account only in the process of interpolation and only if the ex ante perspective is compelled 
by the background conventions against which parties form and pursue their subjective 
intent.19  
In other words, Fried's vision admits the ex ante perspective only exceptionally and thus 
prohibits any consequentialist principles from entering the picture. In this sense, Fried's theory 
does not have direct implications for the direction legal change should take20 and thus does 
not fit with the central idea of this project. In contrast, economic analysis entails the tools 
necessary to analyse national remedial rules and to make the normative suggestions with 
regard to structuring the European rules in view of certain regulatory effect.  
                                                                                                                                                        
normative suggestions on the European level. In the positive part of the thesis the national rules will be evaluated 
from an ex ante perspective with regard to their impact in the particular institutional environment in order to 
build or reject the normative claim regarding the regulatory function of European remedial rules. 
17 In this sense, see Kraus 718-725. In her opinion, the key lies in Fried's notion of a gap which is not the same as 
that of Craswell. While Craswell sees the need for genuine gap-filling and the need for interpretation as 
essentially the same since both require the application of default rules, to Fried these problems are fundamentally 
different. Which of the two is faced by the court in every particular dispute depends on "background conventions 
and understandings" that provide evidence regarding the formation and the content of parties' subjective intent. If 
these conventions indicate that the parties have reached a subjective agreement about the disputed issue but the 
contractual terms are not sufficiently clear, the court should interpret  the contract in light of the parties' 
subjective intention. The basis for the interpretation  process is provided by the promise principle. For example, 
even if the parties have not explicitly agreed on the remedy in the contract, Fried considers they have 
subjectively intended expectation damages. Fried 17. But when the background conventions do not inform about 
such subjective intent or about its content beyond the plain meaning of the contractual terms, there is a genuine 
gap in the contract which requires filling by means of interpolation . This is the case for example when the 
contract lacks an explicit term with regard to mistake and impracticability. Ibid 89. Since in such a case the 
promise principle runs out, the necessary interpolation  can be carried out only by referring to principles external 
to contract law. For example, whenever the parties' manifestations of objective intent do not give adequate 
evidence of their subjective intent, the liability imposed on the basis of objective intent is non-contractual. Ibid 
61, 66-67. For a more detailed interpretation of Fried's theory in this sense, see Kraus 715-730. 
18 Fried 85. 
19 For example, according to Fried, the 'mailbox' default rule is justified by considerations of "convenience." ibid 
52. See also Kraus 728-730. 
20 Kraus 727. 
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To put it briefly, my methodological choice excluded Fried's promissory theory since the 
latter rejects any perception of contract law as an instrument in the pursuit of certain social 
aims. Founded on the concept of autonomy, it has limited value with regard to shaping default 
rules in order to achieve certain regulatory goals. Legal-economic methodology, on the other 
hand, corresponds very well to the strong emphasis on positive analysis in the thesis, to my 
assertion about dilution of the borders between private law and regulation and to the adopted 
ex ante perspective of shaping legal rules. From this viewpoint, law and economics has the 
resources to inform changes in contractual remedies in the explored jurisdictions as well as 
guidelines for building a European remedial regime. Yet, if a standards-based approach is 
selected to inform this research, why is the standard chosen that of efficiency and not that of 
justice?21 
B. Why efficiency? 
Clearly, it is the economic line in the chosen interdisciplinary methodology that sets 
efficiency as the principal concern. Law, on the other hand, has traditionally been engaged 
with issues of justice and fairness. This disparity often causes a great deal of tension on both 
sides of the interaction. It is not rare that legal scholars equate such change in value focus 
with ethical bankruptcy and dethroning law from its position of autonomous discipline. Many 
economists, on the other hand, insist that the concepts of justice and fairness disguise matters 
of distribution, i.e. questions that are political and not scientific. Conventionally, efficiency 
and justice are understood as conflicting objectives which require difficult trade-offs between 
optimal resource allocation and equitable solutions.22 I side neither with the argument that 
lawyers should not be concerned with efficiency, nor with the view that the latter standard 
should be the one and only goal of the efforts of legal scholars and practitioners. Indeed, I 
also do not see efficiency and justice as antithetical concepts, but rather as types of legal 
argument that are often complementary rather than alternative. 
There is nothing a priori improper in relying on efficiency as a criterion of assessing and 
designing legal rules. Whether we like it or not, legal doctrines have important efficiency 
implications. Every time lawyers assign rights (whether by contract, statute or court decision) 
                                                 
21 Barnett distinguishes between party-based theories, process-based theories and standards-based theories of 
contract, the latter having efficiency or substantive fairness as standards of evaluation. See Randy Barnett, ‘A 
Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 269. 
22 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 323. 
 48 
they make a decision on an economic problem in a world of scarcity. Why then decide 
intuitively instead of in an informed way? Why deliberately close our eyes to the effect of 
alternative legal institutions and rules instead of proceeding with awareness about their 
impact? Why miss the opportunity to enrich our understanding of law and legal change for 
fears that opening up to the economic instrumentarium might inflict loss of prestige? Truly, 
the world of facts and the world of norms are closely interrelated and the starting point of the 
positive analysis undoubtedly influences normative judgments.23 I will not pretend that law 
and economics is neutral. Yet, such criticism can also be directed to any methodology based 
on a theory of justice. So the more important question is how to carry out a better economic 
analysis, how to enhance it and infuse it with context, not whether we do so at all. 
Fortunately, nowadays, more and more European legal scholars, including among those 
criticising law and economics, would agree that this approach cannot simply be ignored and 
should be one of the perspectives considered in the course of decision-making. 
That the issue of efficiency and the issue of distribution are separated questions is, however, 
highly misleading. It is the neoclassical claim that efficiency is about the size of the pie and 
distribution about its division; therefore, private law should be left alone to maximise the pie 
whereas public (tax) law should be engaged in its fair distribution without any interference 
into the pie's creation.24 Yet, disregarding that a legal rule affects both allocation and 
distribution of resources is problematic. In a bargaining game the production of surplus is 
determined by the players' cooperation, which in its own turn depends on the players' 
agreement about the surplus division. In the absence of a competitive price, parties may not 
be able to agree on the distribution of the stakes. In this sense non-cooperative outcomes are 
possible, in which case the surplus will be lost.25 Even the efficiency-only regulation in pure 
coordination games has distributive effects.26 Moreover, it has also been shown that in the 
ultimatum game the division of the surplus affects the accepting party's incentive to produce 
the surplus. If the latter perceives the division as unfair, he does not reason as Homo 
                                                 
23 See in this sense, though in a different context Jürgen Neyer, ‘Europe's Justice Deficit:  Justification and 
Legitimacy in the European Union’ in Jürgen  Neyer and Antje Wiener (eds), Political Theory of the European 
Union (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 169. Ugo Mattei also engages with this philosophical 
argument and considers it to have been overemphasised: Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 10. 
24 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (First edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 2002). 
25 Robert Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’ (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 17. 
26 Dennis Mueller, Public Choice III (First edn, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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economicus and rejects the offer, even though technically the Pareto-optimality still holds.27 
In other words, once we leave the world of zero transaction costs, the issue of distribution 
invariably comes up. Even if efficient, every legal rule generates some winners and some 
losers in terms of welfare and there must be some criterion determining who falls in which 
category. Therefore, efficiency cannot be the sole standard in assessing and shaping legal 
rules. 
Yet, how to combine efficiency and justice in the same analysis still needs to be worked out. 
Although prominent economists have approached the issue of justice,28 there is no consensus 
formed among economics scholars on the way to address simultaneously both allocative and 
distributive considerations. So far contract law theory has also been unable to produce a meta-
norm which would guide lawmakers in prioritising and balancing between conflicting legal 
principles.29 The ambitions of this research also do not strain to developing a multi-value 
approach in different breach of contract situations. As the development of national private law 
from a distributive justice perspective has already been analysed,30 the thesis will stay solely 
within the efficiency paradigm. This does not mean that in the process of creation of 
European contract law the distributive implications of legal rules should be discarded.31 Yet, I 
leave to others the development of a coordination approach.  
It is also worth emphasising, however, that there is considerable evidence that efficiency and 
justice are not always in competition. It is not uncommon that a law-and-economics analysis 
endorses as efficient a solution that is also supported as just by more traditional accounts. For 
example, both economic and justice-based investigations of tort liability rules favour 
negligence as the general standard of liability with strict liability covering only specific cases 
                                                 
27 A great many ultimatum game experiments (including cross-cultural) have been done during the years with 
robust results consistently deviating from the predictions of game theory. The most common offer is for a split of 
50:50. Proposals for unfair splits (e.g. 70:30) are more likely to be rejected. See the discussion in Ken Binmore, 
Playing for Real. Game Theory (First edn, New York: Oxford University Press 2007) 545-546. 
28 Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson, ‘Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral 
Philosophy’ (1993) 31 Journal of Economic Literature 671; Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford, 
UK; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell 1987); Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (First edn, London: Allen 
Lane 2009). 
29 In an attempt to counter the criticisms directed at unitary normative theories, whether based on autonomy, 
efficiency or fairness, pluralist theories endorse all of these principles to be used in determining contractual 
rules. The difficulties caused by the lack of metric pointing at the decisive value in the face of conflicts are 
demonstrated by Eisenberg. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Theory of Contracts’ in Peter Benson (ed), The 
Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (First edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001). 
30 Somma. 
31 For a similar view, see Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law: Governance Design’ 295. 
 50 
in which the injurer is undoubtedly in a better position to prevent the accident.32 The 
convergence of the principles of the law of takings (public need and compensation at market 
value) in many western legal systems (the US, UK, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and others) can 
be viewed as both efficiency- and equity-driven.33 It has also been shown that the birth of a 
whole set of remedies (injunctions, specific performance, tracing, etc.) in England can be 
explained both by the equity and the efficiency rationale.34 In fact, in different historical 
moments and institutional environments both equity and efficiency have argued against rigid 
application of legal doctrine, infusing it with a considerable degree of flexibility: e.g. equity – 
overcoming the English stringent writ system, efficiency – moving the reasonableness 
consideration in US nuisance disputes from the balancing of harms to the selection of the 
remedy.35 From this perspective, efficiency and justice cease to be mutually exclusive 
notions. From conflicting ideas they turn into powerful legal arguments which often point in 
the same direction and complement each other.  
This is the way I also look at the concepts of efficiency and justice – as seemingly opposing 
but often compatible persuasive techniques, the relationship of which has to be examined on a 
case-by-case basis.36 In this sense, the efficiency analysis is just another line of reasoning 
which may make the case for a particular course in shaping European contractual remedies 
and which does not necessarily negate justice. 
C. Which economics? 
The choice to apply economic methodology to the analysis of remedial rules, however, does 
not answer the question of which economic theory will be used. In my view, the hostility 
towards law and economics results to a great extent from the fact that its opponents identify 
it exclusively with the Chicago school.37 Its major contribution is the development of a 
systematic approach entailing application of a consistent body of economic theory (price 
theory) to legal rules. In this sense, Chicagoans drew the interest of economists to law as a 
                                                 
32 See in this sense Robert Cooter, ‘The Future of Law and Economics’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and 
Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 
2007) 29. 
33 For a more detailed explanation, see Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 17-19. 
34 Ibid 11-13. 
35 In this sense ibid 13-16. 
36 See in this sense ibid Chapter 1 Efficiency and Equity 1-25; Cooter, ‘The Future of Law and Economics’ 29.  
37 See e.g. Barnett, 277-283. According to him the attempt of economic analysis to provide a normative theory in 
the field of contract law is "fundamentally flawed". 
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crucial institution in policy making. Yet, since its birth, law and economics has experienced 
considerable branching out and it is by no means mandatory that economic analysis be based 
on neoclassical economics.38 Although taking post-neoclassical frictionless models as a 
starting point, the thesis will steadily pursue their enrichment with the methodology of New 
Institutional Economics, which aims at more subtle and down-to-earth economic analysis.39 
Three differences between the Chicago tradition and New Institutional Economics lead me to 
rely heavily on the latter school in relation to this research: first, the degree of realism 
achieved by economic analysis; second, the more subtle position taken with regard to the 
deregulation/regulation dichotomy; and third, the developed dynamic framework.40  These 
methodological differences turn out to be not negligible at all as they lead to a different 
understanding of efficiency and to the specific take comparative law and economics has on 
the standard. 
First, based on very strict premises, the Chicago approach created a sort of "economic 
nirvana"41 which has little to do "with what happens in the real world."42 In this approach, 
individuals, being rational maximisers of their satisfaction, respond, in the context of perfect 
markets, to price incentives embedded in the legal rules, the latter devised with an efficiency 
purpose. Wealth-maximisation and the search for the means to achieve it also lie at the core 
of New Institutional Economics;43 yet, the latter has moved well beyond the neoclassical and 
even the post-neoclassical paradigm. It is not only that the introduction of the concept of 
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Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006). In addition, Behavioural Law and 
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39 On Coase and Williamson criticising Posner's views, see Richard Posner, ‘The New Institutional Economics 
Meets Law and Economics’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die GesamteStaatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics) 73; Ronald Coase, ‘Coase on Posner on Coase: Comment’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift 
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40 On the fundamental building blocks of the Chicago approach and of New Institutional Economics, see 
Mercuro and Medema 102-126; 241- 276. 
41 Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau and Jean-Michel 
Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First edn, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press 2008). 
42 Ronald Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 72, 73. 
43 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1; Oliver 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: Free 
Press, London: Collier Macmillan 1985) 23. 
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transaction costs to economic analysis44 pointed at the illusory comfort of the world in which 
mainstream economists lived – an ideal world in which there are no costs of search, 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement.45 Post-Chicago scholars are also aware of the 
importance of transaction costs and the need to take economic thinking beyond the idea of 
perfect markets.46 It is not only that the assumption of full rationality is relaxed in order to 
base the new institutional analysis on the concept of bounded rationality.47 Some post-
Chicagoans also realise the need to integrate a more realistic model of behaviour in their 
approach.48 The true progress made by New Institutional Economics, I think, is rooted in the 
very procedure of analysis which makes the latter less abstract and more sensitive to the 
actual facts.  
At the beginning of the analysis is always the Coase theorem.49 In a world of zero transaction 
costs, law does not matter since parties will always bargain for the one efficient outcome. 
Our world, however, is a world of positive transaction costs and in it, law has important 
efficiency implications.50 In the imperfect human universe parties will bargain not until the 
right reaches its most valued user but until the expected gains exceed the expected costs. So 
how the particular right is initially assigned determines its final place. Therefore, law should 
be efficient, i.e. it should structure property rights in a way which minimises transaction 
costs and maximises society's wealth.51 So far, so good; Chicagoans and New 
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46 See e.g. Goetz and Scott. 
47 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour (Second edn, New York: Macmillan 1961) 24. Some new 
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made and the effect of these choices on the economy. North; Douglass North, ‘Prologue’ in John Drobak and 
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48 Eric Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’ (2003) 112 The 
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49 In fact Coase, himself, did not expressly state the Coase theorem. It can be induced from Coase, ‘The Problem 
of Social Cost’. 
50 It is often the case that only one of the assumptions, on which the Coase theorem rests, is emphasised – that of 
zero transaction costs (including information costs). For this reason it will be useful here to recall the other two 
assumptions which are just as important: (1) that the rights over the resources are fully defined, and (2) that the 
legal rights are alienable. Mercuro and Medema 110, 113. For more on these two assumptions, see infra Section 
D. of this Chapter. 
51 This is known as the Coase lesson. For a detailed proof and interpretation of the Coase theorem, see ibid 107-
119. 
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Institutionalists would not, I think, disagree on this.52 But what are the concrete steps to be 
taken in the process of finding the efficient solution? Here is where the most significant 
differences start.  
The logic of the Chicago analysis roughly proceeds as follows: An optimal contractual 
model is constructed under the assumption of zero transaction costs. The hypothetical legal 
rule enabling the parties to achieve the outcome in the optimal model is pointed to. The 
existing legal rule is then compared to the optimal one: if it is the same, the effective law is 
efficient; if it differs, then it is criticised as a rule that does not lead to an optimal result and, 
therefore, should be changed. The exercise may also include changes in the assumptions of 
the zero-cost model to discern different rules that are efficient under different conditions. 
Then again it will be seen whether the real-life rule fits any of the efficient ones.53 New 
Institutional Economics, however, sets on a different route of analysis (again roughly 
described): The different real-life institutional solutions to a problem are identified. Then the 
institutional framework is inquired into in order to discover the factors determining 
transaction costs and the types of transaction costs associated with each of the solutions. 
Further, the different institutional arrangements are compared in terms of costs. The 
appropriate institution then becomes the one that implies the lowest level of transaction 
costs.54  
Obviously, both schools aim at getting as close as possible to the Coasean zero-transaction-
cost world. Why then is the methodological procedure of New Institutional Economics to be 
preferred? The problem with the Chicago approach is the continuous, invariable emphasis on 
the optimal model. In the Chicagoan vision, the ideal world should be approximated by 
imitation, by replicating it as if it actually exists. If parties cannot reach the efficient 
allocation of property rights as a result of transaction costs, the law should provide for it to 
help them attain the outcome as if there were no barriers to exchange. Costs are minimised 
by assuming zero costs and assigning rights and liabilities as if this assumption were correct. 
The rights go to the party that would have purchased them as the highest value user; the 
                                                 
52 For this reason Coase is considered a founding father of both schools. It is also for this reason that Mercuro 
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Ibid 243. 
53 This description of the Chicago thinking follows to a great extent the description in Posner, ‘Economic 
Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’ 833-834. 
54 This rough description is distilled from the methodological account in Chapter 1 Transaction Cost Economics 
of Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. 
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liabilities  go to the party that would have assumed them as the least cost avoider.55 Yet, the 
assumption is not correct since no matter how much transaction costs are reduced, they are 
never completely eliminated and there will always be costs of defining and enforcing 
property rights.56 So we cannot arrive at the ideal world by imagining we are actually there. 
In other words, the mistake of Chicagoans is that in trying to approximate the desired state of 
the world, they reason as if it is possible to actually achieve it. New Institutionalists, on the 
other hand, have accepted that this is unfeasible so the emphasis is on where we are now, not 
on where we want to be. They study existing alternative governance institutions and aim at 
economising on transaction costs by endorsing the institution which governs exchange at the 
lowest cost level. Saving takes place not by mechanically reproducing the situation parties 
would be in if transaction costs were absent but by choosing the real-life workable 
arrangement that is the most cost advantageous. In this way, New Institutional Economics 
moves away from the "economic nirvana" and adopts an analytical technique that enables 
accurate conclusions. 
This does not mean that the Chicago models are useless. On the contrary, they represent an 
important analytical and educational tool which provides important information on the 
incentives affected by a legal institution and the trade-offs involved by stimulating one 
incentive or another. This is the reason why this thesis also starts from the received 
neoclassical wisdom.57 Yet, once the potential of optimal models is exhausted, it is necessary 
to step into the real world since much of the insight can be gained not by keeping hold of the 
model but by examining the imperfect environment. Often (post-) neoclassical models leave 
out important variables either because the latter do not appear as crucial within the ideal 
world, or because the scholar is focused on coming up with clear-cut recommendations. 
Other, more sophisticated models include the relevant variables but can lead to definite 
conclusions only if there is statistical data which can be punched into the model to make it 
operative.58 In contrast, New Institutional Economics investigates in detail the sources of 
transaction costs in particular contexts and attenuates the quantification difficulty by 
                                                 
55 The same reasoning stays behind the efficient breach principle under which the promisor should be allowed to 
breach the contract if the gains from the breach exceed the costs. 
56 Steven Cheung, ‘On the New Institutional Economics’ in Steven Cheung (ed), Economic Explanations: 
Selected Papers of Steven Cheung (First edn, Hong Kong: Arcadia Press Ltd. 2005) 248-250; Cooter and Ulen, 
Law and Economics 94; Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’ 11. 
57 See infra Chapter V. 
58 See in this sense Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’. 
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comparing the costs of diverse institutions. Instead of being paralysed by the absence of data 
on the magnitude of costs, it draws conclusions from their difference. Without being too 
much preoccupied with computation problems, lawyers can make a substantial contribution 
in this analytical procedure as they are well-trained to recognise the transaction costs 
depending on the national legal system. Therefore, this research will also employ 
comparative institutional analysis as developed by New Institutionalists.   
Second, the Chicago school invariably insists on the necessary connection between 
efficiency and the market. If the efficient allocation of property rights can be reached by 
parties' contracting, the reasoning goes, the law should facilitate exchange by providing for 
maximum tradability of property rights at low cost. It should ensure the conditions for 
achieving the efficient outcome by excluding any restrictions on freedom of contracting and 
by "mimicking the market". Such an interpretation of the Coase theorem is easily translated 
into the normative recommendation of minimum regulation. Public regulation is viewed as 
an additional source of transaction costs, obstructing the operation of competitive markets 
and generated, among other things, by regulatory capture.59 To this prescription also 
contributes the view of the efficiency of common law (broadly understood as judge-made 
law).60 According to Posner, the common law incentivises players to "channel their 
transactions through the market" or, in case of high transaction costs, simply reproduces the 
outcome that would have been obtained, had costs not impeded market operation.61 Its 
efficient legal doctrines make state intervention through statutory regulation unnecessary, all 
the more that the legislative process does not have the means to produce efficient results, 
whether these means are the party's choice between settlement and adjudication,62 an 
evolutionary mechanism, driven by the utility-maximising decisions of litigants,63 or the 
utility function of judges as determined by the institutional structure of the adjudicative 
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system.64 In short, the decentralised decision making of the free, self-correcting market 
generates efficiency and if a market failure occurs, it is sufficient to rely on the common law 
to bring about the efficient outcome. 
Such a view, however, does not coincide with the hypothesis of this thesis which entails an 
increasing regulatory role of contract law. Truly, such a hypothesis suggests a diminishing 
importance of public regulation but, still, it also implies that the market does not always 
function efficiently and that market failures need correction. The starting point entails a trend 
from a command-and-control to incentive-based regulation, not a trend toward deregulation 
as advocated by the Chicago school. From the above short account of the Chicagoan 
viewpoint it is clear that the origin of the market bias lies in the way Chicagoans construe the 
Coase lesson. In their view, the role of law should only be to define property rights and to 
assign them to the party who values them most since this would be the result from the market 
operation in the zero-transaction-cost world. Yet, as explained, such a laissez-faire attitude 
would lead to efficiency only if it actually brings about the ideal world, an outcome that is 
highly unlikely.65  
The source of market favouritism, however, can also be found in the natural law model of 
property rights which is at the basis of neoclassical economics. This is the model on which 
Adam Smith, defying mercantilism, grounded his theory of the invisible hand.66 Setting out 
to formalise Smith's doctrine, the Chicago school embraced the natural law definition of 
property rights, implying a sovereign dominion of the individual, in which he is free from 
any government intervention and has an unrestricted bundle of rights over certain resources 
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(property). Developed by civil lawyers, the natural law concept was divorced from the idea 
of obligation, necessary to control externalities, and any property right limitation was 
equated with limitation to freedom. Such absolute property rights were to be assigned by 
private law with any constraints contained only in public law regulation.67 This model 
remained largely an intellectual product and never underlay in its pure form the property 
rights structure in any legal system.68 Yet, it became the background against which 
mainstream law and economics developed its theory, placing great emphasis on the free 
market and perceiving any restraint on it as exogenously imposed.69  
Even after Coase had reconnected property rights and liability,70 mainstream economists did 
not re-examine the property right concept which continued to encompass a zone of "liberty 
over things" and to disregard the fact that in any legal system right-holders also have 
obligations.71 Searching for new methods to fill the void, opened by Legal Realism,72 the US 
legal scholars who became part of the law and economics movement73 adopted economic 
insights without critically questioning them. Economic theoretical concepts were espoused 
without explicitly dispelling the natural law assumption, but as Coase had opened the door to 
real-world legal institutions, the analysis was directed to US law. Thus, the deregulation idea 
supported by the natural law model, received a new resurgence by the institutional structure 
of the American legal system, allotting an important role to courts and much less faith in 
centralised decision-making. In this sense, the already existing misconception was not 
dismissed but another layer of confusion was added – the home country bias.74  
Nevertheless, Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost" paved the way for a genuine shift in the 
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way legal-economic analysis is carried out. Coase rejected the zero-transaction-cost world as 
an ideal place in which the absence of costs makes any institutions, even markets, useless. 75   
Bringing actual, existing law into the analysis, he made the first step of moving away from 
the natural law model, which is at the root of economic theory. In addition, his account 
showed that along with the ex ante centralised model of regulation, the only one imagined by 
economists until then, there exists a functionally equivalent ex post decentralised model, 
operating through the imposition of remedies in private causes of action.76 Truly, the shift in 
the established paradigm turns out to be long and difficult since the Coase theorem continues 
to be misread as ruling out state intervention.77 One reason for this is that New 
Institutionalists have not yet come up with a theory on the choice between public and private 
law.78 But they have made a great progress in digging out the available options of 
institutional control and retreating from the automatic recommendation that the market 
should be left to do its job.  
What makes New Institutional Economics valuable for this research is its premise that the 
institutional framework, of which the legal framework is a part, matters for economic 
performance.79 Institutions determine the level of transaction costs both at the micro-level of 
contracting between private parties and at the macro-level of the economy as a whole.80 
When talking about efficient markets, the logic unfolds, economists already assume a 
complex set of institutions which on balance promote the efficient operation of the market.81 
That is, the market is not efficient per se, its efficiency depends on the institutional structure, 
so improvement in economic performance requires investigation of the way different 
institutional frameworks enhance efficiency.82 In this investigation the optimal, though not 
perfect solution may be provided by whatever real-life arrangement is found to exist: ex ante 
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or ex post; statutory law, judge-made law or private ordering; or any combination between 
them. In this sense, in the world of transaction costs, market solutions are only one of the 
possible alternatives among others, with the range of possibilities including command-and-
control as well as responsive regulation.83 The superiority of any alternative can be claimed 
only after careful comparative institutional analysis revealing the pros and cons of each of 
the options.84  
Separate from the market, efficiency becomes a theoretical concept dependent on the 
institutional context. With law being a vital part of this context,85 a legal researcher may 
proceed with his mind clear and eyes wide open about comparing different legal institutions 
in different jurisdictions. Considering the choice of jurisdictions in this particular work, it is 
not difficult to suppose that the amount of relevant statutory law (i.e. interventionist public 
regulation from neoclassical perspective) is much bigger in Bulgaria compared to the US and 
England, that specific performance and damages have different weight in the three 
jurisdictions, and that in all three of them the two types of remedies strike a different balance 
between facilitation and regulation. Yet, as there is not one single efficient solution, it cannot 
be said from the outset which country's legal institutions are more efficient. Such a 
conclusion requires an in-depth examination of the types of transaction costs generated by 
the legal-economic environment in each jurisdiction. What is more, as efficiency no longer 
constitutes an absolute yardstick for comparison, recommendations will probably differ with 
regard to each of the countries. Thus, the higher subtlety of the positive institutional analysis 
will most probably lead to more subtle and dissimilar normative prescriptions.86 
                                                 
83 For such an interpretation of the Coase theorem see Deakin, ‘Law versus Economics? Reflections on the 
Normative Foundations of Economic Activity’; Deakin and Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A 
Reappraisal’. 
84 In this respect Coase was most explicit. See Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 18-19; Coase, The Firm, the 
Market and the Law 117-118; Ronald Coase, ‘Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson’ (1996) 25 Journal 
of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, January 1996) 103. 
85 Institutions include formal rules (constitutions, laws, regulations) and informal constraints (conventions, 
norms of behaviour, self-imposed codes of conduct). North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic 
Performance 4. 
86 This account of the advantages of New Institutional Economics, of course, does not mean that all research, 
which builds on the claim that institutions matter and uses inter-jurisdictional comparative analysis of legal 
institutions, automatically avoids all theoretical and methodological problems. Thus, the studies associated with 
the New Comparative Economics school have been subjected to fierce criticism from the legal community. 
Using statistical methods, the Legal Origins strand of New Comparative Economics seeks to assert a clear link 
between the origins of a jurisdiction's legal system, on one side, and, on the other side, the content and 
enforcement of its legal rules, as well as its economic performance. The large-scale studies offer far-reaching 
conclusions that do not discriminate between origin and recipient countries or between the ways in which legal 
transplantation has taken place (involuntary imposition, voluntary emulation, etc.). That is, although on the face 
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Third, Chicago legal-economic analysis is remarkably static.87 With models omitting the 
dynamics of the economic and the legal system, neoclassical theory is able to draw a picture 
concerning only a particular point of time. Relying solely on an ex ante comparison between 
the costs and benefits of the introduction of a rule, the Coase model also misses the 
dimension of legal-economic change. Thus, for example, a legal rule compensating 
externalities may preclude the rise of welfare-enhancing business in the short run, but in the 
long run it may encourage competitors to search for innovative, less harmful ways of 
production, thus actually increasing well-being.88 Trying to develop a long term vision, in the 
1970's and 1980's of the 20th century, the Chicago school advanced a hypothesis which saw 
the development of common law as a steady evolution toward efficiency.89 However, 
empirical time-series studies have already produced evidence that does not sustain this 
hypothesis in the commercial area.90 
With regard to the development of a dynamic theory, New Institutional Economics has set 
foot on a much firmer ground. The theory is built on a model of institutional change, which 
New Institutionalists see primarily as an incremental process, though change in a 
discontinuous manner is not excluded, either.91 In the model, law is no longer some 
exogenous, human addition to the market, the latter appearing as an ever-existing divine 
creation. On the contrary, both law and the market are institutions which, set in a larger and 
complex institutional environment, evolve together, each exerting pressure on the other and 
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affecting its development.92 In contrast with the neoclassical vision which pictures a relentless 
advancement toward a stable efficient equilibrium, New Institutionalists tell a much more 
sophisticated story of change, in which convergence and  divergence intermingle in a 
complicated fashion. While North does not deny that some convergence can be observed 
within the Western industrial world, he shows convincingly that, even in this case, national 
stories of evolution diverge, with the gap growing sharply when the analysis is extended 
beyond these limits.93 He explains the general process of convergence as a movement toward 
efficiency. Yet, he acknowledges simultaneously that worldwide inefficient property rights 
structures abound (with competitive pressures not eliminating them) and societies vary greatly 
in their economic performance. He rationalises this puzzling – from the mainstream viewpoint 
– observation with the constraining nature of institutions, which condition organisations' 
choices, incentivising maximising behaviour that in fact perpetuates the existing institutional 
structure. The way to understand the process of institutional stability and change as well as 
the convergent/divergent evolution of institutions across jurisdictions is to retrace the 
historical context in which national institutional matrixes have grown.94  
North's observations on convergence and divergence between countries' economic 
performance do not radically differ from the convergence/divergence tendencies perceived by 
comparative lawyers. Rethinking comparative law classifications, more and more often they 
emphasise the so-called Western legal tradition (versus e.g. Islamic legal tradition, etc.), 
which, despite the important differences between the encompassed common law and civil law 
jurisdictions, is considered roughly homogeneous.95 This analogy in discourse has made me 
frame the hypothesis regarding legal change of contract law in the selected jurisdictions (all 
within the Western world) as a movement toward efficiency. New Institutional Economics 
forces lawyers to recognise that introducing a new legal solution means expending scarce 
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University Institute March 2011). 
93 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance 6, 130. 
94 Ibid Preface, 6-7, 73-82. 
95 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 95, 224-226; Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Methods in Comprative 
Law: an Intellectual Overview’ in Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (First edn, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 10. 
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resources and thus does away with any traces of economic nirvana that may be left in 
comparative law.96 But what is more important, by exploring the kind of conditions that 
account for institutional change toward (in)efficiency across time, the historical branch of the 
New Institutional school can greatly enrich comparative research on legal transplants.97 This 
is essential considering that despite having collected abounding evidence on the occurrence of 
legal change, comparativists know very little about its causal factors, to which they continue 
to refer only by the vague notion of prestige.98  
In examining history, the concepts of path dependency and institutional complementarity 
become crucial for understanding long-run legal and economic change. The increasing 
returns of past institutional choices underpin the evolution of legal institutions and markets 
on a particular path and reversal of direction often comes only through changes in the polity 
or technological shocks.99 From this perspective, the very mode of change (e.g. choice of 
regulation by contract law or by administrative intervention) may be determined by a strong 
path dependency. On one hand, such dependency enables predictions about the probable 
response of a legal system to a new challenge in conditions of continuity; on the other hand, 
it influences the effects generated by a new legal rule in a particular jurisdiction.100 In 
addition, the choice of one type of institutional arrangement in the economic domain makes a 
fitting institution viable in the legal domain and vice versa. Such institutional 
complementarities create the possibility for multiple self-perpetuating equilibria, all of which 
                                                 
96 It has been asserted that the positivistic perspective of domestic lawyers is supported by the neoclassical 
economic nirvana, in which consistency of the hierarchical system of legal norms, is achieved without any 
limitations on rationality and transaction costs. Nicita and Pagano; Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo 
Pagano, ‘Law, Economics, and Institutional Complexity. An Introduction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita 
and Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 
2007) 1-2. The comparative scholarship on legal irritants and legal fragmentation, however, implies some 
understanding of the constraints, termed by economists as transaction costs and bounded rationality. Gunther 
Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law, or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ in 
Francis Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law: the Legal Effects of European Integration (F rst edn, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2000). Yet, to the extent some lawyers still automatically equate borrowing and harmonisation 
with the introduction of the "best" solution, even comparative analysis has not completely broken free from 
economic nirvana assumptions. 
97 New Comparative Economics is convincingly criticised with respect to the necessary conditions it identified 
for successful legal change. It has been submitted that the effect of transplanted legal solutions is determined to a 
greater extent by the degree of their domestication, achieved in the receiving country, rather than by the legal 
family from which they were borrowed. Daniel Berkowitz, Katarina Pistor and Jean-François Richard, 
‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165; 
Daniel Berkowitz, Katarina Pistor and Richard Jean-François, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 163. 
98 In this sense, see Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 313, 
320; Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 129. 
99 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance 112. 
100 Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 348-349. 
 63 
may be equally optimal or sub-optimal, but which may also result in a Pareto-inferior 
outcome.101  Therefore, convergence of legal systems toward efficiency is possible but in no 
way guaranteed, and divergences may mean inefficiencies but not necessarily.102 Different 
equally efficient or inefficient development trajectories are also feasible. Thus, emphasising 
the local historical conditions and the interdependence between the legal and economic 
domains, New Institutional Economics rejects the universal evolutionary path of law 
envisaged by the Chicago school. Instead, it provides this research with a framework to 
analyse legal change which allows for a trend of convergence but also accounts for the 
diversity of national laws and for the dissimilar ways transplanted legal solutions play out in 
different legal systems.103  
The different analytical procedure (i), the view of the market as not efficient in itself (ii) and 
the development of convincing theory explaining change over time (iii) constitute real 
methodological differences between the Chicago school and New Institutional Economics 
which ultimately translate into a different stance with regard to the concept of efficiency. In 
neoclassical theory efficiency is understood as the ideal solution in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, 
which can be brought about by the free market and with which common law comports. New 
Institutional Economics, on the other hand, does not have such an absolute view of 
efficiency. It is not obsessed with the idea of devising the ideal solution. It rather looks for 
the second-best but feasible solution which is to be chosen from the set of identified, 
functionally equivalent alternatives according to the level and types of transaction costs. 
Transaction costs themselves depend on the institutional environment in which the 
alternative options are embedded.104 Efficiency, thus, becomes a relative, dynamic notion, 
not equated with the unique, optimal state of the world to which law, in the Chicagoan 
vision, is bound to converge in the long run. Efficiency is contingent on the institutional 
framework, the latter in turn determined by the historical path on which it has evolved.  
It is this context-dependent, dynamic concept of efficiency that is embraced by comparative 
                                                 
101 Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (First edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: 
MIT Press 2001). For a formal definition of institutional complementarity, see Ugo Pagano, ‘Legal Positions and 
Institutional Complementarities’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings 
and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2005) 65-66. 
102 In the same sense, see Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 129, 133-134. 
103 See in this sense Nicita and Pagano. 
104 Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (First edn, New York: Oxford University Press 1996). 
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law and economics105 and also by this particular research. Such understanding of efficiency 
implies that for the same legal problem one contract remedy may turn out to be efficient in 
one legal system and inefficient in another or that different contract remedies may prove to 
be equally efficient in different national laws.106 That is why, the thesis studies no national 
legal solution by itself but evaluates the efficiency of each one only within the particular 
legal-economic environment. Consequently, with regard to any normative recommendations, 
efficiency is viewed as a category which is to be implemented in different ways in the 
different legal systems.107 Having clarified the choice of economic methodology and the 
controversial issue of efficiency from a theoretical perspective, I now turn to the important 
role of comparative law in the selected interdisciplinary approach. 
D. The role of comparative law 
As both New Institutional Economics and comparative law employ the comparative 
technique and the functional method of comparison, they naturally merge in the comparative 
law and economics approach. In the past comparative lawyers have often slipped into merely 
descriptive exercises in which they observe similarities and differences between legal 
systems without providing convincing theoretical explanations for them. From this point of 
view, comparative law can gain from the mature economic framework, providing it with a 
possibility to rationalise better the collected evidence as well as to measure more accurately 
the common core and the dissimilarities between national laws.108 Also, unlike lawyers in the 
common law tradition, who master inductive analysis, economists tend to engage in 
deductive thinking: on the basis of certain assumptions they construct models which they 
then test against empirical data in order to draw conclusions.109 In this sense, legal scholars 
can benefit from economic reasoning which forces them to understand and make explicit 
their own systemic assumptions about law. No doubt, starting from abstract legal norms and 
overarching principles, civil lawyers are accustomed to deductive analysis.110 This, however, 
does not mean that they are proficient in spelling out their premises. On the contrary, largely 
                                                 
105 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics; Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’. 
106 Paraphrased from Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’347. See in the same sense Mattei, 
Comparative Law and Economics 133-134. 
107 In a similar sense, see Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 22. 
108 In this sense, see Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 346-347; Mattei, Comparative Law 
and Economics 97, 124-125. 
109 Mercuro and Medema 41-43.  
110 Zweigert and Kötz 69. 
 65 
determined by legal tradition, these premises are often taken for granted and thus remain 
tacit in the reasoning of civil lawyers. In addition, the increase in legislation of technical 
character as well as in the standing of the judiciary progressively stimulates inductive legal 
thinking in civil law jurisdictions. Thus, continental legal scholars can also take a lesson 
from economists in clarifying their presuppositions when searching for the correct answer to 
a problem. 
Economic analysis enriches comparative law; yet, the latter's contribution to law and 
economics should also not be underestimated. Comparative law brings in an inexhaustible 
pool of alternative solutions to legal problems, making economics less abstract, more 
engaged with the real world and simultaneously more capable of generalising about the 
working of law, not as local background but as universal social phenomenon.111  
Opening the door to an opulent variety of existing property rights structures, none of which 
matches the natural law model, comparative law shows the necessity of moving beyond the 
unrealistic template on which mainstream law and economics bases its analysis.112 
Appreciation of the wide range of "jural relations" (rights, liberties, powers, immunities, 
duties, liabilities and disabilities)113 will permit a better understanding of the reasons for 
which legal systems have different combinations of remedies, allow different leeway for 
judges in awarding them and employ a different model (centralised or decentralised) for 
remedial distribution.114  
Yet, the merger with comparative law is also about surpassing the wisdom received from 
New Institutional Economics. The economic nirvana of zero transaction costs,115 which New 
Institutionalists manage to overcome, depends on a "legal nirvana",116 sustained by the 
positivistic view of law as a united, hierarchical system of legal norms, whose frictionless 
                                                 
111 In this sense: Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 346, 348; Mattei, Comparative Law 
and Economics 27-28, 70. 
112 On the natural law misconception of neoclassical law and economics, see supra Section C. of this Chapter.  
113 Daniel Cole and Peter Grossman, ‘The Meaning of Property "Rights": Law vs. Economics’ (2002) 78 Land 
Economics 317. 
114 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 58, 63-67. 
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consistency is derived from the authority of one single source.117 This legal nirvana has not 
yet faded away in new institutional research as the latter continues to assume well-defined, 
tradable property rights over all valued attributes of goods and services, for which rights 
there always exists a market and an enforcement system, producing efficient resolution to 
economic conflicts.118 New institutionalist economists simply take the system of setting and 
enforcing property rights as given. In their analysis, the interrelationship between transaction 
governance and law does not affect the level of transaction costs.119 That is why, the 
conjugation with comparative law can be especially insightful. With its interest in many, 
simultaneously valid legal orders comparative law naturally rejects the legal nirvana, 
persevering in new institutional economic analysis. In one stroke, it also cures the home 
country bias, another particular expression of positivism, inherited from American legal 
scholars working in law and economics.120 The ample variety of legal arrangements brought 
in by comparative law in a way confirms, on one hand, their importance for determining the 
ex ante and ex post transaction costs and, on the other hand, the problem of using one single 
legal system as a background for drawing fundamental conclusions on the effect of legal 
institutions. 
Economic tools can be applied to any legal system and it is a matter of comparative 
knowledge, not of a priori economic impotence, to factor the different legal solutions across 
jurisdictions in the analysis. The functional method121 allows comparativists to pierce the 
legal systems' doctrinal veil, which obstructs understanding of the way legal rules operate. 
Carried out on the basis of factual scenarios, functional comparison ignores the conceptual 
disparities between national laws and identifies the applicable legal rules solving the same 
problems in each legal system. Such a functional exercise in the thesis will enable detection 
of similarities and differences across jurisdictions regarding the available type of remedy and 
the calculation of damages. It will penetrate possible differences in legal taxonomies such as 
                                                 
117 Kelsen. 
118 Nicita and Pagano; Cafaggi, Nicita and Pagano, ‘Law, Economics, and Institutional Complexity. An 
Introduction’ 1-2. 
119 For an example of disregarding the influence of law, see Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
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contract/tort, public/private law in order to analyse the effect of legal rules on individual 
behaviour. Yet, the transaction cost analysis will be impoverished if the work remains at the 
stage of functional comparison and completely disregards the differences in the conceptual 
frameworks.122 Once the legal solutions that are functional substitutes across jurisdictions are 
identified, the relative efficiency of each of them will become clear only by juxtaposing them 
within the context of each of the selected legal systems. At this point the specific taxonomic 
and conceptual structures become important again since they can turn out to be sources of 
transaction costs that have to be taken into consideration.  
From this perspective comparative law has accumulated a tremendous amount of knowledge 
that can help in distinguishing the real and false differences between common law and civil 
law countries, between the US and European jurisdictions. It has much to say about the 
diverse legal traditions and the possible hurdles generated by them that may preclude legal 
change in the direction of efficiency.123 Translated in economic terminology such hurdles 
constitute ex ante transaction costs in the definition of property rights, an issue on which 
economic analysis has made very little progress.124 Comparative law can also explain the 
reasons for which functionally equivalent legal solutions may prove to be grounded in 
contract in one legal system and in tort in another. It can illuminate the diverse allocation of 
institutional roles across jurisdictions and thus justify the different weight attributed to 
private law and public law devices. The different nature of the legal arrangements and the 
transaction costs imposed by legal tradition may suggest a modification within the existing 
legal solution without changing its assignment between different areas (contract or tort, 
private or public law).125 Comparative research also implies that the development of a legal 
system may strongly depend on the degree of influence of the professional groups, framing 
the law, in the different legal contexts. Hence, determined by factors such as power and 
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authority, the legal system evolution may not necessarily entail cuts in transaction costs.126 
All these are matters which must be investigated on a case-by-case basis. However, what 
needs to be emphasised at this stage is that methodologically comparative law has a great 
deal of experience in the deconstruction of the declared legal rules as well as in the deep-
level examination of the context-dependent conceptual framework.127 Both are vital for 
making a sound economic analysis.  
One important methodological question, on which comparative law has made a major 
difference and which needs to be clarified before engaging in the empirical research, is the 
divergent source-of-law structure in the compared common law and civil law jurisdictions. 
As already mentioned, in order to go beyond black-letter law and capture law in action, 
much of the empirical data in this research will come from careful examination of case-law 
in each jurisdiction.128 Case-law, however, is not a source of law in civil law jurisdictions 
and in principle Bulgaria does not make an exception in this regard. Only the interpretative 
decisions and ordinances of the general assemblies of the supreme courts, which are binding 
on the courts and the executives,129 are viewed as sources of law; yet, ones that should not be 
confused with the usual lawmaking acts because of their secondary and interpretative 
nature.130 On the face, the selected legal systems neatly fit into the common perception of the 
                                                 
126 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 120-121. 
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128 See supra Section B. of Chapter I. 
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with Art. 297 of the Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure, promulgated State Gazette №59 of 20.07.2007, in force 
since 01.03.2008, last ammended State Gazette №5 of 14.11.2011); yet, no rule of precedent exists and other 
 69 
common law/civil law divide – the US and English legal systems are mostly based on judge-
made law, applied according to the rule of precedent, while the Bulgarian legal system is 
grounded on statutory law, interpreted by courts. For these reasons, the predominant focus of 
the analysis on case-law can be a priori attacked as unconvincing both by mainstream law-
and-economics scholars and by conventional domestic lawyers.  
The argument of mainstream supporters of economic analysis is usually framed in terms of 
legal process. Concerned mainly with courts' efficient decision-making, they consider a civil 
law system such as the Bulgarian one inefficient from the start. In their view, in such a 
system the legislative process, subject to capture by interest groups, has the lead while 
judges, deprived of any lawmaking functions, are merely bureaucrats, enforcing the 
legislators' will. Domestic civil lawyers, on the other hand, are often preoccupied with 
research ignoring the differences in national structures of sources of law. They view 
economic analysis as placing disproportionate weight on case-law, which even if having 
some influence in legal reality, is not setting out binding legal rules. The absence of a rule of 
precedent gives rise to concerns over whether the economic approach is at all fit to be 
applied to civil law. Clearly both views are the legacy of the positivist conceptions of law, 
ignoring the latest achievements of comparative law methodology.131 
Inherently anti-positivist in nature, comparative law has long passed the point of juxtaposing 
only the legislative texts of European continental legal systems, struggling with the 
phenomenon of uncodified common law. The focus on law in action has opened new lines of 
                                                                                                                                                        
judges faced with similar disputes are not bound by the earlier decision even if it was rendered by a higher court. 
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131 In this sense Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 69-99. 
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enquiry revealing that the similarities between the two legal traditions are more than 
previously presumed. On the other hand, being faithful to historical analysis, comparative 
law has maintained that the national differences in the source-of-law doctrine can be 
understood only in view of the historical development of the particular legal system. Relying 
on these methodological premises, the amassed comparative experience shows that the 
differences between civil law and common law pointed out above are exaggerated and do not 
preclude economic analysis. 
To be precise, the relationship between the legislative process and the judicial process has 
also raised concerns in common law jurisdictions. The declaratory theory of law, insisting 
that judges were not making but only digging out and declaring the ever existing common 
law, was a reaction to openly expressed uneasiness that judicial lawmaking was not in line 
with the doctrine of separation of power and with the fundamental principles of democratic 
legitimacy. It was the exercised self-restraint on the side of English judges and the 
strengthening of the rule of precedent in the course of the 19th century that assuaged fears of 
judicial creativity. Yet, after the rule of precedent had been relaxed in the second half of the 
20th century, English judges have been increasingly criticised for their activism.132 The issue 
of whether judges make or find the law is also a matter of dispute in the American legal 
doctrine. The debate usually receives a new impetus around the time of appointment of 
federal judges with some circles still supporting the myth that judges only interpret the 
law.133 
As Bulgarian contract law developed largely within the Romanic legal tradition,134 judges 
are denied any lawmaking role. This also explains the laconic judicial justifications in 
Bulgarian court decisions essentially written in the French style, without discussing the 
diverse scholarly opinions, as is typical for German case-law, or public policy reasons, as is 
increasingly done by English judges. Yet, the role of Bulgarian judges is not exhausted with 
being the "mouthpiece of statutory law", as appealed by Montesquieu. Bulgarian courts have 
developed important issues of the regime of damages for breach of contract, of the contract 
for the benefit of third parties, the contract for transfer of property in exchange of care and 
                                                 
132 In this sense: Stefan Vogenauer, ‘Judge-Made Law’ in Dougas Baird and others (eds), The Max Planck 
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maintenance. Actually, the broad standards, used abundantly in the legislative acts in civil 
law systems, increase the importance of case-law, as judges are charged with the task of 
giving these broad concepts a concrete meaning.135 The case-law in the area of preliminary 
contracts has even prompted amendments to the relevant statutory provisions.136 What is 
more, the new legislation, adopted after the start of the democratic changes in Bulgaria, has 
supplied the basis for increasing the importance of case-law in the Bulgarian source-of-law 
system.  
Thus, the currently effective Code of Civil Procedure provides the Supreme Cassation Court 
with an additional mechanism for standardising contradictory case-law besides the abstract 
and binding interpretative decisions and ordinances.137 Now the individual decisions of the 
Court related to particular disputes also work to this end since where the appealed decision is 
rendered in the context of conflicting case-law, in its judgment the Supreme Cassation Court 
is obliged to point and reason which of the case-law is correct, which is not correct, and 
which is inapplicable to the case at hand.138 Also, where the appellate court has pronounced 
on "an issue which is relevant for the accurate application of the law as well as for 
development of law", this constitutes a ground for cassation appeal.139 Such a formula, 
recognising that courts resolve questions which matter "for development of law" already 
suggests tacit acknowledgement by the legislator that courts, too, contribute to lawmaking. 
Interesting enough, the Supreme Cassation Court chose to be more explicit and while 
interpreting these legislative provisions bindingly, to assert further the role of its case-law as 
a source of law.140  
Recall that under the text of the Judiciary Act it is only the Supreme Cassation Court's 
interpretative decisions and ordinances that are binding, but not its individual decisions.141 
However, the Court defined its own case-law, the conflict with which represents a ground for 
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cassation appeal, by including both kinds of acts.142 As a result, since it is possible for each 
appellate judgment to be challenged for conflicting with the Supreme Cassation Court's acts, 
be they abstract or individual, the lower instance courts, as well as indirectly the addressees 
of the interpreted legislation, are actually motivated to ensure their judgments, and 
respectively their behaviour, are in conformity with these acts. In this sense, by putting its 
interpretative acts and its individual decisions on the same footing, the Supreme Cassation 
Court in fact made the latter also binding on the lower instance courts, though binding only 
on the facts of the particular case.143 This bindingness entails more than the courts' obligation 
to pay respect to effective court decisions, following from res judicata, and, functionally, is 
not different from the common law rule of precedent.144  
The Supreme Cassation Court takes a further step in building the appreciation of its 
individual decisions as sources of law when elaborating on the meaning of the phrases 
"accurate application of the law" and "development of law" (part of another ground for 
cassation appeal).145 The Court sees its contribution in the "development of law" not only in 
overturning the case-law which applies the law incorrectly, but also in changing the case-law 
(including the binding one) which has become outdated because of changed social conditions 
as well as in expanding the scope of existing legal rules in the course of interpreting by 
analogy.146 How does this expanding of scope fits with the "accurate application of the law" 
and how far the Court can go in adjusting case-law to social changes are, indeed, vexing 
questions.147 Clearly, such interpretative activity is akin to lawmaking and the Court uses the 
discussed interpretative ordinance to affirm its own influence in shaping and modernising 
                                                 
142 See point 2 Interpretative Ordinance №1 of 19.02.2010. To be correct, the Court included the causal 
decisions, rendered under the new Code of Civil Procedure with the aims of standardising contradictory case-law 
or ensuring the accurate application of the law as well as development of law. 
143 The Supreme Cassation Court does not shun the categorising of its causal decisions as "binding" on the lower 
instance courts. See point 4 of Interpretative Ordinance №1 of 19.02.2010; point 2 of Interpretative Ordinance 
№2 of 29.09.2011, comm c №2/2010, General Assembly of the Civil and Commercial Chambers of the Supreme 
Cassation Court. See also Decision of 10.06.2013, comm. c. №1114/2013 of Regional Court – Ruse.  
144 The causal decisions rendered by panels of the Supreme Cassation Court, however, are not binding on other 
panels of the Court. See point 2 of Interpretative Ordinance №2 of 29.09.2011. In other words, the precedent 
applies only vertically, but not horizontally. 
145 Art. 280 (1) p. 3 Code of Civil Procedure. 
146 See point 4 of Interpretative Ordinance №1 of 19.02.2010. In fact, in this part of its interpretative ordinance 
the Court adopted and restated the arguments of Stalev, who, in the 1990s was the only Bulgarian legal scholar, 
holding the view that case-law is a source of law. Stalev. See also supra footnote 130 of this Chapter. This 
actually is no surprise when considering that before devoting himself entirely to scholarly work, Stalev used to 
be a judge.   
147 In fact, in her dissenting opinion Judge Darya Prodanova took the view that such interpretation by analogy 
was in direct conflict with the accurate application of the law. See also Pavlova, ‘On the Role of Case-law’ 82. 
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Bulgarian law. 
In other words, emphasising its creative function and endowing its individual decisions with 
binding force even without an express statutory provision to this effect, the Supreme 
Cassation Court claims a source-of-law status for all of its judicial acts. Nevertheless, the 
traditional view which denies binding force to court decisions perpetuates, reflecting a 
common anxiety about possible legal uncertainty. In fact, the Bulgarian legal doctrine does 
not ignore the piling court decisions developing areas of civil law – discussing them, 
explaining them, criticising them, and today, most Bulgarian lawyers admit the utmost 
importance of case-law in the legal system. But even if legal scholars acquiesce to the 
creative role of judges, they are often not prepared to recognise case-law as a source of 
law.148 Still, the reality is that Bulgarian judges do not have the position of dead letters in the 
Bulgarian legal system as imagined by mainstream law-and-economics authors. 
Any judicial system needs to act in a coordinated way, resolving similar cases in a similar 
fashion. Despite the absence of a formal rule of precedent, usually, courts in Bulgaria follow 
their own previous decisions, the decisions of the higher courts, and especially those of the 
Supreme Cassation Court.149 The centralised Bulgarian court system has its own means of 
requiring judges to honour previously rendered adjudicative acts when faced with a court 
dispute having the same facts. These means are different from the means used in the highly 
decentralised American and English court systems, but they do exist. The low number of 
reversed decisions by the higher court is one of the criteria in the attestation procedure, 
determining the future prospects of promotion for judges. The strong emphasis on case-law 
in the educational programme of the National Institute of Justice, organising the initial as 
well as the continuing training of magistrates,150 as well as the existing formal and informal 
channels of publicising the existing case-law151 also play a role for the acceptance and 
perpetuation of the legal arguments made in earlier court decisions. In other words, despite 
                                                 
148 The general attitude toward judicial lawmaking is most probably best described by a short statement of a 
former assistant-professor of mine Krasimir Mitev: "Every lawyer knows that that he cannot get by without 
knowing the case-law…From a pragmatic point of view, we should never tell our judges that they can make law; 
otherwise, they will completely turn up their noses." Krassimir Mitev is a doctor of law, assistant-professor in 
law of obligations at "Paisiy Hilendarski" University of Plovdiv in Bulgaria. For the development of the 
Bulgarian judiciary, see also Tokushev, The Judiciary in Bulgaria: from Antiquity to the Present. 
149 Stoychev, ‘Contracts. Bulgaria’ General Introduction 12. 
150 See www.nij.bg, last accessed 01.12.2012. 
151 The formal channels include the published bulletins and yearbooks of the Supreme Courts. The informal ones 
include the privately developed legal databases – Ciela, Apis, Digesta, the existing legal journals, etc. 
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the refusal of conventional legal thinking to grant case-law the status of a source of law, de 
facto Bulgarian court decisions have a binding force. Indeed, this is not the juridical binding 
force, typical in common law, but it has enormous significance in the operation of the court 
system and the legal system as a whole.152 In this sense, the existing difference between the 
selected common law and civil law jurisdictions is not unbridgeable and does not foreclose 
application of the economic approach, as maintained by positivist-minded domestic lawyers.  
In my opinion, the argument of regulatory capture, which is supposed to downplay the 
legislative process as opposed to the presumptively neutral and uncorrupted judicial process, 
also does not stand with respect to the two codifying acts in Bulgarian contract and 
commercial law. Both the Contracts Act and the Commercial Act were drafted by a group of 
renowned Bulgarian legal scholars, largely following classic foreign models in the respective 
field.153 Indeed, the Contracts Act, adopted in 1951, integrated the principles of socialist law 
and planned economy, but in a way they were additionally stitched to the legal tradition, 
already established by the 1892 Contracts Act, from which the new Contracts Act did not 
break.154 This is confirmed by the ease with which in 1993 the socialist elements were cut 
out of the Contracts Act as well as by its vitality to this day.155 The drafters were not in a 
hurry to insert all the solutions proclaimed by the Soviet legal doctrine and adopted by the 
Soviet legislation. With respect to compensation of non-pecuniary damages in case of breach 
of contract, they remained faithful to the conservative position of the Western legal 
doctrine.156 Conversely, in tort, they retained the provision allowing equitable compensation 
                                                 
152 For a similar argument, see Rosen Tashev, Jurisprudence (Fourth edn, Sofia: Sibi 2010) 125-126, 115-117; 
Vogenauer, ‘Precedent, Rule of’. 
153 The Contracts Act was drafted by Prof. Ivan Apostolov, Prof. Alexander Kojuharov, Acad. Lyuben Vasilev, 
Prof. Jivko Stalev, all leading Bulgarian scholars in the field of contract law at the time. As for the Commercial 
Code, Prof. Vitali Tadjer and Prof. Ognyan Gerdjikov had a decisive role. See also supra Section B.2. of Chapter 
I. 
154 See supra Section B.2. of Chapter I. 
155 In Stoichev's view the Contracts Act establishes sufficiently full and well-composed models of particular 
contracts, which are naturally taken as templates in the process of contract drafting. Stoychev, ‘Contracts. 
Bulgaria’. 
156 Although the Soviet legal doctrine does not support compensation of non-pecuniary damages, the fact that the 
Contracts Act is silent on the question when it comes to breach of contract and that until recently Bulgarian 
courts used this silence as an argument not to award this type of damages should not be attributed to the socialist 
past. In 1944 when Bulgaria started its course on the path of socialist development, the issue had already been 
much discussed in the Bulgarian legal doctrine. In a seminal article published in 1937/1938 Apostolov 
substantiates his view in favour of compensation of non-pecuniary damages in contract. See Ivan Apostolov, ‘On 
the Theory of the Creditor's Pecuniary Interest in Contract’ (1937/1938) 33 Yearbook of "St Kliment Ohridski" 
University - Sofia, Law Department 3, 3-4. His position remained unchanged in 1947 when he published his Law 
of Obligations. See Ivan Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation (Second edn, 
Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Publishing House 1990) 7-8, 98-99.  In fact, the Bulgarian socialist legal 
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for pain and suffering, despite the prescription of the Soviet model to the contrary.157  
In reality, at the time the economic development of the different regions and of the country 
                                                                                                                                                        
doctrine almost unanimously agreed that non-pecuniary damages should be compensated in case of contractual 
breach. See e.g. Alexander Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations, vol I (Ognyan 
Gerdjikov ed, 2nd edn, Sofia: Sofi-R 1996) 265-267; Vasil Gotsev, Contractual and Delictual Liability: 
Comparison and Competition (First edn, Sofia: Science and Art 1979) 35-37. Only two Bulgarian legal scholars, 
Krassen Stoichev and Lyubomir Popov, opposed the idea. See Krasen Stoychev, ‘Review of the Case-Law 
Regarding Non-Pecuniary Damages’ (1982) 5 Legal Thought 79, 82-83; Lyubomir Popov, ‘Non-Pecuniary 
Damages in Contract’ (1987) 6 Socialist Law 26, 33. For a full review of the positions defended by Bulgarian 
legal scholars during the socialist period, see Vladimir Petrov, Compensation for Non-Pecuniary Damages in 
Contract (First edn, Sofia: "St. Kliment Ohridski" University Press 1991) 10-19. It is also worth recalling that 
Apostolov, Kojuharov and Stalev (the latter also championed compensation of non-pecuniary damages in case of 
contractual breach) were among the drafters of the 1951 Contracts Act. What is more, Stalev was actively 
involved in the preparation of the 1979 draft of Civil Code which explicitly provided for compensation of such 
damages within the frames of contractual liability. Thus, to explain the lack of an express legal provision in the 
Contracts Act with experienced pressure from the Soviet legal doctrine, especially considering that the act 
provides for compensation of non-pecuniary damages in delict, does not seem very convincing. On the contrary, 
the silence of the Contracts Act when it comes to contract is explained by Apostolov and Stalev with the way the 
institute developed in the European civil law doctrine and the specific Bulgarian context at the time of drafting 
the 1951 Contracts Act. Compensation of non-pecuniary damages was not overtly sanctioned in the Contracts 
Act just like it was not in its predecessor – the 1892 Contracts Act, the latter itself following the pattern of the 
Italian and the French civil codes. At the time they were drafted (1804, respectively 1864) the legal doctrine in 
France and Italy (as well as Germany) thought of compensation solely in terms of pecuniary damages. Since this 
was considered evident, both the French and the Italian civil codes did not contain a specific provision on the 
matter.  It was not until the end of the 19th century that French civil scholars took on the new trends coming from 
Germany which supported compensation of the non-pecuniary interest of the creditor. Yet, the Code Civil was 
not amended and the rules on compensation of non-pecuniary damages were shaped by French courts. In 
contrast, the dominant opinion of the Italian legal doctrine remained hostile to the modern tendencies, swaying 
also Italian case-law. Thus, Bulgaria met the beginning of the 20th century with the 1892 Contracts Acts copying 
the French and Italian civil codes which, drafted under the influence of the old French civil doctrine, were silent 
on the issue. Nevertheless, Apostolov held the view that free from any specific instruction in the 1892 Contracts 
Act, Bulgarian courts were not facing any obstacle in developing case-law on non-pecuniary damages in 
contractual liability. This was probably one of the reasons for which a legal provision to this effect was not 
included in the 1951 Contracts Act. Such a rule was, however, considered necessary in the field of delict in order 
to repeal a provision of the 1935 Criminal Procedure Act which allowed compensation of non-pecuniary 
damages only when incurred by certain crimes. See Apostolov, ‘On the Theory of the Creditor's Pecuniary 
Interest in Contract’; Jivko Stalev, ‘Contractual Liability for Non-Pecuniary Damages’ (1990) 1 State and Law 3, 
6-7. The resulting asymmetry in the text of the Contracts Act regarding non-pecuniary damages in contract and 
delict was unfortunately used by the Supreme Court as an argument to refuse awarding such damages in case of 
contractual breach. See Decision №1786 of 02.07.1970, c. c. 1148/1979, I c. d. of the Supreme Court. The fact 
that non-pecuniary damages were claimed for discomfort caused by an unfinished heating system and a faulty 
elevator in a newly constructed residential building at a time when the State had serious troubles meeting the 
housing needs of the population probably also played a role. In this sense Petrov, Compensation for Non-
Pecuniary Damages in Contract 25-26. Thus, in the aftermath, the negative attitude of Bulgarian courts towards 
non-pecuniary damages in contract is rather related to the conservative stance of the old European, and not of the 
Soviet, legal doctrine.  
For the sake of good order, it must be pointed out, however, that by Interpretative Decision №4 of 2012 of the 
General Assembly of the Civil and Commercial Chambers, the Supreme Cassation Court overturned the 
Bulgarian case-law in this regard, proclaiming that awarding non-pecuniary damages is admissible in case of 
contractual breach. Note that under Art. 130 (2) of the Judiciary Act the interpretative decisions of the general 
assemblies of the Supreme Cassation Court are binding on the courts, the executive and local authorities as well 
as on all authorities, issuing administrative acts, thus, predetermining the future case-law and administrative 
practice on the issue. See supra the text accompanying footnote 129 of this Chapter.  
157 Petrov, ‘Development of the Idea on Civil Law Codification in the Republic of Bulgaria’ 138-140; 
Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 95-98; Kojuharov 265-266. 
 76 
as a whole was determined with the plan as well as with the numerous secondary legislative 
acts, adopted by the Council of Ministers and often bypassing the Parliament.158 In addition, 
the judiciary was not shielded from the political process and even formal provisions 
prescribing its immunity were lacking.159 So even if there were special interest groups, 
capturing the regulatory process, they were directing their efforts to influencing the plan, the 
secondary legislation or directly the outcomes of court disputes. The Contracts Act was too 
oblique a channel for achieving the goals of any economic ambitions.  
The same can be said for the Commercial Act, adopted in 1991. In Bulgaria this was the time 
of the initial accumulation of capital in the process of transition to market economy. The 
major interests of the emerging shady economic groups lay in the process of restitution and 
privatisation of state property, not in sophisticated drafting exercises of commercial 
contracts, which at that time were in any case difficult to enforce through the court system. 
Further, since 1991 the development of Bulgarian contract law takes place largely through 
case-law as well as through separate legislative acts touching only very specific issues. The 
Act on Protection of Consumers, which is also of some interest to this research, has always 
literally reproduced the European solutions on consumer protection; so, it cannot be 
described as "captured", too. From this perspective, the Contracts Act and the Commercial 
Act remain mainly products of legal scholars, not of interest groups. This is also the moment 
to recall that both the US and the UK have adopted quasi-continental contract acts: the 
                                                 
158 See also supra footnote 125 of Chapter I. 
159 See Act on the Organization of the People's Courts, promulgated State Gazette №70 of 26.03.1948; revoked 
as of 07.11.1952 according to which the court system was subject to constant social-political control. Judges 
were elected by the people's councils and had to report to them in writing about their work. They could also be 
recalled, including on the ground of impairing the social interest. In practice, this stripped of any meaning the 
judiciary's independence, formally proclaimed by the Constitution of 1947. At the time of the adoption of the 
Act on the Organization of the Court System, promulgated State Gazette №92 of 07.11.1952, revoked as of 
19.03.1976 the judiciary was viewed as part of the unitary state power and was expected to pursue the 
communist policy for protection of the established political order and of the social interest. During the whole 
period of totalitarian government in Bulgaria (1944-1989) judges were subject to party and administrative 
pressure. It was not uncommon for them to receive instructions from local communist leaders with respect to the 
outcome of one or another court case. The pressure was softened to some extent only after the adoption of the 
new Act on the Organization of the Court System in 1976 (Act on the Organization of the Court System, 
promulgated State Gazette №23 of 19.03.1976, revoked as of 22.07.1994), which introduced the principle of 
judicial immunity and provided for the election of judges at all court instances by the National Assembly. This 
made the judiciary relatively independent from party leaders at the same level. In addition, non-party lawyers 
began to be elected as judges during the 70's. The currently effective Bulgarian Constitution proclaims the 
judiciary's independence and immunity. See Art. 117(2) and Art. 132 of Constitution of the Republic of 
Bulgaria, promulgated State Gazette №56 of 13.07.1991, in force as of 13.07.1991, last ammended State Gazette 
№12 of 06.02.2007. In 2007 Bulgaria was considered to have fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, implying an 
independent and functioning judiciary, and became member of the EU. See also Tokushev, The Judiciary in 
Bulgaria: from Antiquity to the Present 303-304, 308, 312, 350. 
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Uniform Commercial Code, the Sale of Goods Act and the Supply of Goods and Services 
Act. In principle, as legislative enactments, they are also subject to risk of regulatory capture; 
yet, scholars do not start from the position that the process of their preparation must have 
been flawed and corrupted.  
Certainly, legal process differences between the selected common law and civil law 
jurisdictions exist but with respect to contract law they should not be searched for in the 
availability of codifying laws and rule of precedent or by mechanically applying regulatory 
capture theories. The important differences rather relate to the existing incentives to litigate, 
the procedure of collecting relevant information in the judicial and legislative process, etc.160 
As it was shown, in the area of contracts, the courts in the US and England live in "the age of 
statutes",161 while legislators in Bulgaria have to face the reality of increasing case-law 
influence on the legal system. For this reason, comparativists continuously emphasise that 
throughout the 20th century the common law/civil law differences in the source-of-law 
structure have been softened with the two legal traditions experiencing a process of 
convergence; as between England and Bulgaria this process of convergence is also to some 
extent supported by the membership in the European Union.162 Acknowledging the changing 
social reality and in an effort to capture law in action, the most recent comparative theory 
maintains that a specific legal rule cannot be ascertained by solely consulting the source of 
law (legislation or case-law), endorsed by the national definition of the term. A legal rule is 
rather a product of the interaction of different "legal formants" (court decisions, legislative 
acts, scholarly works), each of which contributes to shaping the rule.163 Thus, finding the rule 
requires consultation of many different texts, written by different suppliers of law, which 
may very well contradict and challenge each other. The role of the comparative lawyer then 
is, by analysing all these texts, to discover not the rule in force, but the true operational rule 
in the legal system as well as the various factors and influences that led to it. Resolving in 
                                                 
160 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 77. 
161 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (First edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press 1982); Patrick Atiyah, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (1985) 48 Modern Law Review 1. 
162 Vogenauer, ‘Common Law’ 266-267. 
163 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 343. Legal formants may also be referred to in terms of professional communities who are 
engaged in shaping the law (judges, legislators, professors). John Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (Second edn, 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1978); Raoul van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators, and Professors: 
Chapters in European Legal History (First edn, Cambridge (Cambridgeshire); New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1987); Monateri. For the competition between the Bulgarian professional communities, see supra the text 
accompanying footnotes 137-147 of this Chapter. 
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this way the puzzle with the different source-of-law structure, comparative law not only 
manages to overcome the gap between common law and civil law systems and to establish 
itself as one of the most promising legal disciplines. It also makes it possible to perform an 
economic analysis which accounts for the dissimilarities between the different legal 
traditions and simultaneously bridges them in order to examine them from a common 
perspective.164 
In fact, the conjugation of the comparative and the economic approach is especially 
productive with respect to sources of law. Embracing the theory of legal formants, 
comparative law and economics refutes the positivist model of cooperation by means of 
hierarchy and posits the different legal formants as competing, battling, trying continuously 
to enlarge their influence on the development of the legal system and thus offering different 
legal rules on the market of legal solutions.165 Yet, this is not the time to go into details. The 
important argument from this section of the current work is that nothing in the economic 
approach to law makes it necessary to confine the analysis to the American (or to another 
common law) legal system. American law does not constitute an obligatory background for 
economic research, just like neoclassical economics is not the mandatory branch of 
economics to be used. Indeed, refuting the natural law and positive law assumptions that still 
underlie economic theory, comparative law sharply enhances its potential. Bringing with it 
ample empirical material and accrued knowledge of different institutional environments, it 
broadens the economic perspective of different types of transaction costs. Last but not least, 
as shown by the source-of-law example, it solves concrete problems which economic theory 
applied to different legal systems can hardly disentangle by itself. 
                                                 
164 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 70-71. 
165 Ibid 101-121 Of course, it is possible that with respect to a particular legal solution (some of) the different 
legal formants cooperate and complement each other's role, but again this is not cooperation imposed by the 
harmonious hierarchical model of positivist legal theory. It must be also emphasised that this model leaves out 
legal doctrine which is not an official source of law in any legal system. Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law 
and Economics’ 349-350. Being closer to reality, the theory of legal formants also accounts for the role of legal 
scholars. As it was already shown, in Bulgaria legal scholars played a crucial role in drafting the Contracts Act 
and the Commercial Act. They are often consulted as experts in the legislative process. The law departments in 
Bulgarian universities may also be asked to give written opinions in the procedure of rendering interpretative 
decisions and ordinances by the Supreme Courts. Indeed, Bulgarian judges rarely refer to legal doctrine; yet, this 
does not mean that they do not consult scholarly works when drafting their court decisions. Just like every other 
participant in the legal process, in their legal thinking they have been at least to some extent influenced by the 
teachings of their former law professors. Sacco. Still, the process of decline of legal scholarship's influence, 
observed by comparativists in civil law systems, is also valid for Bulgaria. In contrast, the opposite trend has 
been detected in the English legal system. Vogenauer, ‘Common Law’ 267. As for the US, American law 
schools have always been viewed as having a special position in the legal process. Monateri 19.     
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Conclusion 
To conclude this methodological chapter, it is worth emphasising once again that the 
approach was chosen for its fitness with the objective of the thesis as well as for its powerful 
potential. Considering the normative ambition of the project to contribute to the engineering 
of contract law on the European level, the method was naturally preferred to other more 
traditional approaches which a priori dismiss an instrumental view of law and consequential 
legal thinking. To any critic who suspects that the choice of methodology was determined 
solely by the fashionable common obsession with efficiency, the answer is that the author of 
this research went through her own intellectual crisis and disillusionment with economic 
analysis.166 Nevertheless, the conscious decision was taken to remain on the chosen path and 
not to adopt a different perspective. This is not to say that I consider the economic approach 
as providing the "ultimate answer".167 On the contrary, I am deeply convinced that if legal 
scholarship wants to be the driving force behind the development of European private law, it 
needs to commit itself to approaching law from many different viewpoints, experimenting 
with different ideas and methodologies. In this sense, efficiency is just one possible line of 
argument among many, an argument which bears no exclusive and absolutist connotation.  
Still, I am also deeply convinced that the future of legal scholarship lies in breaking out of 
the self-woven doctrinal cocoon and turning to other social sciences. Interdisciplinarity 
opens new horizons to legal research and infuses it with new analytical energy. It is also 
clear that each method comes with shortcomings of its own and that a profound research 
calls for a combination of approaches. On this account, comparative law and economics 
seems a remarkably promising marriage between two methodologies of two different 
disciplines. Both inherently comparative and historical, New Institutional Economics and 
comparative law naturally complement each other, curing each other's weaknesses. In the 
resulting rich framework, efficiency ceases to be a universal benchmark to which all legal 
systems are measured against and acquires meaning only within the institutional 
environment of a particular jurisdiction. It is only regrettable that until now this new 
interdisciplinary field has not been fully explored. This thesis delves into it, engaging with 
                                                 
166 See supra the elaboration on the premises of the Chicago school and New Comparative Economics in Section 
C. of this Chapter as well as on the role of comparative law in Section D. of this Chapter. 
167 Borrowed from Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy (25th Anniversary edn, Crown 2004). 
When finding that the ultimate answer to life, the universe and everything was "forty-two", Adams's characters 
realised that it was actually more important to search for the question.  
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the subject of remedies. 
Having described the chosen methodology in detail, I move on to Chapter III in which I 
define the concept of damages and the different damage measures that are at the basis of the 
various incentive models developed by law-and-economics scholars. 
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Chapter III Damages 
Any legal system, whether a common law or a civil law one, attaches certain legal 
consequences to the non-performance of a contractual obligation. Out of the remedies, 
generally available to the aggrieved party in case of breach of contract,1 damages are probably 
the most important. Indeed, with regard to remedies, it is habitual to view the common law 
and the civil law tradition as characteristically different: while being the principal remedy in 
Anglo-American law, damages are considered somewhat limitedly available in continental 
legal systems, which appear more favourable to specific performance.2 Yet, it has been 
suggested that although there is such a divergence, in practice it is less acute than expected, 
because the differently formulated rules may, allegedly, lead to similar results.3 In addition, 
evidence has been put forward that specific performance is in fact rarely used in civil law 
countries and in disputes under CISG.4 These arguments taken together imply that in all legal 
systems the aggrieved party can receive compensation in money with any restrictions on its 
availability being of rather theoretical nature.5 Such indications on the commonness of 
damages in both legal traditions signal their innate significance in the national systems of 
contract law despite the remaining inter-jurisdictional differences. 
Nevertheless, since 1976 – when Treitel published his seminal study on remedies of breach of 
contract (including a substantial part on substitutionary relief), comparative scholars seem to 
be more interested in the different national approaches to specific performance6 or in the law 
of damages in the field of tort.7 Even the recent academic projects that dealt with contractual 
liability (the PECL, the DCFR) were more or less aimed at unification and thus contain very 
                                                 
1 Treitel's rough classification includes three kinds of remedies: specific relief, substitutionary relief and 
termination. Treitel 3. As opposed to specific and substitutionary relief, termination, involves putting an end to 
the contract. It is referred to as "rescission" in the common law tradition or "razvalyane" in Bulgaria. Ibid 110-
111. In Treitel's classification the remedy also includes early termination of the contract, referred to as 
"repudiation" (the US), "anticipatory breach" (England) or "otkaz" (Bulgaria).  
2 Ibid 24; Zweigert and Kötz 470-485. 
3 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1 (House of Lords) 11-12; 
Treitel 22; Arthur Taylor von Mehren and James Gordley, The Civil Law System. An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law (Second edn, Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown and Company 1977) 1122-1123; .  
4 Investigating the use of specific performance, Lando and Rose find that it has been virtually abandoned in 
Denmark and is rarely used in France, Germany as well as in international disputes, in which CISG is the 
applicable law. Henrik Lando and Caspar Rose, ‘On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law 
Countries’ (2004) 24 International Review of Law and Economics 473. 
5 In this sense see Treitel 24. 
6 Mak. 
7 Christian von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol II (First edn, Oxford/New York: Oxford 
University Press 2000); Ulrich Magnus (ed) Unification of Tort Law: Damages (First edn, The Hague; Boston: 
Kluwer Law International 2001). 
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concise comparative notes which are meant to serve only as a starting point in examining the 
national laws. To some extent such a focus on other remedial issues is understandable. As the 
prima facie difference between common law and civil law, the dissimilar role of specific 
performance attracted a great deal of attention in relation to the European efforts in the area of 
consumer protection. In its turn, liability in tort became naturally topical due to the new and 
increased risks brought by the remarkable speed of technical progress in the last decades. On 
the other hand, until now the European Union law has only marginally affected the laws of 
contractual damages of the Member States with the ECJ largely accepting the national 
differences in this respect. In addition, determining the types of recoverable loss, the forms of 
compensation (in money or in kind), the way of calculating the amount of damages (when 
monetary), etc., the law of damages is fairly technical and complicated, thus making a 
detailed comparison a rather challenging task.   
In contrast, damages ex contractu are at the focus of this research. What is more, by 
implication of the adopted interdisciplinary methodology, damages are analysed in terms of 
the incentive effects they generate. The latter notion marks a very important characteristic of 
the undertaken economic approach. Looking at damages as incentives is by no means 
customary for lawyers. Naturally, their view has also evolved and nowadays they agree that 
the principal aim of damages is compensatory and not penal8 as was the dominant 
understanding in Roman law.9 But it is common that lawyers perceive remedies as civil 
sanctions, i.e. as consequences of contractual breach.10 Economists, on the other hand, seek to 
                                                 
8 This is also the understanding of the US legal doctrine despite the fact that an award of punitive (also called 
"exemplary") damages may be allowed when breach of contract mingles with tortious elements. See UCC § 1-
305. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. (a); Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 355 Punitive 
Damages; Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor 362 NE2d 845 (Ind 1977) followed in F. D. Borkholder Co., 
Inc. v. Sandock 413 NE2d 567 (Ind 1980). In English law the general principle that exemplary damages are not 
awarded in contract has been systematically applied. It is derived from Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd AC 488 
(House of Lords). In line with the civil law tradition, punitive damages are awarded in Bulgaria neither in tort, 
nor in contract. Anguel Kalaydjiev, Law of Obligations. General Part (Third edn, Sofia: Sibi 2005) 378. 
9 This understanding was pushed into the background by the compensatory principle and the prohibition of 
unjust enrichment under the influence of the restitution theory developed by the Spanish Late Scholasticism. 
Thus, the basic principles that are at the root of the modern perception of damages were strongly inspired by 
natural law conceptions to which Spanish authors adhered and which, through their bearing on secular natural 
law ideas, still affect today's legal thinking. This natural law influence, however, casts little light on the types of 
loss recoverable and the amounts of damages granted in different legal systems as these are largely determined 
by value judgments changing between systems as well as over time. Wolfgang Wurmnest, ‘Damages’ in 
Basedow Jürgen and others (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, vol I (First edn, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 444-445. 
10 The problem with such positivist terminology is that it completely blurs the difference between punishment 
and compensation. See Kelsen. Legal scholars use the term "civil sanction" despite the express recognition of 
compensation as the primary aim of damages. See Trayan Konov, Selected Works. Grounds of Civil Liability 
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predict the consequences that are likely to follow from a particular remedy. This change of 
perspective shifts the focus from contractual obligations whose non-performance brings a 
certain remedy as an end result to remedies as sources of incentives which, if explored, will 
elucidate the consequences to be expected. 
To be sure, at the core of such an understanding of remedies lies microeconomic theory in the 
framework of which legal rules constitute prices of illegal conduct and as such produce 
incentives to which rational individuals respond. In this sense, the art becomes to set the price 
(in this case the remedy) at a level which would incentivise market players to reduce their 
illegal conduct (in this case breach of contract) to the point at which the marginal benefits 
(i.e. the release from damage payments due upon non-performance of the contract) exceed the 
marginal costs of not engaging in breach where these costs are weighted by the probability of 
detection and successful verification of the illegal conduct in a court of law.11 Thus, the 
economic perspective is "legal-centralist": having the capacity to induce and to alter 
individual incentives, legal rules are central to affecting individual behaviour in a way which 
would produce the desired economic results.12 For this reason, the economic analysis of 
contract remedies is no longer confined solely to recognising their effect on the promisor's 
decision to fulfill or break his contractual promise. Rather, it evolved to identify a number of 
incentives that are induced by an adopted legal remedy and currently strives to evaluate 
contract enforcement from the point of view of all these incentives. As it will be seen, the 
fundamental concern of economics is to determine the optimal remedy which balances the 
whole set of induced incentives.13 Much of this concern relates to adjusting the measure of 
damages, so economic analysis is particularly congenial to approach the measurement 
problems the law of damages needs to resolve. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Third edn, Sofia: Reguli 2002) 26-32. In his account Konov clearly differentiates the compensatory from the 
penal goal and excludes the latter with respect to contractual damages, but such clarity is not valid for all 
Bulgarian legal scholars. Pointing at the sanctioning character of civil liability, Kojuharov emphasises the 
principle of attributing liability to the party who is at fault. Kojuharov 19, 23, 207-209, 256. This brings to mind 
associations with retribution and creates confusion about his understanding of the rationale of damages. The 
same can be said about Goleva, who confines herself to declaring that besides compensating, damages also 
"sanction in some way" since the debtor is obliged to pay them against his will. Goleva 132. Nevertheless, the 
majority of Bulgarian legal doctrine is straightforward. Apostolov expressly states that unlike criminal liability, 
civil liability is not a sanction for guilty conduct, the problem being economic rather than moral. Apostolov, Law 
of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 4, 229-230. On the concept and aims of civil liability 
Kalaydjiev sides with Konov. Kalaydjiev 378. 
11 Mercuro and Medema 104. 
12 Ibid 104, 33. 
13 Richard Craswell, ‘Against Fuller and Perdue’ (2000) 67 The University of Chicago Law Review 99; 
Craswell, ‘Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises’ 28, 30-32. 
 84 
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section A. points at the waning vigour of the specific 
performance principle in Bulgarian contract law and argues that in some cases Bulgarian 
promisees de facto recover damages even if de jure they pursue a course of action classified 
as specific performance. Section B. defines the concept of damages. Section C. delineates the 
different damage measures and claims that, although grounded in a taxonomy originating in 
the US, the classification of damages, adopted by economists, is just as valid in civil law 
jurisdictions. The Chapter then concludes. 
A. The principle of specific performance 
In contrast to the US and England, in Bulgaria specific performance is erected into a basic 
principle, underlying the system of contract law.14 For civil lawyers, it may be even strange 
that the remedy of damages is chosen to be compared in relation to defective performance, a 
legal doctrine which has traditionally been considered as built on the basis of the specific 
performance principle.15 Indeed, two of the four enforcement options the Buyer has available 
to him in case of defective goods or construction works are in fact forms of specific 
performance: the right to repair as well as the right to replacement (if in the sale contract 
goods are specified only generically).16 Nevertheless, although Bulgarian contract law erects 
specific performance into a general principle,17 there are good reasons to insist on comparing 
the damage remedy and even on comparing it exactly in the case of defective performance. 
First, in the last two decades or so Bulgarian contract law shows a clear trend toward 
weakening the position of specific performance in its relation to expectation damages. 
Generally, the principle manifests itself in the resolution of two basic issues: whether the 
promisee can seek expectation damages instead of performance when the latter is still 
possible and whether she can rescind the contract when performance is still possible. As the 
principle found its way in Bulgarian contract law with the adoption of the very first 1892 
                                                 
14 Kalaydjiev 229. 
15 Krasen Stoychev, ‘The Content of the Specific Performance Principle in the Contractual Obligations Between 
Socialist Organizations’ [1986] Legal Thought 79; Chudomir Goleminov, Civil Liability for Defective Goods 
(First edn, Sofia: Romina 2001) 20-21. 
16 Art. 195 and Art. 265 Contracts Act. See Mak 120-123 who defines specific performance in a broad sense, 
including repair and replacement. 
17 In this respect, Bulgarian contract law is similar to German law whose starting point is also the right of the 
promisee to performance. Within the civil legal tradition French law chooses a different approach: specific 
performance is possible in relation to some obligations and is not possible in relation to others. Treitel 10-17; 
Kalaydjiev 306, footnote 18.   
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Contracts Act under the influence of the Romanic legal tradition, any comment that 
characterises it as a tenet normally following from the socialist system of economic 
governance is frankly exaggerated.18 Yet, the principle was considerably strengthened during 
the socialist period. Thus, rescission was made an extreme remedy which could be resorted to 
only when all possibilities for performance of the contract had been exhausted.19 Unlike the 
1892 Contracts Act which gave courts discretion to grant the breacher with a new term for 
performance, the Contracts Act turned the provision of such a final chance to the promisor 
into a mandatory prerequisite for contract rescission.20 In addition, while under the 1892 Act 
courts had the discretion to refuse rescission when requested for minor breaches and when the 
promisee did not have a serious interest in it, the Contracts Act straightforwardly disallowed 
the promisee's right to rescind if non-performance was immaterial with a view to her 
interest.21 This interrelation between the rescission remedy and specific performance remains 
effective until today. The one between specific performance and expectation damages, 
however, appears changed. 
As explained in this chapter, under Bulgarian contract law if the promisor breaches, the 
promisee is entitled to claim performance together with damages for delay (moratory 
damages), or damages for non-performance (compensatory or, as defined in this thesis, 
expectation damages).22 When the promisee claims damages for non-performance, the 
                                                 
18 For such characterisation of the specific performance principle, see Alexander Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. 
General Theory of Obligations, vol I (Sofia: Science and Art 1958) 206-207. 
19 Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 298-299. 
20 Cf. Art. 70 (3) Act on Obligations and Contracts, promulgated State Gazette №268 of 01.01.1892, repealed 
State Gazette №275 of 22.11.1950 and Art 87(1) Contracts Act; Decision №31 of 20.01.1930, c. c. №529/1935, 
I c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court. 
21 Cf. Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 304-305, 310; Decision №31 of 
1936, I c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court and Art. 87(4) Contracts Act; Decision №1106 of 20.04.1957, c. c. 
№ 2125/1957, IV c. d. of the Supreme Court; Ordinance №3 of 29.03.1973 c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the 
Supreme Court. To determine whether the non-performance is immaterial with a view to the promisee's interest 
in the context of construction contracts, courts normally enquire about the proportion of the work already done 
out of the whole construction work agreed upon. See Decision №1279 of 28.10.1999, c. c. № 553/1999 of the 
Supreme Cassation Court (where the court says that Art. 87(4) requires evaluation of the ratio between the 
uncompleted and the completed part of the construction work). See also Decision № 999 of 24.10.1995, c. c. № 
737/1995, II c. d. of the Supreme Court (where the constructor performed between 93% and 97% of the work, 
the client had no right to terminate the contract since the non-performance amounted to maximum 7% of all the 
construction work agreed, which was immaterial with a view to the client's interest); Decision № 641 of 
06.04.1999, c. c. № 54/1999, V c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court (where the constructor did not complete 
40% of the construction work, he was considered not to have fulfilled the condition precedent for acquiring the 
right in rem to construct on another plot, so the seller was entitled to rescind the contract for the sale of the right 
in rem); Decision № 1003 of 30.12.2001, c. c. № 420/2001, II c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court (where the 
court decided that 62.27% of the construction work not being done, this amounts to non-performance that is 
material with a view to the client's interest). 
22 See infra the text accompanying footnotes 80-81 and 106 of this Chapter. 
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promisor can offer to perform and pay damages for the delay in case the promisee still has 
interest in performance.23 This provision of the Contracts Act does not change in substance 
the legal rule effective under the preceding 1892 Contracts Act.24 Both at the time of the latter 
Act and today the Bulgarian legal doctrine and courts have been maintaining that the non-
breacher can freely choose between the two claims: the one for specific performance (possibly 
combined with moratory damages) and the one for expectation damages.25 Such a right to 
choose can be deduced from the very wording of the relevant legal provisions and is 
completely in line with the French and Italian legal traditions which inspired them.26 Only if 
the breacher offers to perform and pay moratory damages and proves that the promisor has 
interest in such delayed performance, will the promisor have to accept it.27  
The specific performance principle was, however, implemented much more perseveringly 
during the socialist period in the contractual relations between socialist enterprises. At that 
time contracts between socialist enterprises were perceived as legal means ensuring the 
fulfilment of production and financial plans. For this reason the remedial regime was 
supposed to guarantee that socialist enterprises actually performed their contractual 
obligations and did not buy themselves out of the signed contracts.28 Where commodities 
were distributed centrally and there was no free market, on which substitutes could be 
purchased, the then effective Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations consistently 
                                                 
23 Art. 79 Contracts Act. 
24 The new Art. 79(2) ibid, stipulating the breacher's right to offer performance together with damages for delay 
even if the non-breacher has already claimed damages for non-performance, in fact provided for what was 
already accepted in the Bulgarian legal doctrine. Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of 
Obligation 288; Ivan Apostolov, ‘Grounds of Contractual Liability’ (1940/1941) 34 Yearbook of "St Kliment 
Ohridski" University - Sofia, Law Department 3, 39-40. 
25 Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 287-288; Apostolov, ‘Grounds of 
Contractual Liability’ 38; Decision №713 of 1928, III c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; Decision №207 of 
22.03.1937, c. c. №129/1935, III c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; Kalaydjiev 333, 437-438; Ivan Ruschev, 
Liability for Eviction (First edn, Sofia: Reguli 1995) 190; Decision №16 of 13.03.2006, c. c. №706/2005, II c. d. 
of the Supreme Cassation Court. 
26 In this sense Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 288. For more detail on 
the importance of the French and Italian legal traditions for the relation between specific performance and 
expectation damages under Bulgarian contract law, see  32-40. 
27 Kalaydjiev 333. Note that if the breacher offers delayed performance but without moratory damages, the 
promisee does not have to accept even if she still has interest in performance. It has been held that the standard 
for deciding whether the promisee has interest in delayed performance is objective. She does not have such 
interest if performance has already become impossible or futile and, if under the particular contract, time was of 
the essence. When the breacher is in delay to pay money, the promisee always has interest in performance 
coupled with moratory damages. In this sense, see Decision №934 of 06.07.2010, c. c. №553/2009 of 12 c. panel 
of District Court – Varna, confirmed by Decision №8 of 13.01.2011, c. c. №615/2010 of Appellate Court – 
Varna. See also Decision №1640 of 14.08.1968, c.c. №981/1968 of I c. d. of the Supreme Court.   
28 Stoychev, ‘The Content of the Specific Performance Principle in the Contractual Obligations Between 
Socialist Organizations’ 80-81. On contract law during the socialist period, see supra footnote 130 of Chapter I. 
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obliged them to seek specific performance.29 According to the steady case-law of the State 
Arbitration Court, which resolved disputes between socialist enterprises, the non-breacher 
was not entitled to choose between specific performance (together with damages for delay) 
and damages for non-performance and could not elect to claim directly monetary 
compensation.30 The principle was expressed in a number of ways: the payment of damages 
did not release the breacher from his obligation to render performance,31 the performance that 
was not rendered within the respective plan period (month or trimester) had to be rendered 
during the following one,32 socialist enterprises had the right to amend a contract only to the 
extent allowed by the plan and to terminate it only to the extent it was not in the interest of the 
national economy,33 and a socialist enterprise that was delivered a good with incurable defects 
was obliged to refuse it and require a new conforming one.34 In other words, the application 
of the principle led to specific performance literally excluding the payment of expectation 
damages. It also affected the damage remedy indirectly. The amounts of the liquidated 
damages in the different legislative acts governing contracts between socialist enterprises had 
to be set so that they incentivise performance. Also, any contracts in which socialist 
enterprises released their contractual partners from the prescribed liquidated damages or 
agreed not to claim them in case of a legal dispute were forbidden.35  
In this sense, the returning of Bulgarian courts and legal doctrine to the pre-socialist view of 
the relation between the specific performance and expectation damages represents a 
significant change in Bulgarian contract law. As Bulgaria set on the road of transition from 
planned to market economy, the legislative acts governing the contractual relations between 
socialist enterprises were revoked. Indeed, their steadfast commitment to the principle of 
                                                 
29 Art. 8(2) in relation to (1); Art. 32(5) Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations. 
30 Decision of 14.12.1982, sup. c. №705/1982 of the State Arbitration Court; Decision under sup. c. №243/1977 
of the State Arbitration Court; Decision under sup. c. №128/1965 of the General Assembly of the State 
Arbitration Court. 
31 Art. 39(4) Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations. The seller was also obliged to deliver goods that 
were his own produce. He could not perform his obligation by procuring goods from another manufacturer as all 
such goods had already been distributed under the plan and the plan did not indicate him as a buyer. Jivko 
Stalev, ‘Characteristic Features of the New Legal Regime of the Sale Contract’ (1951) 3-4 Bulletin of the 
Economic and Legal Institute 161, 178-179. 
32 Art. 11(2) Ordinance on the Specific Rules for Governing the Business Organizations and Units in the 
Transportation Branch, promulgated State Gazette №101 оf 21.12.1979, revoked State Gazette №1 of 
04.01.1991; Decision of 05.11.1981 under sup. c. №823/1981 of the State Arbitration Court. 
33 Art. 16 and 17 Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations; Decision of 13.10.1973, c. №585/1973 of 
the State Arbitration Court. 
34 Art. 44(1) ibid. 
35 Stoychev, ‘The Content of the Specific Performance Principle in the Contractual Obligations Between 
Socialist Organizations’ 84. 
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specific performance was not facilitating the creation and development of a national market, 
in which actors had to be able to contract of their own free will and not because the plan 
required them to do so. If exchange was to be fostered, promisees had to be able to choose not 
only whether to enter into agreement at all but also how to enforce it and promisors had to 
have the possibility to be released from their contractual obligation also by payment of 
monetary compensation. Following closely classic western models, the Contracts Act (with 
only minor amendments) was able to provide the basis for expansion of the damages remedy. 
Today legal scholars and courts agree that it is not mandatory that a claim for expectation 
damages be preceded by a claim for specific performance. Even more bold opinions already 
find their way in the scholarly writing and arbitration practice. Kalaydjiev has taken the 
stance that specific performance cannot be imposed on the promisee against her will and that 
her interest must be preferred to that of the breacher.36 In one decision the Arbitration Court at 
the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce adds that the very choice of the promisee to seek 
expectation damages already means that she has lost interest in delayed performance and that 
it is not for a court to establish her lack of interest by resorting to any objective criteria.37 That 
is why, considering that there is a visible trend in Bulgarian contract law toward narrowing 
the scope of specific performance and putting it on a par with expectation damages, a research 
on the – until recently – neglected damages remedy is undoubtedly necessary.  
Secondly, one of the forms of specific performance under Bulgarian law is, in fact, 
tantamount to monetary compensation of the aggrieved party. Thus, in case of defective 
performance of a sale-of-goods or construction contract, the Buyer has the right to request 
that the court authorise her to have the defect repaired at the expense of the Seller.38 To 
succeed in this course of action, classified as specific relief, the promisee is not required to 
have already made the expenditure necessary for repair; she can ask to be authorised and 
awarded the money in advance.39 Also, if authorised, she does not have to personally 
effectuate the repair; she can contract and have the defect remedied by a third party. The 
                                                 
36 Kalaydjiev 437-438. Cf. with the position taken by Kojuharov during the communist regime in Bulgaria. 
Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 289. 
37 Decision of 27.06.2000 internal arb. c. №3/2000 of the Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of 
Commerce. 
38 Art. 80(1) in connection with Art. 195(1) and Art. 265(1) Contracts Act. 
39 Decision №55 of 22.04.2010, comm. c. №817/2009, Commercial Chambers, I comm. division of the Supreme 
Cassation Court; Decision №174 of 31.01.2011, c. c. №2627/2008, Civil Chambers, 7th panel of Sofia Appellate 
Court; Decision №20 of 04.02.2011, app. c. c. №537/2010 of Lovech District Court; Decision №12 of 
22.02.2010, app. c. c. №645/2009 of Burgas District Court; Kalaydjiev 175, 306. 
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expenditure needed for this rectification, however, will have to be borne by the Seller. In 
other words, even though the Buyer's course of action is one for specific performance, in its 
end result it does not differ from the outcome under US and English law where in case of 
defective construction promisees are granted damages that often amount to the cost of 
remedying the defective work. 
Nevertheless, the Bulgarian legal doctrine is firm that the monetary payment obtained by 
Buyers if authorised to have the defect remedied at the Seller's expense, is not an award of 
damages. The uniformly supported position is that the promisee's recovery is not aimed at 
compensating her for the losses suffered but at realising the result, implied in the promisor's 
obligation, a goal that is practically equivalent to the one of specific relief. That is why, the 
reasoning goes, this is a claim for specific performance and it is only the method of execution 
that is different: execution not by coercing the Seller to perform himself but by permitting the 
Buyer to attain the pursued result elsewhere and charge the Seller for the expenses. In this 
sense, it is only because the modern execution procedure has found new ways to ensure the 
promisee receives what she bargained for that the Buyer obtains a sum of money from the 
Seller; however, this sum of money does not constitute damages but specific performance in 
monetary form.40 The fact that the statutory provisions provide for the promisee's opportunity 
to claim damages in addition to rectification of defects at the promisor's expense is pointed as 
a further argument that under Bulgarian law the recovery of expenditures is not intended as 
compensation.41 
While tracing the above doctrinal distinctions, it becomes obvious that Bulgarian contract law 
draws the line between damages and specific performance differently from the selected 
common law jurisdictions. In fact, the Bulgarian concept of specific performance turns out to 
be more expansive both with regard to the parties who can deliver performance and with 
regard to the financial consequences for the promisor.  
In the US and England a decree for specific performance is issued in personam, directing the 
promisor to perform under the threat of punishment for contempt of court.42 In contrast in 
Bulgaria, when the contractual obligation is not intuitu personae, the promisee may be 
                                                 
40 Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 231, 281; Konov 36-37; Kalaydjiev 
305-306. 
41 Art. 195(2); Art. 79(1) Contracts Act; Konov 37-38.  
42 In this sense, see Treitel 7. 
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authorised to obtain substitute performance from a third party. Indeed, this will not be the 
exact performance she bargained for, but significantly delayed performance by the promisor 
himself would also not be precisely what the contract required.43 In other words, unlike in the 
US and England, the Bulgarian civil law notion of specific performance also includes 
substitute performance by an outsider. In common law jurisdictions, on the other hand, 
Buyer's procurement of a substitute does not take place in relation to an action of specific 
performance and commonly gives rise to a claim for damages.44 To be correct, in English law 
if a decree of specific performance is not complied with, the court may also direct that the act 
be done by another person at the cost of the defendant. This, however, is without prejudice to 
the court's power to punish the disobedient party for contempt.45 In this sense, even if 
substitute performance may, in some cases, be available as a method of executing a specific 
performance decree already issued,46 the coercive financial element of the Anglo-American 
concept, to which I turn now, remains present.  
In the US and England, disobedience to a decree of specific performance leads to fines (i.e. 
sums of money) levied in the context of contempt proceedings. These fines go to the state and 
their size is not directly related to the creditor's loss, so it is undoubted that they constitute 
compulsion in monetary form rather than some kind of compensation. By contrast, the 
Buyer's claim to have the defect repaired, though classified as specific performance under 
Bulgarian law, does not entail the imposition of fines. On the contrary, it entails a monetary 
amount covering the cost of repair, which the promisee may be awarded as estimated by an 
expert in advance, without having to incur the expenses first. In addition, having received the 
sum, the Buyer does not have to use it to actually repair the defect; she may spend the money 
in some other way. So, unlike fines, the money payment going to the promisee, clearly 
invokes the idea of compensation, typical for the damages remedy.  
                                                 
43 In this sense, see ibid 3, 7. 
44 Ibid 7. See UCC § 2-712. "Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods. In England under the duty to 
mitigate the promisee is expected to buy substitute goods as long as there is a market in which he can obtain 
them. He can then claim damages amounting to the price difference. See Hugh Beale, ‘Chapter 26. Damages’ in 
Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts General Principles, vol I (Thirty-first edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell; 
Thomson Reuters 2012) 1807; Halsbury's Law of England. Damages, vol 12(1) (Fourth. Reissue edn, London: 
Butterworths 1998) 459; Sale of Goods Act 1979, in force from 01.01.1980, c. 54, Pt VI, Section 51(3) Damages 
for non-delivery.   
45 See RSC Order 45 Enforcement of Judgments and orders: General, Rule 8, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/sched_rsc/rscorder45#IDALKYS. 
46 Treitel Guenther Treitel, ‘Chapter 27. Specific Performance and Injunction’ in Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on 
Contracts General Principles, vol I (Thirty-first edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell, Thomson Reuters 2012) 7. 
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Indeed, the concise comparison above leads to the conclusion that the Bulgarian concept of 
specific performance extends to embrace legal process (substitute performance, money 
payment collected by the promisee) which in common law jurisdictions is akin to the remedy 
of damages. Can we then consider the monetary amount, recovered by the Buyer if authorised 
to have the defect remedied, as equivalent to an award of damages despite the Bulgarian legal 
doctrine, which insists that the course of action is specific performance? It is appropriate here 
to remind that for the purposes of this thesis the categorisation of a remedy as damages should 
be determined by its fitness to the adopted functional definition47 and not by its doctrinal 
classification in the respective legal system. From this viewpoint, the formal cataloguing of 
the described legal process as specific performance should not obscure the fact that a 
monetary payment, measuring the loss of the promisee and awarded to her, does compensate 
her for the harm suffered from breach. As already mentioned, the ultimate result of having the 
remedy granted is indistinguishable from the Anglo-American expectation damages 
calculated on the basis of cost of completion. In this sense, any sophisticated doctrinal 
arguments pointing out that the money payment does not represent damages but a monetary 
"surrogate" of the initial performance, due by the promisor,48 originate in the strong tradition 
of the specific performance principle. At the same time they reflect awareness of the 
execution difficulties related to this principle and of the need to find practical devices to 
overcome them. The clash between tradition and modern dynamics results in preservation of 
the specific performance rhetoric which, however, disguises a conversion of the specific 
performance remedy into compensatory payment of damages.49 After all, do not damages 
represent exactly a monetary surrogate of the promisor's initial performance? It is difficult not 
to notice that even the wording used by Bulgarian legal scholars in essence restates the 
definition of the concept, discussed in this chapter. For this reason, in the rest of the thesis the 
monetary amount received by the Buyer, if authorised to have the defect remedied at the 
expense of the Seller, will be put on the same footing with common law damages. 
Thirdly, even when promisees in Bulgaria have requested and been granted by the court 
specific performance, at the execution stage the remedy is often reduced to monetary 
compensation. Under the Contracts Act, in case of defective performance, the Buyer has two 
remedies, which constitute classic forms of specific relief in the civil law tradition: the right to 
                                                 
47 See infra Section B. of this Chapter. 
48 Konov 36-37. 
49 On the conversion of specific performance into damages, see also Lando and Rose, 475. 
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have the defective work or good repaired within a reasonable period of time without any 
additional payment50 and the right to replacement of defective goods (provided that the goods 
have been specified in the sale contract only generically).51 However, if the Seller does not 
comply with the judgment directing him to repair his own defective work/good, the only 
choice the Buyer has in the execution proceedings is to request the bailiff to authorise her to 
have the defect remedied at the expense of the Seller.52 When the promisor's obligation is to 
do something (facere), but the promisor is not the only one who can do it, Bulgarian law does 
not provide for levying fines as a method of execution.53 The promisee is allowed to have the 
defect rectified by a third party with the necessary expenses borne by the promisor. However, 
if she wants to collect the expenditure in advance, she must institute new court proceedings 
and request the court award her the money before the defect is actually repaired.54 In other 
words, unless the Seller conforms to the court decision, the Buyer ultimately achieves what 
she would attain by asking the court directly to authorise her to have the defect remedied at 
the expense of the Seller. She receives a monetary amount equal to the cost of repair, but only 
after waiting in vain for the Seller to perform and going through two (instead of one) court 
proceedings. Since it is very likely that the right to repair is reduced to receiving a 
compensatory money payment in the execution proceedings, it is no wonder that Buyers 
generally prefer to request immediately the court for authorisation and award of the 
expenditure, necessary for repair. 
The execution proceedings are likely to unfold in a similar way when the buyer has been 
granted replacement of defective generic goods. If the seller does not make a fresh 
conforming delivery, the bailiff must simply seize the goods from him and deliver them to the 
buyer.55 Yet, if the bailiff does not find such goods in possession of the seller or he finds 
goods that have deteriorated, the buyer collects only the monetary equivalent.56 Thus, instead 
of having the goods replaced, the buyer may very well receive a money payment equal to their 
                                                 
50 Art. 265(1) Contracts Act. The right of the promisee in a sale contract to have the defective good repaired 
within reasonable time and without additional payment is not expressly stipulated in the Contracts Act, but the 
Bulgarian legal doctrine is unanimous that despite this omission the buyer has such a right. Alexander 
Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts, vol III (Ognyan Gerdjikov ed, 2nd edn, Sofia: Sofi-R 1996) 
95-96; Goleminov 32, 36. 
51 Art. 195(3) Contracts Act.  
52 Art. 526(1) Code of Civil Procedure. 
53 Art. 527 ibid. 
54 Art. 526(2) ibid. See e.g. Ruling № 2814 of 27.09.2013, pr. c. c. № 2543/2013 of District Court - Plovdiv. 
55 Art. 521(1) ibid. 
56 Art. 521(2) ibid. 
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market value.57 In the face of such prospects, however, a commercial buyer, who measures 
time in terms of money, would prefer to terminate the contract (which she can do simply by 
sending a written notice without giving the seller an additional period to perform),58 buy the 
generic goods elsewhere and then sue the seller for damages. It is not surprising then that in 
1996 the Commercial Act set out that in case the buyer terminates and buys substitute goods 
within appropriate time, she can claim the difference between the contract price and the price 
of the substitute transaction together with other damages.59 Recognising the need to speed 
money flows in the process of building a market economy, the legislator naturally provided 
for the possibility that the buyer makes a cover purchase and claims compensation measured 
by the contract-market differential.60 Thus, without formally repealing the buyer's right to 
replacement, the new solution, provided by the Commercial Act, in practice works toward 
restricting the importance of specific performance in Bulgarian contract law.    
In short, in Bulgaria the remedy of contractual damages is implemented in a specific 
institutional context, characterised by the possibility to claim specific performance 
irrespective of the kind of promisor's obligation (dare, facere or non facere). At the same 
time, when it comes to the practical application of the specific performance principle, it is 
more moderate than it appears at first glance. Even if granted at the court level, at the 
execution stage the remedy of specific performance is often relegated to a monetary award. 
What is more, despite the refusal of the mainstream legal doctrine to acknowledge it, contract 
law provides for the possibility that the right to repair is converted into damages as early as 
the court proceedings. To this one must add the trend toward narrowing specific performance 
relative to expectation damages as a result of of the political and economic changes taking 
place in Bulgaria since the end of the 1980's. Keeping an eye on the importance of these 
Bulgarian institutional peculiarities, I proceed to compare contractual damages in the three 
selected jurisdictions.  
                                                 
57 Decision № 1566 of 06.12.1994, c. c. № 214/1994, V c. d. of the Supreme Court; Ruling № 460 of 
19.12.2008, pr. comm. c. № 428/2008, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court. 
58 This solution regarding sale-of-goods contracts is an exception to the rule of general contract law according to 
which the promisee may terminate the contract only after giving the promisor an appropriate additional period of 
time for performance. See Art. 87(1) Contracts Act and supra the text accompanying footnote 20 of this Chapter 
See also Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts 93 and Decision № 595 of 11.06.2004, c. c. 
№2700/2008, V comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court. 
59 Art. 323 Commerce Act. 
60 Cf. UCC § 2-712. “Cover”; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.; Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 51 
Damages for non-delivery.  
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B. The concept of damages 
The development of an economic model of damages requires me first to spend some time on 
definitions. To some, the account in this Section B may appear somewhat boring. Yet, in my 
opinion, having a clear understanding of the concepts on which the model is based is highly 
necessary. As it will become evident further on in the thesis, comparing remedies of legal 
systems that belong to different legal traditions inevitably raises questions of delimitation that 
may easily cause misunderstandings. In this sense, any effort directed towards sparing 
terminological confusion is effort well spent. In addition, investigating the incentives 
generated by damages, the economic analysis centres mainly on the effects produced by three 
damage measures: expectation, reliance and restitution. This traditional law-and-economics 
classification follows the seminal article of Fuller and Perdue,61 and is thus based on typical 
common law distinctions. As the comparative exercise also covers a civil law jurisdiction, it is 
important to question to what extent this taxonomy can be applied to study damages in 
Bulgarian contract law and whether it needs to be adjusted to the Bulgarian legal system.62 
Consequently, first, I define the concept of damages as used in this thesis, and, second, I 
argue that the differentiation of damage measures employed by economic analysis is 
compatible with the Bulgarian legal regime on damages.  
If this research focuses on comparison of damages, what is it exactly that this concept stands 
for in the thesis? The answer is fairly short and straightforward. By damages I mean the 
compensation the aggrieved party receives as a substitute of the promised but unexecuted 
contractual performance. The term "damages", adopted in the thesis, is the common law term 
for substitutionary relief in money.63 In some legal systems, another form of compensation, 
reparation in kind, is also available, making it difficult to distinguish, on one hand, between 
substitutionary and specific relief,64 and on the other hand, between primary obligations 
(obligation to perform) and secondary obligations (obligations arising in case of non-
                                                 
61 Lon Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 
52; Lon Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2’ (1937) 46 Yale Law Journal 
373. 
62 In Ugo Mattei's view, the mechanic imposition of untweaked American models on a substantially different 
institutional context is perhaps one of the main reasons for the cold acceptance of law and economics in Europe. 
Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 77. 
63 The term used in Bulgaria is "parichno obezshtetenie za vredi". 
64 Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 3. 
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performance).65 In line with the Romanic legal tradition,66 the Bulgarian Contracts Act 
remains silent on the question of whether compensation should be in money or in kind. 
Nevertheless, in the field of contractual liability, the issue of reparation in kind can be raised 
only with respect to obligations not to do something (non facere). 67 Then substitutionary 
relief can take place in natura: by eliminating the consequences of breaching the undertaken 
obligation, e.g. by demolishing the structure the party promised not to build, by transferring 
title to the thing the party promised not to transfer to anybody else.68 Most of the time, 
however, contractual obligations are obligations to do (facere) or to give (dare) something. 
This is also the nature of the Seller's obligations in the construction contract and the contract 
for sale of goods, with which this research is concerned (i.e. the obligations to perform the 
work and to deliver the good are such of facere and the obligation to transfer title to the good 
is such of dare).69 In these cases, the reasoning goes, the remedy should bring about a new 
state of affairs, not restore the old one and, therefore, when the contract is enforced in natura, 
the consequences of breach are done away with by specific performance, not reparation in 
kind.70 In other words, in Bulgaria, substitutionary relief is generally in money just as in most 
European legal systems. As already said, in Anglo-American law, damages in principle 
constitute a sum of money. For this reason, in the thesis the term "damages" refers to 
monetary compensation.  
It must be admitted that such a functional definition of damages is very broad and cuts across 
the distinctions between remedies drawn in different places in the different legal systems. 
Indeed, since the thesis focuses on breach of non-monetary obligations, the question of 
whether the claim available to the promisee in case of non-payment is one for damages or one 
                                                 
65 German law with its §249 (1) of Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch is the classic example of a legal system that 
provides explicitly for reparation in kind and even, at least as written in the civil code, gives preference to this 
form of compensation. See Hannes Unberath, ‘Reparation in Kind’ in Basedow Jürgen and others (eds), The Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, vol II (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 1453.  
66 As to the legal solution adopted in the Romanic legal tradition, see Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. 
General Theory of Obligation 120; Unberath 1454.  
67 In contrast, when it comes to delictual liability, the aggrieved party in principle has the right to choose 
between monetary compensation and reparation in kind. Decision №631 of 13.05.1996, p. c. №511/1995, I p. d. 
of the Supreme Cassation Court; Decision of 23.06.2008, p. c. №1114/2007, c. d. of Sofia District Court.  
68 Kalaydjiev 437. 
69 Ibid 174, 176-177. For a Bulgarian non-lawyer, it may seem confusing that the obligation to deliver is an 
obligation to do (facere) while the obligation to transfer title is an obligation to give (dare). It will be helpful 
probably to remind once again that generally in Bulgaria the moment of transfer of title is different from the 
moment of delivery. See supra footnote 127 of Chapter I. That is why, in the contract for sale of goods the 
principal obligation of the seller to transfer ownership is an obligation of dare. His additional obligation to hand 
the good to the buyer is, taken alone, an obligation of facere. 
70 Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 288; Kalaydjiev 437. 
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for specific performance does not arise. But as it will be seen further, if defined from a 
functional viewpoint, damages, when explored within a particular legal system, encroach on 
other remedies: the remedy of restitution71 as well as on the civil law concept of specific 
performance.72 Still, such a functional definition is completely in line with the adopted 
methodological approach and thus has a number of advantages. First, anchored in the 
compensatory role of damages, it focuses on a principal trait of the remedy that is in fact 
common for all Western legal systems.73 Secondly, the definition facilitates the comparative 
exercise as it allows me to go beyond the doctrinal rhetoric of each of the selected legal 
systems that tends to obscure monetary compensation with numerous technical details and 
demarcation lines. Thirdly, the definition also permits me to illuminate the important remedial 
differences across jurisdictions and at a later stage factor them in the comparison as sources of 
transaction costs. 
If damages constitute monetary compensation of the harm suffered, the inevitable question is 
how exactly to measure the harm resulting from non-performance of the undertaken 
contractual obligation in order to offset it by the money award? For this reason, having 
defined damages as a concept, I now turn to the different measures used to calculate damages 
awards. 
C. Measures of damages 
As already mentioned, economic analysis has adopted Fuller and Perdue's differentiation of 
three measures of damages (expectation, reliance and restitution) and is thus rooted in US 
doctrinal notions74 that have also permeated into English legal doctrine and case law.75 At the 
same time a perfunctory look at the laws of damages of the compared legal systems gives the 
impression of a profoundly different structure across legal traditions. For example, due to the 
importation of French legal solutions, Bulgarian contract law textbooks commonly discuss 
                                                 
71 See infra Section C.3. of this Chapter. 
72 See supra Section A. of this Chapter. 
73 Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 24. 
74 Fuller and Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’; Fuller and Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest 
in Contract Damages: 2’. The classification of Fuller and Perdue has pervaded the American legal doctrine and 
court practice. See e.g.: Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 344 Purposes of Remedies; Sullivan v. 
O'Connor 296 NE2d 183 (Mass 1973); Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, vol III (Third edn, Aspen 
Publishers 2004). 
75 Beale 1769. 
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"compensatory" and "moratory" damages,76 which do not readily seem to match the 
conventional common law categories of "expectation" and "reliance" damages.  
If the inherent aim of damages is compensation, granting compensatory money awards 
requires comparison between the injured and uninjured state of the aggrieved party. Thus, the 
issue that arises is which uninjured state to take as the baseline of compensation: the state that 
the creditor planned to reach as a result of the contract performance or the state that preceded 
the conclusion of the contract. In fact, one of the contributions of Fuller and Perdue is that 
they conceptualised each of these uninjured states as "interests" of the promisee and then 
matched each interest with a different measure of damages.77 In this section I argue that since 
the three interests of the promisee are recognised in each of the selected legal systems, 
whether common law or civil law, the damage measures, adopted in law and economics, can 
also be applied in a comparative research of damages that includes a civil law jurisdiction. 
The common ground is identified by means of a comparative exercise that seeks the contact 
points between legal traditions while simultaneously paying attention to the doctrinal 
differences and assessing their importance. Only if the mentioned classification of damage 
measures can be rooted in such common ground, can it be part of an economic model on 
incentives that is pertinent to all legal systems subject to comparison. 
1. Expectation damages 
The expectation interest has the purpose of placing the aggrieved party in the position she 
would have been in had the contract been fully performed. The protection of this interest in 
case of contractual default is characteristic for all common law jurisdictions, including the US 
and England.78 As in all civil law systems, in Bulgarian law, the expectation interest is 
referred to as the "positive" interest, i.e. the promisee's interest that requires change in the 
                                                 
76 Kalaydjiev 332. As it will be seen below, here the term "compensatory" is used with a sense that is narrower 
than the sense imputed in the above discussion of the "compensatory", as opposed to "penal", aim of damages. 
77 Fuller and Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ 53-54. US and English court awards of 
"nominal damages" are an exception to the damage measure catalogue based on the protected interest. The trivial 
sum of damages is awarded when despite breach of contract the plaintiff suffered no loss or she failed to prove 
the loss with sufficient certainty. In this sense, nominal damages do not infringe the compensatory principle that 
underlies the remedy of damages. The reasons for such awards should be searched for in the old common law 
rule which barred courts from making purely declaratory awards. In this sense, see Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 
Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 26, Farnsworth 189, Beale 
1763.  Bulgarian courts do not award nominal damages. Kalaydjiev 389. 
78 In this sense Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 28. 
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status quo.79 It is fully recognised in the Bulgarian Contracts Act which provides for the non-
breacher's right to claim "damages instead of performance".80 These damages are denoted in 
the legal doctrine as "compensatory".81  
2. Reliance damages 
In contrast, the reliance interest has the purpose of placing the aggrieved party in the position 
she would have been in had she not signed any contract at all. In the Bulgarian legal doctrine, 
this interest is referred to as the "negative" interest, i.e. the non-breacher's interest that 
requires preservation of the status quo. Under Bulgarian law the damages awarded to the 
promisee upon termination of the contract due to the promisor's non-performance protect 
precisely the negative contractual interest.82 It must also be mentioned, however, that an 
argument about protection of the negative interest being a goal of liability in delict and not in 
contract83 spurred a debate in the Bulgarian legal doctrine about whether the award of 
damages in this case represents contractual84 or delictual85 liability. The disagreement 
between Bulgarian scholars stems from the fact that in principle contract termination has 
retroactive effect.86 Upon termination, the argument goes, the liability for damages arises 
from the retroactive rescission of the contractual obligation, not from its non-performance. If 
the contractual obligation falls away ex tunc, the liability cannot be contractual, but only non-
contractual, delictual liability. Therefore, the damages awarded to protect the negative 
contractual interest are a special case of delictual liability.87 Under Bulgarian law, the 
classification of the liability arising upon termination of the contract has concrete implications 
with regard to the applicability of the foreseeability requirement, the possibility to release the 
defendant from liability in case of contributory negligence, etc. Yet, this damage award will 
not be discussed here in further detail. At this point it is only necessary to stress that no matter 
whether the basis of liability is in contract or in delict, under Bulgarian law the negative 
interest is protected in case of contractual breach. 
                                                 
79 Konov 45; Kalaydjiev 379; Goleva 118-119. 
80 Art. 79(2) and (1) Contracts Act. 
81 Kalaydjiev 332.  
82 Konov 45-46; Kalaydjiev 379-380. 
83 Konov 45-46; Kalaydjiev 379-380. 
84 Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 298; Gotsev 13; Ruschev, Liability 
for Eviction 186-188. 
85 Konov 54; Kalaydjiev 365-368 
86 Art. 88(1) Contracts Act. 
87 Konov 54; Kalaydjiev 365-368. 
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For the sake of consistency, in this thesis the measures of damages protecting respectively the 
expectation (positive) and the reliance (negative) interest are referred to as expectation and 
reliance damages. The terms "positive" and "negative damages" are deliberately avoided since 
in the Bulgarian legal doctrine they are used somewhat incoherently. While they usually 
denote the damages incurred upon infringing, respectively, the positive and negative 
interest,88 sometimes they are employed to designate the structural elements of pecuniary 
harm.89 Thus, one can encounter scholarly writing associating negative damages with 
damnum emergens (loss suffered) and positive damages with lucrum cessans (gains lost).90 
Consider, however, that the coverage of expectation damages is defined in the Bulgarian 
Contracts Act precisely by the notions of loss suffered (damnum emergens) and gains lost 
(lucrum cessans).91 It is confusing then to use the label "positive damages" in order to refer 
both to the broader category of expectation damages and to one of its components: the 
prevented profit.92  
The problem with the inconsistent positive/negative terminology is exacerbated when 
considering that the gains lost (lucrum cessans) may also be a part of the damages protecting 
the negative (reliance) interest. Indeed, this is not the usual rhetoric when it comes to 
shedding light on the kind of harm that reliance damages compensate. On the contrary, it is 
common to say that reliance damages include the expenses incurred in reliance on the 
contract: expenses made in preparation for or in performance of the contract (in the language 
of Fuller and Perdue "essential reliance") and expenses made in relation to collateral 
agreements that increase the benefit from the contract in question (in the language of Fuller 
and Perdue "incidental reliance").93 In the case of a construction contract, an example of the 
former type of expenses would be the money spent by the constructor for the architect's 
drawings and for materials, while an example of the latter – the money spent by the client to 
                                                 
88 Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 57-59. 
89 In this sense Trayan Konov and Anguel Kalaydjiev, ‘Liability in Case of Infringed Negative Interest’ (1988) 
11 State and Law 24, footnote 4. 
90 In this sense: ibid, citing Lyuben Vasilev, Civil Law of National Republic of Bulgaria. General Part (First edn, 
Sofia: Science and Art 1956) 505. 
91 Art. 82 Contracts Act. See also Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 267-271; 
Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 99-100. 
92 The confusion becomes even greater when taking into account that in the German legal doctrine it is damnum 
emergens (i.e. the loss suffered) that is referred to as "positive damages" and lucrum cessans (i.e. the lost profits) 
that is named "negative damages". See Ludwig Enneccerus and Heinrich Lehman, Recht der Schuldverhältnisse 
(Fifteenth edn, Tübingen: Mohr 1958). 
93 Fuller and Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’77. 
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purchase a stock of goods for the shop to be built.94 Expenses made, however, may not be the 
only thing the promisee renounced in reliance on the contract. She may have also foregone the 
opportunity to enter into another contract, which might as well have been performed, and thus 
lost the gains this alternative contract could have yielded.95 In this sense, referring to missed 
profit as the "positive" constituent of the negative (reliance) damages does not add to clarity, 
so throughout the thesis I will stick to the categories of "expectation" and "reliance".96 
Having opened the subject of foregone opportunity I have to mention that economists denote 
the best opportunity passed up by the promisee in reliance on the contract as "opportunity-
cost". Thus, striving for perfect measurement of the reliance interest, they define opportunity-
cost damages as a form of reliance damages that place the aggrieved party in the position she 
would have been in, had she signed the contract that was the best alternative to the breached 
one.97 Reliance damages calculated on the basis of opportunity costs are typically more 
generous than reliance damages calculated on the basis of expenses made (out-of-pocket 
damages).98 If the three measures of damages are ranked, expectation damages will usually 
yield the highest and reliance-based out-of-pocket damages – the smallest amount. After all, 
the promisee normally chooses the best deal on the market and her lost expected value 
(measured by expectation damages) is higher than the expected gain from the second best 
contract (measured by opportunity-cost damages). Also, the promisee signs a contract in the 
first place because she expects that it will bring her a gain higher than her costs (v > p + c). 
So unless the contract turns out to be a losing one for the promisee, expectation damages 
exceed out-of-pocket damages. Last but not least, if the promisee signs the second best 
contract and it is performed, she will normally be better-off than if she refrains from 
contracting at all, which explains why opportunity-cost damages are higher than reliance 
damages based on out-of-pocket expenses.99  
                                                 
94 This is a popular example used in the literature. See Farnsworth 154; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 
331-334; Robert Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ (1985) 73 California 
Law Review 1, 11. 
95 Enneccerus and Lehman 62. 
96 For a critique of the usage of "positive" and "negative damages", see also Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for 
Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 29.  
97 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 250-251. 
98 On the different formulae for calculation of reliance damages, see infra Table 1 accompanying footnote 134 of 
Chapter IV. 
99 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 316. 
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Since the opportunity cost of the broken promise has been increasingly discussed in both legal 
and economic scholarly writing, opportunity-cost damages will also be considered in the 
economic model developed in the thesis. However, whether or not courts, when awarding 
reliance damages, actually account for the opportunities lost by the promisee is a different 
question that is left for the following chapters. Still, since a lot of parallels and distinctions 
have been made up to this point, it might be useful to express the introduced measures of 
damages in formal terms. 
The expectation measure relates to the value v the promisee would have realised from the 
performance of the concluded contract. For example, a buyer agrees to purchase a good for a 
price p. So that she is able to use the good and enjoy the full value v this good has to her, she 
incurs costs c. If the seller does not deliver the good, in order to leave the buyer in a position 
as good as when the contract has been performed, the seller must pay expectation damages 
equal to v – p – c in case the buyer has not yet spent p and c, or to v in case the buyer has 
already spent both. The out-of-pocket measure relates to the lost value of the investment made 
in reliance on the promised performance. Thus, in the example above if at the time of breach 
the buyer has already paid the price p and incurred the costs c, reliance damages will equal  
p + c.100 The opportunity-cost measure relates to the value of the opportunity which the buyer 
has foregone in reliance on the promised performance. Therefore, in the above example unless 
the buyer had contracted for the good at price p, she would have bought the good from 
another seller at price p1. When the seller, with whom the buyer signed a contract, breached, 
the buyer had already lost her second best option, the good at p1, and had to purchase the good 
at the spot price p2. The opportunity cost damages then equal p2 - p1.101 
Having distinguished the expectation and reliance measures of damages, it is important to see 
whether Bulgarian "moratory" damages fit in this distinction or whether they protect some 
other promisee's interest that is disregarded in the common law tradition. As already 
mentioned above, Bulgarian contract law opposes "moratory" to "compensatory" damages,102 
the latter relating to the promisee's expectation interest.103 Unlike "compensatory" damages, 
"moratory" damages, however, do not represent damages for non-performance but damages 
                                                 
100 The example follows an example given by Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 100. 
101 The example follows an example given by Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 312. 
102 See supra the text accompanying footnote 76 of this Chapter. 
103 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 78-81 of this Chapter. 
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for delay. In other words, they are distinguished on the basis of the form of contractual 
breach, a common criterion for differentiating damages in civil law systems.104 Upon the 
promisor’s delay, the promisee can claim either specific performance together with moratory 
damages, or compensatory damages.105 It makes sense, however, to speak of promisor's delay 
when his performance is still possible.106 If it has become impossible through the promisor's 
fault, if delayed performance is no longer of any use to the promisee or if the time fixed for 
performance must have been exactly complied with,107 the delay amounts to total breach.108 
Then the promisee has no interest in claiming specific performance and moratory damages, so 
she can claim only compensatory damages. Note, however, that whichever the scenario, the 
promisor is in delay or his delay is equivalent to total breach, the promisee has the above 
remedies if she has not terminated the contract and stands ready to perform. In case she has 
terminated, she can resort neither to specific performance coupled with moratory damages, 
nor to compensatory damages, but only to reliance damages (together with restitution if she 
has already rendered performance).109   
In other words, under Bulgarian contract law, moratory damages are not reliance damages. 
Rather, like compensatory damages, they seek to protect the non-breacher's expectation 
interest and the fact that we do not come across this category of damages in common law 
should not make us doubt this. The reason for which Anglo-American law does not make 
such a sharp differentiation between damages for delay and damages for non-performance is 
because it deals with contractual breach in a simple, integrated way. Whatever form the 
breach takes, be it delay or some other, it gives rise to a claim for damages. Whether time is 
of the essence or it is not of decisive significance may matter to the promisee's right to 
                                                 
104 On the Roman roots of this approach, see Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996) 783-833. Besides 
delayed performance, the Bulgarian Contracts Act also distinguishes "impossibility of performance". Thus, 
impossibility of performance through the promisor's fault constitutes another form of contractual breach. See 
Art. 81(1). As for liability for defective performance, rules are scattered under several titles of the Contracts Act 
concerning specific contracts. On its side, the Bulgarian legal doctrine differentiates between: total breach, 
inexact performance, partial breach, delayed performance, performance ahead of the term, bad performance, 
defective performance. Kalaydjiev 303-304. 
105 Art. 79(1) Contracts Act. 
106 Thus, when the contractual obligation is specified only generically, performance cannot become impossible 
because gender does not perish. See e.g. Art. 81(2) ibid. 
107 Art. 87(2) ibid. 
108 Kalaydjiev 327-328. 
109 Ibid 332-333. For the restitution interest see infra the text accompanying footnote 117 of this Chapter. 
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terminate the contract but it does not lead to distinction between kinds of damages.110 It is the 
incurring of loss that determines whether the non-breacher is entitled to damages, not the type 
of contractual default.111 That is why, damages for delayed performance are in fact 
recoverable in Anglo-American law,112 even if they are not sanctioned in the statutory 
texts.113  
In this sense, Bulgarian moratory damages, do not upset the common law distinction of 
damage measures that has become the basis of the economic model. Naturally, since moratory 
damages complement performance and cover only the expenses made or gains lost resulting 
from the delay,114 the magnitude of the compensated harm is smaller than the one in the event 
of no performance whatsoever. Yet, moratory damages are calculated on the basis of the same 
principles as compensatory damages115 and like them are directed at putting the promisee in 
as good a position as if the contract had been performed. 
3. Restitution 
Fuller and Perdue also recognised a third interest in case of breach of contract – the 
restitutionary interest. Protection of the latter requires the party in default to give back 
whatever was conferred to him by the aggrieved party under the contract. In today's market 
exchange the time of payment often differs from the time of delivery, so the Buyer frequently 
makes a down payment and receives the promised counter-performance only later. If 
                                                 
110 Neither the American UCC, nor the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 comprises provisions regarding damages 
for delay in performance. 
111 In this sense Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 54-55.  
112 Farnsworth 278-279; Beale 1853-1854. 
113 Neither the American UCC, nor the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 comprises provisions regarding damages 
for delay in performance. They contain different rules on damages for non-delivery and damages for delivery of 
defective goods, but the differentiation is made on the basis of the consequences from breach and not the form of 
breach. See UCC § 2-708. Seller's Damages for Non-Acceptance and Repudiation., § 2-713 Buyer's Damages for 
Non-Delivery and Repudiation., § 2-714 Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods.; Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 Section 50 Damages for Non-Acceptance, Section 51 Damages for Non-Delivery, Section 53 
Remedy for Breach of Warranty. 
114 Goleva 123-124. 
115  In this respect the reader should not be confused by the special legal rule on calculation of moratory damages 
when the promisor delays a money payment since moratory damages are also awarded when the promisor delays 
the delivery of a commodity. In this sense, see also Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract 
(Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 54. When the delay concerns an obligation to pay money, 
moratory damages amount to the legal interest as of the day of delay. For the losses exceeding the legal interest, 
the promisee can also claim damages but must prove their amount. Art. 86 Contracts Act. The legal interest is set 
by the Council of Ministers at the basic interest rate of the Bulgarian National Bank increased by 10 percentage 
points. See Decree №100 of 29.05.2012 for determining the basic interest rate in relation to lapsed obligations in 
Bulgarian leva and other currencies, promulgated in State Gazette №42 of 05.06.2012, in force as of 01.07.2012 
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eventually the Seller fails to perform, the court may order him to return the amount given to 
him in advance. In the above formalised example this will be the price p.116  
Strictly speaking, restitution is not the remedy of "damages" as its principal aim is not to 
compensate the aggrieved party but to prevent unjust enrichment of the party in default.117 
Consequently, the award is measured by the benefit received by the breacher, not by the loss 
of the plaintiff. This difference in objective between "damages" and "restitution" is recognised 
in all legal systems under comparison. In case of contract termination the Bulgarian legal 
doctrine firmly distinguishes between the claim for returning what was already given and the 
claim for compensation.118 Recovery of the benefit conferred under the contract is considered 
conceptually different from the notion of civil liability. Also, in case of defective 
performance, a distinction is made between the aggrieved party's claim for damages and the 
cumulatively available claim for price reduction. The latter has the purpose of restoring the 
balance between the parties' performances as initially agreed119 and thus seems based on the 
principle of unjustified enrichment (restitution).120 In US law restitution and expectation 
damages were commonly perceived as alternative remedies since damages pursued 
enforcement of the contract while restitution followed its termination.121 The analogue of this 
reasoning in the Bulgarian legal doctrine is the view that the aggrieved party cannot 
simultaneously rescind the contract (i.e. cancel it retroactively) and claim compensatory 
damages for its non-performance, thus justifying the delictual ground of the breaching party's 
liability in case of contractual termination.122 Of the three compared jurisdictions, England 
seems to take the most lenient approach allowing the plaintiff to recover the money paid by 
way of restitution or by way of a claim for damages for wasted expenditure (where there has 
been a total failure of consideration).123 In addition, combining the different types of claim,124 
                                                 
116 See supra the text accompanying footnote 101 of this Chapter. 
117 Farnsworth 154, 324; Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution (Second. An Abridgement 
edn, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 1993) 210, 793-794; Guenther Treitel, The Law of Contract (Eleventh 
edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell 2003) 941; Goleva 288-289. 
118 While the restitution claim is based on Art. 55(1) Contracts Act, the claim for damages is based on Art. 88(1) 
ibid. Konov, Selected Works. Grounds of Civil Liability 35; Kalaydjiev 363, 365-368; Kojuharov, Law of 
Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 316, 318-319. 
119 Art. 195(1)(2) and Art. 265(1) Contracts Act; Konov, Selected Works. Grounds of Civil Liability 36-37; 
Kalaydjiev 337; Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts 94-95. 
120 Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 43. 
121 Dobbs 794; Farnsworth 154, 324-325. 
122 Konov, Selected Works. Grounds of Civil Liability 54; Kalaydjiev 365-368. 
123 Beale 1772. 
124 Millar's Machinery Co Ltd v David Way & Son (1935) 40 Com Cas 204 (a buyer of a machine who receives it 
and pays the price but then discovers that the machine is not in accordance with the contract, recovers the price 
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English judges appear to be the least concerned with conceptual problems and guided solely 
by the principle against double recovery.125 
Though Fuller and Perdue were aware of the theoretical difficulties regarding damages and 
restitution experienced by the American legal doctrine, they considered the classification of 
the action immaterial and related to the legal superstructure, not to policy questions.126 
Indeed, even if the restitutionary interest is termed to have the goal of placing the party in 
breach (not the aggrieved party) in the position he would have been in had the contract not 
been concluded, the ultimate effect of restitution is to put both the breacher and the non-
breacher in this position.127 In other words, the principle of unjustified enrichment and the 
compensatory principle do not generally contradict each other. Restitution also presupposes 
loss on the part of the aggrieved party with this loss resulting from a benefit that has flowed to 
the party in default who is then required to disgorge it.128 It is this compensatory effect of 
restitution that is recognised in the Bulgarian legal doctrine when it is argued that even if 
restitution and liability are distinct, in reality compensatory (i.e. expectation) damages 
comprise two elements: the money equivalent to the unexecuted performance plus damages 
for the losses suffered from non-performance. This structure of compensatory damages, the 
reasoning goes, is easily recognised when they are juxtaposed to the alternative options 
available to the creditor: specific performance plus moratory damages or termination followed 
by restitution of the benefit conferred plus damages. The composition of compensatory 
damages, the reasoning goes, cannot be drastically different from the structure of their 
alternatives: it must comprise a damages element but also an element representing the value 
of the initial performance.129 Allowing damages in addition to recovery of the price, the UCC 
                                                                                                                                                        
the machine would have had if it had been in accordance with the contract, thus recovering the price paid 
(restitution); the wasted expenditure such as installation expenses (reliance loss) and the net profit he would have 
been able to make by using the machine (the loss of the bargain)). 
125 Treitel, The Law of Contract 942; Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action 
Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 38. 
126 Fuller and Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ 53. 
127 Treitel, The Law of Contract 941. 
128 Farnsworth 329. 
129 Konov, Selected Works. Grounds of Civil Liability 38-40. Konov argues that in pursuit of compensation of 
the expectation interest, Bulgarian law, just like other legal systems, seems to discard the difference between 
these two elements of compensatory damages. Yet, he points out, some legislative texts still take the distinction 
into account. One of them is Art. 126(1) Contracts Act stating that if performance becomes impossible and only 
one of the promisors is responsible, the promisee can seek from him the full amount of damages due while from 
the other promisors he can only seek the money equivalent to the initial performance. Both amounts constitute 
compensatory damages but the fact that they are different proves, in Konov's view, that compensatory damages 
consist of two components: the equivalent to performance and damages for the losses incurred, where only the 
second component represents contractual liability. Konov, Selected Works. Grounds of Civil Liability 40.    
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also changed the American perception of restitution and damages as mutually exclusive 
remedies.130 Under its influence the combination of such claims has spread beyond the 
contract for sale of goods to other types of contracts.131  
In other words, compensation and restitution are not a priori incompatible. Indeed, to put it in 
the words of Corbin, "full damages and complete restitution… [may] not be both given for the 
same breach of contract",132 but this is a question of degree, not of contradiction. That is why, 
untroubled by doctrinal distinctions, law-and-economics scholars readily use the phrase 
"restitution damages" in their writing.133 Even if this may be shocking to some mainstream 
lawyers, it is difficult not to admit that in case of breach of contract, restitution in fact 
reimburses the aggrieved party for her loss. For this reason, the model developed in this thesis 
will also encompass the restitution interest and consider recovery of the value given under the 
contract as one of the measures for compensatory damages. 
Bringing the restitution interest into the model raises the question of whether it differs from 
the reliance interest. After all, the plaintiff's down payment is also a form of reliance on the 
contract since it is made in performance of the promisee's contractual obligations. It is 
precisely the fact of enrichment of the promisor that constitutes the difference between the 
two interests. Besides the down payment the promisee may make a number of other expenses 
which in no way benefit the counter-party: e.g. the buyer may order special equipment for the 
car that the seller is supposed to deliver. If the seller breaches, these expenses would 
constitute reliance damages as they are not received by the promisor. In contrast, the down 
payment goes directly to him and is thus subject to restitution. What is crucial is that the 
expenditure is not only a loss to the promisee but also a benefit to the promisor.134  
It does not come as a surprise that in the above ranking of damages, restitution is typically the 
smallest remedy. It does not compensate the aggrieved party for the lost value of the broken 
contract (as expectation damages), for her foregone second-best bargain (as opportunity-cost 
damages) or for the part of wasted expenses that do not enrich the promisor (as out-of-pocket 
                                                 
130
 UCC § 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods. § 2-720. Effect of 
“Cancellation” of “Rescission” on Claims for Antecedent Breach. 
131 In this sense, see Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 37-38. 
132 Arthur Corbin, Contracts (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 1963) § 1221. 
133 See e.g. Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 100. 
134 Dobbs 795; Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 28.  
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damages).135 As repeatedly asserted, it merely requires return of what was given under the 
contract. Restitution, just like reliance-based out-of-pocket damages, may turn out to be a 
bigger sum than expectation damages when the promisee struck a bad deal, e.g. the buyer did 
not predict the future development of the market and the price of the good, purchased under a 
futures contract, fell instead of rising. Naturally then, in case of default, the buyer will rather 
claim restitution than expectation damages. Yet, in reality in such situations the seller rarely 
breaches since the contract will be profitable for him. Another reason why the promisee may 
prefer restitution is because such a claim is easier to prove than the claim for lost 
expectation.136 
4. Other categories of damages 
The above account does not mean to say that the differentiation of expectation, reliance and 
restitution measures represents a full inventory of the kinds of damages a promisee can 
recover upon breach. Some categories of damages protect neither of the three described 
interests. This is the case with the damages which, though not labelled by a common term in 
the civil law tradition, are referred to as "incidental" in Anglo-American law. Incidental 
damages should not be confused with "incidental reliance", mentioned above,137 as they are 
expenses made not "in reliance on the contract, but rather in consequence of its breach."138 
These include costs incurred in a reasonable effort to mitigate loss. For instance, where a 
party attempted, successfully or not, to effect cover, incidental damages would be the very 
expenses made to find and conclude the cover contract, not the price difference, compensable 
by recovering expectation damages. Incidental damages would also be the expenses made in 
relation to taking care of rightfully rejected goods.139 Certainly, the examples given are 
typical but not exhaustive. To put it as generally as possible, the concept encompasses the 
                                                 
135 Farnsworth 155; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 318-319. 
136 Dobbs 794-795. 
137 See supra the text accompanying footnote 94 of this Chapter. 
138 Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 30. 
139 Under Art. 198(1) Contracts Act and Art. 325(1) Commercial Act the buyer promisee has the obligation to 
take care of the rejected goods. Though neither act provides for this expressly or even uses the term "incidental 
damages", the promisee has the right to recover the expenses incurred, in case he rejected the goods rightfully. 
Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts 91. 
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costs incurred by the aggrieved party to deal in some manner with the practical results from 
breach.140  
The damages, called in the common law tradition "consequential", also frequently do not 
appear rooted in any of the three described interests. The term commonly refers to physical 
injury or damage to property (other than the subject-matter of the contract) suffered by the 
aggrieved party as a result of the breach. These are losses different from the loss in value of 
the other party's contractual performance.141 Typical examples are the losses suffered by a 
buyer because she purchased cattle that proved to be infected and spread the disease to the 
rest of the herd or because she had to compensate a sub-buyer for the defective goods 
supplied to her where it was within the seller's contemplation that the goods would be resold. 
Though the Bulgarian legal doctrine qualifies the losses in these examples as "direct" and, 
hence, encompassed by contractual liability,142 physical injury or damages to other promisee's 
belongings are in principle considered consequential damages that lead to delictual and not 
contractual liability.143 Yet, the issue discussed here is whether the damages recovered for 
these losses are interest-based and not the label per se. The mentioned examples clearly 
illustrate that, used in this sense, consequential damages are not really lost expectation (unless 
we stretch the interest to comprise also expectation not to suffer additional losses) or reliance 
loss (unless we stretch the reliance interest to comprise also the buyer's assumption that the 
goods would not be defective).144  
Still, as the term is employed with a number of meanings, attention should be paid to the 
sense which it bears on the concrete occasion. Thus, the term also frequently denotes "lost 
profits".145 In this sense, consequential damages measure not the loss in value of the asset 
                                                 
140 UCC § 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages. (1); Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) 
§ 347 Measure of Damages in General; Farnsworth 207-208; Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of 
Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 30; Beale 1777-1778. For the promisee's right to 
recover such expenses under Bulgarian law, see e.g. Decision №630 of 4.11.2010 г., c. c. №461/2009  of IV c. d. 
of the Supreme Cassation Court (where the promisee is authorised by the court under Art. 80(1) Contracts Act to 
perform at the promisor's expense, the promisee can also recover the expenses incurred to receive the court 
authorisation)). 
141 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 347 Measure of Damages in General; UCC § 2-715. Buyer's 
Incidental and Consequential Damages. (2)(b). 
142 Apostolov, Law of Obligations. First part. General Theory of Obligation 103, 112; Kojuharov, Law of 
Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 280-282. 
143 Sukareva 184-186. 
144 Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 30; 
Beale 1778. 
145 Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 30; 
Beale 1779, footnote 183; Dobbs 226-229. See e.g.: Duyck v. Northwest Chem Corp. 764 P2d 943 (Or App 
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which is the subject-matter of the contract but the loss of income which the asset could 
generate.146 For example, if a company is supplied with defective materials which cannot be 
used to manufacture the projected final goods, it loses the profit it could make from this 
produce.147 Therefore, in this particular meaning, consequential damages are encompassed by 
what is called in Bulgarian law lucrum cessans (gains lost), the latter being, as already 
explained, a structural component of expectation damages.148 "Gains lost", however, remains 
a more general term that comprises both the prevented gains, measured by the increased 
market price of the contractual subject-matter, and the lost income, measured by 
consequential damages.  
In the third place, to complicate matters, the term also refers to lost profits that were not in the 
contemplation of the parties and were, therefore, too remote. Thus, just like in their second 
meaning, consequential damages again stand for a head of damages that in principle falls 
within the promisee's expectation; yet, here, they designate lost profits that cannot be 
recovered under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.149 As the requirement of foreseeability150 is 
the civil law counterpart of the Hadley limitation, the Bulgarian legal term that corresponds 
best to "consequential damages", used in this sense, is "unforeseeable" damages. 
Other kinds of damages also stray away from the three-interest differentiation. Thus, the 
Anglo-American disgorgement damages are intended to wipe out not only the benefit that the 
promisee conferred to the promisor (as the restitution measure), but the profit of the promisor 
from his own breach.151 Similarly to the US punitive damages, disgorgement damages exceed 
                                                                                                                                                        
1988) (farmer's claim for lost yields due to insecticide was barred as one for consequential damages). UCC does 
not define the term "consequential damages", insisting that it bears the sense with which it is used outside UCC. UCC 
§ 1-305. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. comment.3. Thus, it has been suggested that the vague 
language of UCC § 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages. (2)(a) implies precisely the loss of 
profit. In this sense: Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 30, footnote 250.    
146 Dobbs 227-228. 
147 Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 268-269. See supra the text accompanying 
footnote 92 of this Chapter. 
148 In this sense Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 30. 
149 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; In this sense Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract 
(Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 30; Beale 1779, footnote 183. 
150 Art. 82 Contracts Act. 
151 Disgorgement damages are granted by US courts in some rare cases of breach of sales contracts where the 
promisor has already sold the subject-matter of the contract to a third party. Unable to resort to the classic 
specific performance, courts compel the breacher to transfer his proceeds from the sale to the first buyer. See 
Gassner v. Lockett 101 So2d 33 (Fla 1958); Bander v Grossman 161 Misc2d 119 (NY 1994). As a result, in case 
of a fluctuating price, the promisee may recover an amount much higher than the estimate of damages from the 
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the promisee's expectation interest.152 However, the goal of this section is not to give an 
exhaustive overview of the existing categories of damages in the compared legal systems. As 
it will be seen further in the thesis, courts often award monetary amounts that do not fit 
perfectly the interest-based classification of damage measures. The goal is rather to show that 
this classification, adopted by law and economics, does represent a common ground of the 
selected legal systems and can serve as a basis for their comparison. In this sense, the 
economic model elaborated below will not force Bulgarian remedial concepts into a strange 
extrinsic taxonomy. 
Common among the selected legal systems is also the possibility for the parties to contract out 
of the default contractual remedies and stipulate in their agreement a fixed amount of money 
that the promisor has to pay in the event of breach. In other words, the law in all three 
jurisdictions recognises the right of the parties to choose their own measure of damages, 
though the freedom of their choice is not unlimited. Since generally in Bulgarian contract law 
such provisions are valid, even if the stipulated sum may be reduced when too excessive,153 
further in the thesis I will refer to them as "liquidated damages", the label used in Anglo-
American law with respect to valid stipulated damages.154 The term "penalty" will be 
employed only with respect to clauses that are voided in the common law tradition because 
the agreed amount is unreasonably high compared to the sustained or anticipated harm from 
breach.155 In any case, the point made again is that there is a universal starting point to which 
the economic analysis of damages can be anchored even if it spans across legal traditions.  
Conclusion  
Having settled on a functional definition of damages, the short comparative exercise in this 
section allowed me to conclude that the traditional measures of damages used by law and 
economics, expectation, reliance damages and restitution, were not alien to the civil law 
                                                                                                                                                        
breach. In this sense and for more details, see Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 884. In England, after 
Att-Gen v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, courts may award partial disgorgement or total disgorgement by an account of 
profits in breach of contract cases if there are special circumstances to justify it. In Experience Hendrix LLC v 
PPX Entrerprises Inc and Edward Chaplin [2003] EWCA Civ 323, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830 it was 
recognised that an account of profits was also possible in a commercial case. 
152 See supra footnote 8 of this Chapter. 
153 Art. 92(2) Contracts Act; Art. 309 Commercial Act. 
154 The term used in Bulgarian contract law is "neustoika". 
155 For the US, see UCC § 2-718. Liquidation or Limitation of Damages, Deposits. (1); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 356 Liquidated Damages and Penalties. For England, see Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New 
Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 86-88. 
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system included in the research. Convinced that the framework underlying the economic 
model is not constrained to a single legal tradition, in the following chapter I connect the 




Chapter IV Types of Contracts 
The thesis compares damages not only across jurisdictions but also across specific types of 
contract, the sale-of-goods and the construction contract.  
Perhaps the most important achievement of contract theory of the second half of the 20th 
century is the recognition that many contractual arrangements in the real world do not fit the 
classical concept of contract as a discrete event but are better described as ongoing dynamic 
"relations".1 Having occurred in the field of socio-legal studies, the breakthrough was 
subsequently taken up by the founding father of New Institutional Economics, Williamson, 
who rationalised relational contracts in economic terms and elucidated them as intermediate 
solutions in the old Coasean dichotomy between contract and firm.2 Yet, despite the voices  
claiming that the substantial differences between the one-shot exchange and the long-term 
contractual relationship require separate treatment,3 so far neither the sociological, nor the 
economic literature has been able to develop different legal rules with regard to relational (as 
opposed to non-relational) contracts.  
Clarifying the features that distinguish long-term from spot contracts (A.1 and A.2), Section 
A hypothesises that contract remedies have gradually been assuming a regulatory function in 
response to the market failures associated with the former type of contracts. The section also 
asserts that the complex problems arising in the case of breach of long-term contracts (A.4) 
make the choice of the optimal remedy particularly difficult. Section B employs the spot/long-
term contract distinction to investigate the borderline between sale-of-goods and construction 
contracts in each of the three legal systems and to show that US and English contract law no 
longer conceptualise sale of goods as a simple spot contract. The Chapter then concludes. 
                                                 
1 Macaulay; Ian Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ (1974) 47 Southern California Law Review 691. The 
core findings of Macaulay's preliminary study gave the direction of much of the scholarly research in the field of 
contracts in the following decades. Macneil, on the other hand, coined the term relational contract and clearly 
distinguished it from spot contracts.  
2 Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 22 The 
Journal of Law and Economics 233; Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. 
3 Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 813-816; Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘Principles of Relational 
Contracting’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 1089, 1090.  
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A. Spot v. long-term contracts 
Before going deeper into the subject, some explanations with regard to the terminological 
choices made appear necessary. Why is this section entitled "Spot v. long-term" and not "Spot 
v relational contracts"? 
1. A terminological note 
Although both Macneil and Williamson differentiated between relational and long-term 
contracts,4 the terminology seems to be fairly fuzzy. The conceptual vagueness partly comes 
from the fact that the literature has not generated a clear and concise definition of relational 
agreements. They are commonly described against the classical discrete contract5 and even 
Macneil himself preferred "a rich classificatory apparatus" to a definitive approach.6 As both 
relational and long-term contracts typically extend over a protracted period of time, the two 
concepts are often used interchangeably even by authors who have previously asserted that 
they are not necessarily equivalent.7 Yet, even if relational contracts commonly govern 
continuing relations,8 this is not always the case.9 From this point of view, the two categories 
of agreements should not be confounded on the basis of time coverage. Goetz and Scott adopt 
a different construction: "[a] contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of 
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations".10 Though 
overcoming the focus on duration, this definition also does not seem satisfactory.11 It points at 
the inherent incompleteness of relational contracts, but as developed below, incompleteness 
alone cannot mark out long-term contracts, considering that they are incomplete only to a 
                                                 
4 Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and 
Relational Contract Law’; Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 
5 Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’; Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’. 
6 For a criticism of this method, see: Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations’ 236. For Macneil's answer to this criticism, see: Ian Macneil, ‘Economic Analysis of Contractual 
Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus"’ (1981) 75 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1018. 
7 See e.g. Scott, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts’ 2053 but earlier: Goetz and Scott, 
‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1091. Eisenberg also points at to the existing tendency to use the terms 
"relational contracts" and "long-term contracts" as synonyms. See: Melvin Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ in 
Beatson Jack and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (First edn, Oxford: Clanderon 
Press 1995) 291. 
8 Alan Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial 
Strategies’ (1992) 21 The Journal of Legal Studies 271, footnote 1. 
9 Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1091; Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ 293-294. 
10 Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1091. 
11 In this sense also: Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ 294. 
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higher degree. Let me remind that even simple, one-shot contracts are most often not 
complete, especially when it comes to remedies.12 In reality, the pure complete contingent 
contract, the one that is the basis of classical law and of Posnerian law and economics, does 
not exist.13  
Despite this terminological ambiguity, a solid ground for having a preference toward the term 
"long-term contracts" was identified. As emphasised by Hviid, the literatures on long-term 
and relational contracts discuss different issues. While the former addresses the effects of 
renegotiation and the added value of long-term with respect to short-term contracts, the latter 
focuses on the role of social norms and non-legal sanctions in ensuring that parties fulfil their 
contractual obligations.14 Since this work is concerned with courts' reactions to problems 
arising from renegotiation and self-enforceability is touched on only in passing, the better 
choice appears to be to stick to the terminology used in the corresponding literature. 
Another important consideration also tipped the balance in favour of this terminological 
choice. Macneil sees contractual phenomena as occurring along a spectrum having with an 
extreme discrete and an extreme relational pole.15 The extreme discrete pole is epitomised by 
the spot sale transaction16 and the extreme relational pole – by the internal relations within a 
firm,17 with particular contracts falling at different points along the spectrum. Thus, Macneil 
characterises the construction contract between firms (one of the contracts under comparison 
in the thesis) as long-term, i.e. a contract that is not entirely relational but clearly closer to the 
                                                 
12 Ibid 295; Richard Craswell and Alan Schwartz, Foundations of Contract Law (First edn, New York/Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1994) 199-200. 
13 As it is clearly pointed out, complete contracts are only "hypothetical". Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 
Economics, Organizations and Management (First edn, London: Prentice-Hall International 1992) 597. See also 
supra footnote 45 of Chapter I. 
14 Morten Hviid, ‘Long-Term Contracts and Relational contracts’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de Geest 
(eds), The Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, vol III (First edn, Edward Elgar/University of Ghent 2000) 47, 
54. 
15 Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 736-741. 
16 Macneil gives as an example the purchase of gasoline at a service station along a superhighway (with the 
reservation that any prior or subsequent relations between the parties stemming from advertising, branding or 
crediting are ignored). Ibid 720. Another example he uses is the sale of a horse taking place at noon between a 
walker and a rider who are complete strangers. Ian Macneil, Contracts: Exchange Transactions and Relations 
(1977) 13. Williamson refers to a purchase of local spirits from a shopkeeper in a remote area of a foreign 
country which one will never visit again. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations’ 247-248. In any case, what is crucial is that neither are parties entangled in any 
noteworthy past relations, nor are they likely to get entangled in any such relations in the future. 
17 Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and 
Relational Contract Law’ 865, 886-887. 
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relational rather than to the perfectly discrete pole.18 Williamson also classifies the 
commercial construction transaction as highly idiosyncratic and thus akin to transactions 
which require relational contracting. However, as construction transactions are usually 
occasional (and not recurrent), he takes the view that a specialised governance structure, such 
as the one devised within the frames of relational contracting, would be too costly and that 
long-term contracting is a better fit. Nevertheless, in his classification, commercial 
construction transactions are also situated closer to the relational than to the discrete end of 
the spectrum.19 With these taxonomies in mind, it appears more appropriate for this work to 
use the term "long-term" and not "relational contracts".  
A short clarification is also needed with respect to the term "spot contracts". In the below 
account this term also does not denote the pure, discrete, complete-contingent contract that 
can be executed solely on the perfectly competitive market, itself a theoretical concept. Few 
contracts in the real world have the "totally isolated character" required for pure 
discreteness.20 As expressly pointed by Macneil, many of us often shop at the same place or 
get attached to a particular brand or make purchases by credit cards, all of these being details 
that inject some past and future in the everyday one-shot contracts we conclude.21 In this 
sense, real-world discrete contracts are frequently coloured by such relational elements while 
nevertheless preserving a substantial level of separateness from the accompanying past and 
future context. For this reason, guided by the aim to make a relatively realistic but still 
conceptual comparison, I use the term "spot contract" to denote not the perfect discrete 
contract, but real-world quasi-discrete contractual events which, for the purpose of clarity, are 
stripped from their secondary relational facets.   
One last, yet not unimportant note of clarification should be made with regard to the "spot 
contracts" label. In economic terms, spot transactions by definition do not occur in the futures 
or forward market. They are settled either immediately or within a specified period of time 
                                                 
18 Ibid 866, 877-878; Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 731, footnote 120, 760. 
19 Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 237, 247 Figure I, 248, 
253 Figure II. 
20 This is readily conceded by both Williamson and Macneil. See ibid 247; Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of 
Contracts’ 720, footnote 86. For examples of very discrete transactions, given by both scholars, see supra 
footnote 143. 
21 Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 720, footnotes 86 and 87. 
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(usually a few days).22 Yet, such instantaneous or very short-term contracts are no longer 
dominant in today's advanced economies in which exchange is routinely projected in the 
future through the vehicle of promise.23 Clearly, the longer duration of a contract, such as a 
contract for future delivery of a commodity at a fixed price, undermines its discreteness as 
compared with that of an immediate exchange. But where promise as a presentation tool 
conserves a substantial level of discreteness of such contracts and where this discreteness is 
not outweighed by some relational elements of considerable importance, it makes sense to 
include such one-shot, forward contracts within the scope of "spot contracts."24 Thus the term 
used may appear somewhat overstretched to some more economic-minded scholars, but I 
believe the below account will explain convincingly enough the reasons for the choice made. 
In fact, to some extent this terminological note may also seem confusing to some legal 
scholars. It refers to two large groups of contracts but does not draw a clear-cut dividing line 
between them. Long-term contracts are positioned as the exact opposite of discrete ones, but 
spot contracts encompass contractual events that are not entirely discrete, either. Long-term 
contracts, as the term suggests, have a long time span, but under certain conditions some 
forward contracts are allocated to the spot contracts cluster. The presence or absence of 
completeness is also denied to be the factor which separates the two categories of contracts. 
What then are the distinguishing features between them, and where do these features place the 
sale and construction contracts, subject to this research, in the spot/long-term distinction?  
2. Distinguishing features 
From a law and economics perspective two important features distinguish spot and long-term 
contracts: specific investments and the degree of incompleteness. Some authors also point at 
the complexity of the problems related to contract breach as an additional, third feature,25 but 
in my opinion the intricacy of some legal issue is rather a result of particular traits of a 
concrete real-world phenomenon. For this reason, in the thesis the complexity of breach 
                                                 
22 For a definition of spot transactions, see http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Spot+Transaction; 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-spot-transaction.htm; http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spottrade.asp, 
last accessed on 01.06.2013.  
23 On relations ousting discrete transactions in the modern world, see Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 
24 Ibid 745, 749; Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ 857 – 859. 
25 Mireia Artigot i Golobardes and Fernando Gomez Pomar, ‘Long-Term Contracts in the Law and Economics 
Literature’ in Gerrit De Geest (ed), Contract Law and Economics Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol VI 
(Second edn, Cheltenham, UK/ Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar 2011) 314. 
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problems (including the problem of remedies) is considered a logical consequence of the two 
features mentioned and not a distinguishing characteristic of itself. 
Below is a comparison between spot and long-term contracts with respect to each of the 
attributes postulated as distinguishing. While progressing in the text, the reader is once again 
requested to bear in mind that both categories of contracts depart from the complete 
contingent model and do occur in the world of positive transaction costs. The comparison also 
allows to contrast the facilitative and regulatory function of contract law and to emphasise the 
importance of the latter with respect to long-term contracts.  
Specific investments 
This is not a term familiar to lawyers; yet, it has an exact equivalent in legal terminology: 
"reliance".26 In this sense, such investments are nothing other than expenses that allow a 
contractual party to increase the gain, his own or that of his counterparty, from the particular 
contract.27 As opposed to general investments which are beneficial if used in alternative 
contractual arrangements, specific investments have value only within the particular 
contract.28 For example, when a Seller invests in specialised equipment to provide a 
customised commodity, for which there are few alternative Buyers, this is specific investment 
in specialised physical capital.29 Specific investments are the efforts, time and other inputs 
that a contractual party devotes to any customised performance. They entail a considerable 
amount of risk since if the contract is prematurely terminated, they lose value and become 
                                                 
26 In this sense, see also Robert Scott and George Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract 
Design’ (2005) 56 Case Western Reserve Law Review 187, 189; .  
27 For the types of specific investment and for the effect of damages on the incentive to make them, see infra 
Section C. and Section D. of Chapter V. See also Robert  Cooter and Melvin Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of 
Contract’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1432, 1465. 
28 Golobardes and Pomar 314, 326.  
29 Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 242; Williamson 
distinguishes three more types of asset specificity: human asset specificity (e.g. specialised training and learning-
by-doing economies in production operations); site specificity (e.g. plant proximity to realise inventory and 
transportation cost economies) and dedicated assets (i.e. discrete investments made in general-purpose plant at 
the prospect of selling to a specific customer). Oliver Williamson, ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to 
Support Exchange’ (1983) 73 The American Economic Review 519, 526. Later two further asset-specificity 
distinctions were added: brand name capital and temporal specificity (where timely response is crucial). Oliver 
Williamson, ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’ (1991) 36 
Administrative Science Quarterly 269, 281-282. 
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sunk costs. For this reason specific investments tend to correlate with longer contractual terms 
during which they can be recouped.30 
Since the duration of spot contracts is usually short, they generally do not involve transaction 
specific investments. Goods and services are standardised and as there are many alternative 
offers, the identity of the parties is of little importance. It is precisely the absence of specific 
investments resulting in sales of standardised goods, for which there is an active market, 
together with the short contact between the parties during contracting and performance that 
determine my view of some forward agreements as closer to the discrete end of the spectrum. 
The existing ready market for exchange of standardised goods and services is characterised by 
substantial competition which restrains the opportunistic behaviour of contractual parties. 
Policing takes place by reference to one's own experience (if the transaction is recurrent), to 
rating services or to the experience of other players on the market (if the transaction is 
occasional).31 To put it briefly, spot contracting is feasible for standardised products and 
commonly takes place on an active market that constitutes the closest approximation to a 
perfectly competitive market. 
In contrast, specific investments, often needed to fully realise the gains from trade, are typical 
for long-term contracts which ensure a much higher level of commitment.32 The product of 
specific investments is specialised goods and services. As neither the Seller, nor the Buyer 
can find an alternative contractual partner without difficulty, the identity of the parties 
becomes important and they are practically locked into the contract. For example, a Seller 
invests in specialised equipment because he relies on selling the customised commodity to a 
                                                 
30 Compared to a series of short-term contracts, a long-term contract implies commitment which is a way to 
solve the inter-temporal trade-offs between investment and return when parties do not have access to credit 
markets. If the Seller invests in physical capital but is compensated by instalments of the same amount over the 
whole life of the agreement, during the initial period the Buyer is effectively borrowing against the Seller. On his 
own turn, the Seller is better-off with a long-term contract (rather than with a series of short-term contracts) as 
the Buyer commits himself to purchase commodities for a period that is sufficiently long to allow the Seller to 
recoup his investment. Golobardes and Pomar 320-321. 
31 Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 248-249. 
32 That the element of commitment is important in long-term contracts is shown by Malcomson and Spinnewyn. 
They demonstrate that in principal-agent models, absent renegotiation, under asymmetric information a long-
term contract can improve on a series of short-term contracts when one of the parties commits to a payoff lower 
than the one that could be obtained under the series of short-term contracts. James Malcomson and Frans 
Spinnewyn, ‘The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem’ (1988) 55 The Review of Economic Studies 391. In 
addition, Rey and Salanie argue that under asymmetric information long-term contracts are likely to perform 
better than a sequence of short-term contracts since the problems with investment incentives, resulting from 
incomplete information, are generally better overcome through ex ante commitment than through ex post conflict 
solving that leads to inefficiencies. Patrick Rey and Bernard Salanie, ‘Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: 
On the Value of Commitment in Contracting’ (1990) 58 Econometrica 597. 
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specific Buyer. The Buyer, on the other hand, will also find it more costly to obtain the 
commodity from other Sellers who do not dispose of such specialised capital.33 Thus, the 
parties are not in a (perfectly) competitive setting and it is to the best interest of both of them 
that the transaction goes through.  
Though in the above example the identity of the parties matters from the very beginning, 
often it becomes important only during the long period of time over which the contract 
stretches. Thus, for example, a constructor may initially bid with a client in a competitive 
environment. However, in the course of the construction process he gets to know the specific 
terrain, the project designs, identifies the defects of the structure that emerge during the work 
and solely or together with the client takes decisions on remedying them. Yet, this special 
knowledge of the constructor is worth nothing outside the particular construction contract. 
The client can also fully benefit from it only if he stays with his partner until the end of the 
work as from all the constructors on the market, this particular one is best acquainted with the 
problems and challenges presented by the specific construction project. The constructor, for 
example, is in the best position to remedy the defects of the structure at the least cost.34 In 
addition, the intensive communication between the parties in the course of the construction 
process produces substantial communication economies. The parties develop a sense about 
each other's preferences, character, approach to problems, capability to adapt to new 
contingencies. To put it simply, they get to know each other which raises the costs of 
switching to another partner.35 From this perspective, even if at the time of signing the 
agreement parties operate on a competitive market, after the contract has been awarded to the 
constructor, the relationship between him and the client gradually transforms into one of 
monopoly/monopsony bond, known as bilateral monopoly.36 Thus, whether specific 
investments take place at the outset of the contractual relationship or are related to a 
progressive specialisation of the parties vis-a-vis each other, long-term contracts are 
associated with an imperfectly competitive environment. 
                                                 
33 As pointed by Williamson, the cost of supply from specialised capital is presumably lower than from 
unspecialised capital. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 
239-240. 
34 For a similar example in the context of distribution contracts, see Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational 
Contracting’ 1100-1101, footnote 25. 
35 Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel and Robert Scott, ‘Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration’ (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review 431. 
36 Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1100-1101, footnote 25. 
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In the idiosyncrasy of such a relationship each party is dependent on the other and 
consequently more susceptible to opportunistic behaviour.37 The more nonmarketable the 
expenses incurred, the greater the gap between their value in the particular contract and the 
second best contractual substitute.38 In this sense, the party who makes the (higher) specific 
investment is especially vulnerable to strategic behaviour by the other party in the contract, 
i.e. to what economists refer as hold-up. The risk of hold-up becomes apparent upon breaking 
the commitment by a unilateral deviation (breach of contract) or multilateral deviation 
(renegotiation).39 As the specific investments have increased the contractual surplus, the non- 
(less) investing party has the incentive to use his strategic advantage and try to capture a 
bigger share of the joint benefits40 or as is also termed "to appropriate the quasi-rents".41 Once 
the seller has installed the specialised equipment, the buyer may start bargaining to cut down 
the previously agreed price. Or the client may insist that the constructed structure does not 
satisfy his quality criteria and the constructor must rebuild it. Thus, the investing party is 
threatened to lose a part of the return on his investment. For this reason, the risk of hold-up 
strongly influences the parties' incentives to enter into the contract as well as to cooperate 
throughout its term. 
                                                 
37 Williamson defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely limited to 
more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing and cheating. Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of 
deceit… More generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially 
to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, obfuscate or otherwise confuse". Williamson, The Economic Institutions 
of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 47. Scott and Goetz add that opportunism involves 
"bluffs, threats and games of ‘chicken’ designed to exploit another party's presumed bargaining disadvantage." 
Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1101, footnote 26. Klein, on the other hand, considers 
deceit as "a highly unsatisfactory, usually untestable way to explain" hold ups. He associates hold up with 
violating "the intent of the contract by taking advantage of the imperfect terms of the agreement" when the latter 
leaves the self-enforcing range of the relationship (i.e. the range in which the gains from non-performance 
exceed the losses from future trade). Klein 66-67. Whether and under what circumstances courts sanction 
opportunism as breach of contract is a subject for Chapters VI and VII. Here I only model long-term contracts to 
point that such behaviour increases transaction costs.  
38 Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1101, footnote 25. 
39 Golobardes and Pomar 327-328. The risk of hold-ups upon making specific investments is considered a 
foremost consideration in the decision of the parties to integrate vertically. Oliver Williamson, ‘The Vertical 
Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’ (1971) 61 The American Economic Review 112. 
Vertical integration is a solution to the deadlock situation in which parties want to make investments that are 
mutually dependent but each party fears that if he is the first to invest, the other one will seize the chance to 
extract more favourable terms. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting 85-102. To the extent the gains from a hierarchical (instead of contractual) form of organisation are 
offset by the cost of monitoring management and labour within the firm, parties will prefer long-term contracting 
as the way to organise their relationship. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 394-395; Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz, ‘Production Information Costs and Economic Organization’ (1972) 62 American Economic Review 
777, 777-783. This text discusses the contractual solutions directed toward reducing the risk of opportunism (and 
thus toward reducing transaction costs) in the specific investment context.  
40 Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1101, footnote 25. 
41 Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the 
Competitive Contracting Process’ (1978) 21 Journal of Law and Economics 297. 
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Certainly enough, none of the parties would want to invest in the relationship unless he is sure 
that the other party would not take advantage of his vulnerable situation. Ex ante parties may 
resort to different ways to cope with this problem. They may write a contract setting out in 
detail the terms and conditions of cooperation42 or take precautions by purchasing insurance. 
To the extent contract law enforces the parties' contract and thus, ensuring performance, 
encourages them to make specific investments, its function is not different from the 
facilitative role it plays in spot contracts.43 Yet, long-term contracts are much more 
complex.44 Spanning over a protracted period of time, they are inescapably accompanied by 
change in conditions (economic, technological, climatic, etc.) and thus place different strains 
on the existing contract law system. This leads me to the second important feature of long-
term contracts. 
Increased incompleteness 
In theory, in discrete, one-shot exchanges parties could write a complete contingent contract, 
i.e. a contract that specifies ex ante all possible contingencies that might affect performance 
and the consequences that follow if these contingencies materialise. Such a contract could 
presumably allocate risks in all future states of the world and ensure that performance takes 
place when and only when it is efficient. There would be no need for the parties to renegotiate 
as they can anticipate in advance and integrate into their agreement any amendment or 
supplement needed. As for the role of the court in case of dispute, it would consist of more or 
less mechanical enforcement of the parties' promises to the letter.45 However, in the real world 
of positive transaction costs, parties do not write such perfect, complete contracts.  
Before indulging in contractual incompleteness, however, a short terminological clarification 
may prove helpful considering the diverse meaning which economists and lawyers impute 
                                                 
42 Recent empirical research indicates that when the relationship between the parties involves specific 
investments, they tend to write more complete formal contracts. Especially when players have prior experience 
with similar exchanges, their familiarity with the possible obstacles results in more complete contracts.  
Golobardes and Pomar 329, 332. However, as it is shown below: on one hand, writing a perfectly complete 
contract is virtually impossible; on the other hand, parties need to find the balance between the dangers of over- 
and under-completeness. Ibid 333. 
43 For more details on this manifestation of contract law's facilitative function, see supra Section A.1. 
Encouraging specific investment of Chapter I. 
44 See also Baird, 585 who emphasises the complexity of long-term contracts by modeling them (not in formal 
terms) on the basis of repeated games. 
45 Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure (First edn, Oxford: Clanderon Press 1995) 22, footnote 
10. 
 123 
into the term. In this account I refer to incompleteness in the economic sense, i.e. 
informational incompleteness where the contract fails to differentiate all possible conditions 
on which performance could depend and, consequently, fails to pair each of these conditions 
with the optimal obligations. Lawyers, in contrast, usually understand contractual 
incompleteness as literal or, also called, obligational incompleteness, i.e. the contract fails to 
define a complete set of obligations not only explicitly, but also implicitly and thus has 
gaps.46 To make it clear, a contract stating that a widget shall be delivered on a particular date 
for a specified price is implicitly obligationally complete as it provides for the parties' 
obligations under all possible conditions.47 An obligationally incomplete contract then would 
be a contract stating, for example, that the seller shall deliver the widget on the agreed date if 
the weather is sunny, but shall not deliver it if it snows. Such a contract omits to define the 
seller's obligation on days that are neither sunny, nor snowy. What then is the seller required 
to do on days that are cloudy or rainy or foggy?48  
Though more intuitive to lawyers, the latter conception of contractual incompleteness is 
potentially problematic. After all, parties can easily complete their contract by simply 
inserting a clause that provides for the outcome in the event of materialisation of all other 
contingencies that are not expressly listed in the agreement. In this sense, literal/obligational 
incompleteness presupposes extremely naïve parties, who do not simply fail to foresee some 
relevant condition but are not even aware they may fail to foresee a condition, which does not 
seem to be a good assumption when trying to explain why parties draft contracts that have 
gaps.49 Indeed, Triantis argues that real-world contracts are seldom obligationally incomplete 
as envisaged obligations are usually framed to apply across an array of different states of the 
world, so these states are in fact foreseen, though it may have been more efficient to include 
them as specific conditions.50 Note then that an obligationally complete contract, i.e. a 
                                                 
46 For this distinction between informationally incomplete and obligationally (or literally) incomplete contracts, 
see Scott and Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design’, 190-191; Robert Scott and 
George Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ (2006) 115 The Yale Law Journal 814, 816, 
footnote 2; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 70-71, 72-73; See also in this sense, though not using the mentioned 
terms: Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 292-293.  
47 The example follows the example given by Scott and Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of 
Contract Design’ 190. 
48 The example is somewhat modifying a similar example, given by Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis 
of Law 292. 
49 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 70-71; Scott and Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract 
Design’ 190. 
50 George Triantis, ‘Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability’ (1992) 42 Toronto Law Journal 450, 464-468.  
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contract which is complete in legal terms, may still be informationally incomplete, i.e. 
incomplete within the meaning of the economic literature, since it does not specify the 
optimal obligations of the parties under all possible circumstances.51 From this perspective, 
when I refer to parties' inability to write a complete contract, I mean their inability to write an 
efficient complete contract as they can always draft an inefficient complete contract.  
As it was already asserted,52 incompleteness is by no means an exclusive attribute of long-
term contracts. As a rule contracts are incomplete. Even when it comes to sale of standardised 
products, parties take care to plan mainly their primary obligations concerning the subject-
matter and the price of the contract, often failing to reach an enforceable agreement on the 
other terms and conditions of exchange.53 Planning takes place to the extent the gains 
outweigh the costs, so contingencies that are remote and unlikely are left out of the contract.54 
Note that these are deliberate, rational gaps which are justified by the costs that would 
otherwise be expended to achieve completeness.55 The function of contract law, then, is to 
facilitate saving of contracting costs by supplying default terms for typical bargainers to fill 
the gaps as well as to enforce the express stipulations of the parties, enabling them to make 
credible commitments and engage in beneficial exchange.56  
Turning to long-term contracts, the problem of incompleteness magnifies and becomes 
especially insurmountable.57 Where the contract is of such extended duration, parties' 
bounded rationality makes them unable to predict at a reasonable cost, if at all, the infinite 
number of external contingencies following the signing of the agreement or the optimal 
reaction to these contingencies. Under conditions of uncertainty it becomes too costly for 
parties to foresee all the future changes in technology or in government regulation or the 
countless other possible states of the world that may affect the cost-profit calculus.58 And 
even where they are capable of such foresight,59 they may find it too complex to work out 
                                                 
51 Scott and Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design’ 190; Scott and Triantis, 
‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 816, footnote 2. 
52 See supra footnotes 12-13 in Section A.1. of this Chapter and the text accompanying them. 
53 Macaulay 57-60, 62. 
54 Ibid 64-65; Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 761. 
55 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 292-293. 
56 Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 279. 
57 Golobardes and Pomar 315. 
58 Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 333; Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1090, 
footnote 4. 
59 Bear in mind that sophisticated commercial parties, especially if they have prior experience in similar 
exchanges, are usually aware what contingencies can arise during the life of the contract. Schwartz, ‘Relational 
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(between themselves) and then specify in a comprehensible, unambiguous (for a third party) 
way the efficient responses to each and every event together with the respective remedies for 
non-performance.60 Thus, it may be difficult to determine at the outset all variables that are 
relevant with respect to a construction project: the "appropriateness" of materials, the 
"quality" of equipment, the "adequacy" of design or the "reasonableness" of precautions.61 In 
addition, the very fact that the level of specialisation of the parties evolves in the course of the 
relationship depending on the circumstances makes it practically impossible to set out ex ante 
the desirable amount of specific investments.62 In such situations of high uncertainty and 
complexity, the result can be no other but a contract that suffers from increased, added 
incompleteness. 
Another source of the increased incompleteness of long-term contracts is information 
asymmetry.63 A lot of variables that matter in long-term contexts are unobservable or 
unverifiable and thus, in economic terms, "non-contractible".64 For example, the client often 
knows that his constructor shirked, but the costs of proving this to a third party enforcer can 
be fairly high. For this reason, in economic contract theory such intangible investments as the 
quality of effort, exerted by the constructor, are considered unverifiable. If parties condition 
their contract on such information, economic scholars reason, the contract will not be legally 
                                                                                                                                                        
Contracts in the Courts: Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies’ 278-279. See also supra 
footnote 42 of this Chapter. 
60 Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 333; Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’ 1090, 
footnote 4;  Hart 23-24.  
61 These are only some of the variables formulated in such vague terms in construction contracts. They are 
extracted by way of review of construction contracts from all three jurisdictions under comparison. The 
collection (on file with the author) was made especially for the purposes of this research and includes all 
standard forms of agreement and general conditions in the A Series (Owner/Contractor agreements) of the latest 
2007 edition published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA) in the US and 5 standard form construction 
contracts of the 2005 edition published by the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) in England and Wales. For more 
information on AIA Contract Documents, see: http://www.aia.org/contractdocs/about/ and on JCT construction 
contracts, see: http://www.jctltd.co.uk/. The Bulgarian part of the collection includes 30 construction contracts, 
assembled by requests sent out to lawyers practicing in Bulgaria, and 7 template construction contracts, used in 
the jurisdiction. For the sake of good order, it must be emphasised that the collected templates are not 
standardised forms but only contracts which are sometimes used by legal counsel as starting samples that are 
redrafted and adapted according to the needs of the clients. Unlike the US and England, standard forms of 
construction contract are not published in Bulgaria. Two of the template contracts were found by internet search 
and five are published in: Zahari Tormanov, The Contract in Construction and Real Estate (Sofia: Sibi 2008) 
123-157. The Bulgarian collection includes business-to-business as well as business-to-consumer construction 
contracts. Some of the contracts were drafted for different projects of the same company. 
62 Fernando Gomez, ‘Breach of Contract Issues in Long-Term Distribution Contracts’ (Presentation, EUI, 
Florence, 22 January 2010). 
63 For a definition of information asymmetry, observability and verifiability, see supra footnote 46 of Chapter I 
64 Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies’ 
280; Schwartz, ‘The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State’ 111-113. 
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enforceable. Hence, parties would never contract on such an unverifiable factor as the 
agreement would entail moral hazard and incentivise parties to misrepresent information.65 
Other important variables are not even observable. Since the long-term relationship has no 
adequate substitute, neither of the parties can turn to the market to monitor the relevant 
economic data of the other party. Thus, the promisee does not know the production cost of the 
promisor. She knows the probability distribution from which costs are drawn but not the 
production cost itself.66 The promisor, on his turn, does not know the value of his 
performance to the promisee. Hence, the reasoning goes, parties cannot condition the contract 
on such unobservable information, as their promises will simply not be credible.67 The 
difficulty to prove cost and value to the standard necessary for legal enforcement must also be 
added to this observability problem.68 Thus, asymmetric information constitutes one of the 
main causes for the high incompleteness of long-term contracts. 
It must be also emphasised that the very awareness of the parties that change in conditions 
and, consequently, renegotiation are unavoidable slows down revelation of information 
between them.69 The promisor does not have incentives to disclose his costs as he fears that at 
renegotiation the promisee will bargain for a lower price. The promisee, in her own turn, is 
afraid the price will soar if the promisor becomes aware of her value.70 It is also shown that a 
moral hazard problem arises since a principal who does not observe the agent's effort cannot 
induce him to undertake high effort at all if the agent anticipates renegotiation taking place 
after he has chosen the level of effort but before the outcome of his choice becomes known.71 
To the extent that the risk of hold up at renegotiation72 also involves making choices in one's 
own and not in the joint interest, it is a part of the broader moral hazard problem which arises 
from the fact that the party making the specific investments must share the accrued gains with 
                                                 
65 See Hart 37, footnote 15. The assumption about non-contractibility of investments is in the tradition of Oliver 
Hart and John Moore, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation’ (1988) 56 Econometrica 755. However, as it 
will be shown below, the relationship between verifiability and the degree of contract incompleteness is more 
subtle. See also Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’. 
66 Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 25. 
67 Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies’ 
280; Schwartz, ‘The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State’ 112. 
68 Note that calculation of payments on the basis of cost or profit varies depending on the accounting principles 
used. Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 825, footnote 22. 
69 Hviid 49; Golobardes and Pomar 337. 
70 See supra footnote 46 of Chapter I. See also Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 354. 
71 Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, ‘Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts’ (1990) 58 
Econometrica 1279. In this case the revelation of information is slowed down by the agent randomising over his 
choice of effort level. Hviid 49. 
72 See supra Section A.2. Specific investments of this Chapter. 
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his counterparty.73 In other words, the increased incompleteness of long-term contracts 
necessitates their subsequent revision but at the stage of this revision the problem of 
information asymmetry manifests once again, opening the door to opportunism. Absent 
information and fearing expropriation, a party may suspect his contractual partner of strategic 
games and thus refuse to adjust even though in reality readjustment will enhance the joint 
surplus. Or the party may agree to adjustment but inadvertently fall in the hold-up trap set by 
the self-interested counterparty. In this sense, asymmetric information not only prevents 
parties from writing a complete contract ex ante but may also deter them from efficiently 
filling the gaps ex post.74 
If the above-mentioned barriers (mostly of information character) to complete contracting are 
expressed in terms of transaction costs, two large groups of costs have to be distinguished: ex 
ante contracting costs and ex post enforcement costs. To avoid any confusion that may stem 
from the literature, it will be useful to itemise explicitly the types of transaction costs falling 
within the scope of these two large groups.75  Contracting costs include search costs to locate 
a contractual partner, costs stemming from investments in acquiring information of the 
possible future contingencies and of the necessary adjustments to them, negotiating costs, 
drafting costs, costs arising from the information asymmetry between the parties. 
Enforcement costs include verification costs (costs of observing and proving to court relevant 
private information) as well as uncertainty and error costs.  
Note that the same types of transaction costs exist in spot contracting; yet, their magnitude is 
considerably smaller. Finding a contractual partner on the spot market is not that costly due to 
the presence of many players offering similar goods and services. As generally conditions are 
not likely to change over the life of the contract, parties do not need to invest much in trying 
to foresee the future, do not need to worry about costly renegotiations and, consequently, do 
not need to spend that much time and resources in haggling over the contractual terms. There 
is, of course, information asymmetry even in spot exchange, but overcoming it to a substantial 
degree is much less costly on established thick markets.76 All these problems being less 
                                                 
73 Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 280. 
74 Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 25-26. 
75 On contract theorists commonly focusing on costs at the one end and ignoring the costs at the other end of the 
contracting process, see Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 817, 835. 
76 To assume complete transparency of the market would be quite unrealistic. Information asymmetries arise 
both with respect to consumers and businesses. As asserted by Stigler, market players cannot obtain full 
information even on markets for completely homogeneous commodities. Yet, the smaller dispersion of prices in 
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intense, drafting costs are also lower. In addition, asymmetric information does not produce 
significant ex post inefficiencies since, in the absence of specific investments, a contractual 
partner can be easily substituted with a new identical one.77 The high number of market 
participants and alternative offers precludes opportunism – or, if it still occurs, minimises the 
costs arising from it. Enforcement costs, too, go down as the market readily provides a 
benchmark for calculating the damages suffered in case of breach.78 In other words, put 
simply, one-shot exchange transaction costs are positive but they are still sufficiently low for 
bargaining to achieve (more often than not) efficient allocation of resources.79 All contract 
law needs to do, then, is to push transaction costs even lower through supply of efficient 
default rules and enforce the efficient outcome of parties' contracting.  
As the duration of the contract extends and the market thins due to the specific investments 
made, ex ante and ex post transaction costs rise impeding the efficient coordination of the 
parties. The degree of incompleteness of the contract no longer turns only on parties' 
unwillingness to plan for remote contingencies for which planning costs exceed the gains.  
Contractual gaps widen also because parties prefer to withhold some private information 
(such as costs and value) or because some facts (such as effort) are not verifiable in court. 
With contracts growing to be more imperfect as a result of information asymmetries, parties 
may be incentivised to avail themselves of the increased, added contractual incompleteness. 
Thus, when transaction costs become prohibitively high, the market starts to fail.80 Ironically, 
fostering exchange by resorting solely to the same old means of reducing negotiating and 
drafting costs through supply of default rules will not do the job. Since the incentives for 
opportunistic behaviour are not eradicated, limiting the role of contract law to facilitation will 
                                                                                                                                                        
thick markets is explained by the lower search costs on such markets. George Stigler, ‘The Economics of 
Information’ (1961) 69 The Journal of Political Economy 213. Certainly, overcoming information asymmetries 
on the spot market may still prove to be prohibitively costly for consumers, but here the comparison is between 
thick and thin markets, not between consumers and businesses on the same market. 
For those readers who are less familiar with economics terminology, a short terminological explanation may be 
useful. A thick market is a market with a high number of Buyers and Sellers and consequently a high number of 
bids and asks. They are characterised by a great number of transactions, low price volatility and high asset 
liquidity. Although the concepts of market thickness and market competitiveness are not equivalent, market 
thickness essentially indicates the level of competition on the market. Generally, the thicker the market, the more 
competitive it is. See: Daniel Leiter and Thiery Warin, ‘An Empirical Study of Price Dispersion in Homogenous 
Goods Markets’ Middlebury College Economics Discussion Paper No 07-10 
<http://cat2.middlebury.edu/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0710.pdf> accessed 22.03.2013. 
77 Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 25-26. 
78 For more details, see infra Section A.4. Spot contracts of this Chapter. 
79 For the Coase theorem, see supra Section C. of Chapter II. See also Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 85 
80 Ibid 85. 
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only trigger more and longer haggling, making an optimal agreement even less likely.81 This, 
of course, is contrary to the postulate of the Coase theorem. But let me remind that in the 
context of long-term contracting parties are so far from the Coasean zero-transaction-cost 
world that we cannot simply rely on the Coase theorem to solve the problem. With strategic 
considerations raising transaction costs beyond a certain threshold, contract law needs to 
minimise not only the initial obstacles to cooperation but also the inefficiencies arising from 
failures to cooperate.82 To be more straightforward, it needs not only to facilitate but also to 
regulate. 
The dimensions of this necessity become clearer when considering that the failing market 
produces a social cost which may dwarf the efficiency losses experienced by the parties.83 
Information asymmetry leads to adverse selection where Buyers, being unaware of the quality 
of the purchased commodities, offer blended prices that do not warrant investment in 
production of high quality commodities, thus driving high-quality Sellers out of the market. 
The result is a market of "lemons" – and, in the extreme, - a complete collapse of the 
market.84 Indeed, consider the reaction of the held up party when concluding the next 
contract. Taking into account the threat of opportunism, he may overinvest in precautions, 
thus limiting the amount of ex ante contractual surplus to be divided (private cost). He may 
decide to make investments that are only general, thus forgoing some efficiency gains (private 
cost but also a social cost as there is a decrease in the overall welfare). Or he may even choose 
to close down, reducing the amount of trade on the market altogether (again private as well as 
a social cost).85 Multiply the latter result by the number of held up players and here is how an 
entire market may disappear. This implies a huge social cost which, according to Akerlof, 
explains the differences in social welfare between developed and underdeveloped countries.86 
The private and social inefficiency costs make a strong case for contract law performing a 
                                                 
81 Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’, 23. 
82 This idea is developed in detail in ibid 17-20. Cooter takes as a starting point the Coase theorem as well as 
Hobbes' belief that people will never reach agreement unless there is a third party to coerce them, expressed in 
his 17th century work Leviathan. Revealing the falsehoods of the extremely optimistic Coase theorem and the 
extremely pessimistic Hobbesian approach (which Cooter calls the "Hobbes Theorem"), Cooter argues that to be 
efficient, law should be structured to balance between these two normative principles. See also Cooter and Ulen, 
Law and Economics 85, 91-94 as well as supra Section C. of Chapter II on the methodological differences 
between Chicagoans and New Institutionalists stemming from their different attitude toward the Coase theorem. 
83 Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 26. 
84 George Akerlof, ‘The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. 
85 Baird 587; Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 26. 
86 Akerlof 488. 
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regulatory function in the context of long-term contracts. By regulating, contract law can 
correct market failures and minimise strategic conduct that exploits contractual 
incompleteness and erodes parties' readiness to engage in beneficial trade.87  
Clearly, whether and to what extent contract law needs to perform a regulatory function 
depends on where a particular real-world contract lies along the contractual continuum. In the 
above account I have already identified several factors that determine the position of a 
contract as closer to the spot or to the long-term end of the continuum: the duration of the 
contract, the involvement of specific investments, the standardised or customised character of 
the contract subject matter, the importance of the parties' identity, the 
thickness/competitiveness of the market. Note that the commercial or consumer character of 
an agreement does not define its classification as spot or long-term as both consumer 
shopping and purchases on the commercial spot market readily fall within the scope of 
discrete exchange. It would also be wrong to automatically assign any sale contract to the spot 
range and any construction contract – to the long-term range of the spectrum. Nowadays 
many sales of goods occur not as one-shot, discrete contracts but as long-term supply 
agreements. As for construction contracts, as defined in the thesis,88 they cover a very broad 
subject matter which does not always imply development of a mutual relation between the 
parties. Imagine, for example, an agreement for the execution of some simple plumbing work 
such as repair of the tap or trap of one's kitchen sink to eliminate a leakage: it does not exhibit 
the distinguishing features of a long-term contract. 
Nevertheless, although every real-world agreement needs to be positioned on the continuum 
depending on its particular characteristics, contracts for services generally tend to be more 
prone to long-term contracting than contracts for sale of goods. In this sense, all other things 
equal, a construction contract would always lean more to the long-term range of the spectrum 
than a contract for sale of goods. Indeed, services are intrinsically less susceptible to 
standardisation and detailed advance planning and naturally presuppose the growth of some 
relation between the parties as the Seller is much more constrained by the idiosyncratic 
peculiarities and preferences of the Buyer.89 Considering the lion's share of services in the 
                                                 
87 In this sense, see: Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 244; Chirico 410. 
88 See supra Section B.1. of Chapter I. 
89 Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 694, 717, footnote 78, 763, footnote 209, 767, footnote 217, 768-
770. 
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GDP of EU Member States and the US,90 it can be expected that enforcement of contract 
remedies has responded to the organisational changes in the economy and the increased use of 
long-term contracting. The question, then, is whether national contractual regimes regarding 
remedies draw a line between spot and long-term contracts and if they do, where and on what 
grounds.91 Also, if existing, does this borderline entail the remedies of specific performance 
and damages gradually assuming a regulatory function? While these questions will be 
explored in the chapters that follow,92 I turn now to some typical governance mechanisms by 
which parties regulate their long-term contracts.  
3. Governance mechanisms 
Before investigating the way courts in the compared jurisdictions resolve contractual disputes, 
it will be useful to get some idea of how parties themselves regulate the enhanced 
incompleteness of their long-term contracts. This section casts a light on the contracting 
dilemma confronting parties to long-term agreements and focuses on two important 
governance mechanisms used by them to organise their coordination: industry experts and 
vague contractual terms. 
Parties, engaging in long-term contracting, have to balance between the need to bind their 
hands in order to stimulate efficient specific investment and the need to adapt as the future 
unfolds in order to ensure their exchange continues to generate joint benefits. Fixing 
obligations too rigidly may turn out to be counterproductive and prevent parties from 
adjusting when conditions change. Their agreement needs to be revisable in case of becoming 
suboptimal ex post but, ironically, such flexibility also increases the risk of hold up and 
weakens parties' ex ante commitment.93 Trying to resolve this puzzle, incomplete contract 
theorists have expended a great deal of efforts developing economic models that seek to 
overcome the moral hazard and hold-up problems by means of the correct contractual design. 
                                                 
90 For some statistics with regard to EU Member States, see supra Section B.1. of Chapter I. As for the US, in 
2011 services activities accounted for nearly 80 per cent of private sector GDP and 82 per cent of all private 
sector employment. See http://blog.trade.gov/2012/05/21/expanding-trade-through-services/, last accessed on 
01.06.2013. 
91 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘From a Status to a Transaction-Based Approach? Institutional Design In European Contract 
Law’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 311, 320-321. 
92 For the empirical research, see infra Chapters VI and VII. 
93 On this ex ante/ex post tension in long-term contracts, see also: Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 
334; Baird 586; Hviid 48; Golobardes and Pomar 330. In particular, on rent dissipation and the risk of hold-up 
resulting from increased contractual specification, see Klein, ‘The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-
Enforcing Relationships’. 
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The devised ingenious contractual schemes that disincentivise exploitation of the vulnerable 
partner or invest the latter with bargaining power in renegotiation are, however, based on very 
strong assumptions. They imply that parties are able to invent first-best contractual solutions 
which courts would specifically and mechanically enforce.94 Yet, this is not what happens in 
practice. Neither parties are perfectly rational, nor are courts immune from making mistakes 
when enforcing (or not) the contracts that come before them. 
With the information barriers discussed above (uncertainty, complexity, information 
asymmetry), parties are incapable of drafting ideal long-term contracts that resolve ex ante all 
conflicts between their joint interest and the individual interest of each of them. As a result, 
the vitality of their relationship depends to a great extent on their ability to incorporate in the 
agreement a sensible governance structure that permits them to adjust as they go along. Such 
governance structures may include measurement systems allowing for indexation of the price 
depending on the market conditions (sale contracts) or for valuation of the work depending on 
the costs incurred (cost-plus construction contracts). They may combine direct monitoring 
arrangements (such as the client's right to supervise the constructor's performance) with 
indirect monitoring systems that integrate incentive mechanisms stimulating higher 
performance efforts (such as termination rights or liquidated damages clauses).95 Governance 
structures may also encompass extra-legal means of adjustment such as trust, reputation, 
norms of commercial ethics,96 or enforceable contractual clauses assigning decision rights to 
one of the parties or providing for their mutual agreement. Written contract terms may also 
complement (instead of substitute) the mentioned self-enforcing mechanisms by making non-
performance more costly.97 Generally, governance is extremely varied and sensitive to the 
particular contractual context. 
                                                 
94 Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 337; Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three 
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The role of industry experts 
Even if a particular governance scheme dominates certain types of contracts, it may be 
implemented in very different ways across jurisdictions. For example, construction 
agreements typically provide for the rights of a third party, an industry expert, to make 
decisions affecting the obligations of the contracting parties. The reasons for this solution are 
apparent: on one hand, the constructor's performance is fairly multidimensional and 
dependent on the materialised state of the world; on the other hand, clients, unlike 
constructors, often have no experience in construction matters which usually require highly 
sophisticated technical skills. In such a situation, parties commonly charge a qualified 
specialist with the responsibility to specify ex post many aspects of the constructor's 
performance. In the US and England, this role is routinely delegated to the architect; in 
Bulgaria, - to several professionals in the industry. In all jurisdictions, depending on his 
contract, the expert controls the choice of construction materials, equipment and 
subcontractors, instructs rectification of defects and variations and generally ensures that the 
work complies with the contract requirements. Though these powers are ambiguously referred 
to as "contract administration", their exercise in fact completes the parties' imperfect 
construction contract. 
Yet, looking more in depth, the role of such industry experts varies in the different 
jurisdictions under comparison. In the US and England, the architect's judgment regarding the 
valuation of the work and its completion according to the contract is embodied in certificates 
which are made conditions precedent to the right of the constructor to be paid.98 In both 
jurisdictions the design professional is the initial decision-maker who resolves claims for 
payment of money, extension of time or other relief under the contract as well as any other 
disputes between the contractual parties. His decision is binding on the parties unless 
challenged following the procedure envisaged by the contract – mediation, adjudication or 
binding dispute resolution (arbitration or court proceedings).99 Commonly, the ultimate 
                                                 
98 Such is the role of the architect under AIA Document A201 – 2007 General Conditions of the Contract for 
Construction and the JCT Standard Building Contract (2005 edition). See also Justin Sweet, Legal Aspects of 
Architecture, Engineering and the Construction Process (Sixth edn, Brooks/ Cole Publishing Company 2000) 
574-583; John Uff, Costruction Law (Tenth edn, London: Thomson Reuters; Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 236, 289-
294, 410-411. 
99 See Article 15 of AIA Document A201 – 2007; Clause 2.26-2.29, Section 4 and 9 of the JCT Standard 
Building Contract (2005 edition). See also J.  Uff and V. Moran, ‘Chapter 37. Construction Contracts’ in H.G. 
Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts Specific Contracts, vol II (Thirty-first edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson 
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certificate issued at the end of the construction process enjoys a certain degree of finality and 
is binding unless there was fraud or gross mistake.100 In other words, the architect serves both 
as an agent of the client, ensuring that he is not taken advantage of by the constructor, and as 
an impartial arbitrator who gives his professional opinion having regard to the interest of both 
parties.101 The architect presumably has to show objectivity also when making decisions on 
matters relating to aesthetic effect and when evaluating the standard of workmanship as such 
to his "reasonable satisfaction".102 And although in England the architect is said to resolve 
controversial points between the parties only incidentally, by issuing certificates and giving 
instructions,103 while in the US his authority to resolve claims and disputes is particularly 
emphasised,104 in both jurisdictions he is given the role of a "judge". 
However, the agency relationship with the client naturally implies hazards to the impartiality 
of the design professional. These hazards are additionally increased by another potential 
conflict of interest: the architect may bypass defective work to incentivise the constructor not 
to file a claim for additional time or cost that may point at the architect's professional 
negligence or conversely he may give instruction for rectification of a defect trying to conceal 
his own mistake in the design.105 Prioritising the goal to avoid costly delays of construction 
projects as well as enforcement costs, Anglo-American law relies on the architect's 
reputational stake as a guarantee against all the perils inherent in his dual role. After all, in 
demonstrating objectivity, the design professional increases his chances to be selected in 
subsequent contracts. In contrast, Bulgarian law sacrifices some of the speed of adjustment in 
return for higher chances for unbiased decision.  
In Bulgaria, the function of the Anglo-American architect is divided between several industry 
experts. The law obliges the client to contract with the design professional who supervises the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Reuters 2012) 805 To avoid confusion, here the term "adjudication" is not used in its usual sense of legal process 
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project for its adherence to the drawn up designs106 as well as with a licensed consultant who 
ensures its compliance with the mandatory legislative construction requirements and with the 
designs.107 If licensed, the design professional may also serve as consultant but very often this 
function is entrusted to another specialist – the one who has previously reviewed the designs 
and opined on their conformity with the mandatory norms as a precondition for obtaining the 
approval of the public administration.108 Whether they be same or different persons, both of 
these participants in the construction process instruct correction of defects and minor 
variations in the work and thus, securing a certain minimum quality of effort on the side of the 
constructor, make binding decisions on some matters of contention between the parties. They 
also sign the acts and protocols that are drawn up in the course of the project and have 
evidentiary force as to the facts related to the execution of the construction work.109 To the 
extent that they evaluate the constructor's performance, both the design professional and the 
consultant function as arbitrators between the parties. The consultant is also responsible for 
resolving disputes between all participants in the construction (including disputes between the 
parties, between the design professional and the constructor and between the client's agent and 
the constructor or the design professional) and his decisions are binding, though subject to 
appeal before the competent public construction administration.110 In this sense, his function 
comes closest to the judging role of the architect in the US and England. 
Note, however, that although the mentioned acts and protocols certify the quality and quantity 
of the work carried out, they do not have any bearing on the valuation of the work and the 
payment due to the constructor. Neither the design professional, nor the consultant are 
authorised to grant additional time or additional cost to the constructor. Generally, they stay 
out of the economics of the relationship between the parties. They take care that the structure 
complies with the mandatory requirements of the construction legislation and the designs but 
not with any higher requirements of the client that may be prescribed by the construction 
agreement. To ensure that the work meets his own particular demands as to quality of 
materials, standard of workmanship, aesthetics, etc. that go beyond the specifications of the 
                                                 
106 Art. 162 of the Spatial Development Act, promulgated State Gazette №1 of 02.01.2001, in force as of 
31.03.2001, last ammended State Gazette №80 of 14.11.2011 (hereafter "Spatial Development Act"). 
107 Art. 166 ibid. 
108 Art. 166 (3) in connection with Art. 166 (1) 1. Ibid. 
109 Art. 4 (1) in connection with Art. 1 (4) of Ordinance №3 of 31.07.2003 on Drawing Up Acts and Protocols in 
the Course of Construction, promulgated State Gazette №72 of 15.082003, last ammended State Gazette №29 of 
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110 Art. 5 (7) ibid. 
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mandatory law and the designs, the client needs to contract with an additional expert as his 
agent on the site.111 The latter can also control the quantity of materials used, the choice of 
subcontractors as well as manage the valuation of the executed work. Yet, his accounting does 
not create a debt due for the client as do the certificates issued by American and English 
architects. Nor he is commonly empowered to grant time extensions to the constructor. Thus, 
as the responsibilities of the client's agent usually concern the proper performance of the day-
to-day construction work, matters such as payment and time remain for the agreement of the 
parties.  
In short, Bulgarian law relies much less on the stature and integrity of design professionals. It 
imposes control on the observance of a certain mandatory minimum of quality prescribed by 
the legislation and the administratively approved designs and then leaves it to the client to 
ensure that the project meets his own particular requirements. For this reason, the figures of 
the objective supervisor and of the client's agent are commonly separated in Bulgaria with the 
legal system providing a mechanism (the consultant) for quick initial resolution of disputes 
between all participants in the construction process. This is a more cumbersome system 
requiring better coordination between the different players but it generally reduces the risks to 
ex post decision-making stemming from the assignment of a protective (for the client) and a 
judging role to the same person. Yet, if the constructor is provided with a specific proxy for 
his effort (the minimum requirements) and clients regularly save costs by cutting out the 
supervision of an agent, this may lead to an overall lower level of quality of construction and 
more disputes between the parties as to the efforts expended by the constructor. In addition, 
adjustments on time and payment are generally left out of the domain of the experts that are 
part of the project. Their judgment on such issues is purely advisory, so differences between 
the parties on these matters may lead to costly delays and high enforcement expenses incurred 
in court or arbitration procedures. Thus, the less powerful monitoring role of construction 
experts in Bulgaria impedes parties' subsequent adjustment.    
                                                 
111 There is no legal obstacle for the client to charge the consultant with this function. In practice, however, 
licensed consultants are not inclined to take such responsibilities as they imply closer involvement in the 
relationship between the client and the constructor. An expert who takes on this job must also enjoy the full 
confidence of the client. For these reasons, clients usually employ an additional expert as their agent on the site. 
Tormanov 109. 
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Rules and standards 
Yet, let us leave the ex post operation of governance devices and go back to the time of 
contracting when parties need to decide on the ratio between commitment and flexibility in 
their agreement. To strike this balance, parties draft their contracts by alternating precise 
rules112 and vague standards.113 Rules ensure the credibility of commitment114 while standards 
accommodate the inevitable need for cooperation over the life of the relationship. That parties 
commonly use vague terms in their agreements including with regard to the effort owed by 
the Seller is an undeniable fact confirmed by the review of the construction contracts 
collected for this research.115 Thus, the US AIA form contracts regularly provide for the 
constructor's "best skill and attention".116 The English JCT forms often require the constructor 
to perform "in a proper/good and workmanlike manner"117 while Bulgarian construction 
contracts call for the "due care of a prudent merchant".118 And although for reasons of time 
constraints no similar collection of sale contracts could be made for the purposes of this 
thesis, that goods sold are also often described fairly imprecisely was pointed out as early as 
Macaulay's seminal study and remains undisputed to this day.119 Contracts specifying the 
quality of the gadget as "high", "premium", "merchantable" or by another ambiguous term are 
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114 All three legal systems under research require contracts to meet a certain level of definiteness to be legally 
enforceable. In the US the common law indefiniteness doctrine infers the intention of the parties to be legally 
bound from the extent to which material terms were left unspecified by the parties. Varney v. Ditmars 111 NE 
822 (NY 1916); Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 33. In England an agreement which is so vague that 
it requires adding new terms to acquire a definite meaning or which is obviously incomplete in some important 
respect is not a binding contract. G Scammell&Nephew Ltd v. Ouston [1941] AC 251; Bols Distilleries BV v. 
Superior Yacht Services Ltd [2006] UKPC 45; Edwin Peel, Treitel. The Law of Contract (Thirteenth edn, 
London: Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2011) 50, 52. In Bulgaria the failure to reach an agreement on a 
material term makes the contract not legally binding. Kalaydjiev 86, footnote 85. 
115 See supra footnote 61 of this Chapter and the accompanying text. 
116 All AIA documents of the 2007 edition contain a vague standard with respect to the effort owed by the 
constructor: he must use his "best skill and attention" (8 contracts), "best efforts" (2 contracts) or simply has the 
obligation to "cooperate" (9 contracts).  
117 Three construction contracts of the English collection require the constructor to act "in a proper/good and 
workmanlike manner" and one: to act "carefully and competently". 
118 Bulgarian contracts require constructors to act with "due care of a prudent merchant" (8 contracts), "regularly 
and diligently" (1 contract) or "to carry out work with quality and in a timely manner" (10 contracts). Phrases 
such as "to make maximum effort" (2 contracts) and "to provide services of the best quality" (1 contract) also 
appear. 
119 "Although most businessmen think that a clear description of both the seller's and buyer's performances is 
obvious common sense, they do not always live up to this ideal. The house counsel and the purchasing agent of a 
medium size manufacturer of automobile parts reported that several times their engineers had committed the 
company to buy expensive machines without adequate specifications." Macaulay 58. 
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not rare at all. That is why, the premise of economic theorists that parties would not contract 
on unverifiable factors such as effort and quality and would stay away from vague clauses 
which are prohibitively costly to verify is simply wrong.120 The question is rather how courts 
interpret and enforce such broad terms, not whether parties would contract for them or not. 
From this perspective, an assumption that verifiable (precise) terms are costless while 
unverifiable (vague) terms are costly to enforce, does not seem to be a good starting point for 
exploring the effect of legal institutions on parties' contracting.121  
Indeed, verification costs are one of the primary causes for contractual incompleteness but 
just like any other type of transaction costs they do not simply define two discrete 
antagonistic alternatives (verifiable/unverifiable) but lie on a spectrum reflecting differing 
degrees of verifiability.122 In this sense, economists' proposition on the undesirability of 
standards, embraced by some legal scholars,123 also suggests a very stylised and unrealistic 
conception of contractual incompleteness, which, ironically, seems closer to the previously 
described legal view,124 since it envisages incompleteness merely as the absence of 
contractual provisions on information that entails fairly high verification costs. This 
conception implies that contracts do not contain terms conditioning prices on such relevant 
variables as quality and effort but solely terms that make price dependent on verifiable 
consequences of these variables, e.g. the volume of trade.125 However, the review of real-
world contracts reveals that with regard to quality and effort obligations, incompleteness 
presents itself not as missing terms that result in a literal contractual gap which can be filled 
by the court only at a very high cost. Rather, incompleteness manifests as a vague standard 
which applies across many different states of the world (as is typical for informational 
incompleteness) and appears in combination with precise rules that stipulate some of the 
relevant aspects of performance and mitigate verification costs. 
                                                 
120 See Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 824-825, footnote 22 who make this 
argument with respect to incomplete contracts in general. In this sense, my observations resulting from the 
review of the collected construction contracts entirely confirm Scott and Triantis' argument. 
121 Alan Schwartz and Joel Watson, ‘The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting’ (2004) 20 Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 2, 14, footnote 18. 
122 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts’ (1994) 23 Journal of 
Legal Studies 159, 162. 
123 See, for example, Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and 
Judicial Strategies’ 280. 
124 See supra Section A.2. Increased incompleteness of this Chapter. 
125 Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 37-38, footnote 15; Schwartz, ‘The Enforcement of Contracts 
and the Role of the State’ 111-112. 
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Thus, the above-mentioned ambiguous clauses requiring constructor's "best skill and 
attention", "good and workmanlike manner" or "due care" come together with fairly exact 
terms that introduce imperfect, but specific proxies of the desired performance.126 In fact, the 
obligation of the constructor to follow strictly the project designs constitutes such a proxy for 
the skill and care that is expected from him during the construction process. Indeed, this 
proxy establishes only a certain minimum level of investment that does not correlate ideally 
with the relevant effort that the Seller has agreed to exert but, still, it alleviates the 
verifiability problem confronting the parties. Another proxy requiring a certain level of 
investment on the side of the constructor is his obligation to use materials having particular 
technical characteristics, or materials of a particular brand, or such satisfying particular 
standards. Concrete technical specifications and standards with regard to equipment, 
construction systems and workmanship which the constructor must apply in the course of the 
construction work also serve as performance proxies. As a result, precise rules provide courts 
with some measures of the relevant variable (effort) and constrain the discretion of the court, 
thus limiting verification costs. Yet, as precise rules cannot exhaust all facets of the desired 
performance, parties also include the vague standard that is supposed to capture the remaining 
unspecified aspects of desirable conduct which do not fall within the scope of precise 
terms.127  
To put it briefly, by alternating rules and standards in their incomplete long-term contracts, 
parties balance between the advantages and disadvantages of commitment and flexibility. 
Rules make the contract definite and legally binding, but also increase the likelihood of ex 
post efficiency losses as parties hinge on predictions about the probability of future 
contingencies. Standards allow parties to subsequently adapt and thus decrease the danger of 
an overly rigid agreement. At the same time they create moral hazard by giving to the party 
with the stronger bargaining power a chance to transfer some of its costs to his contractual 
partner and dissipate some of the ex ante joint surplus. But while enabling parties to enhance 
incentives for both ex ante efficient investment and ex post efficient performance, such 
                                                 
126 As emphasised by Scott and Triantis, courts do not observe facts directly but instead rely on evidentiary 
proxies to make factual determinations. The term "proxy" refers to the "operative facts" that establish 
compliance or non-compliance with the contract terms. Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design’ 818, footnote 8, 826, 837. 
127 Ibid 852. For more details with respect to other rule-standard combinations, see ibid 851-856. 
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interweaving of precise and vague terms also has another important implication: it allows 
parties to pursue these conflicting objectives at the optimum level of transaction costs.128  
Rules increase the contracting costs parties incur ex ante to create efficient incentives. The 
more concrete the specification of the performance requirements in the contracts, the less 
work the court has to do to decide whether the Seller has fulfilled his contractual obligations. 
Consequently, the ex post enforcement costs decrease. And conversely: by including in the 
contract vague standards inviting cooperation, parties delegate courts with discretion to 
choose the relevant proxy that determines which one of them was responsible for the breaking 
down of the relationship. In this way, parties save on ex ante contracting costs and rely on the 
court which, having the benefit of hindsight, can potentially select a more efficient measure to 
evaluate performance. Yet, they have to swallow the higher ex post enforcement costs. Thus, 
by drafting their contracts as a mixture of rules and standards, parties can shift transaction 
costs between the time of contracting and the enforcement stage trying to maximise the 
improvement in incentives at minimum total expenditure of ex ante and ex post costs.129 
Considering the generally high level of transaction costs typical for long-term contracts,130 
such cost optimisation is especially important. 
Where parties manage to reorganise their cooperation in the joint interest, the governance 
mechanisms integrated in their agreements have proved adequate to reduce sufficiently the 
incentives to cheat, generated by the increased contractual incompleteness. However, where 
renegotiation does not go as smoothly or does not take place at all (e.g. because immediate 
action is needed or because contacting the other party is difficult), parties often turn to courts 
and entrust them with the task to sort out whose (in)actions amounted to breach of contract.  
4. The complexity of the problems related to breach of long-term contracts 
This section also compares spot and long-term contracts but this time with respect to the 
problems arising in case of contractual breach. The specific investments and increased 
incompleteness typical for long-term contracts logically result in greater complexity of the 
issues encountered by courts upon breach. At the core of this complexity stand the problems 
                                                 
128 Gilson, Sabel and Scott 454-455; Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 817, 822-
823. 
129 Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 823, 836-838; Gilson, Sabel and Scott 454-
455. 
130 See supra Section A.2. Increased incompleteness of this Chapter. 
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of moral hazard and asymmetric information that are so inherent to the long-term contractual 
setting. Long introductions are not necessary here since these problems were already clarified 
above,131 but as the discussion that follows also touches on issues related to calculation of 
damages, a short disclaimer needs to be made before proceeding to the essence. The 
subsequent account refers solely to the logical method of computation of damages and not to 
the actual way they are calculated by courts in the researched legal systems. The latter is a 
task for the following chapters.  
Spot contracts 
In the context of spot contracts breach of contract issues are relatively unproblematic. The 
(usually) short-term duration of the contract and the general stability of conditions during its 
life a priori endow parties with fewer occasions for shirking and chiselling. In addition, the 
large-numbers competition on the market protects each party against the opportunistic 
behaviour of the other. As the contract is more complete, with the rights and obligations – 
better defined, and the standardised goods and services – simpler to specify and measure, 
breach is not that costly to observe and prove. The choice of the most efficient remedy is also 
less complicated since in the absence of specific investments it does not have to account for 
the effect of the remedy on parties' investment decisions. Courts also encounter much less 
trouble in verifying contractual breach and estimating compensation as the value the market 
accords to the standardised goods and services provides a good proxy for assessment of 
damages.  
From this point of view, recall that the market has many similar Sellers and Buyers and upon 
breach, each party can find an alternative contractual partner. In such a strongly competitive 
environment, expectation damages equal the difference between the contract price and the 
price of the substitute contract concluded on the spot market (the so-called substitute-price 
formula).132 But for the breached contract, each party could have contracted with an 
                                                 
131 See supra Section A.2. of this Chapter. 
132 See infra Table 1. If the breached contract is for the sale of a differentiated (and not homogeneous) 
commodity so that the Buyer cannot purchase a perfect substitute, then the substitute spot price can be arrived at 
by means of extrapolating the prices of the closest comparable commodities available on the market. Cooter and 
Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’, 1439, 1448. For example, the substitute spot price of a 1985 
Brunello di Montalcino bottle of wine can be calculated by extrapolating the prices of a 1985 Brunello di 
Montepulciano as well as a 1975 and a 1983 Brunello di Montalcino bottles. Such extrapolation, however, 
already implies some computation error and departure from perfect compensation.  
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alternative counterparty on approximately equal terms. Hence, reliance damages equal the 
difference between the price of the alternative, second-best contract that could have been 
concluded at the time of contracting and the price of the substitute contract concluded on the 
spot market after the breach (the so-called opportunity-cost formula).133 
Table 1134 
Damages Formula Breaching party Computation 
Buyer contract price - spot price expectation substitute-price 
Seller spot price - contract price 
Buyer forgone price - spot price reliance opportunity-cost 
Seller spot price - forgone price 
Buyer contract price - cost expectation lost-surplus 
Seller subjective value - contract price 
Buyer cost - realisable value reliance out-of-pocket-cost 
Seller cost - realisable value 
Buyer contract price - price received expectation diminished-value 
Seller contract price - market price of 
performance received 
 
                                                 
133 See infra Table 1. Ibid 1440-1441, 1448. 
134 Table 1 follows closely the table on damage formulas in ibid 1443. 
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Note that the closer the market approximates the perfectly competitive market, the smaller the 
difference between the contract price and the forgone price of the alternative contract; hence, 
the more expectation damages approach reliance damages.135 Of course, this model has some 
implicit assumptions,136 but it demonstrates very well two things in the case of discrete, one-
shot contracts, taking place on a strongly competitive market. First, the market itself promptly 
provides an apt benchmark for computing damages. Second, for determining the amount of 
compensation, market price constitutes the most suitable benchmark. Basing the calculation 
of expectation damages on the lost profits from the breached contract (as in the lost-surplus 
formula)137 would not account for the profit made from the substitute contract.138 And 
computation of reliance damages taking as yardstick the out-of-pocket costs incurred in 
reliance on the agreement (as in the out-of-pocket-cost formula)139 would not account for the 
opportunity lost as a result of the breached contract.140 In this sense, any other proxy besides 
market price would yield damage awards that deviate to a greater extent from perfect 
compensation.  
An exception from the latter general principle emerges, however, when the Seller's business 
conduct is described not by the traditional but by the statistical-planning model. The model 
implies that the Seller accounts for the high, but predictable on a statistical basis, rate of 
breach and enters into more contracts than the number of units he offers on the market. It is 
relevant, for example, with regard to airlines' sales of plane tickets. The received wisdom is 
that when the statistical-planning model applies to the Seller's business behaviour and the 
actual rate of breach is higher than the one predicted, the promisor is left with excess 
inventory; he incurs lost volume and consequently lost profits. Expectation damages then 
need to be determined by way of accounting for the surplus that the aggrieved Seller would 
have enjoyed in case of due performance. This surplus can be captured by some adjustment of 
the lost-surplus formula.141 
                                                 
135 Ibid 1445, 1448. 
136 The model assumes that the non-breacher's costs are unaffected by breach, that the parties' business conduct is 
described by the traditional model (Sellers provide until the marginal cost equals the contract price and Buyers 
purchase the whole production) and that breach occurs at a low rate. Ibid 1445-1449. 
137 See supra Table 1 as well as ibid 1439-1440. 
138 Ibid 1448-1449, 1478-1480. 
139 See supra Table 1 as well as ibid 1442. 
140 Ibid 1449. 
141 Ibid 1449-1451. 
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Long-term contracts 
As already emphasised,142 the extended time-horizon and the inherent incompleteness of long-
term contracts predestine the necessity of ex post renegotiation at the stage of which there is 
an ample room for opportunism on the side of the party having greater bargaining power. 
However, non-cooperative behaviour may be manifested not only at the moment of 
renegotiation. Since specific investments constrain the choice of trading partners, policing 
eventual evasive tactics through simply switching to a new partner becomes costly. Thus, 
shirking may covertly permeate the whole relationship and represent a continuous test for its 
successful development.  
The problem of moral hazard is additionally aggravated by information asymmetries that are 
difficult to surmount at a reasonable cost. If the client is unable to monitor the constructor's 
efforts in the execution of the construction project, it is highly likely that the constructor will 
not resist the temptation to underperform. Indeed, governance mechanisms attenuate the 
moral hazard and asymmetric information concerns, but they cannot completely annihilate all 
opportunistic incentives. Despite the important role of industry experts in the construction 
process, for example, the amount of construction disputes heard by courts in the three 
jurisdictions under comparison is not insignificant at all. In addition, let me also remind that 
the problems caused by private information concern not only observability but also 
verifiability of the characteristics of performance. Even if the Buyer can observe (or only 
infer) that the quality of the good or the Seller's efforts are not as required, he needs to prove 
this to a court in order to be able enforce the contract. Yet, in the construction process, for 
example, defects are easy to cover while the quality of the construction practices being part of 
the process, the communication between the parties and the exercised care by the constructor 
are difficult to establish. The awareness that one's own breaching behaviour is hard to verify 
only augments parties' common propensity to act in their own self-interest and to misrepresent 
facts in court. Thus, where the policing effect of market competition is absent and the party-
designed governance mechanisms have failed, courts are called upon to resolve breach of 
contract disputes in a context of conspicuous information asymmetry between them and the 
parties. 
                                                 
142 See supra Section A.2. Increased incompleteness of this Chapter. 
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The problems of moral hazard and information asymmetry manifest themselves when courts 
have to give precise meaning to vague standards. In fact, this is a difficult task from the outset 
since courts need to appraise conduct such as "effort", "reasonableness", "care" that may 
acquire multiple dimensions, that is difficult to quantify and whose conformity with the 
contract heavily depends on the circumstances developing over the life of the agreement.143 In 
addition, to the extent vague standards describe desirable behaviour that is not encompassed 
by the imperfect proxies specified by the parties,144 courts are compelled to determine the 
relevant proxy themselves. Note that in doing this job, they do not receive much guidance 
from lawmakers who, constrained by drafting costs (that should not exceed the social gain), 
generally devise statutory norms applicable to a large set of heterogeneous parties and to great 
many possible contingencies.145 Thus, broadly framed defaults providing for e.g. "good faith", 
"reasonableness", "care of a prudent merchant", etc. are not an exception in the contract and 
commercial legislative acts of any of the three jurisdictions under comparison.146 In this 
sense, the combined drafting practices of lawmakers and parties result in greater burden for 
courts which not only have to establish the true state of the world (also necessary when it 
comes to applying precise rules), but also have to choose the proxy that is optimal with 
respect to the realised state.147 From this perspective the regulatory activity of courts finds 
expression not only in setting aside or modifying explicit contractual terms,148 but also in 
assigning particular import to parties' ambiguous clauses. 
The latent moral hazard that is so intrinsic to vague standards additionally complicates the 
work of courts which are anyhow charged with more responsibility. As already emphasised, 
standards integrate the need for cooperation149 and reduce the promisee's incentives to extract 
a premium for his readjustment. But at the same time they encourage promisors to claim 
change of circumstances even when such has not ensued and force the other party in 
renegotiation appropriating some of the quasi-rents.150 Standards' ambiguity may also 
incentivise an opportunistic party to evade a portion of his responsibility and then suggest to 
                                                 
143 Gomez, ‘Breach of Contract Issues in Long-Term Distribution Contracts’. 
144 See supra Section A.3. Rules and standards of this Chapter. 
145 Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’, 598-601. 
146 See UCC § 2-311. Options and Cooperation Respecting Performance. (1); the Supply of Goods and Services 
Act 1982, Part II, Section 13; Art. 302 of the Bulgarian Commercial Act.  
147 Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 842. 
148 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 224. 
149 See supra Section A.3. Rules and standards of this Chapter. 
150 Baird 587. 
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the court a proxy that is more favourable to him.151 Certainly, specifying obligations after 
events have already taken place, courts have an informational advantage compared to parties 
who at the time of contracting can only presuppose the likelihood of occurrence of various 
contingencies.152 Having superior information ex post, courts can be expected to select a more 
efficient proxy for the required performance.153 Yet, the resolution of uncertainty does not 
alleviate the information asymmetry between the parties and the enforcer and the fact that the 
enforcer needs a sufficiently convincing evidence to take a decision. Thus, where the choice 
of optimal proxy depends not so much on the way the unknowable future evolved but on 
hidden information about quality of performance, the problem of verifiability remains and 
increases the possibility of court error.154  
Another peculiarity that attaches an additional level of complexity to the issues encountered 
by courts upon breach of long-term contracts is the fact that the awarded remedy has an effect 
on parties' investment decisions. As already asserted,155 long-term contracts are characterised 
by an implicit tension between ex ante and ex post, making the achievement of both ex post 
efficient trade and ex ante efficient investment a significant problem. To recall once again: as 
the future unfolds the ex ante contractual arrangements, ensuring specific investment that 
maximises the gains from trade, become suboptimal with respect to performance; yet, 
renegotiating them to guarantee efficient ex post trade disincentivises ex ante investment 
because of the possibility for hold-up. In fact, with change of conditions routinely affecting 
the cost and/or value of performance and with efficient levels of specific investment being 
impossible to fix at the time of contracting,156 the problem of motivating concurrently 
efficient ex post trade and efficient ex ante specific investment has been identified as the 
central issue of economic contract theory today.157 Note that this issue does not arise in the 
case of spot contracts where investments are normally generic and, thus, not subject to 
expropriation. 
                                                 
151 Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 844-845. 
152 Gilson, Sabel and Scott 454. 
153 Scott and Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ 842, 845. 
154 Ibid 842-843. 
155 See supra Section A.3. of this Chapter. 
156 For the difficulties to contract ex ante on specific investments, see supra Section A.2. Increased 
incompleteness of this Chapter. 
157 Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 545; Fernando Gomez, ‘Termination 
and Compensation in Long-Term Distribution Contracts: An Economic Perspective of EU Law’ in Pierre 
Larouche and Filomena Chirico (eds), Economic Analysis of the DCFR The Work of the Economic Impact Group 
within CoPECL (München: Sellier European Law Publishers 2010) 186. 
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Indeed, as already emphasised,158 various governance devices implemented in parties' 
contracts are directed toward resolving, or at least attenuating, the above conundrum. 
However, such governance mechanisms may often turn out to be inadequate in counteracting 
the insufficient incentives to invest that result from the moral hazard problem (which is 
additionally exacerbated by vague standards) and the difficult verification of contractual 
breach. Therefore, harnessing all possible tools that have the capacity to contribute against 
dissipation of incentives to make specific investment is essential. In fact, legal remedies can 
have an important role in this respect. As it will be shown below,159 they have a major impact 
on parties' investment decisions with the particular effect depending on the type of investment 
and the type of remedy. Yet, for the moment my point is a more limited one. Assuming courts 
are concerned with efficiency, their decision on the remedy in a dispute for breach of a long-
term contract is more complex. One of the reasons for this is that they need to consider an 
additional effect of the legal remedy they will award: the effect on the incentive to make 
specific investment of parties who in the future may turn out to be in a situation similar to the 
facts of the case. 
Last but not least, the problem of asymmetric information causes further difficulties when it 
comes to calculating damages with respect to contract breaches in specialised markets that 
differ substantially from perfect competition. As the market for substitute performance 
becomes thinner, the value of the second best alternative contract, compared to the value of 
the one concluded, decreases. As a result, expectation and reliance damages diverge 
considerably (the former exceeding the latter) making damage computation in case of breach 
of long-term contracts trickier.160  
Irrespectively of whether Sellers adopt business conduct described by the traditional or by the 
fishing model, they often respond to breach by holding prices constant and reducing sales 
volume. Breached commodities are not resold on the spot market either because the latter is 
not sufficiently competitive and the resale would in fact lead to lower profits (traditional 
model) or because the very essence of the adopted strategy entails inventory adjustment as a 
                                                 
158 See supra Section A.3. of this Chapter. 
159 For all the effects of remedies, see infra Chapter V. In particular, for the effect of remedies on parties' 
investment choices, see infra Section B., Section C., Section D and Section E. of Chapter V.   
160 This is true even where the business conduct of market participants is described by the traditional model. 
Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1451. For long-term contracts being typical for 
specialised markets that differ substantially from perfect competition, see Section A.2. Specific investments of 
this Chapter.  
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response to demand fluctuations (fishing model).161 Since there is no replacing of the 
breached contract with a substitute one (as required by the substitute-price formula), 
expectation damages equal the lost profits from the breached contract (the lost-surplus 
formula).162 Yet, damages that account for the lost surplus from performances that have not in 
fact taken place are hard to establish.163 Calculating the Buyer's expectation damages is also 
challenging. Since by definition idiosyncratic performances have few, if any, adequate 
substitutes, the market itself provides price information which implies computation error that 
is not insignificant. If the commodity is unique and not readily traded on the market, the 
estimated compensation is particularly imperfect as benchmarks for comparison are difficult 
to find. This issue arises in the case of partial or defective performance where expectation 
damages equal the difference between the contract price and the market price of the received 
performance (the so-called diminished-value formula).164 Using market price to infer the 
Buyer's expectation damages also yields very inaccurate assessments when the Buyer values 
performance more than the market. If courts really face an atypical party (as opposed to an 
opportunistic party), an objective proxy such as market price may deviate so substantially 
from the plaintiff's subjective value that this results in reliance damages exceeding the 
expectation damages calculated by court.165  
Turning to reliance damages, verifiability becomes even more problematic. If the non-
breacher would have contracted with an alternative party, reliance damages need to reflect the 
opportunity cost of the breached contract captured by the opportunity-cost formula.166 Yet, 
                                                 
161 In imperfectly competitive markets in which the Seller's business conduct is described by the traditional 
model, the Seller may choose to lower prices and resell the breached commodities on the spot market. Yet, if the 
spot market is not sufficiently competitive, the Seller would be better off if, instead of prices, he adjusts 
inventory, i.e. retains the breached commodities and sells fewer of them without lowering the price. Ibid 1452-
1454. The fishing model implies business conduct similar to the behaviour of a fisherman who casts his bait and 
waits for a catch to jump at it. Thus, if a Buyer defaults, the Seller simply waits for another one, willing to buy at 
the same price. In other words, under the fishing model a breach on the futures market does not result in an 
additional sale on the spot market. Ibid 1455-1457. 
162 See supra Table 1 in Section A.4. Spot contracts of this Chapter. 
163 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 101. 
164 Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1442; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 310, 
footnote 3. See also supra Table 1 in Section A.4. Spot contracts of this Chapter. 
165 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 316; Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General 
Theory of Contractual Obligation’, 1004, footnote 97. 
166 See supra Table 1 in Section A.4. Spot contracts of this Chapter. It must be emphasised that the Seller forgoes 
an opportunity only if his business conduct is described by the traditional model. Under the fishing model, the 
Seller contracts with anyone who is willing to pay the quoted price; hence, he does not forgo opportunities and 
does not incur opportunity-cost damages. The Seller is also not likely to incur significant out-of-pocket-cost 
damages since by not lowering the price he receives the expected return from the costs made every time he 
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determining the value of lost opportunities is easier said than done since it requires, first, 
proving the negative fact of not pursuing alternative offers and, second, verifying the forgone 
price, which is a largely speculative exercise where there is not an active market for the 
commodity, providing information about the second-best price.167 Reliance damages seem 
easier to calculate if the non-breacher would not have contracted with an alternative 
contractual partner in which case they need to account for the difference between the costs of 
the investment made in reliance on the contract before breach and the realisable value of the 
investment after breach (the out-of-pocket-cost formula).168 Still, computation is complicated 
by the fact that reliance expenditures often include overhead expenses and joint costs not 
readily assignable to a specific contract. This only increases the investor's incentive to 
mischarge costs and shift them between investments.169 Measuring the promisee's gains from 
the investment made might also be problematic. If such problems lead to an award close to 
mere reimbursement of the out-of-pocket expenses, the reliance damages suffered by the 
promisee may be significantly overestimated.170 In addition, when it comes to quantifying 
non-monetary investment representing the time and effort devoted by an executive manager to 
the particular contract, proving reliance damages in court is extraordinarily hard.171   
In short, breach of long-term contracts raises more complex issues compared to spot 
contracts. While the opportunities and temptations for breach increase, so do the costs of 
observing and proving a non-cooperative behaviour. For courts, on the other hand, 
distinguishing breach from non-breach and choosing the most efficient remedy also becomes 
more difficult. This last subsection outlines three concrete aspects that make the task of courts 
with respect of breach of long-term contracts a more complicated one: interpretation of vague 
standards, awarding a remedy that offsets the insufficient incentives for specific investment 
                                                                                                                                                        
concludes a contract. Therefore, where the Seller's business conduct is described by the fishing model, he does 
not incur reliance damages. Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1457-1458. 
167 Ibid 1455, 1461, 1470; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 101. 
168 See supra Table 1 in Section A.4. Spot contracts of this Chapter. Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach 
of Contract’ 1442, 1455; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 311, footnote 5. 
169 Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’ (1980) 89 
The Yale Law Journal 1261, footnote 54; Yeon-Koo Che and Donald Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the 
Value of Contracting’ (1999) 89 American Economic Review 125 125, footnote 1; Alexander Stremitzer, 
‘Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds and Cooperative Investments’ 28 The Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 337, 354. 
170 Goetz and Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’ 1289, 1290, footnote 57 and 
58. 
171 Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1470; Che and Hausch, footnote 1. 
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and calculating damages. The first two lines of enquiry will be deepened in the following 
chapters. 
This section B, on the other hand, strives for a different and more general point. The dominant 
distinction in national legal systems as well as in European Contract Law continues to be 
between business and consumer contracts. The view that consumers are systematically 
disadvantaged with respect to collecting valuable information has given rise to European and 
national consumer contract law intended to remedy information asymmetries that consumers 
can overcome only at prohibitively high costs. The section, however, leaves aside this 
ubiquitous division and instead pursues the distinction between spot and long-term contracts, 
with each of these categories including both business and consumer agreements. Thus, it is 
shown that information asymmetries are particularly grave in long-term contracting where 
they arise not only with regard to consumers but also with regard to business people. In the 
long-term range of the contractual continuum, asymmetric information (among other factors 
related to information costliness) causes increased contractual incompleteness which coupled 
with specific investment creates the setting for opportunistic behaviour that undermines ex 
ante efficiency and generates a huge social cost. From this perspective, long-term contracts 
call for contract law performing a regulatory function in order to correct the market failure as 
well as for researching whether national remedial contract rules exhibit trends in assuming 
such a regulatory function. The plausibility of that hypothesis is also confirmed by the 
predominance of long-term contracting and the persistently growing share of services 
(inherently gravitating towards the long-term contractual range) in the modern economies of 
developed countries.  
This, however, should not be read as an argument in favour of introducing new mandatory 
rules in business contracts. As already explained in Chapter I,172 default rules can also 
exercise a regulatory function and should be preferred as a regulatory method in the field of 
contract law. An eventual performance of such a regulatory function by national remedial 
contract rules does not preclude the possibility that they still differentiate between business 
and consumer contracts. The point, however, is that the prevailing business/consumer 
distinction may simply be blinding contemporary lawyers and diverting them from the 
possibility to see that national contract law has also been accommodating differences based 
                                                 
172 See supra Section A.2. Default rules and mandatory rules of Chapter I. 
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on the degree of contractual incompleteness and investment specificity and not only on the 
status of the contracting parties. Such (in)sightlessness may be particularly counterproductive 
when discussing the structural design of new European legal instruments intended to boost 
trade in the internal market as well as the future of the entire European contract law. 
B. Contract for sale of goods v. contract for services 
The distinction between spot and long-term contracts in Section A. of this chapter ended with 
the conclusion that in the real world sale-of-goods and construction agreements may happen 
to fall in either range of the continuum; yet contracts for services (construction agreements 
included)173 naturally lean more to the long-term end. This, however, is only a theoretical 
reflection that assumes pure sale-of-goods and service contracts which are delimited from 
each other by a clear and doubtless boundary. As usual, however, reality is much more 
complex and disorderly. Many of the contracts concluded on the market place today constitute 
neither pure transfer of property in existing goods, nor contracts for erection of a building and 
thus cannot be described as, respectively, sale-of-goods and construction contracts without 
any shadow of uncertainty. On the contrary, they contain both sale and service elements and, 
thus, present any national contract law with classification difficulties. Such mixed contracts 
then raise interesting questions. How does each of the three legal systems distinguish between 
contracts for sale of goods and contracts for services? Do they qualify contracts, containing 
strong service elements, as contracts for sale of goods? Or do they limit the contract of sale 
solely to title transfer?  
The answers to such questions are important for at least for three reasons. First, the 
classification of mixed contracts within a legal system ultimately determines the applicable 
rules on remedies. In this sense, awareness of differences in legal taxonomy across 
jurisdictions (e.g. the same contract is classified as a sale of goods in one of the compared 
legal systems and as a contract for service/construction contract in another) is vital for 
performing comparative fact-based analysis. Second, how each national law resolves 
delimitation difficulties has a bearing on the way it accommodates long-term transactions 
within its own legal categories of sale-of-goods and service contracts. In this sense, the 
presence of service elements in a contract, classified as sale of goods, may push the contract 
                                                 
173 Recall that in this thesis contracts for work and labour are termed "contracts for services". See supra the text 
accompanying footnotes 114-116 in Section B.1. of Chapter I. 
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away from the spot range. Third, the way in which national contract law accommodates the 
economic distinction between spot and long-term contracts in its legal taxonomy invariably 
affects the level of transaction costs in the national legal environment. For this reason, this 
section explores how each of the compared legal systems classifies mixed, borderline 
contracts that stray away from the ideal legal categories of a sale-of-goods and service 
contract. 
The comparative investigation that follows is organised along two typical scenarios that spur 
problems of delimiting a contract for services from a contract for sale of goods: the first, – 
where the Seller produces a new thing using his own materials; and the second, – where the 
Seller affixes a moveable supplied by him to the land or premises of the Buyer. In both factual 
scenarios the passing of title to a thing, having the characteristics of a good, is accompanied 
by rendering a service. Yet, the first scenario emphasises the work that goes into the creation 
of the good, while the second one accentuates the work of erection or installation.  
One last note before proceeding to the actual comparison. Investigating the second scenario, I 
inevitably discuss agreements that in the national context are usually entitled "contracts to 
supply and install machinery/equipment". Even when the national law classifies such 
agreements as contracts for services, some authors prefer to label them "contracts in the 
construction process"174 rather than "construction contracts", in order to differentiate them 
from the classic contract for erection of a building. Nevertheless, to the extent that the 
following comparison shows that national judges deem the installation of 
machinery/equipment as no different from the erection of a building and apply the same 
remedial default terms, I will not hesitate to refer to such agreements as "construction 
contracts" further on in the thesis. 
1. Producing a new thing with one's own materials 
The vexing question of distinguishing between contract for sale of future goods and contract 
for services, where the Seller's work results in the creation of nova species to be delivered in 
performance of the contract, can be traced back to Roman law.175 To this day the scenario in 
                                                 
174 Miroslav Dimitrov, The Construction Contract (First edn, Sofia: Sibi 2012) 56-62, 66-67. 
175 As the law was settled by Justinian, the distinction between emptio venditio (the sales contract) and locatio 
conductio operis (lit. a hiring contract for services) depended on whether the material was supplied by the Seller, 
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which it is the Buyer who provides the materials necessary for the production of the new 
movable(s) does not raise doubts. All of the selected legal systems categorise such a 
relationship between the parties as contract for services.176 However, the classification of a 
particular agreement which obliges the Seller not simply to repair or improve a thing of the 
Buyer, but to deliver an entirely new movable, manufactured by him, with his own materials, 
is by no means self-evident. The way in which each of the selected legal systems resolves this 
difficulty actually determines whether specialised goods, the latter, recall, being typical of 
long-term contracts,177 can be subject to sale agreements at all.  
Under Bulgarian law sale contracts do not entail specialised goods. Since the fact that the 
Seller carries out work with his own materials by no means precludes qualification of an 
agreement as one for services,178 courts seek the differentiation of service from sale-of-goods 
contracts in the degree of individualisation and specification of the new thing which the 
promisor creates in order to perform his contractual obligations. If the agreement defines the 
new chattel that is to be manufactured only generically, this is a contract for sale. Conversely, 
if the agreement defines the chattel pointing at specific characteristics it needs to have or at 
specific parameters (e.g. productivity) it needs to satisfy, this is a contract for services. The 
explanation for relying on individualisation as a distinguishing feature is simple: to a buyer 
the process of producing the new thing is irrelevant; she is not interested in who and how will 
manufacture it; what she cares about is to become the owner of a chattel of a certain gender, 
so she defines it only by generic traits. By contrast, when it comes to a service contract, the 
client is in no way indifferent to the production process; she has particular requirements, even 
                                                                                                                                                        
in which case it was a contract for sale of goods, or by the Buyer, in which case it was a contract for services. 
Gaius, Institutes of Roman Law, vol III 24, 4, § 147. 
176 For the US, see Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co. 609 F2d 248 (6th Cir 1979); North Am. Leisure Corp. v. A&B 
Duplicators 468 F2d 695 (2d Cir 1972). For England, see Accurate Bailiffs & Collection Agency Ltd v. ITM 
Industries Ltd. (1993) 78 BCLR (2d) 1; Philip Rawlings, ‘Chapter 1. The Contract of Sale of Goods’ in Michael 
Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods (Eighth edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2010) 39-40. 
For Bulgaria, see Decision №1243 of 07.07.1997, с. с. №1288/1996, V c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; 
Decision №310 of 03.04.2008, comm. c. №994/2007, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; Decision 
№205 of 17.03.2006, comm. c. №491/2005, I comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; Kojuharov, Law of 
Obligations. Specific Contracts 166. Where each party supplies some of the materials, the characterisation of the 
contract depends on who supplies the principal (England, Bulgaria) or most (the US) of the materials. Again if 
this is the Buyer, the contract is one for services. For the US, see Jackson Hole Traders v. Joseph 931 P2d 244 
(Wyo 1997); for England, see Clay v. Yates (1856) 1 H & N 73 and the subsequent explanation of the argument 
in Lee v. Griffin (1861) 1 Best and Smith 272, 121 ER 716, 716; for Bulgaria, see Kojuharov, Law of 
Obligations. Specific Contracts 166-167. 
177 See supra Section A.2. Specific investment of this Chapter. 
178 Art. 261(2) Contracts Act; Decision of 26.06.1964, c. №340 of 1964 of the State Arbitration Court. Thus, the 
distinguishing factor used by the Roman jurists is not adopted in Bulgarian law. 
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pretensions, to the article produced; consequently, the latter is individualised in detail by her 
specifications or design.179 To be precise, following closely the German legal tradition, 
Kojuharov poses the (non-)fungibility of the new thing, and not its generic or specific 
identification, as the distinctive criterion between a sale-of-goods and a service contract. Yet, 
the reasoning remains the same: where the Seller creates a fungible chattel, the production 
process does not become part of the agreement, which is an outright sale; conversely, where 
the Seller creates a non-fungible chattel, the production process has substantial importance to 
the Buyer, which makes the contract one for services even though it is the Seller who supplies 
the materials.180 Thus, although from a theoretical point of view individualisation and 
fungibility are different concepts,181 the uniformity of the underlying rationale makes it of 
little significance which one is used as a criterion to distinguish between the two categories of 
contracts.182 The described core rationale also reveals that Bulgarian contract law reserves 
custom-made goods to service contracts. This is not to say that sale-of-goods contracts can 
never fall into the long-term range. If nothing else, both the Contracts Act and the 
Commercial Act provide for sale contracts with periodic deliveries.183 Yet, normally the 
goods involved in a sale are standardised, meaning that under Bulgarian law sale-of-goods 
contracts are typically attached to the spot range of the continuum.   
This is not the case under US contract law where UCC flatly allows long-term sale 
arrangements having specialised goods as their subject-matter. In this respect, the Code 
differs from the previous Uniform Sales Act under which, similarly to today's Bulgarian law, 
a transaction, entailing goods manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer and not 
                                                 
179 Asen Nikolov, Liability of the Contractor in the Manufacture Contract (Sofia: Science and Art 1970) 11-13. 
For a court case, applying the individualisation criterion to distinguish between a contract for sale of goods and a 
contract for services, see Decision №318 of 27.06.1994, c. c. № 177/1994 of the Supreme Court (a contract for 
the manufacturing of spare parts according to the drawings and technical specifications of the Buyer is 
categorised as contract for services). 
180 Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts 167-168. For a court case, applying the (non-)fungibility 
criterion, see Decision №1574 of 7.01.2004, c. c. № 361/2003 of the Supreme Cassation Court. In German law a 
transaction in which the Seller supplies all the materials is equalised to a sale contract, except where a non-
fungible thing is produced, in which case, it is classified as "Werklieferungsvertrag", a "mixed contract", 
requiring also application of legal provisions concerning contracts for services. Lorenz 7. 
181 Kalaydjiev 180. 
182 The label of the distinctive criterion makes a difference when analysing the time of passing of property rather 
than when deciding the category of the specific contract. Cf. Nikolov 11-13 with Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. 
Specific Contracts 167-168 and see Decision №1574 of 7.01.2004, c. c. № 361/2003 of the Supreme Cassation 
Court. But see also Decision №318 of 27.06.1994, c. c. № 177/1994 of the Supreme Court where while 
classifying the contract for manufacturing and delivery of spare parts as a contract for services, the court denied 
that the fungibility of the spare parts is of any relevance at all.  
183 Art. 208 Contracts Act; Art. 332 Commercial Act. 
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suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, was not a sale, at 
all.184 
In the UCC-era, when encountering a "mixed" agreement, US courts follow the so-called 
"predominant factor" test to determine whether the contract is a transaction in goods, and 
therefore covered by UCC, or a transaction in services, and therefore governed by common 
law. To decide whether the "predominant factor" "…, reasonably stated, is the rendition of 
service, with goods incidentally involved… or is a transaction of sale, with labour incidentally 
involved…"185 courts examine several aspects of the contract: its language, the manner in 
which the transaction was billed, the intrinsic worth of the materials involved, the nature of 
the Seller's business, the moveability of the subject-matter.186 Neither of these factors alone is 
determinative for the classification of the agreement. In any case, in order for UCC to apply, 
the transaction must be "in goods" and the very definition of "goods" under the Code includes 
"specially manufactured goods".187 In this sense, the mere fact that the thing produced is 
adapted to the needs of a particular buyer does not take the contract out of the scope of the 
UCC. On the contrary, US courts consistently evaluate the services of engineering, design and 
manufacturing the good as incidental to the primary purpose of the contract and, hence, by no 
means precluding its characterisation in its entirety as a sale.188 Thus, unlike Bulgarian law, 
US law does not exclude customised goods from sale contracts. 
Struggling to distinguish between a contract for sale of goods and a contract for services 
where the promisor's work results in the creation of a new thing that is to be delivered in 
performance of the contract, English courts have developed two different rules that cannot be 
                                                 
184 Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co. 360 P2d 897 (Cal 1961). Surprisingly, there is one US court, relying on 
this pre-UCC decision to justify the applicability of UCC to a particular contract. See Varco-Pruden, Inc. v. 
Hapmshire Construction Co. 50 Cal App 3d 654 (Cal 1975). No other UCC case, however, follows this 
approach.  
185 Bonebrake v. Cox 499 F2d 951 (8th Cir 1974) at 960. The test is also sometimes called "predominant thrust" 
or "predominant purpose". 
186 For the "predominant factor" sub-tests, used by courts, see Coakley and Williams, Inc. v Shatterproof Glass 
Corp. 778 F2d 196 (4th Cir 1985); BMC Industries v. Barth Industries 160 F3d 1322 (11th Cir 1998); Hensley v. 
Ray Motor's Co. 580 SE2d 721 (NC App 2003). 
187 UCC § 2-105. Definitions: Transferability; “Goods”; “Future” Goods; “Lot”; “Commercial Unit”. (1) as well 
as § 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds. (3)(a). 
188 Belmont Industries v. Bechtel Corp. 425 FSupp 524 (ED Pa 1976) (a contract to design, fabricate and deliver 
structural steel for construction of a container handling system); Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp. 
451 F2d 1115 (10th Cir 1971) (a contract to design and produce flooring material according to the panel floor 
requirements of the client); BMC Industries v. Barth Industries (a contract to design and manufacture automated 
eyeglass lens equipment). 
 156 
reconciled.189 Judges consider neither the ownership of the materials, on which the work is 
bestowed,190 nor the comparative value of the work and the materials conclusive of the 
matter.191 Under the first test established in Lee v. Griffin, a contract is one for sale if "… 
when carried out, it would result in the sale of a chattel". Only "if the result of the contract is 
that the party has done work and labour which ends in nothing that can become the subject of 
a sale", is this a contract for service.192 Following this famous dictum of Blackburn, J., courts 
have often held or simply assumed the contracts in dispute to be sale-of-goods, among them 
agreements, involving specially manufactured goods,193 that would have also been 
characterised as sale contracts under US law, but would have been classified as service ones 
under Bulgarian law.194 It cannot be overlooked, however, that under such an approach sale of 
goods can subsume any contract that can be described as transferring a chattel for a price,195 
even a contract with a sculptor, commissioned to execute a work of art.196 Still, another, more 
restrictive test was introduced in Robinson v. Graves where a contract to paint a portrait of a 
lady was held to be a contract for services.197 The court doubted the dictum of Blackburn J. in 
Lee v. Griffin and insisted that what was decisive was the "substance" of the contract: "If … 
the substance of the contract was the production of something to be sold …, then that is a sale 
of goods. But if the substance of the contract … is that skill and labour have to be exercised 
for the production of the article and that it is only ancillary to that that there will pass … to 
                                                 
189 In this sense, see also Rawlings 43. 
190 This was suggested as a distinguishing criterion in Atkinson v. Bell, 1048, but the dictum was repudiated in 
Grafton v. Armitage (1845) 2 CB 336, 339. 
191 Lee v. Griffin, 718.  
192 In ibid a contract to make a set of artificial teeth was held to be a contract for the sale of goods. See the 
influential dictum of Blackburn J. in ibid 718. 
193 See e.g. Newman v. Lipman [1951] 1 KB 333 (where a photographer took a photograph on the street and 
offered to supply a copy of it later), Marcel Furriers Ltd v. Tapper [1953] 1 WLR 49 (where a fur coat was made 
with materials and according to a style selected by the client, this was a contract for sale on a special order), , 
Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Ltd. [1972] AC 441 (where animal food was compounded in 
accordance with a formula of the client), Deta Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd. [1979] 
VR 167 (an Australian case where the defendant produced a tool for the production of plastic drawers according 
to plaintiff's specifications). 
194 Cf. Deta Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd. (see supra footnote 193 of this Chapter) 
with the Bulgarian Ruling №61 of 4.02.2009, comm. c. №812/2009, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court 
(a contract for the manufacturing and delivery of a drying machine produced according to specifications of the 
client, classified as a contract for services) and Decision №36 of 16.03.2004, c. c. №358/2003, IV c. d. of the 
Supreme Cassation Court (a contract for the manufacturing of a plum-mousse flow production line according to 
specifications of the client, classified as a contract for services) as well as with the US BMC Industries v. Barth 
Industries (see supra footnote 188 of this Chapter).  
195 In this sense, see also Rawlings 41-42. 
196 See the dictum of Blackburn J. in Lee v. Griffin 718. 
197 Robinson v. Graves [1935] 1 KB 579. According to Bonebrake v. Cox at 960, under the US predominant 
factor test, a contract with artist for painting would also be a contract for services.  
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[the] client … some materials in addition to the skill involved … the substance of the contract 
is the skill and experience … in producing …".198 Thus, in view of these lines one concludes 
that the "substance" of the contract depends on the relative importance of work and materials, 
both components of the final product that is to be delivered.  
In essence determining the "substance" of the contract very much resembles determining its 
"predominant factor" – though in the US, the comparison between the importance of the 
different components involves, more correctly I think, the work element and the element of 
transfer of a finished good (which in the case of Robinson v. Graves would be the portrait) 
rather than the work element and the transfer of materials used in manufacturing the good.199 
Yet, by limiting the expansive test of Lee v. Griffin, the rule of Robinson v. Graves also brings 
the state of English law closer to the Bulgarian ratio decidendi. Note that in deciding 
Robinson, the court did not overrule Isaacs v. Hardy200 where a picture dealer engaged an 
artist to paint and deliver him a picture of a given subject, so that he could sell the picture in 
the course of his business.201 Note also that Slesser L.J. decided Robinson on the particular 
facts, pointing that the commission was to paint "the portrait of a specific lady" (emphasis 
added) who had to "give sittings" so that the work be executed.202 All this suggests that the 
distinctive criterion, actually used by the English court, may be no other but the extent to 
which the Seller needs to tailor his performance in order to meet the requirements of the 
particular Buyer.203 Indeed, it is only natural that as the need for tailoring increases, the 
importance of work also swells, becoming at one point the central component and, therefore, 
determining some of the contracts, involving customised goods, as contracts for services. This 
is also the implicit rationale of the standard applied in Bulgarian law where the contract is 
categorised as one for services based on the individualisation (or the non-fungibility) of the 
new thing produced, in which individualisation (non-fungibility) in fact serves as a proxy for 
the significant labour invested in the customisation of the good.204 From this perspective, 
Robinson v. Graves could lead to the classification of an agreement for the supply of a good, 
                                                 
198 Robinson v. Graves 587. In fact the court returns to the criterion, suggested in Clay v. Yates 78, but discarded 
in Lee v. Griffin.    
199 Note also that the intrinsic worth of the materials constitutes one of the sub-tests of the US predominant factor 
test while under English law the relative importance of the work and the materials is not determined by their 
relative value. See also supra the text accompanying footnote 191 of this Chapter. 
200 Isaacs v. Hardy (1884) Cab & El 287. 
201 Robinson v. Graves 594. 
202 Ibid 591-592. 
203 In a similar sense, see also Lorenz 6. 
204 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 179-182 of this Chapter. 
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manufactured by the Seller with his own materials, as a contract for services, an outcome that 
would be the exact opposite to the one that would result under Lee v. Griffin. This would 
consequently engage common law remedies for breach of contract rather than the remedies 
under the Sale of Goods Act. Thus, the two different tests, pronounced in English law, could 
produce conflicting legal solutions and bring the application of different legal rules.   
However, presented with a dispute regarding an agreement that mingles the service of 
transforming materials into a new good with the element of sale, English courts do not 
generally categorise the contract by applying Robinson v. Graves. Only when it comes to 
shipbuilding agreements, do judges, without referring expressly to the latter test, consider 
them to resemble construction contracts due to the significant work element involved.205 Yet, 
these seem to be the only cases in which English courts do not reduce the parties' contractual 
relationships of the factual pattern discussed here to simple sale-of-goods contracts.206 
Normally, English courts prefer the clearer and more straightforward test of Lee v Griffin,207 
thus allowing sale contracts to have specialised goods as their subject matter. In other words, 
English law, just like US law, accommodates long-term sale-of-goods contracts much better 
than Bulgarian law. 
2. Affixing supplied moveables 
Conversely, Bulgarian law seems to confine the sale contract to the spot range of the 
continuum as far as possible. It generally conceives sale of goods as a transaction where 
delivery and payment take place simultaneously and at the same place.208 Any sale contract 
which deviates from this ideal (sale by instalments or sale with advance payment) or which is 
conditional and, hence, can be expected to entail higher incompleteness (sale on try-out or 
inspection, sale with right of pre-emption, sale with additional specification of the subject-
                                                 
205 Hyundai Heavy Industries v. Papadopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129; Stocznia Gdanska v. Latvian Shipping 
[1998] 1 WLR 574. 
206 In Foster Wheeler Group Engineering v. Chevron UK nreported February 29, 1996 the court viewed 
Robinson v. Graves as running along the lines of Lee v. Griffin and simply assumed the former to be the correct 
test. Yet, in this case the Seller was not obliged to manufacture a new thing; he only had engineering 
responsibilities – as well as responsibilities to correct the defects of the contractors that actually fabricated the 
equipment, so Robinson v. Graves was not really applied to a situation, in which the Seller created a new thing 
with his own materials. The same is true with respect to Dodd and Dodd v. Wilson and McWilliam [1946] 2 All 
ER 691 where veterinary surgeons supplied and applied a veterinary vaccine which, however, they purchased 
from a third party. 
207 The Canadian Supreme Court of Victoria even considered the Robinson v. Graves test "unsatisfactory and 
illogical". See Deta Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd. 
208 Art. 200(2) Contracts Act. 
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matter), has been considered to deserve a special rule.209 In addition, the law strips the sale 
contract of any service element that may have a role in the transaction. This concerns not only 
the work of manufacturing the good, the importance of which, as shown above, removes the 
particular contract from the scope of sales law, but also the work of installing or affixing the 
good. Where installation and fitting services are offered independently of any title transfer, 
the agreement is an outright service contract.210 The same is true where, as it is usual with 
specialised machinery, the contract entails work both in relation to the creation of the good 
and to its affixing.211 With designing and manufacturing labour having determined the 
agreement as one for services, the presence of installation responsibilities is just one more fact 
that adds to such categorisation of the contract. Yet, in today's commerce installation services 
also commonly accompany the sale of standardised products, appliances or systems as Sellers 
offer them to Buyers in relation to the goods they deliver. On such occasions, Bulgarian 
courts "unmix" the different elements of the contract and apply sales law to the supply 
obligations and service law – to the installation and set-up responsibilities,212 thus moving the 
latter under the same remedial regime that pertains to construction contracts. In other words, 
where the work does not go into the making of the good delivered, the contract is divided into 
a sale and a service portion, each governed by the relevant legal rules.213  
By contrast, English courts do not engage in such separation of the different elements and 
classify the contract either as one for the sale of goods or as one for services.214 Where they 
construe the parties' intention to be that property passes at the time of delivery of the chattel 
                                                 
209 For sale by instalments, see Art. 205, 206 ibid and Art. 335 Commerce Act; for sale with advance payment, 
see Art. 201(1)(a) Contracts Act and Art. 334 Commerce Act; for conditional sales, see Art. 204 and 209 
Contracts Act as well as Art. 331 and Art. 333 Commerce Act.   
210 Decision №250 of 11.01.2011, comm. c. №535/2010, II comm. dep. of the Supreme Cassation Court (a 
contract for the installation of equipment at a petrol station site where the equipment was furnished by the 
client).  
211 Decision №586 of 21.06.2007, comm. c. №227/2007 of the Supreme Cassation Court (a contract for the 
manufacturing and installation of an overhead crane). In addition, the agreements with respect to which Ruling 
№61 of 4.02.2009, comm. c. №812/2009, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court and Decision №36 of 
16.03.2004, c. c. №358/2003, IV c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court (see supra footnote 194 of this Chapter) 
were rendered also included installation responsibilities, which, however, were not decisive in categorising the 
contracts as such for services. Even if the Seller had not been charged with any affixation obligations, the 
agreements would have been classified as contracts for services based on the specific individualisation of the 
machines that were to be produced. 
212 Decision of 2003, comm. c. №2268/2002, I c. panel of the Sofia Appellate Court (a contract for sale, 
installation and set-up of a one-channel telephone radio communication system). 
213 See also Dimitrov 67. 
214 Thus, although in H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791 Lord Denning 
thought the contract for the sale and erection of a hopper was divisible into two parts (at p. 800), the court held 
there was only one contract - a contract for sale (at p. 805 and 809). 
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and before its installation, the contract is a sale with a supplementary term to affix the good. 
Where courts find that parties intended property not to pass until affixation, i.e. until the time 
when the article had lost its character as a moveable, the contract is not for the sale of the 
article as a good, but a contract for services.215 Sometimes, however, the intention of the 
parties may not be easy to determine, thus making the distinction between a sale-of-goods 
contract (with the installation agreement being only ancillary) and a service contract (with the 
supply of materials being only ancillary) very fine.216 In this respect, the degree of 
individuality of performance matters. If the thing delivered is a standardised good, available 
on the market, which needs to be fixed because it cannot be used otherwise, English courts 
consider this a sale.217 Indeed, installation entails some regard of the buyer's needs, but the 
seller offers to do this mainly to secure additional contracts, so it remains a comparatively 
small matter. If, however, the Seller undertakes to manufacture something under the contract 
for the particular Buyer and the thing comes into being through the very process of its 
incorporation in the Buyer's premises, then this is a contract for services, akin to construction 
contracts. 
The approach of English courts is perhaps most apparent when comparing Pritchett & Gold v. 
Currie218 and Clark v. Bulmer.219 In both cases the contracts required the Seller to deliver a 
number of component parts at the Buyer's premises where he had to erect and put them 
together. Yet, in Pritchett & Gold v. Currie the contract was held to be a sale of the 
component parts of a battery, with an additional agreement for their erection,220 while in 
Clark v. Bulmer it was held to be a contract for services.221 The different interpretation 
adopted by courts in these two cases can be explained by the different degree of customisation 
that characterised the Seller's performance up until – and during – the time of affixation. 
Thus, in Pritchett & Gold v. Currie there was nothing particularly special either about the 
sixty-five component cells, making up the battery, or about the installation process. Though 
                                                 
215 For a concise review of English case-law from which these principles can be distilled, see Collins Trading 
Co. v. Maher [1969] VR 20. 
216 In this sense, see also Rawlings 39. 
217 Love v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd. [1944] KB 484 (a contract for the supply and fixing of black-out 
curtains, rails and battens); Philip Head & Sons v. Showfronts [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 140 (a contract to deliver 
and lay a carpet at the defendant's showrooms); H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd (see 
supra footnote 214 of this Chapter). 
218 Pritchett & Gold v. Currie [1916] 2 Ch 515. 
219 Clark v. Bulmer. 
220 Pritchett & Gold v. Currie 524-525. 
221 Clark v. Bulmer 796. 
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manufactured on the defendant's order, the cells themselves were identical and thus were 
hardly adapted to the specific conditions of Mrs. Currie's house. Their erection and 
connection was also a fairly ordinary process that required only standard fittings and did not 
have to be done exactly by the seller.222 In fact, most probably the battery was delivered in 
component cells and not in a complete state mainly for logistical, if for any other, reasons. So, 
though the analysis of the parties' correspondence and material documents did not lead the 
court to construe the contract as a sale of a completed article,223 it concluded the contract was 
for the sale of unascertained goods (the battery cells) the property of which passed at the time 
of delivery when they were appropriated to the contract. In other words, the agreement 
regarding installation was interpreted as a supplemental term to a contract that in substance 
was a sale.224  
Although similar on the surface, in its essence the situation in Clark v. Bulmer was very 
different. The Seller was required to invest special skill and labour in order to build a steam 
engine that fit the particular purpose of pumping water out of the Buyer's mine. He was to 
exercise his expertise at all stages of performance – both at the stage of selecting materials 
and transforming them into tailor-made engine components and at the stage of fixing the 
components to the ground at the Buyer's colliery. The affixation process itself was essential to 
contract performance. The components produced at the Seller's manufactory were forwarded 
in parts and at different intervals to the mine where they were fixed one by one to the soil and, 
thus, converted into the engine that the Buyer sought to acquire.225 Thus, unlike in Pritchett & 
Gold v. Currie, neither were the engine components a set of standard elements, nor was 
installation a mundane process of assembling and fixing the different components. The engine 
was not available, complete except for fixing, on the market. In fact, it became an engine only 
upon its erection, much like a building constructed on the owner's land, so erection was not 
merely some supplemental part of the contract. For these reasons, Parke, B. thought that the 
proper construction of the agreement was not as a contract for the sale of an engine which 
would afterwards be affixed but as a contract for erecting and constructing an engine. 
Following his earlier decision in Tripp v. Armitage, which concerned the treatment of 
                                                 
222 Indeed it was the defendant company that ultimately erected the battery and not the seller, as agreed. Pritchett 
& Gold v. Currie 517. 
223 The correspondence and the material documents of the transaction all pointed at the delivery and erection of 
battery cells and not of a battery. Clark v. Bulmer 516-517. 
224 Pritchett & Gold v. Currie 524-525. 
225 Clark v. Bulmer 796. 
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materials used in the construction of a building,226 Parke, B. refused to deem the engine 
components as goods sold and delivered, either. Where the contract was a service one, there 
was no sale of the engine components as moveables, at all.227  The Buyer did not contract to 
acquire the parts of a steam engine; she contracted to have an engine, capable of fulfilling a 
certain task, constructed at her premises – and this was the substance of the contract that 
determined its classification. In this sense, it was the comparative importance of affixation 
and the overall extent of adaptation of the Seller's performance that shaped the outcome in 
Clark v. Bulmer. To put it differently, the same features that situate agreements for the 
making and installation of specialised machinery closer to the long-term end of the 
continuum, qualify such contracts in English law, in the same way as in Bulgarian law, as 
contracts for services.228 
How does the involvement of installation services influence the categorisation of mixed 
contracts in the US? Similarly to Bulgarian courts, US courts sometimes sever the goods and 
the service aspect of the contract, using the so-called "gravamen of the action" test. Instead of 
centring on the nature of the transaction, the test focuses on whether the underlying action is 
brought because of a defect in the goods furnished, in which case UCC governs, or because of 
the quality of the services rendered, in which case common law applies.229 Though the 
approach is rather an exception, it is often resorted to, just like in Bulgaria, where the goods 
involved can be purchased on the general market.230 Thus, in a widely cited case, Anthony 
Pools v. Sheehan,231 the court employed the gravamen test with respect to a contract that was 
predominately for consumer services (a contract to construct a swimming pool) to hold that 
the UCC warranty provisions applied to the incidental sale of an allegedly defective consumer 
good (a diving board), which was part of the pool-related equipment supplied by the 
constructor and which had retained its identity as consumer good. Yet, discussing the practice 
                                                 
226 Tripp v. Armitage (1839) 4 M & W 687, 150 ER 1597 (a contract to build a hotel). See also Young & Marten 
Ltd. v. McManus Childs Ltd. [1969] 1 AC 454 (a sub-contract for roofing houses). 
227 Clark v. Bulmer 796. 
228 Buxton v. Bedall (1803) 3 East 303, 102 ER 613 (a contract for making two machines especially for the buyer 
and fixing them up at the buyer's premises); Appleby v. Myers (1866-1867) LR 2 CP 651 (a contract to erect 
certain machinery on the defendant's premises). 
229 In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies 578 A2d 343 (NH 1990) at 345. 
230 In his concurring opinion in Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno Trimpoli Gen. Constr. Co. 350 NYS2d 920 
(NYAD 1974) at 924, Greenblott, J. also advocates dividing the contract, with UCC controlling the Seller's 
obligation regarding the goods, "at least where the goods involved could have been purchased on the general 
market and used by the (customer)' ". Cf. with Lord Denning's dictum in H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley 
Ingham & Co Ltd at 800 (see supra footnote 214 of this Chapter). 
231 Anthony Pools v. Sheehan 455 A2d 434 (Md 1983). 
 163 
of dividing mixed contracts, it must be emphasised that Anthony Pools v. Sheehan does not 
feature the same factual situation as the cases in which Bulgarian courts separate the 
transaction. Recall that what Bulgarian judges do is to divide the sale of standardised goods 
from the related installation responsibilities.232 Conversely, in an identical factual situation, 
English courts consider the contract as a whole and apply sale-of-goods law.233 That is, in a 
mixed contract with a clearly dominating sale component and only ancillary affixation 
responsibilities, Bulgarian courts relegate the sale and service portion of the contract to 
different bodies of law, while English courts apply the law of the dominating component to 
the entire contract. In contrast, in Anthony Pools v. Sheehan the court faces a predominately 
service contract and separates the incidental sale of related equipment from the leading work 
element to allow application of UCC warranties and afford better protection to the consumer-
buyer. In other words, even though the case is a famous example of the divisibility approach 
applied by some courts in the US, it is not analogous to the factual situations in which 
Bulgarian courts sever the contract and in this sense does not represent material that is 
appropriate for comparison with the factual set distilled under Bulgarian law.  
In fact, although there is some authority for treating mixed contracts, including those that 
entail affixation work, as divisible,234 the majority of US courts still evaluate the entire 
contract along the sale-services continuum.235 That is to say, similarly to English judges, 
when deciding whether to apply UCC or common law to a hybrid agreement, involving both 
sale of goods and provision of installation service, US judges normally engage in determining 
                                                 
232 See supra footnotes 212 and 213 of this Chapter and the text accompanying them. 
233 See supra footnote 214 of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
234 In Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Wiggins Scale Co. 240 SE2d 323 (Ga App 1977) the court also divided the 
contract for sale and installation of a truck scale by using the gravamen test. Since the claimant was suing for 
defective construction of the pit and installation of the scale without claiming a defect of the scale itself, the 
court reasoned that the cause of action was based on the contractual provision for furnishing services, not on the 
separate provision for selling the scale and so refused to apply UCC. In Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Radiant Electric Co. 222 NW2d 323 (Mi 1974) in a dispute concerning a contract to install electrical wiring in 
an apartment building, the court held that UCC implied warranty applied with respect to the goods (clamps and 
cable) installed while common law implied warranty applied to the manner in which the goods were installed. In 
Hooker & Sons v. Roberts Cabinet 683 So2d 396 (Miss 1996) the court held that since the case did not concern 
the quality of the new cabinets manufactured, it was general contract law rather than UCC Article 2 that 
governed the dispute between a general contractor and subcontractor arising from the latter's refusal to dispose of 
cabinets that it tore out from a public housing redevelopment site for purposes of installation of new cabinets. 
235 Thus, in Milau Assoc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp. 368 NE2d 1247 (NY 1977) at 1249-1250, the court sustained 
the practice of classifying the entire contract as either one for the sale of goods, or as one for services. See also 
Pittsley v. Houser 875 P2d 232 (Idaho App 1994) at 235 where the court was of the opinion that severing 
contracts into various parts and applying different law to each separate part contravenes the UCC's purpose ' "to 
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." '. 
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the overriding and the incidental component of the contract.236 Using the predominant factor 
test,237 they regard "mobility", being a key feature of goods,238 as one of the significant 
factors, which though not decisive, may tip the balance in favour of classifying the contract as 
one for goods and not services.239 In this respect, however, the fact that a moveable qualifying 
as a "good" is involved in the transaction is not sufficient. What is necessary is that the 
moveable constitutes the very subject-matter of the transaction and is still mobile at the time 
of identification to the contract. 240 Applying this so-called "moveability" sub-test to contracts 
for the supply and installation of equipment, US courts sometimes conclude that the subject of 
the transaction, the equipment system installed, comes into being only as an immoveable and 
consequently cannot be mobile when identified to the contract. For example, in Osterholt v. 
St. Charles Drilling Company241 the court characterised the contract as primarily one for 
services because the defendant undertook to install a well and water system, specified only in 
terms of required capacity and not in terms of comprising goods.242 Hence, the court 
reasoned, the component parts did not become identified to the contract until they were 
actually affixed to the plaintiff's property, so the transaction could not be qualified as 
essentially one "in goods".243 In this sense, the court treated the contract as a classic contract 
for the construction of an immoveable fixture. 
Still, very frequently, albeit not always, US courts hold that contracts for the supply and 
installation of equipment fall on the goods side of the Bonebrake test, thus differentiating 
them from classic construction contracts. In such contracts, the reasoning goes, the equipment 
is not just a material used in the erection of a fixture, but the primary subject of the 
transaction. It is completed and existing before its installation and, hence, is still moveable at 
                                                 
236 To recall the test used by English judges, see supra the text accompanying footnotes 215 and 216 of this 
Chapter. 
237 See supra the text accompanying footnote 185 of this Chapter. 
238 See the definition of goods in UCC § 2-105. Definitions: Transferability; “Goods”; “Future” Goods; “Lot”; 
“Commercial Unit”. (1) as well as the Official Comment to Subsection (1). 
239 BMC Industries v. Barth Industries at 1330; Space Leasing Associates v. Atantic Building Systems, Inc. 241 
SE2d 438 (Ga App 1977) at 441. 
240 On moveability as a sub-test of UCC applicability, see BMC Industries v. Barth Industries 1330-1331; Robert 
Marshall, ‘The Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to Construction Contracts’ (1979) 28 Emory Law 
Journal 335, 366-367. 
241 Osterholt v. St. Charles Drilling Company 500 FSupp 529 (Miss 1980). 
242 Recall that such specification of the system to be installed would also categorise the agreement as a contract 
for services under Bulgarian law. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 179 and 211 of this Chapter.   
243 Osterholt v. St. Charles Drilling Company at 533. 
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the time of identification. Therefore, the equipment falls within UCC's definition of goods.244 
Thus, where the moveability sub-test along with other determining factors, such as the 
language of the agreement and the manner in which the transaction was billed,245 point at the 
dominance of the goods element, courts very often classify a contract for the supply and 
installation of equipment as a sale.   
In this respect, if the equipment to be affixed is standardised, the moveability sub-test 
commonly directs a result identical to that in English law. Being pre-fabricated, the 
equipment is available complete, except for fixing, on the market and, in the absence of any 
special agreement, becomes identified upon delivery, i.e. while still being moveable. Under 
such circumstances, courts generally deem the installation service, provided under the 
contract, as only incidental and determine UCC as the governing law.246 Even where the 
subject to be constructed is a steel building, the fact that it is pre-designed and pre-engineered 
makes the court view it as a kit of pre-made components which merely need to be assembled, 
rather than as a fixture which is constructed by taking a great variety of materials and 
assembling them into something new.247 However, if applied to a contract, involving specially 
designed and manufactured equipment where installation plays an important role, the 
moveability sub-test again frequently leads US courts to the conclusion that the contract is 
predominately a sale of goods. On one hand, "specially manufactured" articles are not less 
"goods" within the meaning of UCC.248 On the other hand, since the enquiry focuses on the 
nature of the equipment at the time of its identification to the contract, to the extent parties do 
not stipulate that identification occurs only upon affixation, the equipment, once fabricated, is 
                                                 
244 BMC Industries v. Barth Industries at 1331 (see supra footnote 188 of this Chapter, the contract for design 
and manufacture of automated eyeglass lens equipment also included installation responsibilities, so besides 
discussing the importance of the service element of design and manufacturing, the court also applied the 
moveability sub-test); Marshall 366-367. 
245 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 185-186 of this Chapter. 
246 The most famous example, given at the very enunciation of the "predominant factor" test, is installation of a 
water heater in a bathroom. Bonebrake v. Cox at 960. The court in Bonebrake also classified the disputed 
contract, an agreement for delivery and installation of bowling equipment, as a contract for sale, emphasising 
that the equipment was identified before installation and that it did not come into existence on the site because it 
was pre-fabricated and already used. Ibid 959. See also Meyers v. Henderson Construction 370 A2d 547 (NJ 
Super 1977) where a contract for the supply and installation of pre-fabricated overhead doors was qualified as a 
contract for sale of goods although the installation of the disassembled doors required a mechanic and a helper to 
spend more than 15 days hinging the panels together, installing the tracks, setting the assembled doors in place 
and mounting the glass panels in them. But see Glover School & Office Equipment Co. v. Dave Hall 372 A2d 
221 (Del Super 1977) where a contract for providing and installing school lockers, tackboards and chalkboards, 
all standard items, was held to be a contract for services. 
247 Cober v. Corle 610 A2d 1036 (Pa Super 1992), but see Herman v. Bonanza Buildings 390 NW2d 536 (Neb 
1986). 
248 See supra footnote 187 of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
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still moveable at the relevant moment and, hence, a "good" in the sense of the Code.249 Thus, 
the fact that the contract involves installation services, which ultimately render the article 
immobile, is of little consequence. The contract is considered heavily weighted toward goods 
and hence falling within the scope of UCC.250 
To put it shortly, in contrast to their Bulgarian and English colleagues, US judges tend to view 
contracts for the supply and installation of specialised machinery/equipment as "transactions 
in goods". And though the contrast is the same in its end result, the reasons for it differ 
depending on the jurisdiction. While the difference with Bulgarian law is a logical outcome of 
the latter's consistent removal of any service element, including those related to affixation, 
from the sale contract, the divergence with English law is rooted in the different moment in 
time, pertinent to the evaluation of the contract’s predominant purpose. Moving this moment 
to the earlier time of identification to the contract (as opposed to the time of passing property 
in England)251 allows US courts to depreciate the importance of the installation services 
involved. Such depreciation takes place irrespectively of any counterarguments about the size 
of the equipment erected on the Buyer's premises252 or the amount of labour and skill entailed 
                                                 
249 For the time when identification to the contract occurs, see UCC § 2-501. Insurable Interest in Goods; 
Manner of Identification of Goods. 
250 Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co. 532 F2d 572 (7th Cir 1976) (a contract for 
the construction of a one-million-gallon water tank); Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco 991 F2d 21 (Mass 1993) 
(a contract for design, delivery and installation of wastewater treatment system) - cf. with Osterholt v. 
St. Charles Drilling Company (see supra footnotes 241-243 of this Chapter and the text accompanying them); 
BMC Industries v. Barth Industries (see supra footnote 188 of this Chapter); Ogden Martin Systems of 
Indianapolis v. Whiting Corp. 179 F3d 523 (7th Cir 1999) (a contract to construct, deliver, and assemble two 
13.5 ton solid waste refuse cranes and operating systems) - cf. with Decision №586 of 21.06.2007, comm. c. 
№227/2007 of the Supreme Cassation Court (see supra footnote 211 of this Chapter). 
251 Under US and English law the title to equipment and materials in construction contracts passes only upon 
their incorporation into the site despite the fact that they have been identified/appropriated to the contract at an 
earlier stage, e.g. upon delivery or approval. For England, see Tripp v. Armitage (1839) 4 M & W 687, 150 ER 
1597; for the US, see Sweet 413. Still, in some US cases the issue of passing of title has also been considered by 
courts when determining the predominant purpose of the contract. For example, in Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp. 342 NE2d 65 (Ill App 1976) at 78, the court took into consideration, among other things, that under the 
disputed contract for the construction of an anhydrous ammonia plant, the client acquired title to all machinery, 
equipment and supplies not from the constructor but directly from the individual dealers. This meant that the 
disputed contract did not contain any sale element that could mandate the application of UCC. Also, in Entron, 
Inc. v. General Cablevision 435 F2d 995 (5th Cir 1970) at 1000, the court interpreted the contractual provision 
stating that title remained with the Seller until completion, acceptance and payment of the entire television 
system as a clear indication that the contract was for sale of goods.   
252 Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co. at 580 ("…we are unaware of any 
authority that specially manufactured small dies should be goods and a very large tank not so classified."); 
Ogden Martin Systems of Indianapolis v. Whiting Corp. at 529 ("The suggestion that an object such as a crane is 
capable of being delivered and yet incapable of being moved approaches an oxymoron.").  
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in the process of affixation.253 It also permits courts to focus not on the moment of conversion 
of the different pieces of equipment into a unified operational system, but on the moveability 
characteristic of the separate parts and, thus, regard them as goods sold and delivered. This is 
exactly the opposite stand to that taken by Parke, B. in Clark v Bulmer where, recall, he 
refused to treat the parts of the engine as moveable goods the property of which passed upon 
delivery at the plaintiff's premises.254 In this sense, by liberally constructing the definition of 
"goods", US courts tend to broaden the scope of UCC and subsume under the Code mixed 
long-term contacts,255 which in England and Bulgaria would be classified as contracts for 
services and handled as construction contracts.  
In fact, the emphasis on mobility sometimes leads US courts to qualify even classic 
construction contracts, which do not involve any specialised machinery or equipment, as 
contracts for the sale of goods. Thus, in Smith v. Union Supply256 a contract to install a new 
roof was held to be governed by UCC with the sole argument that the materials installed on 
the roof were moveable at the time of identification to the contract.257 It is also not clear what 
distinguishes the contract to furnish and install pre-fabricated overhead doors, characterised in 
Meyers v. Henderson Construction258 as sale of goods on the basis of the moveability 
criterion, from an ordinary construction subcontract, under which the subcontractor purchases 
doors specified by the client directly from the manufacturer and then installs them on the job 
                                                 
253 Evidently, careful and skilful installation was crucial in order for the wastewater treatment system in 
Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco to operate properly. Installation included eighty-eight different pieces of 
equipment and, along with debugging, took a whole year. Subsequently, only the second expert, and only after a 
lengthy and meticulous inspection, could identify that some parts of the equipment were not installed. 
Nevertheless, the court classified the contract as one for sale of goods. 
254 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 226 and 227 of this Chapter. Cf. Clark v. Bulmer at 796 with 
Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco at 24. To make the juxtaposition even more explicit, imagine how Clark v. 
Bulmer could have been decided under US law. Indeed, unlike the contract in Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, 
the contract in Clark v. Bulmer did not identify the various components of the steam engine and in this sense the 
engine appeared less as a kit that only needed to be assembled and affixed to the plaintiff's land. Yet, Parke, B. 
could decide that the very delivery of the component parts at the colliery clearly indicated that the Seller had 
designated them as goods to which the contract referred and so the time of their identification undoubtedly 
occurred before installation. 
255 In this sense, see Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco at 24; Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven 
Manor Water Co. at 580; Meyers v. Henderson Construction at 80 citing approvingly Pittsburgh-Des Moines 
Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co.; BMC Industries v. Barth Industries at 1330 citing Cambridge Plating 
Co. v. Napco as well as another case, in which the courts believed that the general trend is to view such mixed 
contracts as governed by the UCC.  
256 Smith v. Union Supply 675 P2d 333 (Colo App 1993). 
257 Ibid at 334. Cf. with O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope 529 SW2d 258 (Tex 1975); Frommert v. 
Bobson Construction 558 NW2d 239 (Mich App 1996) as well as with Young & Marten Ltd. v. McManus Childs 
Ltd. [1969] 1 AC 454 (see supra footnote 226 of this Chapter). 
258 Meyers v. Henderson Construction (see supra footnote 246 of this Chapter). 
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site.259 Add to this also the other aspects of the contract that courts deem important when 
evaluating its predominant nature – the contractual language, which they sometimes interpret 
fairly selectively;260 the presence or absence of a separate charge for services; the portion of 
the overall contractual price that the cost of goods constitutes – and it becomes clear that, 
compared to English courts, US ones tend to focus on form and to downgrade the overall 
substance of the contract.261 
In other words, when it comes to mixed agreements that involve affixation services, the 
decisions of US judges are less consistent than those of their Bulgarian and English 
colleagues. While Bulgarian and English courts are firm that contracts to supply and install 
specialised machinery/equipment are contracts for services, the position of US courts is not so 
foreseeable: they may characterise such agreements as service contracts but at the same time 
exhibit a clear tendency toward classifying them as contracts for sale of goods. While 
Bulgarian and English courts do not express any doubts as to the categorisation of 
construction subcontracts, US courts may sometimes render surprising decisions qualifying 
them as transactions in goods. From this perspective, compared to the default tests in Bulgaria 
and England, the predominant factor test with its intrinsic lack of predictability262 
unquestionably raises transaction costs. First, it raises drafting costs since parties either need 
to be very careful with the contractual language they use in order not to prompt the court to 
categorise the contract contrary to their intention, or need to include an explicit provision as to 
the governing law (UCC or common law).263 Second, it raises uncertainty and error costs. 
Since the court has to analyse a number of proxies together with the evidence related to them 
as well as to choose what weight to place on the different proxies, the likelihood of judicial 
                                                 
259 In this sense, see also Marshall 354. Cf. with Ranger Construction v. Dixie Floor 433 F Supp 442 (DSC 
1977) (a contract for installation of resilient flooring where the court, relying on the language of the contract and 
on the nature of the subcontractor's primary business, found UCC inapplicable); Milau Assoc. v. North Ave. Dev. 
Corp. (a contract under which a subcontractor was obliged to furnish and install a wet pipe sprinkler system - 
also characterised as a contract for services); Coakley and Williams, Inc. v Shatterproof Glass Corp. (a contract 
with a subcontractor to furnish and install an aluminium and glass curtain wall and storefront work in a building 
- also deemed a contract for services).  
260 In Entron, Inc. v. General Cablevision at 1000 (see supra footnote 251 of this Chapter) the court, relying 
heavily on the contractual language, held that a contract for the construction of a community antenna television 
system was sufficiently a sale of goods as to bring it within UCC. The court considered it significant that the 
contract referred to the defendant as the "buyer", but at the same time ignored that the agreement spelled out the 
plaintiff's obligation as being to "construct and sell" (emphasis added) the television system. 
261 In this sense, see also Anthony Pools v. Sheehan t 440. 
262 For a strong criticism and rare explicit refutation of the test, see Elkins Manor Assoc. v. Eleanor Concrete 
Works 396 SE2d 463 (W Va 1990) at 469. 
263 On the possibility that parties may, by an explicit provision, subject a contract to UCC or exclude it from its 
scope, see Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, vol I (Third edn, New York: Aspen Publishers 2004) 58  
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error increases. This invites parties to behave opportunistically. A defendant, for example, 
may strategically claim that the agreement is a sale-of-goods contract in order to justify the 
application of the shorter UCC limitation period and thus preclude the plaintiff from obtaining 
any remedy.264 Or a plaintiff may claim that a service contract is in fact a sale-of-goods one to 
be able to assert breach of a UCC implied warranty and thus benefit from a smaller 
evidentiary burden.265 Moreover, considering the different remedies under UCC and common 
law, opportunism may not be limited to parties' conduct in court. The possibility of having to 
pay UCC market damages rather than the higher cost-of-completion damages, typical for 
construction contracts, may incentivise a promisor, whose benefit from breach would be 
sufficiently great, to shirk his responsibilities and default in the first place.266 All this taken 
into account, the increase in transaction costs may in fact offset the advantage of having such 
a multi-factored test which, in principle, is appropriate for heterogeneous contexts and allows 
for decisions that reflect the actual nature of the particular contractual relationship. In fact, 
neither the Bulgarian (focusing on the degree of individualisation in the contract and the 
presence of installation services), nor the English test (focusing on the time of passing of 
property), which differentiates sale-of-goods from construction contracts, is a default rule in 
the sense of a default term whose content is specified in advance.267 Each of them gives courts 
some flexibility and opportunity to account for the concrete circumstances – the English test – 
more than the Bulgarian one. Yet, since the tests do not involve so many sub-aspects and 
relevant proxies, they are applied more uniformly and entail less uncertainty and prospect of 
judicial error. Thus, the more predictable Bulgarian and English tests appear to be more cost-
saving than the US predominant factor test. 
                                                 
264 Under UCC § 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale. (1) the UCC limitation period is four years 
and parties may not agree to extend it. In contrast, in most states the limitation period applicable to contracts that 
fall outside UCC is five years or more. 
265 In contrast to UCC, common law does not imply any warranty of merchantability or of fitness for particular 
purpose. See UCC § 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade. and § 2-315. Implied Warranty: 
Fitness for Particular Purpose. Thus, when common law applies, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the thing 
is not fit for its ordinary or particular purpose. She has to resort either to a negligence claim (requiring her to 
prove that the promisor has a duty to the aggrieved party and has violated the respective standard of care) or to a 
claim of breach of an express warranty (requiring her to prove violation of an explicit warranty term in the 
agreement). Marshall 337-339. 
266 See e.g. Freeman v. Shannon Construction 560 SW2d 732 (Tex 1977) (where a cement subcontractor who 
had abandoned work contended that the contract called for sale of goods and consequently the general 
contractor's damages should have been limited to the difference between the market and the contract price 
together with any incidental and consequential damages as provided by UCC § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for 
Non-Delivery or Repudiation). 
267 See supra footnote 69 of Chapter I. 
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Discussing transaction costs, a note on the approach of dividing mixed contracts versus that of 
treating them as entire, is also necessary. As shown by the comparative analysis above, while 
Bulgarian courts divide agreements mixing sale of standardised goods with installation 
services, English and US courts generally consider such contracts as entire and apply to them 
sale-of-goods law.268 The latter practice has the advantage of lowering ex post transaction 
costs. First, it lowers verification costs as the aggrieved party does not have to verify whether 
non-conformity stems from a defect of the good or from defective installation; she simply 
needs to show lack of conformity without proving the reason for it. Second, it simplifies ex 
post administration for courts and thus reduces uncertainty and error costs. Still, the practice 
also has a downside because it may incentivise strategic behaviour on the side of the Buyer. 
Extending the more demanding warranties of sale-of-goods law to the service element of the 
contract, the approach may motivate her to claim breach of contract for any performance of 
the affixation obligations that is less than perfect. The Buyer may even terminate the entire 
contract, including its sale portion, for only a minor non-conformity resulting from 
installation.269 Thus, whether ultimately the gains from treating the contract as entire will 
exceed the losses from opportunism depends on the particular circumstances.  
In this respect, note that even though the contracts, of which the choice is between dividing 
the contract or considering it as entire, are all contracts involving the sale of standardised 
goods and affixation responsibilities, they still vary considerably from one another. Thus, a 
contract for the sale of curtains and rails which must also be fixed270 is so predominantly a 
sale contract with installation being so incidental an obligation that the reduction in 
transaction costs may very well surpass any eventual losses from opportunism. On the other 
hand, in a contract for the construction of a steel building out of pre-made components271 the 
service element is not as marginal and a qualification of the entire transaction as such "in 
goods" is fairly disputable. From this perspective, even in these standardised-good contracts, 
                                                 
268 Cf. footnotes 212 and 213 of this Chapter and the text accompanying them (for Bulgaria), with footnote 214 
of this Chapter and the accompanying text (for England), and with footnote 235 of this Chapter and the 
accompanying text (for the US). 
269 See e.g. Hooker & Sons v. Roberts Cabinet  (see supra footnote 234 of this Chapter) where the Buyer asserted 
that since the contract was governed in its entirety by UCC, the Seller's substantial performance and breach of 
only an incidental service obligation did not preclude her from unilaterally terminating the agreement. For 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the Seller, see Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Wiggins Scale Co. (see supra 
footnote 234 of this Chapter), where the Seller contended that the Buyer had no right to damages since, the 
contract being in its entirety a contract for sale of goods, she had not given notice of alleged defects which under 
UCC was a precondition for an action of damages.  
270 Love v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd. (see supra footnote 217 of this Chapter). 
271 Cober v. Corle (see supra footnote 247 of this Chapter). 
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which are characterised in their entirety as sale-of-goods in the US and England, the 
importance of the service element fluctuates. As the importance of its role increases, the risk 
of opportunism also augments, thus increasing the chance that the gains from cost-saving may 
be swallowed by the losses from strategic behaviour. Thus, where the service mingling with 
the sale of standardised goods does not play so trivial a role and the choice is between 
severing the contract and relegating it in its entirety to the single body of sale-of-goods law, 
the former approach may be the better option. 
The comparison of the categorisation of mixed contracts in the two scenarios above: where 
the Seller delivers a new good, which he has manufactured with his own materials, and where 
the contract involves the sale of a moveable and installation responsibilities, reveal US and 
Bulgarian contract law as diametrical opposites. While Bulgarian contract law denies to any 
contract involving a service element, be it the service of manufacturing or of affixing, the 
character of sale of goods, US law tends to downplay the importance of the service 
component in order to fit the contract within the scope of UCC. Thus, while Bulgarian 
contract law reserves the sale-of-goods contract for the spot range, US law, allowing for the 
involvement of a substantial service component, rather envisages sale of goods as a contract 
gravitating to the long-term span. As for English contract law, it takes an intermediate 
position. Classifying as sales, contracts that involve significant work related to the creation of 
the delivered good, English courts accommodate long-term transactions within contracts for 
sale of goods. Where, however, the service element involves erection, affixation, or 
installation obligations, which play an important role, thus pointing at a long-term 
relationship, the contract is classified as one for services. In this sense, English contract law 
incorporates long-term transactions in contracts for sales of goods; yet, it does not exhibit the 
tendency of US law to subsume all mixed contracts with substantial service elements under 
sale-of-goods law. 
Conclusion 
Having distinguished the features which determine the spot or long-term character of a 
contract and having shown that in a legal system the differentiation between sale-of-goods 
and construction contracts does not necessarily go along the lines of the spot/long-term 
distinction, I can now make some basic decisions about the positive comparative analysis in 
Chapter VI. 
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First, while comparison of the availability of termination will take place not only across 
jurisdictions but also across the legal categories of sale-of-goods and construction contracts, 
the selection of similar court disputes concerning each of the specific contracts will always be 
made with an eye on the availability of a market for substitute performances. In this sense, the 
analysis will seek to compare not only whether national courts grant termination in a similar 
factual situation, involving a sale-of-goods, respectively, a construction contract, but also 
whether the type (spot or long-term) of the particular contract, being it sale-of-goods or 
construction, affects the remedial awards of courts belonging to the same jurisdiction. As it 
has been shown, where the presence of a market for substitute performance is a criterion for 
matching analogous contractual disputes, some issues of delimitation between sale-of-goods 
and service contracts arise and it is perfectly possible that a contract classified as a sale of 
goods in one of the chosen jurisdictions is actually qualified as a contract for services in 
another.272 In this respect, once the national legal taxonomy has served to identify the 
applicable legal rules, the comparative analysis will not hesitate to go beyond it and juxtapose 
similar factual scenarios even if they happen to be classified under a different legal category 
in the different jurisdictions. 
Second, the selection of similar contractual disputes will not cover cases in which courts 
apply the special contractual remedies, provided by national contract law in case of breach of 
consumer sale-of-goods and construction contracts. In practice, this would affect the selection 
of court cases with respect to Bulgaria and England, which having implemented the consumer 
acquis, adopted on the EU level, differentiate their contract rules according to the kind of 
parties involved – business or consumer.273 It would not make a difference with respect to the 
choice of cases in the US, where contract law, whether common law or UCC, is not intended 
to deal with problems of consumer protection and, thus, remains integrated.274 Some may 
                                                 
272 See supra Section B. of this Chapter. 
273 In other words, the selection of similar contractual disputes will not cover cases, decided under the Act on 
Protection of Consumers in Bulgaria as well as under Part 5A Additional Rights of Buyer in Consumer Cases of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and Part 1B Additional Rights of Transferee in Consumer Cases of the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982 in England. 
274 In the US, UCC does not generally provide consumer buyers with specific contractual remedies. Continuing 
the common law tradition that contract law applies to merchants as well as others, the Code itself is not designed 
to protect consumers and leaves this role to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and to other statutes adopted on 
state level. UCC legal provisions directed particularly to sale-of-goods contracts involving consumers can be 
counted on the fingers of one hand. See e.g. UCC § 2-502. Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Repudiation, 
Failure to Deliver or Insolvency. (1)(a); § 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy. (3). A 
number of the amendments to UCC proposed in 2003 envisaged the modification of some legal provisions 
precisely with respect to consumer contracts; yet, since no state enacted the amendments and the prospects for 
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think that disregarding the consumer protection remedies available in Bulgaria and England 
skews the comparison; yet, this is a conscious and justified decision. The raison d'être for 
treating consumers as a special class of contracting parties is that they are inevitably the 
weaker actor, so in case of supply of defective goods275 they need to be provided with 
additional, special remedies to correct the informational asymmetry that disadvantages them. 
As already emphasised, however, asymmetric information is a serious issue when it comes to 
long-term contracting generally, no matter whether the contracting parties are businesses or 
consumers. For this reason, the thesis engages in exploring the role of contractual remedies by 
investigating national contract law through a distinction based on the type of contract and not 
on the kind of party involved. This does not mean that the comparison will cover only 
disputes between businesses. On the contrary, court cases concerning business-to-consumer 
contracts are also included in the survey, but they have either been decided before the 
insertion of the special consumer remedies in English and Bulgarian law,276 or they do not end 
with the award of consumer remedies, which once adopted are available simultaneously and 
in parallel to the general ones.277 In this respect, the purpose is, first, to explore whether 
                                                                                                                                                        
enactment were fairly gloomy, the amendments were withdrawn from the Official Text in 2011. See 
Recommendation of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code to Withdraw the 2003 
Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A from the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, available at: 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/05/withdrawing-the-2003-amendments-to-ucc-articles-2-and-2a.html, last 
accessed on 08.06.2014. 
275 The special remedies of consumer buyers, which were inserted in English and Bulgarian law to comply with 
the requirements of Consumer Sales Directive, apply only in case of supply of defective goods. They do not 
apply with respect to claims for lack of title and claims for pure non-delivery or late delivery. 
276 In England the additional consumer remedies were inserted in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982 by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/3045) 
and became effective on March 31, 2003. In Bulgaria the special consumer remedies were introduced by the Act 
on Protection of Consumers, promulgated State Gazette №99 of 09.12.2005, in force since 10.06.2006, last 
amended State Gazette №18 of 01.03.2011. 
277 The special remedies made available to consumers excluded neither the existing common law remedies in 
England, nor the existing remedies under the Contracts Act in Bulgaria, which are considered to be "more 
stringent provisions", ensuring a higher level of consumer protection, in the sense of Art. 8.2 of the Consumer 
Sales Directive. Indeed, in England it has been maintained that since the special consumer remedies are heavily 
qualified by limitations of reasonableness and proportionality, which are determined by a court only ex post, the 
common law remedies are more advantageous to a consumer buyer. See in this sense F. M. B. Reynolds, 
‘Chapter 12. Remedies in Respect of Defects’ in Michael Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods (Eighth edn, 
London: Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2010) 634-635, 658-659; A. G.; Reynolds Guest, F. M. B.; Beale, 
H. G., ‘Chapter 43. Sale of Goods’ in H.G. Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, vol II (Thirty-first edn, London: 
Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson reuters 2012) 1513-1514. In Bulgaria, too, it has been pointed out that the limitations 
as to the order, in which the special consumer remedies may be used, in practice make them inferior to the 
general remedies under the Contracts Act, the choice of which is left entirely to the buyer's own discretion. 
Kristian Takov, ‘Rights of the Consumer Buyer in Case of Non-Conforming Goods’ (2007) 2 Commercial Law 
35, 56-57. In addition, §1 of the Bulgarian Act on Protection of Consumers, stating that in case of conflict 
between two statutory acts, the one that ensures a higher level of protection to consumers applies, also leads to 
the conclusion that the special consumer remedies do not simply derogate the existing general remedies for non-
conforming goods. Anguel Shopov, ‘Consumer Contracts in Bulgarian Law’ (2010) 1 Legal World 141, 146-
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aggravation of informational asymmetry causes national contract law to develop a regulatory 
function on its own, without EU law having to impose outside legal solutions. And second, 
the aim is also to explore whether national contract law accounts for the peculiarities of 
consumers (i.e. fewer resources available to collect information, limited cognitive abilities, 
smaller bargaining power, attaching idiosyncratic value to performance) but within the frames 
of the more general long-term contract type, which can appear either as commercial, or as 
consumer agreements. 
Yet, before proceeding to the actual comparison, the reader still needs one more piece of the 
puzzle. After all, if remedies are going to be explored from a consequentialist viewpoint, one 
needs to know how they affect human behaviour, and what they encourage and discourage 
parties to do. Since economic analysis has advanced most with respect to incentives generated 
by damages, this is the remedy on which the model, reconstructed in the following chapter, is 
grounded. Yet, as it will be shown in Chapter VI below, the knowledge provided by this 
model can be adapted to analyze other remedies, including termination, which has so far 
remained outside the focus of law-and-economics scholars' attention.  
In a way, the previous two chapters of the thesis can be viewed as such identifying the very 
basis of the economic model of incentives. Thus, Chapter III defined the three damage 
measures used in the model and showed that they are not restricted solely to the common law 
tradition. This chapter, on the other hand, isolated the variables of ex ante specific investment 
and ex post contractual performance and, thus, set the scene for illuminating the trade-offs 
among the different incentives, generated by damages. Departing from this foundation, I now 
turn to the economic model itself. 
                                                                                                                                                        
147, 154, 157. See Decision №4454 of 27.06.2011, app. c. c. №2069/2011 of Sofia City Court where on appeal 
the court rejected the buyer's complaint about the first instance court wrongly classifying the seller's liability 
under the Contracts Act instead of under the Act on Protection of Consumers, stating that the latter act did not 
exclude, limit or decrease the seller's obligations under the Contracts Act and the Commercial Act. Thus, the 
court recognised that the buyer had two alternative paths for seeking protection but pointed out that she should 
have raised the issue at the first instance. See also Decision №1614 of 31.07.2014, c. c. №2633/2014 of Regional 
Court – Bourgas where the court discussed the fact that the liability of the seller toward the consumer-buyer was 
provided in two acts – the Contracts Act and the Consumer Protection Act, and then resolved the conflict 
between the two statutes by applying, on the grounds of §1, the longer (and hence more favourable to the 
consumer) two-year term of the Act on Protection of Consumers. Justifying its decision as to the applicable law, 
the court also pointed out that the plaintiff herself based her claim on the Consumer Protection Act, thus 
implicitly acknowledging that the Contracts Act was not an unavailable course for demanding protection. 
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Chapter V Incentives 
This chapter analyses how damages affect parties' incentives. Besides exploring which 
measures of damages induce efficient performance and efficient specific investment 
(categories already identified as crucial in Chapter IV), the current chapter distinguishes a 
number of other effects generated by damages. 
Unlike the first generation of economic analysis, which focused solely on the ability of 
different damage measures to induce an efficient breach decision, today's economic 
scholarship recognises that damages produce a whole constellation of incentive effects. 
Somewhat paradoxically, in its early days contract law and economics downplayed the 
significance of remedies. As long as ex post negotiation costs were sufficiently low, the 
reasoning went, renegotiation would correct any inefficient incentives regarding performance 
and breach that might be produced by a suboptimal remedy. Thus, it was suggested, the 
measure of damages mattered only when renegotiation was prohibitively costly and, hence, 
failed or did not take place at all.1 Acknowledging the many aspects of contractual behaviour 
influenced by damages, modern economic analysis, in fact, reveals the true role of remedies. 
Damages also allocate risks and affect the parties' incentives to take precautions against 
breach, to mitigate or to search for a contracting partner. But unlike the decision to perform or 
breach, all these decisions are made before uncertainty has been resolved, so the inefficiencies 
they entail cannot be rectified by renegotiation even if it was costless. In this sense, the 
measure of damages is relevant whether renegotiation is sufficiently cheap to carry out or 
not.2 Damages, thus, are a truly powerful mechanism to achieve efficient results. 
This does not mean to say that ex post renegotiations make no difference at all.3 As it was 
shown in the previous chapter, renegotiation has an importance of its own. Besides 
performance or breach, it is another choice available to promisors in case of regret 
contingency. And, as already emphasised, it has a mixed effect on players' behaviour, an 
                                                 
1 Richard Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach’ (1988) 61 Southern 
California Law Review 629, 632-636; Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 362-364. 
2 Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach’. 
3 For the factors, among them asymmetric information, on which the likelihood of renegotiations depends, see 
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 314-316; William Rogerson, ‘Efficient Reliance and Damage 
Measures for Breach of Contract’ (1984) 15 The Rand Journal of Economics 39, 41. 
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effect which should be taken into account when designing efficient legal rules,4 especially 
considering that parties cannot consensually rule out subsequent contract modification.5 For 
this reason, the complications brought by renegotiation are also considered in the economic 
analysis of incentives induced by damages.  
Finally, I would like to point out that the model in this chapter relies on the assumptions 
commonly made in traditional microeconomic analysis: transaction costs are either zero, or 
prohibitively high; information is symmetric and parties are risk neutral (it is only Section J. 
below that admits that actors are often risk averse and discusses risk allocation). Enforcement 
costs are generally ignored, so the promisee is assumed to sue whenever damages are positive. 
The reader, however, should not hastily interpret this as a step back from the commitment to 
realism proclaimed in Chapter II. Let me remind that as early as the second chapter I noted 
that this thesis will not simply ignore traditional economic models that are necessary to 
identify the many incentive effects generated by damages as well as the trade-offs between 
incentives.6 This is precisely the purpose of the current chapter, which justifies the above-
mentioned assumptions. Having thrown light upon these issues, I will be able to open the 
window onto reality in a more informed way in the following chapters.  
The different effects induced by damages are elaborated below one by one,7 leading to the 
conclusion that no single damage measure is optimal in view of all of the isolated behavioural 
incentives. 
   
                                                 
4 On the importance of renegotiation, see Ian Ayres, ‘Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship’ (2003) 112 Yale 
Law Journal 881, 892-894; Scott and Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design’ 192-
195. 
5 In all three jurisdictions under comparison, courts do not enforce contractual clauses that prohibit contract 
modifications. For the US, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) § 311 Variation of a Duty to a 
Beneficiary, comment a; Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co. 122 NE 378, 381 (NY 1919); Zum-winkel v. 
Legget 345 SW2d 89, 93-94 (Mo 1961). UCC § 2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver. (2) permitted no-
oral-modification clauses but simultaneously subjected them to certain procedural and substantive requirements.  
For England, see Schebsman (Deceased) Ex p. Official Receiver, Re [1944] Ch 83 at 104. For Bulgaria, see Art. 
20a(2) Contracts Act. Even if such contractual clauses were enforceable, parties would always be able to 
circumvent them by dressing a modification of the initial contract as a new agreement.  
6 See supra the text accompanying footnote 57 in Section C. of Chapter II. 
7 The model of incentive effects created by damages largely follows Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 102-114. Still, 
the account herein identifies and discusses an additional effect of damages: the incentives they create with regard 
to making cooperative investment. See infra Section D. of this Chapter.  
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A. The decision to perform or breach the contract  
Assuming the promisor would choose to default if paying damages leaves him better off than 
performance, it is fairly intuitive that the higher the amount of damages a promisor has to pay 
upon breach, the greater his incentive to perform would be.8 Economic analysis, however, 
goes beyond this general intuition and identifies the remedy that incentivises a contracting 
party to perform when and only when it is efficient. If the promisor's costs are higher than the 
promisee's expected value from the transaction, it is more efficient to default. Calling off 
performance under these conditions is referred to in the literature as "efficient breach".9 To 
put it less formally, breach is efficient not when an increase of the promisor's costs (or 
decrease of the promisee's value) make the contract unprofitable for him, but when 
performance creates no surplus for both parties en masse.10 If costs and expected value had 
single, fixed valuations, parties would forgo contracting in the first place. But as they are 
stochastic variables whose valuations are realised after signing and shortly before 
performance of the contract, providing for a remedy which incentivises the promisor to 
perform or breach efficiently an already existing contract is particularly important.11   
As it was mentioned before, the decision to perform or breach is taken only after the 
uncertainty as to costs and expected value has been resolved. Since this is also the time when 
ex post readjustment makes sense,12 in the case when renegotiation is possible, whether the 
applicable remedy generates efficient incentives to perform or breach is not an issue at all. 
Renegotiation would lead to efficient performance irrespective of the remedy.13 If the latter 
induces performance when it is inefficient, the promisor would pay to the promisee up to her 
loss to be excused from performance. If the remedy induces the promisor to breach 
                                                 
8 Such an assumption implies that when making the decision to default, a promisor ignores the harm inflicted by 
breach on his reputation.   
9 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 102.  
10 Gerrit De Geest, ‘Specific Performance, Damages and Unforeseen Contingencies in the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference’ in Filomena Chirico and Pierre Larouche (eds), Economic analysis of the DCFR: the Work of the 
Economic Impact Group within CoPECL (Sellier European Law Publishers 2010) 124. 
11 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 102-103. 
12 Instead of assuming breach at the time of performance, the more recent economic models provide for a more 
refined timeline, which includes an anticipatory breach. See Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung, ‘Contract 
Damages and Cooperative Investments’ (1999) 30 The Rand Journal of Economics 84, 89, 97-98, footnote 26; 
Stremitzer 342-343. Renegotiation can take place before or after breach, whether it is anticipatory or not, but 
always after realisation of the cost and value of performance. In any case, the timing of renegotiation (before or 
after breach) does not change the analysis. Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 
97, footnote 26.  
13 Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach’ 632-636; Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 362-364; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 104. 
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inefficiently, the promisee would "bribe" the promisor to motivate him to perform. In this 
sense, functionally, renegotiation is an alternative means to ensure ex post efficient 
exchange.14 In the absence of renegotiation, however, the remedial rule is crucial with regard 
to inducing performance if and only if its value exceeds its cost. The remedy that creates this 
very incentive, given a fixed level of reliance, is expectation damages.15 
The explanation of this effect of expectation damages lies in the fact that they reflect the costs 
the breach inflicts on the promisee.16 Assuming the promisor knows the magnitude of these 
costs, to decide whether to perform or not, he has to weigh his savings in case of breach 
against both his own and his partner's losses. Thus, expectation damages incentivise the 
promisor to breach when the cost of performance to him exceeds the value of performance not 
only to him but also to the promisee. In other words, the promisor chooses to breach precisely 
when it is efficient to do so.17 Since neither reliance damages, nor restitution compensate fully 
the promisee for her lost benefit of the contract, both measures induce the promisor to breach 
more often than the efficient level.18 Only if the market strongly resembles a perfectly 
competitive one can reliance damages create efficient incentives for the promisor's 
performance as then they are practically equal to expectation damages.19 On the other hand, 
supracompensatory damages, such as disgorgement and punitive damages, motivate the 
promisor to perform more often than the efficient level.20  
The result about the expectation measure holds regardless of the realised valuations of cost 
and expected value, irrespective of which party is the breacher (the Seller or the Buyer), and 
regardless of the time of payment of the price (up-front or at the time of performance).21 
                                                 
14 Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 316-319. The given examples, in which one of the parties 
bribes the other, implicitly assume that renegotiation can take place only before breach. The conclusion about the 
role of costless renegotiation in ensuring efficient performance does not change if renegotiation can occur after 
breach. In this case, the promisor accounts for the expected return from negotiations when deciding whether to 
breach. Even if he breaches inefficiently, for strategic purposes, renegotiation again results in efficient trade. Che 
and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 89, 97-98, footnote 27. 
15 Steven Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ (1980) 11 Bell Journal of Economics 466, 478, 
485.  
16 Recall that expectation damages put the promisee in the position he would have been in had the contract been 
performed. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 78-81 in Section C.1. of  Chapter III. 
17 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 103; Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1463. 
18 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105. 
19 See supra the text accompanying footnote 135 in Section A.4. Spot contracts of Chapter IV; Cooter and 
Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1463.   
20 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105. 
21 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’; Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 349. 
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Under some conditions it is also valid where performance is not a binary yes/no decision.22 
Thus, in the case when actors sign a contract for some quantity of commodities,23 expectation 
damages incentivise the party who has the decision rights over the actual quantity that is 
eventually traded to choose the quantity that is optimal and breach efficiently with respect to 
the commodities that turn to be in excess of the optimal amount of trade.24 Compensating the 
other party for her expectation, the promisor receives whatever is left from the joint profit 
generated by the contract. He is the so-called "residual claimant of the joint surplus"; hence, 
he is motivated to choose only that part of the agreed quantity with respect to which the value 
of performance exceeds the cost.25 Also, under certain conditions (a Cadillac contract, 
payment made to the breaching party up-front and a broad duty to mitigate) expectation 
damages motivate the selfishly or cooperatively investing Seller to make an efficient decision 
when he chooses to breach by performing non-conformingly.26 However, having emphasised 
                                                 
22 Aaron Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein, ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’ (1996) 
86 The American Economic Review 478; Aaron Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient 
Investment under Expectation Damages’ (1996) 12 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 98, 111-114; 
Aaron Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ in Peter Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law, vol I (First edn, London: Macmillan Reference Limited 1998) 174. By contrast, in Shavell's model trade is 
discrete and the promisor either performs, or not. Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 470. 
Edlin, in fact, extends Shavell's result to situations in which performance is not a dichotomous decision.  
23 In the language of economists, where parties sign a contract for a quantity of commodities that is larger than 1 
unit, trade is not discrete but is better denoted by a continuous variable. Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 174. 
24 For the sake of clarity, a party can have unilateral decision rights with regard to the actual quantity that is 
eventually traded only if this quantity is smaller than the one agreed upon. With regard to a larger quantity, the 
parties will have to renegotiate, which is inconsistent with unilateral decision rights. Ibid. In order for the 
breacher to be able to unilaterally decide on the traded quantity, it is necessary that the contract be interpreted as 
divisible. For a definition of a divisible contract, see Restatement (Second) § 240 Part Performances as Agreed 
Equivalents. When the contract is divisible (i.e. comprising of corresponding pairs of part performances that can 
be properly regarded as agreed equivalents), the breacher's cancellation of some of the apportioned pairs does 
not affect the parties' obligations with respect to the remaining portion of the quantity due under the uncancelled 
pairs of part performances. Otherwise, if the contract is deemed entire, the non-breacher will be released of all 
her obligations and will be able to claim expectation damages not only with respect to the cancelled portion but 
with respect to the entire contracted quantity. In other words, the promisee will be able to hold up the breacher 
and insist on more than her expectation interest in order to perform only on the smaller optimal quantity. Ibid 
174-175; Edlin and Reichelstein, ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’ 487. The issue 
of divisibility does not arise when the contract provides for periodic performances over time since when the 
breacher cancels a portion of the agreed quantity, the non-breacher cannot escape performance on the quantities 
of the previous periods. In such case, for the breacher to have decision rights on the traded quantity, it is 
sufficient that he has the right to terminate the contract prematurely. Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 175; Edlin, 
‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’ 114, footnote 23. 
Note that this discussion of the termination right ignores the issue of the optimal timing of breach and focuses 
only on the issue of optimal quantity. Regarding the optimal timing of breach, see infra Section G. of this 
Chapter. 
25 Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’.  
26 This is another extension of Shavell's efficient breach result to cases of non-discrete trade. Edlin, ‘Cadillac 
contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’, 111-114; Edlin, ‘Breach 
Remedies’ 174; Stremitzer. In case the Seller invests cooperatively, an up-front payment is not necessary. Ibid 
346, footnote 13. 
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the broad applicability of the optimal perform-or-breach result generated by the expectation 
measure, it is also necessary to note its limitations.   
As they compel the breacher to internalise only his partner's losses, expectation damages 
incentivise the promisor to consider only the promisee's but not any third parties' change of 
position resulting from his breach. Arguing that it is antitrust, environmental or other fields of 
law that are concerned with such negative externalities, when analysing contract law, 
economics-minded scholars generally assume away costs that might be inflicted on third 
parties.27 I also follow most of the literature in this respect. In addition, expectation damages 
will create an efficient incentive to perform as well as the other incentives discussed below to 
the extent the contract can actually be enforced. If the promisor believes that there is a good 
chance for him to get away without paying, he will have an incentive to breach that from the 
perspective of efficiency is excessive.28 A promisor, in fact, may have a number of reasons to 
expect that he would not have to compensate the other party: courts sometimes make mistakes 
or they may be corrupt, bailiffs may be corrupt or incapable of enforcing courts' awards, the 
breacher may expect to go bankrupt or that the promisee would not sue. The distortion of 
incentives resulting from the uncertainty of enforcement may be corrected by increasing the 
size of damage awards in the cases actually resolved by courts. This has been used as an 
argument in favour of supracompensatory, in particular punitive, damages. Without 
elaborating on the problems with this rationale,29 it serves to recall once again that punitive 
damages are awarded very rarely in contract, if at all.30 Last but not least, to generate the said 
effect, expectation damages must be calculated perfectly. Potentially the expectation measure 
permits judges to hold liable all contract breachers and to save themselves the inquiry about 
the efficiency of any particular default. Yet, they need to be able to measure correctly the 
promisee's value from performance.31 Courts, on the other hand, are widely believed to have 
the propensity to award lower than perfect expectation damages. Various reasons are pointed 
                                                 
27 Schwartz and Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 546. 
28 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 103. 
29 On one hand, the multiplier that optimises the perform-or-breach decision may not optimise the other 
decisions affected by damages. On the other hand, sometimes the optimal multiplier will lead to decreasing, not 
increasing the damage awards. See Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach’ 664-665. 
30 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 121-122. As for punitive damages, see supra footnote 8 of Chapter III. 
31 Ibid 103; Craswell, ‘Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises’ 22-23. 
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at: the non-breacher's losses may be difficult to verify,32 awards are limited to damages that 
are foreseeable at the time of signing the agreement,33 damages often do not reflect adequately 
the costs that the delay causes to the non-breacher; the non-breacher, even if successful in 
court, bears his own litigation costs.34 If courts, however, are likely to err downwards in 
awarding expectation damages, promisors will not have a strong enough incentive to 
perform.35  
Besides affecting the very decision of whether to perform or breach a contract, damages also 
influence the parties' decisions that are directed at reducing the probability of harm-inflicting 
breach: the decision to take precautions and to select a contractual partner. In the following 
section I turn to the precaution decision of the party who commits breach.36 
B. The breaching party's decision to take precautions 
In the literature the term "precautions" is used to denote expenses incurred to reduce the 
likelihood of breach or the scale of damages that follow from it.37 Being expenses, economists 
think of them as investments38 while lawyers see them as a species of reliance. When made by 
the promisor, they fall into the category Fuller and Perdue refer to as "essential reliance".39 In 
other words, these are expenditures incurred towards the performance of the promisor's own 
obligations, which entail concrete measures intended to prevent breach. In the case of a 
construction contract, the constructor, for example, could order materials early in the project 
to avoid price increases that would raise his costs and incentivise him to default. Or he could 
                                                 
32 On verification difficulties, see supra the text accompanying footnote 162-171 in Section A.4. Long-term 
contracts of Chapter IV. 
33 On this point see infra Section E. of this Chapter. 
34 This is the general rule in the US where the party prevailing in litigation still bears his own attorney fees and 
major litigation expenses. The losing party is charged only with some small litigation cost items such as charges 
for service of papers. Dobbs 276. In contrast, in England and Bulgaria the party losing the lawsuit bears all 
litigation costs. Art. 78(1) Code of Civil Procedure. As to the reasons for courts' imperfect assessment of 
damages, see Steven Shavell, ‘Why Breach of Contract May Not be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of 
Contracts’ in Omri-Ben Shashar and Ariel Porat (eds), Fault in American Contract Law (First edn, New York: 
Cambridge Univesity Press 2010) 263.  
35 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 103. 
36 For the precaution decisions of the non-breaching party, see infra Sections C. and E. of this Chapter. For the 
selection decision, see infra Section H.1. of this Chapter. 
37 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3. 
38 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 104. 
39 Fuller and Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ 78. See also supra the text accompanying 
footnote 94 in Section C.2. of Chapter III. Eisenberg and McDonnell refer to the same category of expenses as 
"necessary reliance". See Melvin Eisenberg and Brett McDonnell, ‘Expectation Damages and the Theory of 
Overreliance’ (2002) 54 Hastongs Law Journal 1335, 1342-1344. 
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hire additional workers to avoid any undesirable change in circumstances (such as many 
absentees because of illness) that would lead to a delay in the project and eventually cause 
him to breach. Precautions can also be taken by Buyers. A buyer who has purchased 
machinery that calls for concrete foundations must make the necessary expenses to lay the 
foundation in order to be able to take delivery.40 In any case, the precautionary steps taken by 
the breaching party increase the chances that the surplus of the contract will materialise.41 
The reasoning evolves similarly to that in relation to the perform-or-breach decision. The 
higher the breacher's liability, the greater his incentive to increase the probability of himself 
performing. The promisor, however, decides how much to spend on precautions before the 
uncertainty as to the stochastic variables of cost and value has resolved. In this sense it is 
important that the law prescribes a remedy that incentivises the breaching party to take an 
efficient decision with regard to precautions, a decision that accounts for the possibility that 
under some realised valuations of cost and value, it will be more efficient to breach. A given 
precautionary measure is optimal if the additional expenses the potential breacher would 
make by taking it are less than the increase in the non-breacher's expected revenue caused by 
the higher probability of performance.42 Since expectation damages (if calculated accurately) 
make the breaching party compensate the promisee for all her losses resulting from breach, 
they compel the breacher to internalise the costs of his failure and to take efficient steps 
against possible obstacles to completion of the contract. Consequently, expectation damages 
incentivise the breacher to take efficient precautions.43 Thus, it is expectation damages that 
can optimise both the promisor's decision to choose between performance and breach and his 
decision to make expenses on precautions.44  
Unless equal to expectation damages, reliance damages, which in principle do not reflect the 
aggrieved party's benefit of the contract, enable the breacher to externalise some of the costs 
of his breach and respectively give him the incentive to take precautions that are insufficient 
relative to the efficient level. This is also valid for restitution as well as for any remedy that is 
                                                 
40 The example is borrowed from Eisenberg and McDonnell, ‘Expectation Damages and the Theory of 
Overreliance’ 1342. 
41 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 11, Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages 
for Breach of Contract’ 1464. 
42 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’13, 34; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 
104. 
43 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 104-105; Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1464. 
44 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 485-486; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105. 
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systematically less than expectation damages.45 As explained above, under these remedies, the 
promisor tends to breach more often than it is efficient; consequently, he does not get the full 
return on his investment in performing, so his incentive is to spend less on costly precautions 
than what would be optimal.46 Conversely, supracompensatory damages induce the promisor 
to make excessive efforts to prevent breach.47 
To put it another way, expectation damages incentivise the breaching party to take efficient 
precautions because they reveal to him the costs his default imposes on the non-breacher.48 
This incentive-generating function of theirs, however, rests on the assumption of perfectly 
informed courts and promisors. It implies that courts are able to calculate the promisee's 
expected gain from performance and promisors are able to measure the damages they will be 
liable for. Under these conditions, expectation damages are crucial for the efficiency of the 
promisor's precaution decision. This is not the case, though, when it is not the promisor but 
the promisee that is perfectly informed. If before signing the contract promisees can observe 
the level of precautions taken by a promisor, the market could induce him to take optimal 
precautions since otherwise he would lose business to competitors that are more careful about 
reducing the chances for breach.49 Even if promisors choose precautionary measures only 
after contracting, in a world of perfect promisee's information breachers will take efficient 
precaution decisions regardless of the damage measure. This assumption of perfect 
information, however, is very strong as it requires that promisees know not only the average 
distribution of risks in the market. It is not even sufficient that promisees know the risks 
created by any particular promisor; they must also be able to accurately assess the difference 
between the risk associated with the level of precautions taken by this same promisor and the 
risk associated with other promisors.50 Obviously, these are very difficult-to-satisfy 
information requirements; yet, mechanisms that effectively make non-breachers more 
informed could optimise the precaution decision. For example, if promisees can observe 
promisors' reputation for taking precautions, a potential breacher could have efficient 
incentives to prevent default. After all, a good reputation would allow him to negotiate higher 
                                                 
45 Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1464; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105. 
46 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’, 486-487. 
47 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105; Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach’ 647. 
48 Lewis Kornhauser, ‘Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 
691, 701. 
49 Ibid 694; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105.  
50 Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach’ 653-655. 
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prices on his goods/services.51 Thus, where non-breaching parties are informed shoppers, 
whether due to a legal or non-legal institution, a remedy that is systematically less than 
expectation damages might do.52 
Often, however, it is not only the promisor who can take precautions against breach. 
Promisees are also able to take steps directed at reducing the harm from the promisor's 
default. In Sections C., E. and F. below I consider the various forms of precaution that can be 
taken by the promisee. To understand better how damages affect the non-breacher's incentives 
to take precautions, it is worth starting from the promisee's decision to rely on the contract by 
investing selfishly in it.  
C. The non-breaching party's decision to make selfish investment in reliance 
The more precautions the promisor takes against breach, the more he relies on the contract. In 
contrast, for the promisee taking precautions means less (and not more) reliance.53 The reason 
for this asymmetry lies in the fundamentally different nature of the non-breacher's reliance. 
The latter is not necessitated by the promisee's contractual commitment; rather it is 
discretionary and often occurs in relation to collateral contracts, thus constituting what Fuller 
and Perdue call "incidental reliance".54 In addition, it does not simply enhance the likelihood 
that the promisee enjoys the benefit from the contract, it enhances this benefit. By relying on 
the contract, the non-breaching party increases the value of performance to himself; yet, in 
this way he also adds to the damages he would suffer in case of breach. From this perspective, 
less reliance on the promisee's side actually represents a precautionary measure that decreases 
the losses he would possibly bear.55  
Most often, reliance on the contract has (at least) some relation specific element to it.56 
Economic scholars term the promisee's reliance expenditures with the above-mentioned 
                                                 
51 Kornhauser; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105. 
52 Craswell, ‘Against Fuller and Perdue’ 16. 
53 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3, 11. 
54 See supra the text accompanying footnote 94 in Section C.2. of Chapter III. Note that the advance purchase of 
a stock of goods for a shop under construction, given as an example of selfish investment (see infra the text 
accompanying footnote 57 in Section C. of this Chapter) is also given as an example of "incidental reliance" (see 
supra the text accompanying footnote 95 in Section C.2. of Chapter III). See also infra the text accompanying 
footnote 68 in Section C. of this Chapter. 
55 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3, 11; Cooter and Eisenberg, 
‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1465.  
56 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 105. See also supra Section A.2. Specific investments of Chapter IV. 
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characteristics as a selfish specific investment, i.e. specific investment the benefit from which 
accrues to the investing party. An investment is selfish when it is made by a Buyer to increase 
the value he places on the delivered good or service (e.g. purchase of a stock of goods and 
hiring employees for a shop under construction so that it can open as soon as the works are 
over) or by a Seller to decrease his cost (e.g. purchase of a specialised machine).57 Affecting 
these variables, selfish specific investment actually augments the contractual surplus, which is 
the reason to single it out from the other forms of non-breacher's reliance on the contract.58 
Considering that the promisee's investment is not contractible and is made under conditions of 
uncertainty,59 the issue of interest is which legal remedy incentivises such desirable selfish 
reliance, yet only to the extent it is profitable given the probability of breach.  
As it was shown in the previous chapter, in the presence of specific investment the possibility 
of renegotiation becomes extremely important. Though renegotiation is costly and does not 
necessarily result in an efficient outcome, economic models consider the effect of damages on 
the non-breaching party's reliance decision in the two extremes: when renegotiation is costless 
and when it is impossible due to prohibitively high costs. The costless renegotiation case has 
two repercussions on the analysis. First, since at zero transaction costs the parties can 
renegotiate to an ex post efficient trade irrespective of the legal remedy, economists can focus 
solely on the non-breacher's reliance decision. Thus, the comparison of the efficiency of the 
different remedies turns only on their effect on the promisee's incentive to rely ex ante.60 
Second, the non-breacher's decision on the optimal level of investment depends on the 
outcome he expects from the renegotiations where his anticipations are determined by an 
exogenously specified parameter, representing his bargaining power.61 On the other hand, the 
                                                 
57 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 85; Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative 
Investments and the Value of Contracting’ 126. 
58 For another form of non-breacher's reliance on the contract, see infra Section E. of this Chapter. 
59 Let me remind that non-contractible specific investments and high uncertainty as to the efficiency of exchange 
are typical features of long-term contracts. See supra Section A.2. of Chapter IV. Sure enough, the clear 
separation between the ex ante reliance decision and the ex post resolution of uncertainty in economic models 
involves a considerable degree of simplification. In the real world, both reliance and resolution of uncertainty 
often occur continuously, so events are not so sharply separated from each other. Yet, such arrangement of the 
timeline allows investigation of the problem of generating incentives to invest in an environment dominated by 
uncertainty, which is fairly common. Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 470, footnote 16. 
60 Rogerson 41; Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 175; Ayres, ‘Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship’ 893-894. 
61 Sometimes the parameter is also termed patience, confidence or negotiating/bargaining strength. In the case 
where renegotiations do not occur, this parameter is in fact set to zero. Rogerson 41. Economic models also 
assume that parties share the entire surplus from bargaining, i.e. they do not commit to make payments to a third 
party to avoid renegotiation. For more details on such a three party scheme intended to bar renegotiation, see 
Schwartz and Watson, ‘The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting’ 24-25. This assumption is realistic 
because being an alternative to no-modification clauses, such three party schemes are also unenforceable.  
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case where ex post negotiations do not take place requires that the effects of the damage rule 
on both the promisor's perform-or-breach decision and the promisee's reliance decision be 
taken into account. This case corresponds to a scenario in which the parties submit their 
contractual dispute to be resolved by court. The court decisions I analyse in the following 
chapters in fact constitute pieces of evidence of situations in which renegotiation failed or did 
not occur at all. 
In case of breach the promisee will lose the expected return on her selfish investment. 
Therefore, to be efficient, the promisee's reliance should reflect the fact that in some states of 
the world it will be efficient for the promisor not to perform. Thus, a promisee should rely 
until the consequent marginal increase in revenue, discounted by the objective probability of 
the promisor performing as agreed, equals the marginal cost of reliance, discounted by the 
objective probability of breach. In other words, the more certain the other party's performance 
is, the higher the efficient amount of the non-breacher's reliance expenditures will be. And 
vice versa, the more likely the other party's is to breach, the lower the efficient level of the 
non-breacher's selfish investment in reliance will be.62 
Expectation damages (again if perfectly calculated) incentivise the non-breacher to rely 
excessively on the contract. Giving the promisee her expectancy, they practically fully insure 
her investment against the contingencies in which it will not pay off because of the promisor's 
breach. Whether performance or breach, the promisee always receives the expected benefit of 
her reliance: in the first case -– through the increased value of the realised exchange, in the 
second case – through the damage compensation. Naturally then the promisee perceives the 
profit increase resulting from her reliance as certain and has an incentive to rely beyond the 
optimal level.63 Under reliance damages the non-breacher's overreliance is even higher than 
under the expectation measure. Indeed, the promisee does not realise the expected gain from 
her selfish investment, but being compensated for her investment expenditures, she also does 
not realise a loss. As a result, she underestimates the risk of promisor's breach and again relies 
too heavily. This explains the excessive incentive to rely given to the non-breaching party but 
does not explain why reliance damages perform worse than the expectation measure. 
                                                 
62 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 471-472; Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: 
The Model of Precaution’ 13-14, 16-17; Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1465-1466. 
63 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 472, 478; Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: 
The Model of Precaution’ 18; Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1466; Edlin, ‘Breach 
Remedies’ 175; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 106. 
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Receiving in the event of breach only the expenses she made in reliance, the promisee is in 
fact worse off than under the full insurance provided by expectation damages. Hence, the 
promisee prefers performance and strives to make it more likely through more reliance as this 
automatically increases the amount of damages she will be entitled to in case of the promisor's 
default.64 Thus, ensuring high protection to the non-breacher, the expectation measure of 
damages generates moral hazard; yet, ironically, the less protective reliance damages distort 
the promisee's reliance incentive to an even greater extent. 
These gloomy results about expectation and reliance damages and their effect on the non-
breacher's decision to invest selfishly in reliance hold regardless of whether the Seller and the 
Buyer are, respectively, the breacher and the relying party or vice versa65 as well as regardless 
of whether the probability of performance is exogenous or endogenous.66 The results also do 
not change depending on the lack or presence of renegotiations or on the bargaining power of 
the relying party.67 Still, the overreliance problem is not as ubiquitous as it seems at first 
glance.  
First, it does not concern promisee's reliance which is not in any way specific to the particular 
transaction. When the promisee's investment retains its (or almost all of its) value outside the 
parties' contract, expectation damages and even no damages (i.e. no enforceable contract) at 
all do not generate inefficient incentives to rely. Thus, in the construction contract example, 
given above,68 if the client can resell all the stock purchased in advance at the acquisition 
price and with very few transaction costs, his choice to buy it before the end of the 
construction process has been efficient. The non-breacher's investment is also not wasted 
when upon default she can easily find equally good substitute performance on the market and, 
if time is of the essence, obtain it on time. In this sense, the promisee's decision to rely is not 
distorted significantly in the case of spot contracts69 and is not distorted at all in the case of 
                                                 
64 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 479-480; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 106.  
65 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 475; Rogerson 51. 
66 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 106. 
67 Rogerson 41, 47, 49. 
68 See supra the text accompanying footnote 57 in Section C. of this Chapter. 
69 For the definition of spot contracts, see supra the text accompanying footnotes 20-24 in Section A.1. of 
Chapter IV. 
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their most salient representative: the consumer contract for sale of goods where the relying 
party is the buyer.70 
Second, the overreliance problem by no means concerns all types of promisee's specific 
reliance. Excessive incentives to rely are not induced in the cases of pure cooperative specific 
investment (i.e. investment which confers benefits on the investor's counterparty)71 and hybrid 
specific investment, where the underlying cooperative elements are relatively more important. 
From this perspective, the choice of the efficient damage measure depends not only on the 
presence or absence of promisee's investment but also on the kind of specific investment 
made.72  
Third, the overreliance problem is not especially prominent when it is the Seller who is the 
non-breaching promisee. Though Sellers' reliance can also be of the selfish-investment type (a 
Seller may spend time and money on R&D to lower his production cost), it usually represents 
expenditure incurred in preparing to perform or in rendering performance, thus constituting 
precaution in the sense of the previous Section B. Such expenditure cannot be decreased 
significantly since its reduction leads to the Seller's own breach and, consequently, it remains 
out of the ambit of overreliance. Even the Seller's decision about when to begin performance, 
which in some respects resembles the kind of selfish reliance discussed here, in fact associates 
more closely with the preventative actions considered before. While the start of performance 
is within the Seller's discretion and, if delayed, decreases the costs the Seller makes before 
Buyer's breach (features typical of the selfish-investment decision), a decision on timing also 
accounts for the obstacles to performance and normally entails its early beginning to increase 
the likelihood of timely completion (features typical of precautionary measures). Upon low 
probability of material breach,73 an early, breach-preventative beginning is in fact efficient 
since in this way the Seller gains from less difficult and, hence, more likely performance: 
                                                 
70 Rogerson 42, footnote 42; William Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Contract Remedies (1980); Eisenberg 
and McDonnell, ‘Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance’ 1353; Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages 
for Breach of Contract’ 1466. 
71 For the incentives induced by damages with regard to cooperative specific investment, see infra Section D. of 
this Chapter. 
72 Hybrid specific investments are neither purely selfish, nor purely cooperative but confer benefits on both 
parties. An example is the investment made by a producer in consulting its major retail customers regarding the 
organisation of their dairy cases where the producer's recommendations led to a substantial rise in the retailers' 
sales as well as in the producer's sales to the retailers. Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the Value 
of Contracting’ 126-127. 
73 This is usually the case in advanced economies like the three jurisdictions under comparison. Eisenberg and 
McDonnell, ‘Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance’ 1346. 
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gains which in general by far exceed the surplus increase generated by the saving of 
performance costs that will go to waste in the event of Buyer's breach. Since the Seller's 
timing decision has a stronger breach-reducing than cost-lowering marginal effect, its 
precautionary element dominates its selfish-investment nuance. From this perspective, the 
overreliance incentive does not relate to the Seller's choice of when to begin performance. In 
addition, the domain of overreliance ends where the Buyer's breach ceases to be a statistical 
probability. It makes no sense to speak of Seller's motivation to overinvest in lowering 
performance cost when the Seller is permitted to withhold performance altogether and initiate 
a suit for breach of contract. This is the case when the concrete circumstances reveal a risk of 
Buyer's default and the Seller is not provided with due assurance upon his request.74 Having 
Bearing in mind all of the above, it would not be wrong to say that it is usually Buyers that 
are the promisees who rely too strongly.75 
Despite these limitations, the overreliance problem remains a concern since there is not a 
single damage measure that simultaneously optimises the promisor's breach and precaution 
decisions and the promisee's decision to invest selfishly in reliance.76 In the absence of 
renegotiation in which the promisee could be held up, her reliance can be optimised if the 
promisor is not liable for breach of contract at all.77 In this case the non-breacher is 
incentivised to rely efficiently (given the probability of breach) because she bears all the costs 
of her selfish investment in the event of default. Presumably, if there is no enforceable 
contract, the parties will agree on payment of the price only at performance to make sure the 
promisor is not tempted to withhold both performance and repayment of the money given in 
advance. Yet, with no damages due upon breach, even this arrangement leaves the promisor's 
incentive to perform less than optimal. For this reason, restitution, under which in case of 
breach the promisor again loses only the contract price, achieves identical results with respect 
to the levels of breach and reliance.78 Expectation damages, on the other hand, create an 
                                                 
74 For the US, see UCC § 2-609. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance. (1); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 251 When a Failure to Give Assurance May Be Treated as a Repudiation and § 252 Effect of 
Insolvency. For Bulgaria, see Art. 90(2) Contracts Act. 
75 Eisenberg and McDonnell, ‘Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance’ 1344-1346, 1348-1350; 
Cooter and Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1466. 
76 Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 483. 
77 Economic scholars translate the lack of promisor's liability as a no-damage measure which they consider 
employed in the cases in which the contract is not enforceable in the particular jurisdiction, or in which 
enforcement is impractical due to high enforcement costs or a judgment-proof defendant. See e.g. Ibid 471.  
78 Ibid 480-481. Under reliance damages, restitution and no damages the price has not only a distributive, but 
also a surplus-augmenting effect. A higher price incentivises the promisor to breach less often. For this reason, 
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optimal perform-or-breach incentive (given reliance)79 but induce too much selfish investment 
by the promisee. In this sense, when one party decides about breach and the other party 
decides about selfish reliance, expectation damages and no damages/restitution generate 
symmetrically opposite incentives. This constitutes a manifestation of the so-called "paradox 
of compensation" in contract. The promisor's liability for damages that force him to fully 
internalise the promisee's losses from breach allows the promisee to externalise the costs of 
her reliance. No liability beyond return of the price paid up-front makes the promisee 
internalise the downside of her selfish investment but lets the promisor externalise the costs of 
his insufficient precautions against breach. Either possibilities prevent parties from 
internalising their own costs; hence, the opposite incentives regarding breach and selfish 
reliance. The same problem of not fully internalising one's own costs arises with 
compensation to some intermediate level, such as reliance damages, which optimise neither 
the promisor's breach-or-perform decision, nor the promisee's reliance decision.80  
One way out of this paradox is to optimise the incentives of one of the parties by some means, 
other than damages, and then set the compensation at the damage measure which provides 
efficient incentives to the other party. Thus, if the breacher can be given efficient motivation 
by way of reputation effects, no damages, in the absence of renegotiation, could turn out to be 
the efficient choice.81 Another solution, if renegotiation is ruled out, is to fix the amount of 
compensation so that it does not depend on the non-breacher's reliance. Unable to increase her 
damages, the promisee will bear the cost of her selfish investment over a certain level. As a 
result, the very compensation she receives in the event of default will not incentivise her to 
boost her expectancy beyond the fixed monetary amount; yet, she will still be induced to 
invest until her benefit from the contract becomes equal to the set lump sum. Such a constant 
damage measure, whose value is not affected by the non-breacher's reliance, is liquidated 
damages. Once they are adjusted to equal the value that performance has to the promisee if 
                                                                                                                                                        
the promisee may be willing to agree on a higher price, especially if the contract is fairly profitable for him. Yet, 
under these damage measures, the promisee will never be willing to pay a price that is high enough to induce the 
promisor to breach only if it is efficient. On this effect of the contract price, see ibid 479-480, footnote 37, 481, 
footnote 39. 
79 For expectation damages incentivising the promisor to make an efficient choice between performance and 
breach, see supra Section A. of this Chapter. 
80 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3-5, 11-14; Cooter and Ulen, Law 
and Economics 331-334. 
81 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 107. Alternatively, previously acquired reputation for making efficient reliance 
choices could also motivate the non-breacher to invest efficiently, so in the particular context expectation 
damages, having the ability to ensure efficient breach, might be the optimal damage measure. Ibid 108. 
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she invested efficiently, both parties can be given optimal incentives. The promisor will take 
efficient precautions to avoid breach and breach only if it is efficient because he has to pay the 
agreed damages; the promisee will rely efficiently because she bears the actual harm beyond 
the stipulated damages.82 
The paradoxical opposition of incentives generated by the full compensation/no compensation 
dichotomy, however, disappears if renegotiation is possible. Indeed, as already noted, in the 
presence of renegotiation, expectation (as well as reliance) damages induce overreliance; yet, 
the lack of liability when the promised exchange does not take place again distorts the 
promisee's incentives. Where there is no enforceable contract and renegotiation is not ruled 
out, the threat of holdup causes the party who makes the specific investment to underrely.83 
Nevertheless, if parties design their contract appropriately, economic scholars maintain, they 
can avoid both overreliance and underreliance as well as provide efficient incentives to both 
the promisor and the promisee. To the extent that contractual terms are strictly enforced by 
courts, two fixed-price contractual schemes are suggested to achieve first best even though the 
investment is non-contractible. Both do not specify the renegotiation process and are enforced 
with standard breach remedies.  
The first contractual scheme seeks to balance the risk of moral hazard, generated by damages, 
and the risk of hold-up by means of the commodity quantity. As already explained, when the 
quantity that is efficient to trade is smaller than the one provided by the contract and the 
breacher can unilaterally, without any renegotiation, decide on the output that is eventually 
traded, expectation damages incentivise him to choose exactly the quantity that is optimal and  
breach on the remainder.84 Expectation damages, however, subsidy the non-breacher as they 
insure her for all the benefit created by her selfish investment, even for the one with respect to 
the quantity that was not efficient to trade. This so-called "breach subsidy" incentivises 
                                                 
82 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 14-15, 18-19; Robert Cooter and 
Melvin Eisenberg, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1432 1467; Cooter and 
Ulen, Law and Economics 335-336; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 107.  
83 To the extent the promisee does not have any renegotiation strength, he may not rely at all. With the rise of his 
belief that upon renegotiation he may extract a portion of the additional surplus, his level of reliance increases 
but becomes efficient only if he has all the bargaining power and thinks that his partner will not be able to 
appropriate any of the quasi-rents. Rogerson, ‘Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ 
41, 46-47. For more detailed explanation of Williamsonian hold-up, see supra Section A.2. Specific investments. 
84 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 23-25 in Section A. of this Chapter. Edlin and Reichelstein, 
‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’, 487; Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 176.  
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overinvestment.85 On the other hand, when the efficient quantity is higher than the one 
provided by the contract, the parties have to renegotiate to increase trade. Adjusting the 
quantity, they also bargain to divide the extra surplus of which the breacher captures a certain 
share, thus expropriating a part of the value generated by the non-breacher's reliance. In other 
words, the breacher levies a "hold-up tax" on his counterparty's increased return, inducing the 
promisee to underrely. From this perspective, the overreliance outcome is not inherent to 
expectation damages (the legal remedy in both scenarios) but results from the constructed 
economic models in which the efficient quantity was never higher than the one agreed upon.86 
If parties contract for the efficient quantity, expectation damages will not induce overreliance. 
Rather the breach subsidy will offset the holdup tax and the non-breacher will be given 
incentives to make efficient selfish investment.87 That is why, the argument goes, when the 
Buyer wants some quantity of commodities, the parties should create the possibility for 
holdup by agreeing on a smaller quantity that will motivate efficient reliance. If the Seller 
performs, the parties can strike a spot contract for the difference between the quantity desired 
by the Buyer and the initially agreed upon intermediate quantity. Of course, if the Buyer 
wants just one unit, a contract for a fraction of this unit will not be enforceable, but even then 
parties can agree that the unit should be delivered in some contingencies and not in others. 
Then the possibility for holdup exists in the contingencies, in which, though it is efficient for 
the exchange to occur, the Buyer has no obligation to accept delivery.88     
However, where renegotiation is possible, expectation damages can incentivise the promisee 
to make efficient selfish investment (provided the contract requires the optimal quantity of 
trade) if the promisee is the only relying party. If both the breacher and the non-breacher 
invest selfishly, expectation damages create asymmetric reliance incentives for parties. While 
they give the promisee her full profit, even the part of it generated by her inefficient reliance, 
                                                 
85 Edlin's breach-subsidy result in fact extends Shavell's and Rogerson's results about the effect of expectation 
damages on selfish reliance to situations where trade is not discrete but continuous. Edlin and Reichelstein, 
‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’ 488. 
86 Indeed, both Shavell's and Rogerson's models provide for discrete trade where the agreed quantity is one unit 
and it is never efficient to trade a higher quantity. See Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’; 
Rogerson, ‘Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’.  
87 The result holds for a wide class of sharing rules, referred to as monotonic, i.e. a rule which ensures that each 
party's share of the renegotiation surplus is increasing in the size of the surplus. Where the sharing rule is a 
constant, the efficient quantity decreases as the investor's bargaining power increases. Edlin and Reichelstein, 
‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’. See also Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 176. 
88 Whether the contingencies in which there is obligation to trade are really the contingencies in which trade is 
efficient is irrelevant. Rather it is important that the probability of their realisation equals that of trading the 
optimal quantity. Edlin and Reichelstein, ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’ 489-
490, 494-495; Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 176; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 107. 
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the promisor is left with the residual from trade and thus with the optimal return from his 
selfish investment. Therefore, to optimise the reliance incentives of both parties, the contract 
should be designed to create a possibility for a holdup of the promisee (which, as explained 
before, requires agreement on an intermediate quantity) and for breach subsidy of the 
promisor (which requires very high quantity that can be adjusted downwards when this is 
efficient). Thus, there is simply not one single contractual quantity that equalises the breach 
subsidy and the holdup tax for each of the parties. For this reason, where investment is 
bilateral, expectation damages fail in inducing efficient reliance incentives to both the 
breacher and the non-breacher.89 Still, as the breacher, unlike the promisee, invests efficiently, 
the second contractual design that eliminates overreliance as well as underreliance is based on 
the idea of having the same party make the decisions to invest selfishly and to breach.90  
Three instruments are used to generate efficient selfish investment in this contractual scheme. 
First, the parties should agree on a price such that it induces the investing party to breach: if 
the party who makes selfish investment is the Seller, the price should be below marginal cost; 
if this is the Buyer, it should be over marginal value. Second, to motivate the investing party 
to agree to such an unfavourable price, the non-investing party should sink a big up-front 
payment to the investor.91 These two mechanisms do away with the relying party's incentive 
to overinvest.92 Third, to eradicate the possibility of hold-up in a potential renegotiation and 
thus the investor's propensity to underinvest, the parties should sign a 'Cadillac contract', i.e. a 
contract for a very high quality or quantity. Such contracts eliminate the contingencies in 
which it will be efficient to trade commodities of higher quantity or quality and, consequently, 
                                                 
89 Edlin and Reichelstein, ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment’ 491-492; Edlin, 
‘Breach Remedies’ 176. 
90 Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’. 
91 An up-front payment may constitute not only a monetary transfer but also a waiver of a large amount which is 
due otherwise or the signing of another profitable contract. It is defined as anything valuable delivered at the 
time of contracting, other than the promise for payment of the contract price. Ibid 102. Note that unlike the up-
front payment considered by Shavell (see Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’), this is an up-
front payment to the investing rather than the non-investing party. Also central to the model is the assumption 
that the non-investor who breaches cannot sue to receive back the up-front payment (whether on the ground that 
the investor will be unjustly enriched or on the ground that the up-front payment constitutes a disguised illegal 
penalty). Otherwise, the relying party may not get the surplus as the non-investor will himself try to net it by 
breaching earlier. Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation 
Damages’ 105-106, footnote 11, 109; Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 177. 
92 In other words, the claim is that an up-front payment is needed not only to protect the investing party from 
being held up where enforcement of the contract in court is not viable (because of prohibitively high costs or 
because of the defendant's insolvency) but also to eliminate the excessive investment incentive where 
enforcement is costless and the defendant will not be able to avoid payment. Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-
Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’ 99, footnote 1.  
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the need for renegotiation that will entail a hold-up tax.93 If this contractual design is 
implemented, expectation damages will induce efficient selfish investment provided that only 
one of the parties relies and that courts come up with "unbiased estimates of damages".94 The 
latter qualification in fact lowers somewhat the informational requirements to expectation 
damages (in the case of discrete trade) and posits that it is more important not to bias damages 
(e.g. by a priori eliminating awards that are only tentative and approximate) than to calculate 
them absolutely accurately. Efficient selfish reliance is generated even where trade is not 
discrete and investment choices are multidimensional if the law requires the Buyer to accept 
partial or inferior performance (when the breacher-investor is the Seller) and gives the Buyer 
a right to terminate the contract prematurely (when the breacher-investor is the Buyer).95 In 
other words, in case selfish investment is unilateral, parties can endogenously determine the 
investor as the party who is likely to breach and use expectation damages to optimise both his 
ex ante and ex post incentives. Indeed, expectation damages will not induce the same first-
best result with respect to the non-breacher's incentives but if she does not make significant 
unverifiable investments, this is not of much importance.96 
Besides parties stipulating a constant damage measure in their contract or adopting an 
appropriate contractual design, courts can also incentivise efficient reliance by restraining the 
promisee's recovery of expectation or reliance damages on the basis of selfish investment that 
was optimal. Courts can apply such restrained damage measures97 by imputing the 
requirements of efficiency into the standards of reasonableness or foreseeability. If they 
                                                 
93 Where trade is discrete, a contract to exchange one unit is a Cadillac contract. Ibid 99, 102, 105, 113-114. 
94 Ibid 99, 114-115, 117. 
95 Multidimensional investment choices entail a propensity to spend on overly specific assets rather than assets 
with higher levels of generality. For more details, see Aaron Edlin, ‘Aspects of the Efficient Recovery of Fixed 
Costs: A Collection of Essays’ (Stanford University 1993). Expectation damages eradicate this propensity, too, if 
combined with the suggested contractual design and particularities of the applicable law. In contrast, expectation 
damages, coupled with the contractual design that stakes on the choice of optimal quantity, fail to induce 
efficient reliance where investment is multidimensional. Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: 
Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’ 108-109, 111, footnote 20. The Buyer's broad duty to mitigate 
and his right to terminate prematurely, which the legal system should incorporate, are both intended to vest the 
investor with the unilateral decision to breach, thus eliminating the possibility for renegotiation, holdup and, 
consequently, under-reliance. Again, instead of law allocating the right to premature termination to the Buyer 
(when the breacher-investor is the Seller), courts could interpret the contract as divisible. Ibid 111-114, footnote 
23. The need for a broad duty to mitigate and for a right to terminate prematurely, however, implies that where 
trade is not discrete and investment is multidimensional, it is relevant whether the Buyer or the Seller is the 
investing party. Ibid 104, footnote 8. 
96 Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’ 116. 
97 The designation "restrained damage measure" is used by Craswell in Richard Craswell, ‘Performance, 
Reliance and One-Sided Information’ (1989) 18 The Journal of Legal Studies 365. Craswell attributes it to 
Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 16, footnote 36. 
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compensate only "reasonable"98 or "foreseeable"99 reliance, interpreting it as reliance up to the 
optimal level, they can render the awards of expectation or reliance damages independent 
from the promisee's actual level of selfish investment, much like parties can do so by agreeing 
on the constant liquidated damages. The non-breacher will then be forced to bear the costs of 
any selfish reliance going beyond the maximum measure set through the criteria of 
reasonability or foreseeability. This, of course, requires that courts be able to assess the 
efficiency of the promisee's reliance and to verify the factors that establish it as optimal or 
not.100 
Having clarified the effect of damages on the non-breacher's selfish investment, I now turn to 
another kind of investment decision: the decision to make cooperative investment. It may 
seem inelegant that having once moved to the promisee's decisions, I embark on a choice that 
(as will be discussed below) can be either a promisor’s, or promisee’s. Yet, there is no better 
time to address this decision, I think. Chronologically, cooperative investment was 
differentiated later than its selfish counterpart, so research on selfish investment, which at the 
time had already advanced considerably, naturally influenced the development of the 
cooperative reliance literature. As a result, the latter can be understood best in connection 
with selfish investment models. This is the reason for which the following section deviates 
from the non-breaching party's incentives to discuss cooperative investment. Further in 
Section E. I proceed with the core of the promisee's precaution decision. 
D. The decision to make cooperative investment 
As mentioned above, in contrast to selfish investment, cooperative investment confers 
benefits on the investor's counterparty.101 Thus, the Seller's cooperative investment increases 
the value the Buyer derives from trade and the Buyer's cooperative investment decreases the 
Seller's cost of performance. For example, the Seller's effort in providing high-quality goods 
                                                 
98 Goetz and Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’ 1280; Cooter and Eisenberg, 
‘Damages for Breach of Contract’ 1467.  
99 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 15-16. 
100 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 108. 
101 See supra the text accompanying footnote 57 in Section C. of this Chapter. The term "cooperative 
investments" was first used in two articles published at approximately the same time: Che and Chung, ‘Contract 
Damages and Cooperative Investments’ and Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of 
Contracting’. The same kind of investments are also referred to as "investments with externalities" or as "cross-
investments". See, respectively Georg  Nöldeke and Klaus Schmidt, ‘Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A 
Solution to the Hold-up Problem’ (1995) 26 Rand Journal of Economics 163 and Sergei Guriev, ‘Incomplete 
Contracts with Cross-Investments’ (2003) 3 Contributions to Theoretical Economics. 
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or services is cooperative, including his investment in customising output to accommodate the 
Buyer's demands, as well as the Buyer's investment in improving the efficiency of the Seller's 
production process or in supplying him with more legible blueprints.102 The immediate gains 
in these cases, go to the investing party's contractual partner and the investor benefits only to 
the extent he can obtain a more favourable price. Note, however, that although either parties 
can invest cooperatively, most often it is the Seller who makes this type of investment, as it is 
he who provides the commodity and who can engage in quality enhancement. Buyers, on the 
other hand, have the obligation to pay the price. Usually, they know little of the Seller's 
production process and have little possibility to affect its cost. As it will be seen below, law 
has developed legal institutions (quality thresholds) that are specific to the case in which the 
Seller is the cooperative investor. Economic models, too, normally posit the Seller as the 
relying party.103 All this indicates that the scenario where the Seller (and not the Buyer) 
invests cooperatively is the more typical one. 
Like selfish investment, cooperative investment increases the contractual surplus; yet, unlike 
its selfish counterpart, it is not discretionary but is required under the contract. Indeed, as it 
will be discussed in more detail below, real world contracts do not simply remain silent on the 
matter and the investor has explicit or implicit contractual obligations as to making the 
investment. Thus, cooperative investment falls into Fuller and Perdue's broad category of 
"essential reliance".104 However, it is a special case of essential reliance, which unlike the 
one, discussed in Section B. above, is not purely precautionary. Even if the investor incurs 
expenses in order to fulfil his own contractual obligations, the purpose of these expenses is 
not only to reduce the probability of breach but also to enable the other party to benefit more 
from the contract. Consequently, cooperative reliance expenditure results in specialised 
performance, which differentiates the relying party from the competition.   
When exploring the incentive to invest cooperatively, economists also need to choose the 
party taking the perform-or-breach decision. As it will be seen below, in economic models the 
                                                 
102 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 85; Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative 
Investments and the Value of Contracting’ 126-127; Edlin, ‘Breach Remedies’ 177.  
103 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 89; Stremitzer 342; Richard Brooks and 
Alexander Stremitzer, ‘Remedies On and Off Contract’ 120 The Yale Law Journal 690. Only one model posits 
the Buyer as the cooperative investor while explicitly stating that the case in which the Seller relies cooperatively 
is completely symmetric. See Urs Schweizer, ‘Cooperative Investments Induced by Contract Law’ (2006) 37 
The Rand Journal of Economics 134, 136. 
104 See supra the text accompanying footnote 94 in Section C.2. of Chapter III. 
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party making cooperative investment may be posited either as the promisor, or as the 
promisee. This is a choice economists make rather ad hoc.105 As it will be shown, however, 
whichever the case, the issue is always the same: which damage measure overcomes the 
tendency to underinvest.106 In this sense, by contrast to the decisions to invest selfishly and to 
take pure precautions, in the event of cooperative reliance, whether the choice to invest and 
the choice between performance and breach are allocated to the same or to different parties is 
of little relevance. 
Cooperative investment is more difficult to stimulate than selfish investment. Being relation-
specific, cooperative investment is subject to hold-up, which leads to the relying party's 
incentive to underinvest. While in the case of selfish investment the benefit accruing to the 
investor naturally generates an investment incentive, no such motivation, counteracting the 
suboptimal result, exists in the case of cooperative investment.107 Raising his partner's value 
from the initial contract, the investor in fact improves the status quo position of his 
counterparty and worsens his own bargaining position in potential renegotiations. In this 
sense, by investing cooperatively, the party increases his own risk of hold-up. That is why, the 
reasoning goes, if parties want to incentivise efficient cooperative investment, they must 
commit not to renegotiate in order to exclude the possibility of opportunistic expropriation. If 
parties cannot do this (just as they cannot under the studied legal systems),108 they may not be 
able to generate optimal reliance incentive even if the investment is only weakly cooperative. 
In fact, where renegotiation cannot be ruled out, the capacity of contracting and, hence, of 
damages to create efficient incentives to invest decreases as the investment becomes more and 
more cooperative. It is even argued that a contract, which does not incorporate an enforceable 
ban on renegotiation, not only does not bring a first-best result but is completely useless in 
                                                 
105 Che and Chung model the non-investing Buyer as the one making the choice between performance or breach. 
Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 89, 90. In Schweizer's model, too, it is the 
non-investor who makes the perform-or-breach decision. Schweizer. By contrast, in Stremitzer’s model this 
choice is made by the investing Seller. Stremitzer 344-345. Stremitzer, however, claims that his assumption as to 
the party charged with the perform-or-breach decision is not ad hoc since, having a broad duty to mitigate 
damages under the doctrine of substantial performance, the Buyer will be induced not to breach. See ibid 342, 
354-356. Regarding the doctrine of substantial performance under US and English law as well as its rough 
equivalent under Bulgarian law, see infra Section A.2. of Chapter VI. 
106 Che and Chung as well as Stremitzer argue that their results will not change if the other party (in Che and 
Chung’s model - the Seller; in Stremitzer’s model – the Buyer) is also allowed to breach on her performance 
obligation. Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 90, footnote 11. Stremitzer 354, 
footnote 28. In Schweizer's model, both parties may claim expectation damages and, hence, both parties are 
allowed to breach. Schweizer 135.  
107 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 103. 
108 See supra footnote 5 of this Chapter. 
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motivating purely cooperative investment. In such case whether parties contract ex ante (as in 
long-term contracts) or negotiate only ex post (as in spot contracts) makes absolutely no 
difference.109 
With this general intuition about an implicit tension between the ex ante investment decision 
and the ex post performance decision,110 the question is which damage measure, if any, 
induces efficient cooperative investment. Such investment will be optimal if the investor's 
additional reliance expenses are less than the increase in the non-investor's expected value 
from performance.111 Investment is assumed to be observable but unverifiable.112 As it will be 
shown below, the strictness with which this assumption is pursued varies among economic 
models and this is at the core of the contradictory results, obtained by economists regarding 
the effects of damages on the incentive to invest cooperatively. Thus, while the 
worthlessness-of-contracting result implies that damages cannot induce cooperative 
investment in the presence of renegotiation,113 two other articles maintain that reliance 
damages and bilateral expectation damages can generate efficient incentives to invest 
cooperatively with costless renegotiation.114  
                                                 
109 Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting’. Note that this result holds for the 
whole range of bargaining shares of the parties and with monotonic sharing rules (i.e. a more general class of 
sharing rules than constant ones) as long as the share remains sufficiently constant. Ibid 130, footnote 11. The 
capacity of contracting, and, hence, of remedies, to motivate hybrid investment depends on the investor's 
bargaining power. The higher his bargaining power is, the more he relies on renegotiation to increase his profit. 
From this perspective, he is more sensitive to deterioration of his bargaining position and less willing to make 
investment that has an underlying cooperative element. Consequently, the capacity of the simple fixed-price 
contract to incentivise him to make the hybrid investment decreases. Ibid 135-136. 
110 Recall that in case of change of conditions parties ensure efficiency of exchange by ex post renegotiation. See 
supra the text accompanying footnote 93 in Section A.3. of Chapter IV. For ex post renegotiation ensuring 
efficiency of the performance decision regardless of the applicable remedy, see supra the text accompanying 
footnotes 12-14 in Section A. of this Chapter.  
111 As in the selfish investment models, parties share the entire bargaining surplus according to their exogenously 
specified bargaining powers. Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting’ 126; Che 
and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 90; Stremitzer 343. For the sake of precision 
Schweizer's result about bilateral damages does not require that parties split the renegotiation surplus in fixed 
shares, but is based only on participation constraints. It is also not necessary that renegotiation always leads to ex 
post efficient perform-or-breach decisions. Schweizer 139. 
112 With observable but unverifiable investment, the hidden action problem is avoided but the profit-sharing 
contract typical for the principal-agent literature is unfeasible. Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and 
the Value of Contracting’ 126, footnote 6; Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 85, 
footnote 5. 
113 Indeed, where investment is strictly unverifiable, specific performance appears to be the only feasible remedy 
since to enforce it, the court needs to observe only delivery and payment. Stremitzer 341, footnote 6. 
114 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’; Schweizer. Interestingly, Yeon-Koo Che 
who together with Chung favours reliance damages is also one of the authors claiming that with respect to 
cooperative investment contracting has no value in the presence of renegotiation. See Che and Hausch, 
‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting’.  
 199 
The first article focuses on the trade-off between the incentive to invest cooperatively and the 
efficiency of the perform-or-breach decision.115 It is argued that with renegotiation possible or 
not, expectation damages induce an efficient breach decision and zero cooperative investment. 
Compensated for her expectation interest, the relying Seller ends up with the same profit 
whether the Buyer performs or breaches; hence, she has no incentive to incur additional costs 
if she does not receive a part of the surplus increase. The result, in other words, is worse than 
the case in which ex ante parties sign no contract at all as then the Seller still invests – though 
less than efficiently (unless she holds the entire bargaining power).116 As for the Buyer, 
having to pay expectation damages, she always breaches efficiently. And because the 
investment affects her payoff, her breach is in fact a signal that the Seller's reliance expenses 
fell short of what was promised. The zero-investment outcome does not change even in the 
event of a Cadillac contract which raises the cost of performance so high that it turns the 
investor into a breacher. Owing expectation damages, the Seller breaches efficiently but again 
has no incentive to make cooperative investment since in this way he only raises the amount 
of damages he is liable for.117 
Liquidated damages perform better, stimulating positive, though suboptimal, cooperative 
investment since it becomes possible for the Seller to internalise a portion of the surplus 
increase, generated by his reliance expenditure. Stipulating damages, the parties can attune 
them to an amount that institutes a "net trade price" (the difference between the contract price 
and damages) that is higher than the Seller's cost of performance. Set at such level, the net 
trade price in fact provides the Seller with a "prize for trade". In other words, the Seller is 
better off when the Buyer accepts performance than when she breaches and pays damages, so 
the Seller has an incentive to invest cooperatively. On the other hand, in the absence of 
renegotiation in which the contract price can be lowered, the trade prize also motivates the 
Buyer to breach inefficiently whenever her value from performance remains below the net 
trade price. Then, it is simply cheaper for the Buyer to default and pay damages (even if this 
is inefficient) than to accept performance. The positive, though suboptimal, level of 
                                                 
115 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ A fixed-price non-contingent contract and 
a binary performance choice are assumed. Ibid 86. 
116 Ibid 87, 91-92, 99.  
117 Ibid 92, footnote 13. Recall that under certain conditions a Cadillac contract ensures efficient selfish 
investment. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 91-96 in Section C. of this Chapter.  
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cooperative investment118 is, thus, achieved at the price of distortion of the perform-or-breach 
decision. This contract game is not unrealistic. It is in place, for example, in purchase-on-
approval contracts where the Buyer has an option to accept performance at a predetermined 
price or refuse it without being liable for damages (or to put it differently, having to pay zero 
liquidated damages).119 With renegotiation possible, however, the role of the trade prize is 
somewhat different. When the Buyer accrues benefit that is small relative to the incurred cost, 
the trade prize incentivises her to breach inefficiently in order to extract a price concession. 
The parties negotiate ex post to reverse the inefficient breach and the Seller's investment 
incentive is generated by this very renegotiation, in the process of which the Seller receives a 
share of the increased gains. In this sense, renegotiation is not the stage at which the hold-up 
threat materialises but the stage which allows parties to implement the optimal contract. 
Nevertheless, they do not achieve first-best since the Seller underrelies (unless he has the 
entire bargaining power). In other words, some cooperative investment is motivated, but it 
remains at a level that is not higher than the level achieved when parties have not signed any 
contract in the first place. From this perspective, renegotiation has some additional value only 
if the investor has the entire (or close) bargaining power. On the contrary, if the relying party 
has no (or almost no) bargaining power, the created incentive for cooperative investment is 
worse (as bad as under expectation damages). A smart move will then be for the parties to ban 
renegotiation, but as pointed out, under the studied three legal systems, this is not possible.120  
The sceptical results, obtained with regard to expectation and liquidated damages in the 
presence of ex post readjustment, lead to the conclusion about the uselessness of fixed-price 
contracts in generating cooperative investment where renegotiation is not ruled out.121 On the 
other hand, with renegotiation absent, a damage rule can, at best, balance the cooperative 
investment incentive with the distortion of the performance-or-breach decision. Hence, to 
achieve a first-best result, either the parties should implement a more complex contract, or the 
                                                 
118 The effect is suboptimal but whether it is one of under- or overinvestment can be established only with more 
information about the way the price divides the surplus between the parties. Ibid 93, footnote 14. 
119 Ibid 87, 91-94.  
120 Ibid 87, 99-101.  
121 This result is in fact a special case of the worthlessness-of-contracting result, obtained by Che and Hausch, 
‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting’. Ibid 126, footnote 5; Che and Chung, ‘Contract 
Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 86, footnote 9, 101, footnote 29, 103. Recall that under certain 
conditions, fixed price contracts coupled with expectation damages generate efficient selfish investment in the 
presence of renegotiation. See supra Section C. of this Chapter. 
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investment should be contractible.122 Since in reality parties often write fairly simple, fixed-
price contracts or contracts that incorporate very few contingencies,123 the authors choose to 
relax the unverifiability assumption.124 Assuming that courts are able to verify the amount of 
reliance expenditures incurred by the Seller and to obtain an unbiased estimate of these 
expenditures, Che and Chung turn to reliance damages and maintain that with or without 
renegotiation, they perform the best.125 In the absence of renegotiation, parties can again 
institute a net trade price higher than the Seller's cost of performance, thus giving the Seller a 
trade prize. In addition, reliance damages have a sort of subsidy effect since when the Buyer 
breaches (her value of performance being lower than the net trade price), the Seller receives 
back all his reliance expenses already made. This subsidy effect lowers the cost of investment 
and enhances the stimulating effect of the trade prize. As a result, reliance damages encourage 
more cooperative investment than liquidated damages, given the same net trade price, or 
generate as much cooperative investment with performance closer to the efficient level.126 
With renegotiation possible and a net trade price set above the cost of performance, the Seller 
internalises a part of the increased surplus whether the Buyer breaches efficiently or not.127 If 
the Buyer breaches efficiently, no renegotiation takes place but reliance damages compensate 
the Seller for all investment expenditure. If the Buyer breaches inefficiently, the renegotiation 
that follows corrects the inefficiency of the perform-or-breach decision while the Seller still 
obtains the subsidy, though not by collecting damages but by receiving an increased share in 
the renegotiation surplus due to his better bargaining position than under the liquidated-
damages regime.128 In other words, in the presence of renegotiation, reliance damages 
incentivise more cooperative investment than liquidated damages and if the parties agree on 
an appropriate price, they can even achieve both efficient performance and efficient reliance. 
                                                 
122 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 93, footnote 15. 
123 Ibid 86. See also Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’ 859. 
124 In contrast, in the case of selfish investment both contractual designs that induced efficient investment 
incentives in the presence of renegotiation assume that the court can observe only breach of contract. Investment 
is strictly unverifiable. See supra Section C. of this Chapter. Stremitzer 340, footnote 5. 
125 Recall that when it comes to selfish investment, reliance damages, in the absence of renegotiation, incentivise 
inefficient breach and even more overinvestment than expectation damages. In the presence of renegotiation, 
breach is efficient but investment is still too much relative to the efficient level, again more than under 
expectation damages. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 64-67 in Section C. of this Chapter. 
126 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 87, 94-97. 
127 In contrast, under liquidated damages the Seller benefits from the surplus increase only if the Buyer breaches 
inefficiently as only then do the parties renegotiate. The higher net trade price increases the likelihood of Buyer's 
inefficient breach. Ibid 100. 
128 The subsidy effect of reliance damages ensures the Seller a better status quo position than under liquidated 
damages and, hence, a better bargaining position in the renegotiations. 
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Again, while renegotiation is usually associated with underinvestment, in this case it achieves 
a first-best result.129 This ability of reliance damages to lead to the desirable outcome when 
cooperative investment is important, the article argues, explains some contractual 
arrangements typical to the construction industry contractual arrangements such as cost-plus 
contracts.130 
Without denying the ability of reliance damages to produce the first-best outcome where trade 
is a binary yes/no decision and renegotiation is possible,131 the second article that provides 
results incongruous with the worthlessness-of-contracting outcome seeks to re-establish 
expectation damages. The author Schweizer maintains that they can also induce efficient 
incentives to perform and to invest cooperatively; furthermore, they can produce such first-
best outcomes with or without renegotiation and regardless of whether performance is a 
binary or continuous choice.132 It is argued that the discouraging result generated by the 
expectation measure in Che and Chung's model emerges due to the adopted assumption of 
non-contractibility of investment which leads to positing the investing party as the only one 
who can claim expectation damages. This assumption, the reasoning goes, commonly used 
regarding selfish investment, is simply transferred to the cooperative investment model 
without taking into account that where reliance confers benefits on the contractual partner, the 
latter will also have a claim to the investor as parties must in some way note the investment 
down in their contract. Thus, in Schweizer's model, expectation damages feature not in their 
mundane version, but as 'bilateral', meaning that the relying party is not only able to claim 
compensation upon non-performance, but is also liable if she underinvests relative to the 
efficient level. In other words, the relying party is both promisee and promisor. Bilateral 
expectation damages induce the first best result under three conditions. First, parties must 
stipulate the efficient level of cooperative investment in their contract, a fairly strong 
assumption, which after Che and Chung's already relaxed informational assumptions 
                                                 
129 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 87, 101-103. 
130 See AIA Document-2007 Standard Form of Agreement between Owner and Contractor; AIA Document 
A131CMc–2003 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager.  
131 Schweizer 135, 143-144. 
132  The investment decision is generally assumed to be continuous and one-dimensional. Ibid 136-137. See also 
supra footnote 112 for the other assumptions on which Schweizer's model is based. To contrast once again 
cooperative and selfish investment, recall that in the selfish investment case if trade is discrete, expectation 
damages induce overreliance whether renegotiation is ruled out or not. Where investment is selfish, only if trade 
is continuous and renegotiation corrects inefficient perform-or-breach decisions, can expectation damages 
generate a first best result under certain conditions. See supra Section C. of this Chapter. 
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regarding reliance damages,133 represents a further departure from the standard unverifiability 
postulate. Second, the contract specifies a sufficiently high performance choice, so that 
expectation damages awarded to the investor always compensate her fully for her loss of 
value from breach. This second condition implies that the investor's value from performance 
is also verifiable. Third, the investor's compensation must be calculated to reflect the efficient 
level of cooperative investment stipulated in the contract and not the actual investment made. 
That is, the investor is not able to increase the damages she will receive by saving reliance 
expenditures that directly reduce her gain.134 With this contractual design, the relying party 
has efficient incentive to invest cooperatively because she always receives her expected profit 
whether through performance or through damages; yet, by fulfilling her investment 
obligations, she avoids her own liability. The non-investor is also given an incentive to 
perform efficiently because any inefficient breach prevents him from realising the benefits of 
the other party's cooperative investment. 
Schweizer also extends Che and Chung's model of unilateral expectation damages (i.e. 
damages that can be claimed only by the relying party) to continuous trade.135 Unlike bilateral 
expectation damages, unilateral ones have only modest potential to induce cooperative 
investment in such context. If the contract specifies low quantity and parties anticipate that 
inefficient performance choices will be corrected in ex post renegotiation, some cooperative 
investment will be induced, but it will remain suboptimal.136 Still, this outcome is superior to 
the one under a contract providing for high quantity, where unilateral compensation ensures 
efficient perform-or-breach decisions but gives the relying party absolutely no incentive to 
invest cooperatively. This result is in sharp contrast with the one achieved by bilateral 
expectation damages, which in the case of sufficiently high performance choice not only 
incentivise more cooperative investment than the low-performance-choice scenario but 
                                                 
133 See supra the text accompanying footnote 126 in Section D. of this Chapter. 
134 Schweizer 135, 137, 139-140, 144-145. Some contrasts with the case of selfish investment need to be 
emphasised. Where investment is selfish, in the event of continuous trade and possible renegotiation, a very high 
performance choice may not be efficient as parties need to balance the breach subsidy with a hold-up tax. In 
addition, an assumption that the investing party's compensation depends on the efficient and not the actual level 
of investment would be implausible with respect to selfish investment. As the latter benefits the relying party, 
her compensation can reflect only the investment actually made. For this reason, to induce efficient investment 
incentives, contract designs require attuning of the performance choice. See supra Section C. of this Chapter. 
Ibid 140. 
135 Recall that Che and Chung's results concerned only discrete trade. See supra footnote 116 in Section D. of 
this Chapter. 
136 Unfortunately, Schweizer does not compare this suboptimal investment incentive with the underinvestment 
incentive in the absence of any contract, so it is not clear in which case there is less underinvestment.  
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generate both efficient performance and efficient cooperative reliance.137 Bilateral expectation 
damages should also be preferred to reliance damages which can also induce first-best but 
only where trade is binary and renegotiation is not ruled out.138  
As already mentioned, the reason for the inconsistent results produced by economic scholars 
with regard to cooperative investment lies in the dissimilar informational requirements of the 
different economic models. While the impotence of contracting and damages to incentivise 
cooperative reliance in the presence of renegotiation rests on the assumption that investment 
is non-contractible and courts are capable of verifying only delivery and transfer payments,139 
the first-best results generated by reliance and bilateral expectation damages rely on the 
supposition that the incurred investments are straightforwardly verifiable in court. Bilateral 
expectation damages also require that parties determine from the outset the efficient level of 
cooperative investment in their contract.140 Indeed, first adopted with respect to homogeneous 
goods and selfish investment,141 the assumption of non-contractibility of any investment-
related information (including such information regarding quality) is too strong in the setting 
of cooperative investment, which inevitably results in customisation and heterogeneity.142 
Yet, by implicitly assuming that parties can forthwith contract and courts forthwith verify 
reliance expenditure, economists simply substitute one extreme case for another. Where 
specific investment takes an intangible form (such as effort), its specification in the contract, 
proving in court and quantifying in monetary damages remain a difficult problem. And even 
where out-of-pocket expenses are evidenced by accounting records, verification of indirect 
costs and their correct allocation is a vexing issue.143 That is why, any relaxing of established 
assumptions should go hand in hand with the examination of real-life mechanisms that are 
used to overcome information barriers.144 
When it comes to cooperative investment, the reality indicates an informational context that 
falls neither in the case of strict non-contractibility of investment, nor in the opposite polar 
                                                 
137 Schweizer 141-142. 
138 Ibid 143-144. 
139 Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting’ 130. 
140 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’ 90, 94-95; Schweizer 135, 139. In this 
sense, see also Stremitzer 341. 
141 Hart and Moore, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation’ 757-758. 
142 In this sense, see also Schweizer 135; Stremitzer 340. 
143 See supra Section A.2. Increased incompleteness, especially the text accompanying footnotes 60-62; footnote 
65 and Section A.4. Long-term contracts, especially the text accompanying footnotes 168-169 of Chapter IV. 
144 For a similar argument see Stremitzer 341. 
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case of direct verifiability. As the review of real-world construction contracts showed, in this 
intermediate informational context, parties contract on quality (a signal of investment) by 
combining vague standards with a number of precise rules that ensure a minimum level of 
investment.145 In case parties refrain from stipulating express quality requirements in their 
contracts, default terms that provide for required quality levels implicitly become part of the 
agreement.146 From this perspective, Stremitzer's argument attributing the poor performance 
of (unilateral) expectation damages to the overly strong unverifiability assumption of Che and 
Chung goes to the very root of the matter.147 Strictly implemented, this assumption remains 
far from reality as it implies that neither can contracts include clauses about required quality, 
nor can courts imply such terms in the absence of an express agreement of the parties. In this 
sense, Stremitzer's application of quality requirements represents a completely justified 
departure from the standard non-contractibility assumption; departure that allows him to 
introduce into his cooperative investment model existing legal instruments used in practice to 
deal with the information asymmetries.148  
In the presence of a binding quality requirement (agreed by the parties or set out in a default 
term) with which courts can compare the good delivered, expectation damages induce 
positive cooperative investment. In contrast to the case in which the Seller's performance does 
not have to meet a certain level of quality,149 in the event of quality requirement set above 
variable cost, the Seller's gain is made dependent on his cooperative investment. Investing to 
ensure that his performance conforms to the contract, he reduces the damages he would owe 
to the Buyer if he does not fulfil his obligations as to quality. Thus, the Seller becomes able to 
internalise some of the benefit from his cooperative investment and, hence, more motivated to 
invest. The higher the required quality, the more the investment incentive improves; yet, 
generally, the Seller underinvests since he does not gain more than what the contract permits 
                                                 
145 See supra Section A.3. Rules and standards of Chapter IV. 
146 Such default terms exist in all three legal systems under comparison, For the US, see: UCC § 2-314. Implied 
Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.; § 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose. No 
implied warranties are available under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. For England, see Sale of Goods 
Act (1979) Section 14 Implied terms about quality or fitness, as well as Section 13 Sale by description. and 
Section 15 Sale by sample. For Bulgaria, see Art. 64; Art. 261(1) Contracts Act. 
147 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’. See supra the text accompanying 
footnotes 142-143 in Section D. of this Chapter. 
148 Stremitzer. 
149 Che and Chung, ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’. In the language of economists, Che and 
Chung’s model sets the level of required quality to zero. Consequently, as long as performance takes place, it is 
always conforming to the contract and the Seller's gain remains the same irrespectively of whether he invests in 
quality or not. Thus, as the Seller receives no benefit from his cooperative investment, he has no incentive to 
invest. Stremitzer 338, 349. 
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him to, even if the quality of his performance exceeds the benchmark level. Expectation 
damages induce the first best only if the quality threshold is set as high as it can possibly be. 
In the case of such Cadillac contracts, performance of a quality higher than that required is 
simply not feasible; consequently, there does not exist a valuation of performance for which 
the Seller does not internalise all the benefit from his cooperative investment. Thus, with a 
Cadillac contract the Seller becomes the residual claimant of the surplus and has efficient 
incentives both to perform and to invest cooperatively.150 
In essence, these results do not change in the presence of renegotiation. Still, renegotiation 
has a value of its own because when the required level of quality is not very high, the Seller's 
incentive to invest increases compared to the no-renegotiation case. Seeing that performance 
will meet and even exceed the quality requirement and anticipating that his renegotiation 
share will surpass the expectation damages he has to pay, the Seller has motivation to breach 
strategically in order to internalise, in the subsequent renegotiation, a bigger portion of the 
surplus created by his investment. These prospects of increasing the realised benefit in the 
renegotiation process naturally stimulate the reliance incentive. As the quality requirement 
surpasses a certain threshold, however, the potential of renegotiation to induce more 
cooperative investment is depleted and the investment incentive equalises with that created 
without renegotiation. Again expectation damages ensure an efficient decision to rely 
cooperatively (and of course an efficient perform-or-breach decision) only in combination 
with Cadillac contracts. Yet, such contracts cannot be seen in practice very often, so more 
research is needed on the real world mechanisms used to optimise parties' investment 
incentives.151 Nevertheless, with or without renegotiation, expectation damages are shown, 
                                                 
150 Stremitzer 346, footnote 14, 349. Where investment is selfish, for expectation damages to generate the first-
best, the Cadillac contract has to be combined with up-front payment. See supra footnotes 91-93 and the text 
accompanying them in Section C. of this Chapter. In the context of cooperative investment, however, if parties 
sign a Cadillac contract, expectation damages induce the first-best without any up-front payment being 
necessary. In the selfish investment scenario the role of the up-front payment is to induce the Seller to accept a 
very low price, which on its own turn is needed to make the Seller the breaching party and avoid his 
overinvestment. Where investment is cooperative, the issue of overinvestment does not arise, so the Cadillac 
contract does not have to be coupled with up-front payment. However, an up-front payment may be necessary in 
the cooperative setting, if the contract is not a Cadillac one. Ibid 346, footnote 13, 345, footnote 11, 338. 
151 The example usually given for Cadillac contracts are contracts offered by moving companies which commit 
to deliver clients' possessions undamaged. This, in fact, is the maximum the companies can promise and they do 
it although not infrequently they fail to live up to this standard. For this example, see Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts 
and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’ 102. Yet, as Stremizer correctly 
points out, usually companies promise to deliver commodities that are feasible under the state of technological 
development at the moment. That is, the promised quality of performance is straightforwardly attainable and in 
this sense the contract is not really a Cadillac one. Stremitzer 349. 
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contrary to the result of Che and Chung, to be able to induce positive, even if suboptimal, 
cooperative investment.152  
It is also important to emphasise that Stremitzer's optimistic results with regard to unilateral 
expectation damages imply only a slight departure of Che and Hausch's strict non-
contractibility assumption. They still hold in an informational context in which courts are 
unable to verify the Seller's cooperative investment,153 thus allowing the use of expectation 
damages where their bilateral counterpart or reliance damages would not work. In addition, 
while these results entail the relaxing of one informational precondition, in other aspects they 
are more demanding to the informational environment. In the one assumed by Che and 
Hausch, courts are not capable of verifying the promisee's value of the rendered performance, 
a requirement which is necessary for the enforcement of expectation damages. In this sense, 
Stremitzer's results do not invalidate Che and Hausch's argument about the uselessness of 
contracting and damages in motivating purely cooperative investment where renegotiation is 
not ruled out. For this reason, while recognising the potential of expectation damages to 
motivate cooperative investment, it is also necessary to acknowledge that they imply a 
significant informational onus on courts.154 
In short, damages have different effect on the investment decision depending on whether the 
investment is selfish or cooperative. When it comes to cooperative reliance, expectation 
damages induce too little and not too much reliance as they do in the case of selfish 
investment. Thus, the choice of the optimal damage measure also hinges on the type of 
specific investment that is made in a particular contract. Having clarified the different 
incentive effects generated by damages with regard to making investment, I now turn to the 
promisee’s choice on the level of precautions.  
E. The non-breaching party's decision to take precautions 
Like promisors, promisees can also take precautions before breach has occurred.155 But while 
the promisor’s precautions reduce the probability of him breaching, the preventative 
                                                 
152 Stremitzer 347-350. 
153 Ibid 343. 
154 Ibid 339, 341-342.  
155 For the promisor’s decision to take precautions, see supra Section B. of this Chapter.  
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measures, taken by the promisee reduce her losses from breach.156 For instance, in the already 
used example of a contract for the construction of a shop,157 the client may delay the closing 
of the sale of his old outlet until the construction works have finished even if this is costly. 
Thus, in case the construction is not finished on time, the client will suffer less harm as he 
will be able to continue operating and even to sell in the old store some of the goods 
purchased for the opening of the new outlet. The precautionary decision of deferring the sale 
of the old shop is efficient if the additional cost associated with it is less than the resulting 
reduction in damages that the client will suffer in case of delay of the construction process. To 
put it differently, the promisee limits the magnitude of her losses from breach by accounting 
for the probability that her counterparty may not perform as promised and by consequently 
restraining her reliance. In this sense, the promisee's choice of insufficient precautions 
represents another species of her reliance on the contract.158  
As already explained in Section C. above, expectation and reliance damages incentivise the 
promisee to overrely. Hence, given the reverse connection between the non-breacher's 
reliance and precautions, the expectation and reliance measure induce the promisee to take too 
few precautions. The problem cannot be corrected by renegotiation as the latter occurs at a 
time when the precautionary decision is already made. However, in both common law and 
civil law jurisdictions contract law includes doctrines that may be used to deny the promisee 
compensation for losses she could forestall by taking efficient precautions. For example, all of 
the three legal systems under comparison have a default term allowing non-breachers to 
recover only the damages that were foreseeable at the time of contracting.159 Thus, if courts 
interpret as unforeseeable losses the promisee would not have incurred by taking precautions 
at the efficient level, non-breachers will be induced to take appropriate preventative measures. 
Similarly to liquidated damages, the default term sets an upper limit to the obtainable 
compensation. If the limit is calibrated to the efficient level of precautions (reliance), the 
                                                 
156 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3, 14, footnote 32, 30, footnote 61, 
157 See supra the text accompanying footnote 82 in Section C. of this Chapter. 
158 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3, 11; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 
108. See also supra the text accompanying footnote 80 in Section C. of this Chapter. 
159 For the US and England, see Hadley v Baxendale. For the US, see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
(1979) § 351 Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages (1). Such foreseeability rule is also typical 
for all civil law jurisdictions whose contract law follows the French legal tradition. Bulgarian contract law does 
not make an exception - see Art. 82 Contracts Act. 
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promisee will be forced to bear any losses resulting from her suboptimal precautionary steps 
(or stated otherwise – from her overreliance).160  
In addition, other doctrines, such as impossibility, impracticability, frustration,161 could also 
be employed to compel promisees to internalise the costs of their insufficient (relative to the 
efficient level) precautions and thus incentivise them to make an efficient precautionary 
decision.162 If courts excuse promisors exactly when and only when non-breachers have not 
taken efficient measures to prevent losses and hold promisors fully liable when non-breachers 
have acted efficiently, this could induce both parties to behave optimally.163  
Of course, the above mentioned doctrines will correct the distortion of the promisee's 
precautionary choice only if courts are actually able to distinguish the cases in which non-
breachers did too little to minimise their losses.164 Whether this is so and if yes, which 
national courts prove to be more proficient in this respect, is an issue for a comparative 
positive analysis. For now I turn to another manifestation of promisees' precautions: their 
decision to mitigate losses. 
                                                 
160 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 14-16; Cooter and Ulen, Law and 
Economics 336; Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Sixth edn, New York: Aspen Publishers 2003) 127. 
See also supra the text accompanying footnote 82 in Section C. of this Chapter. 
161 The three legal systems under comparison use various terms to denote the different doctrines that excuse the 
promisor for his non-performance as a result of a supervening event. In addition, the various terms are often not 
used uniformly within a legal system. Legal scholars in the US distinguish between impossibility of performance 
(when performance is not physically possible, see Taylor v. Caldwell 1863 WL 6052 Court of King's Bench), 
frustration of purpose (when performance is physically possible but it has become futile, see Krell v. Henry 1903 
WL 12966 Court of Appeal) and impracticability (when performance has become much more costly than 
initially thought, see People v. Howard 451 P2d 401 (Cal 1969)). See Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield, 
‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’ (1977) 6 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 83. On the other hand, both UCC and Restatement (Second) of Contracts use the term "impracticability" 
as one encompassing both the concepts of impossibility and impracticability in the sense just mentioned (see § 2-
615. Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions. and Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 261 
Discharge by Supervening Impracticability). The Restatement also differentiates "frustration of purpose" (see 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 265 Discharge by Supervening Frustration). In England the doctrine 
of frustration of contract unites three lines of cases: cases in which performance is characterised as factually or 
legally impossible (Taylor v. Caldwell), cases in which the purpose of the contract is frustrated (Krell v. Henry) 
and cases in which the change of circumstances renders performance "radically different" from what was 
contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting (Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban DC 1956 WL 17734 
House of Lords ). See also Zweigert and Kötz 220-225. The Bulgarian legal doctrine distinguishes between 
"impossibility of performance" (see Art. 81(1) Contracts Act and Art. 306 Commercial Act, the latter using the 
term "force majeure") and "commercial intolerability" (see Art. 307 ibid encompassing cases where performance 
is possible but uneconomical). See Kalaydjiev 307-324. 
162 Posner and Rosenfield, ‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’. 
163 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 108-109. 
164 Ibid 109. 
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F. The non-breaching party's decision to mitigate losses 
The decision to mitigate is also directed at reducing losses, but unlike the promisee's core 
precautionary decision, discussed in the previous Section E., it is made after breach has 
already taken place. From this perspective, the mitigation choice of the promisee constitutes a 
form of precaution but not a form of reliance, the latter occurring only before breach.165 While 
the breacher's liability for expectation damages gives him efficient incentive to take 
precautions,166 it undermines the non-breacher's motivation to act preventively whether before 
or after breach.167 Once breach has occurred, it is again the promisee that is in the better 
position to minimise the undesirable consequences of the default. For example, imagine that 
the Buyer has purchased special equipment to be installed in the shop under construction, but 
the structure was eventually not finished. The Buyer, however, may be able to mitigate her 
losses by using the equipment in her old outlet, though its salvage value will be considerably 
lower than the value it would have had, had the construction been executed as planned. 
Certainly, such mitigative measures will be efficient only if they do not cost more than the 
saved loss, i.e. than the realised value of the equipment.168 Yet, the point is that the promisor's 
full liability does not induce the promisee to take after-breach precautions and she omits the 
last clear chance to prevent damages, thus externalising some of her losses onto the 
promisor.169  
In fact, no damage measure is efficient from the perspective of both promisor's precautions 
and promisee's mitigation.170 In theory, when renegotiation is feasible, the damage measure 
can be chosen to optimise only the breacher's decision as the promisor can always induce the 
non-breacher to mitigate in a cost-effective manner by means of a side payment. Note, 
                                                 
165 Ibid 109; Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 16, footnote 36, 32, 
footnote 70. 
166 See supra Section B. of this Chapter. 
167 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 3-5, 11-14. See also supra Section 
E. of this Chapter. 
168 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 109. 
169 While Cooter makes this argument with respect to promisor's and promisee's precautionary decisions taken 
before breach, the argument can easily be adapted to promisee's mitigation choice, which as already stated is also 
a form of precaution. The asymmetry between promisor's incentives to take precautions and promisee's 
incentives to mitigate is another manifestation of the paradox of compensation. Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, 
and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 4, 11-14; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 331-334; Donald 
Wittman, ‘Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related 
Doctrines in the Law’ (1981) 10 The Journal of Legal Studies 65, 72-78. See also supra Section C. of this 
Chapter. 
170 Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’ 4; Wittman 74. 
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however, that if the promisee is not obliged to mitigate, she will be able to extort a payment 
that may considerably exceed the cost of the mitigation activity. In addition, the Seller, 
potential breacher, will factor the extra payment into his contract price, driving away risk-
averse Buyers, who would not be willing to pay a higher price at the outset for the possibility 
to make more money later.171 Yet, it is not the right time to go into redistribution and risk 
preferences.172 Rather, the point is that even when renegotiation costs are low, a legal rule 
requiring the promisee to mitigate efficiently appears to be a fairly good idea. And it is 
necessary when costs are prohibitively high and renegotiation, in which the promisee can be 
motivated to mitigate, is impossible.  
The duty to mitigate, provided for by the contract law of all three legal systems under 
comparison, could, in principle, incentivise the promisee to take efficient measures to reduce 
her losses. Charged with the mitigation duty, the non-breacher cannot recover for the losses 
she could have avoided by taking "reasonable" steps (the US, England) or "with the care of a 
good proprietor" (Bulgaria); yet, she is compensated for the costs incurred while actively 
mitigating.173 Again, the underlying idea is to prevent the non-breacher from passively or 
actively inflating her damages and simultaneously encourage her to attempt to limit them. 
Whether the promisee is actually provided with efficient incentives to mitigate depends on 
courts' interpretation of the standards of "reasonable" and "good proprietor". But if the 
application of these formulae is attuned to the requirements of efficiency and courts are able 
to verify the costs and gains of mitigation actions,174 a promisee's duty to mitigate coupled 
with promisor's expectancy liability could, in principle, optimise both the breacher's 
precaution and the non-breacher's mitigation decisions. It is also argued that under some 
conditions a broad duty to mitigate together with liability for expectation damages is crucial 
for creating efficient incentives to make selfish specific investment.175  
                                                 
171 Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach’ 657. 
172 For the risk allocation effect of damages, see infra Section J. of this Chapter. 
173 For the US, see § 2-704. Seller's Right to Identify Goods to the Contract Notwithstanding Breach or to 
Salvage Unfinished Goods. (2) comment 2; Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 350 Avoidability as a 
Limitation on Damages; Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. 35 F2d 301 (4th Cir 1929) at 307-308; Goetz 
and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 973-974, footnote 18. 
For England, see British Westinghouse Electric Co Ltd v. Underground Electric Rys [1912] AC 673; Beale 
1805-1806. For Bulgaria, see Art. 83(2) Contracts Act; Art. 323 Commercial Act; Kalaydjiev 432-433. 
174 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 109. 
175 Edlin, ‘Cadillac contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages’ 111-
114. See also supra footnote 95 and the accompanying text in Section C. of this Chapter. 
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Having clarified the non-breacher's decision to mitigate losses, I now turn to the decision to 
terminate a contract prematurely which is also employed to reduce the compensation due by 
the breacher. The choice to terminate can be made either by the promisor or the promisee. 
G. The decision to terminate a contract 
The performance of many contracts involves many moves and choices over their lives. Thus, 
for example, the construction of a building entails many stages, the early ones of which may 
take place when costs are still uncertain and it is still unclear whether finishing the building 
will be economic. From this perspective, each stage can be perceived as entailing a choice 
whether to continue performing or to abandon the contract. 
Each of the three legal systems under comparison recognises the possibility for a party (in the 
above example, the Seller) to terminate a contract early by means of repudiation or 
renunciation.176 And each of the three legal systems treats such early termination as 
anticipatory breach that renders the promisor liable for damages suffered by the other party. 
Terminating the contract, the promisor surrenders this opportunity for profitable exchange; 
yet, on the other hand, breaching before the time due for performance enables him to trigger 
early the promisee's duty to mitigate and thus to reduce his liability. From this perspective, the 
termination decision implies a trade-off between the losses saved by early mitigation and the 
potential benefit from performing the contract.177 This trade-off can be given an options 
interpretation under which the value of the contract to the promisor consists of (a) the present 
value of the exchange in the absence of breach and (b) the value of the option to breach 
anticipatorily and pay expectation damages at any time between the date of contracting and 
                                                 
176 For the US, see UCC § 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 When a 
Statement or an Act is Repudiation. On renunciation in England, see Ewan McKendrik, ‘Chapter 24. Discharge 
by Breach’ in Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts General Principles, vol I (Thirty-First edn, London: 
Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2012) 1711-1712. See also Forslind v. Becheley-Crundall (1922) SC 173 HL 
(where the conduct of the seller warranted the purchaser in believing that the seller did not intend to fulfil his 
part of the contract timeously, although he might, if it suited him, proceed to deliver timber, such conduct 
amounted to repudiation of the contract). Under Bulgarian general contract law, the promisor, normally, cannot 
repudiate anticipatorily. In principle, performance becomes due only upon expiry of the contract period, so 
before that the promisor cannot commit breach, at all. See Art. 70(1) and Art. 84(1) Contracts Act; Kalaydjiev 
256-257; Goleva 82; Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 165. The possibility for the 
promisor's early termination is set out only with respect to specific service contracts, e.g. the construction 
contract (Art. 268 Contracts Act), the mandate contract (Art. 289 ibid). 
177 Richard Craswell, ‘Insecurity, Repudiation and Cure’ (1990) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 399, 405. 
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the due date of performance.178 Thus, even if at a particular moment the contract appears 
unprofitable (for example because the cost of performance exceeds the price), when deciding 
whether to terminate the Seller should take into account that relinquishing the agreement, he 
will also relinquish a valuable option. The option is valuable because the cost of performance 
may subsequently decrease, turning the contract eventually into a profitable one. Therefore, 
the decision to terminate will be optimal only when the damages avoided by taking it 
outweigh the option value of the contract.179 Such optimal termination choice can also be 
considered as breach that is efficient from the viewpoint of timing.180  
Surrendering the contract at the optimal time is particularly important in long-term contracts 
where the cost and value of performance are highly uncertain as well as diverging because of 
the thin market of substitute performance.181 Since, as explained above, perfectly calculated 
expectation damages induce efficient breach,182 it is intuitive to suppose that they also induce 
efficient choice between terminating and persisting with performance. Expectation damages, 
however, are meant to give the promisee the benefit from performance, so they do not cover 
the loss of the time value of any breach option the promisee may have. As a result, 
expectation damages, not compensating for this loss, will incentivise the promisor to 
terminate too early.183 If there is a possibility of promisee's insolvency, this propensity of the 
promisor will be aggravated even further.184 On the other hand, if when deciding whether to 
terminate, the promisor knows that at the time of enforcement he himself will not be fully 
                                                 
178 Alexander Triantis and George  Triantis, ‘Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions’ (1998) 41 Journal 
of Law and Economics 163. It is assumed that the exercise price of the option to breach is only the damage 
payment, calculated on the basis of expected values at the time of repudiation. Any enforcement costs and 
reputational sanctions are assumed away. Renegotiation is also excluded. Ibid 168-169, 173-174. 
179 Ibid. The factors that affect the Seller's decision to terminate are: the remaining time until the date when 
performance is due, the volatility of his cost of performance, the magnitude of the damage reduction that can be 
achieved by mitigation, the interest rate, how many times the Seller expects to consider termination in the future. 
Ibid 166, 176-184. 
180 See also Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 110. 
181 In a thick market in which close substitute is easy to procure, the Seller's cost and the Buyer's value of 
performance tend to converge. Thus, in the example above, the rise of the Seller's cost of performance leads to a 
rise of the Buyer's value and consequently to an increase of the damages due by the Seller. For this reason, the 
Seller is unable to keep down the exercise price of the option (the damages due upon breach) by means of 
termination and in this way increase the value of the option (the difference between the Seller's cost and Buyer's 
value of performance). Therefore, the contract does not entail a valuable option to breach anticipatorily. Triantis 
and Triantis, ‘Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions’.  
182 See supra Section A. of this Chapter. 
183 Triantis and Triantis, ‘Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions’. 
184 Ibid 199-200. 
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solvent and, hence, will be unable to pay the full amount of compensation, he will repudiate 
the contract too late.185 
Legal systems (including those under comparison) also permit the non-breaching party to treat 
herself as discharged by the other's breach before the due time for performance.186 In this 
way, the promisee activates the breacher's liability for any damages suffered; yet, making 
such an early choice may allow her to reduce her losses and, consequently, the magnitude of 
the promisor's compensation. In this sense, this step of the promisee can be considered a kind 
of precaution.187 And vice versa, a promisee who refrains from terminating early can be 
considered to be relying on the contract.188 However, as emphasised above, full insurance of 
the non-breacher for all her losses distorts her reliance and precaution decisions189 and, hence, 
it would not induce her to take an optimal decision for early termination, either.190  
All three legal systems under comparison require courts to police the promisee's decision to 
terminate early. Thus, in the US, the non-breacher must show that she has a "reasonable" 
ground for insecurity and that upon demand the other party has failed to provide "adequate" 
assurance for performance.191 The plaintiff in England has to prove that the anticipatory 
                                                 
185 Craswell, ‘Insecurity, Repudiation and Cure’ 408-409. This result is based on the assumptions that the 
promisee does not have an anticipatory breach option, there is no possibility of the promisee's insolvency and the 
promisor incurs the cost of performance only at the performance date. If the cost of performance is not incurred 
all at once at the time of performance, but periodically, starting from the time of contracting, the insolvent (or 
soon-to-be insolvent) promisor will have less incentive to delay the moment of termination since debt overhang 
will be preventing him from financing the investments he needs to make. In addition, it is argued that an 
anticipatory breach option available also to the promisee, especially if coupled with a chance of a promisee's 
insolvency, speeds up termination by promisors despite the chance that they also become insolvent. Triantis and 
Triantis, ‘Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions’ 165, 198-200.   
186 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 110. For this right of the promisee, see in the US: UCC § 2-609. Right to 
Adequate Assurance of Performance., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 When a Failure to Give 
Assurance May Be Treated as a Repudiation and § 252 Effect of Insolvency; in England: see McKendrik 1693-
1694 as well as Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati [1957] 2 QB 401 (where the court decided that the 
owners were not entitled to rescind the contract as none of the charterer's were breaches of condition). In 
Bulgaria the promisee has such right in the context of some specific contracts, as she does in the context of the 
construction contract (Art. 262(2) Contracts Act). General contract law, however, does not permit early 
termination since before the due date the promisee's right is not yet exigible. Kalaydjiev 256-257; Goleva 82; 
Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of Obligations 165. See also Art. 70(1) and Art. 84(1) Contracts 
Act as well as supra footnote 177 in Section G. of this Chapter. 
187 For the meaning of the term "precaution", see supra the text accompanying footnote 37 in Section B. of this 
Chapter. 
188 See supra the text accompanying footnote 53 in Section C. of this Chapter.  
189 For the non-breacher's decisions to rely and to take precautions, see supra respectively Section C. and E. of 
this Chapter. 
190 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 110-111. 
191 UCC § 2-609. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance. (1); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 
When a Failure to Give Assurance May Be Treated as a Repudiation and § 252 Effect of Insolvency; Art. 90(2) 
Contracts Act. 
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breach will "frustrate the object of the venture"192 while in Bulgaria – that the defendant will 
obviously "not perform on time or in due manner".193 The non-breacher must show that the 
promisor's breach was "total", "material" (the US),194 "fundamental", "substantial", goes "to 
the root of the contract" (England).195 Certainly, these tests would lead courts to permit early 
termination only when it is optimal provided that judges are able to observe all the variables 
that determine the efficiency of the termination decision and that they apply the mentioned 
terms in accordance with the standard of efficiency. And if such conditions, in view of 
neoclassical economists, are already fairly demanding, the fact that judicial control over the 
promisee's right to terminate is only ex post brings, they point, further difficulties. At the time 
the non-breacher exercises her right, the reasoning goes, she is not completely certain whether 
the court will interpret the breach as "total" or "substantial" or will consider the given 
assurances "inadequate" or will find it, indeed, "obvious" that the promisor will not perform 
on time or in due manner. And since a subsequent decision of the court holding that there 
were no grounds for the promisee's early termination would in fact incur her liability, a risk-
averse promisee may choose not to take chances while a less risk-averse promisor may use 
the uncertainty to negotiate a contractual modification in his favour.196 Thus, the vagueness of 
legal standards coupled with the ex post governance technique are viewed as hurdles toward 
optimising parties' incentives. 
The reasoning until now ruled out renegotiation. With costless renegotiation possible, parties 
would correct ex post the inefficiency of any termination decision as, after all, the latter is a 
kind of breach-or-perform decision.197 The problem is that while optimising the termination 
choice, renegotiation will distort other decisions. Thus, if the promisee has to bribe the 
promisor not to repudiate too early, the promisor's expected liability upon default as well as 
his incentive to take sufficient precautions against breach will be reduced.198 In addition, the 
promisee's choice to enter into the particular contract will also be altered as the prospect of a 
side payment relieving the breacher from some of his responsibility will induce him not to 
                                                 
192 Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati at 422, 450. 
193 Art. 262(2) Contracts Act.  
194 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 When a Failure to Give Assurance May Be Treated as a 
Repudiation in relation to § 243 Effect of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving Rise to a Claim for Damages 
for Total Breach and § 241 Circumstances Significant in Determining Whether a Failure is Material. 
195 For England, see McKendrik 1725-1726. 
196 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 111. 
197 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 13 and 14 in Section A. of this Chapter. 
198 Triantis and Triantis, ‘Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions’ 202; Craswell, ‘Insecurity, 
Repudiation and Cure’ 410. For the promisor's decision to take precautions, see supra Section B. of this Chapter. 
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factor all the cost of his failure to perform into his price. As a result, the non-breacher's ability 
to select the less risky contractual partners on the basis of price information will 
deteriorate.199 Conversely, the promisor bribing the promisee so that she does not force 
inefficiently early termination will affect the promisee's reliance decision. Receiving a side 
payment, the promisee will be incentivised to rely on the contract even more than she 
overrelies with perfect expectation damages.200  
Having clarified parties' decision to terminate the contract prematurely, I now turn to their 
choices regarding collecting and disclosing information. 
H. The decisions to collect and disclose information 
As already emphasised several times, in their analysis of contract remedies economists 
generally assume symmetric information in which each party knows the other's cost or value 
of performance. However, as in the real world parties are not perfectly informed, if they are 
interested in certain information, they must invest to collect it. Or if it is information their 
contractual partner already has, he can provide it to them. Despite the fact that law and 
economics seems to have focused mainly on the breach and reliance choices, remedies for 
breach also influence the decisions to collect and disclose information. Below I discuss some 
information-related incentives and the way they are affected by damages. 
1. The decision to search for contractual partners 
Besides legal rules on contract formation, damages also have an effect on parties' motivation 
to collect information about potential contractual partners and look for better ones who can 
increase their profits. A party's search is efficient until it reaches the point where the marginal 
cost of any additional hunting effort exceeds its marginal value.201 Generally, the higher the 
damages, the more they discourage a party to search for a new partner as the compensation 
the party has to pay to his old one automatically reduces his increased surplus from the new 
contract.202 In addition, the incentives that damages induce also depend on whether a market 
                                                 
199 Craswell, ‘Insecurity, Repudiation and Cure’ 411-412. For the decision to enter into a particular contract, see 
infra Section H.2 of this Chapter. 
200 For the promisee's decision to rely, see supra Section C. of this Chapter. 
201 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 58. 
202 Lewis Kornhauser, ‘An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies’ (1986) 57 University 
of Colorado Law Review 683, 693; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 112. For a very technical, though very 
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actor's search decision has an external effect on the other market participants.203 In markets 
with many traders where an increase in search does not affect other parties' meeting 
probabilities, expectation damages optimise a market actor's search motivation. In this 
context, too, however, actors, who continue to seek out a better match though they already 
have a contract, may grow to have excessive search incentives if they still value the 
possibility to complete their existing agreement. The reason is that though such parties are 
willing to breach, they will do so only if they find a good partner who is himself partnerless as 
the latter will bring a higher gain than some other potentially good but already poorly 
matched partner.204 On the other hand, in markets with low density of potential partners where 
any additional search increases the chances for finding a potential trader not only of the 
searcher but also of other market participants, expectation damages create too weak search 
incentives. Since the searcher cannot internalise all the benefits of his investment in hunting 
for a better partner, he is inclined to search less than is efficient. In fact, if such positive 
externality occurs, no damage measure, even overcompensatory damages, results in an 
efficient search decision.205   
                                                                                                                                                        
enlightening analysis of parties' incentives to search for a better contractual partner, see Peter Diamond and Erik 
Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States’ (1979) 10 The Bell 
Journal of Economics 282; Peter Diamond and Erik Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of 
Contract II. A Non-Steady Example’ (1981) 25 Journal of Economic Theory 165. 
203 Risk neutrality is again assumed. Diamond and Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of 
Contract, I: Steady States’ 285; Diamond and Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of 
Contract II. A Non-Steady Example’ 167. 
204 Partnerless actors are generally more valuable partners than actors who already have a poor contract as they 
are willing to settle for a smaller share of the contract surplus (after all they do not have to pay damages to 
previous partners) while at the same time they bear the burden of the damages their good match needs to pay to 
his old poor partner. Diamond and Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: 
Steady States’ 286, footnote 15, 293-294. In such markets with high density of potential contractual partners 
overcompensatory damages also generally induce too much search as then the searcher needs to find a good 
partner from whom he can extract a sufficiently large share of the contract surplus which to enable him to pay 
the higher damages to his previous poor match. In this sense, under overcompensatory damages investment in 
finding a new good counterparty is expected to generate a higher return than that under expectation damages; 
hence, search goes beyond the efficient level. Ibid; Diamond and Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search 
and Breach of Contract II. A Non-Steady Example’. 
205 Overcompensatory damages can somewhat improve search incentives because a party who has to pay high 
damages to his previous poor partner is generally motivated to persist in finding a new good contract generating 
a higher gain; yet, overall, the induced search will remain below the efficient level. Note that damages can be 
increased only up to the point where they exhaust the extra surplus made with the new good contract. Damages 
set over this level will make breach unprofitable and, hence, very unlikely, stripping search activity of hardly any 
sense. To be correct, in Diamond and Maskin's analysis the argument is made with liquidated damages set by the 
parties above the compensatory level; yet, it carries on to the case where overcompensatory damages are 
awarded by courts. Diamond and Maskin, ‘An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady 
States’ 294-295, 300. 
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The decision to gather information for the purpose of finding a better partner must be 
differentiated from another decision related to collecting information: the decision of whether 
to enter into a contract with an already located contractual partner. 
2. The decision to enter into a particular contract 
To make it clear from the outset, in the following discussion the incentive to collect 
information in order to decide whether to enter into a particular contract is not associated with 
collecting information about the likely market trends206 but with an inquiry about the possible 
hazards that may render one of the parties unable to perform. The distinction is not 
unimportant since both kinds of information are related to the profitability of the contract; yet, 
unlike the first kind, the second one is not collected with the intention to make money on it 
and its value by no means depends on its confidentiality. The issue is also not which party, the 
potential promisor or promisee, is best positioned to collect information, but rather, assuming 
that the Seller is the would-be breacher and also the most apt to investigate, how much 
research it is optimal for him to conduct in order to decide whether to enter into a contract.207   
Indeed, a Seller learns his true costs of performance only ex post, but he does not have to bind 
himself blindly, without having any clue about the obstacles he will face in fulfilling his 
promise. On the contrary, in deciding whether to contract at all, he can investigate possible 
risks that may render performance too expensive and force him to breach. From this 
perspective, collecting information about one's own potential costs of performance is a sort of 
precaution; yet, such that is taken prior to contracting.208 It is intuitive that higher liability will 
induce more investment in collecting information; yet, the important question is not which 
damage measure increases a party's investigation activity, but which damage measure induces 
him to collect as much information as it is efficient. A party has reached the optimal level of 
risk research when further increase in information-gathering will entail a marginal cost that 
                                                 
206 For analysis of the incentive to collect information about the state of the market, see Antony Kronman, 
‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts’ (1978) 7 The Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
207 Certainly in some cases, it may be the Buyer, i.e. the promisee, who is better positioned to collect 
information. The damage measure that will then induce her to research optimally depends on the same factors as 
the ones indicated in the discussion that follows above. Richard Craswell, ‘Precontractual Investigation as an 
Optimal Precaution Problem’ (1988) 17 The Journal of Legal Studies 401, 404, 406. For some of the issues 
related to the decision which party is better positioned to collect information, see Posner and Rosenfield, 
‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’ 90-92. 
208 Contrast with the promisor's precautions in Section B. of this Chapter, which are also intended to prevent 
breach but are taken after the contract has already been signed.  
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surpasses the reduction in expected losses. In fact, insufficient precontractual research may 
lead to two kinds of losses: losses resulting from concluding a contract that will eventually 
not be performed and losses resulting from not concluding a contract that will potentially be 
profitable. In the first case, these are the reliance damages the promisee would not have 
incurred without the signed contract; in the second case, losses equal the surplus the potential 
contract could have but did not generate because it was not signed. In order to have an 
optimal incentive to collect information before contracting, the party should fully internalise 
both kinds of costs of inadequate investigation.209   
In a perfectly monopolistic and perfectly competitive market, both reliance and expectation 
damages, if perfectly calculated, create optimal incentives to collect information.210 
Undoubtedly, reliance damages will force the Seller to bear the Buyer's reliance losses from 
entering into a contract that will not be completed. And expectation damages, which in these 
market structures converge with reliance damages, will have the same effect.211 As for the 
costs from the Seller's imprudent decision not to contract, a monopolistic Seller may 
internalise them through the very loss of the contract price that he, engaging in first-degree 
price discrimination, could set equal to the Buyer's value, thus extracting the whole 
contractual surplus. In perfect competition, on the other hand, the Seller is not able to charge a 
price, higher than his costs. Consequently, his failure to conclude a contract does not lead to 
any loss of social surplus, and, hence, to any costs that he needs to internalise.212 
However, in a market which (like most markets) is neither perfectly monopolistic, nor 
perfectly competitive, the choice of the optimal damage measure is not so clear-cut. In such a 
market, neither of the parties will be able to command the price and each will capture only a 
                                                 
209 Craswell, ‘Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem’ 413-414. 
210 A short note on the assumptions underlying the results regarding this decision will be useful. To focus on the 
effect of legal remedies, Craswell assumes away any nonlegal sanctions. He also makes some assumptions that 
allow him to concentrate on the effect of damages solely on the incentive to collect information: the Seller 
cannot do anything to increase the probability of performance and the Buyer cannot change his reliance 
expenditure, which is implied to be reasonable. The possibility that the Buyer does not enter into her first-best 
contract, which will cause her reliance damages to exceed her expectation damages, is also excluded. The usual 
assumption of risk-neutrality also applies. Ibid 403, footnote 5, 407, 410.   
211 On the convergence of expectation and reliance damages in perfectly competitive markets, see supra the text 
accompanying footnotes 132-135 in Section A.4. Spot contracts of Chapter IV. As already explained, 
expectation damages encompass the promisee's reliance losses as well as her lost profits. See supra the text 
accompanying footnote 92 in Section C.2. of Chapter III. In a perfectly monopolistic market, however, the Seller 
is able to set a contract price equal to the Buyer's value from performance, thus leaving the Buyer unable to 
make any profit on the contract. As a result, Buyer's expectation damages cover only her reliance losses and 
equal reliance damages. Ibid 416-417. 
212 Ibid 416-420. 
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share of the contractual surplus. Under these conditions, reliance damages motivate too little 
information-gathering as the Seller bears the costs of his ill-considered decision to contract, 
but does not bear the full costs of his poor choice not to contract (after all, if he does not 
collect the contract price, he loses only a part of the unrealised contractual surplus). The 
optimal damage measure, therefore, is one that results in compensation higher than reliance 
damages. Yet, it does not follow that it is exactly the expectation measure that optimises the 
incentive to collect information. Certainly, expectation damages increase the amount of 
damages the Seller has to pay in case he has struck an unprofitable contract and thus stimulate 
him to investigate more before binding himself. However, this may lead to an incentive that is 
too strong relative to the optimal level since expectation damages may exceed reliance 
damages by too much. Or the incentive may prove to be too weak to compensate for the fact 
that, dividing the contractual surplus, the price in fact understates the costs of an imprudent 
decision not to contract. In other words, if the expectation measure ever proves to be optimal, 
this will be only coincidentally. Most often it will turn out to be less or greater than the 
optimal damage measure.213   
It is important to emphasise that all of the above outcomes hold in an imperfect informational 
environment in which the Buyer does not have concrete information of the probability of 
performance of the particular Seller but is aware only of the average risk associated with 
Sellers like the one she negotiates with. To put it differently, the Buyer is assumed to have 
rational expectations about the amount of investigation the Seller conducts prior to 
contracting.214 Without such relaxing of the assumption of perfect information, damage 
measures either do not matter at all (perfect monopoly and perfect competition), or all provide 
the Seller with the same suboptimal incentive (a market falling between the two extremes). As 
long as the Buyer is perfectly informed, perfect competition will induce the Seller to collect 
information optimally regardless of the damage measure because otherwise he will be driven 
out of the market.215 A perfectly price-discriminating monopolist will also decide on the 
optimal amount of research irrespectively of the applicable damage measure since he bears all 
the costs of any increase in investigation as well as internalises, through the higher contract 
price, all the gains brought by it.216 On the other hand, in an intermediate market environment 
                                                 
213 Ibid 402, 421-423. 
214 Ibid 418-419. 
215 Ibid 419-420. 
216 Ibid 417. 
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in which the Buyer knows the exact level of risk posed by the particular Seller, the Seller will 
always collect less information than efficient because whatever the damage measure he will 
always capture only a share of the surplus produced by his wise decision to contract. Indeed, 
as already explained, a higher damage measure will improve the Seller's incentive to 
investigate, but will also make the Buyer (who is better insured against non-performance) less 
eager to pay a higher price for more research. As these diametrically opposite incentive 
effects exactly offset each other, the Seller will have too weak an incentive to collect 
information under any damage measure, even if it is higher than the reliance one.217  
Under the rational expectations assumption, however, the Seller is unable to increase the price 
claiming that he engages in more research of the potential risks since the Buyer simply does 
not observe any changes in the Seller's level of investigation. Thus, even though in each type 
of market the Seller is able to charge the same price as under perfect information, he is unable 
to extract a bigger share of the Buyer's surplus through raising it. As a result, the Seller's 
motivation starts changing depending on the damage measure. In perfectly monopolistic and 
perfectly competitive markets only reliance and the converging expectation damages induce 
the Seller to collect the optimal amount of information.218 And in an intermediate market 
environment, the optimal damage measure exceeds the reliance one but may be below or 
above the expectation measure.219 In this sense, when it comes to the Seller's decision to enter 
into a contract, in order for the choice between damage measures to make any sense at all, it is 
necessary to leave the comfortable perfect informational environment, typical for most 
Chicagoan economic models.220 
Sometimes, the information a party needs to make an efficient decision is held by his 
contractual partner. Damages can also affect the informed actor's decision to disclose the 
collected information to the party who needs it in order to behave efficiently.  
                                                 
217 Ibid 421-422. 
218 Ibid 419. 
219 Ibid 402, 422-423. 
220 In this sense also ibid 427. 
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3. The decision to disclose information 
As it was already explained, the promisor's decision to take efficient precautions depends on 
his awareness of the promisee's expected value from performance.221 Consequently, if the 
promisee has this information and discloses it to the promisor, the latter will be able to adjust 
his precautions to the optimal level. And conversely, to optimise her own selfish investment, 
the promisee needs to account for the probability of promisor's breach.222 Hence, if the 
promisor knows the likelihood of breach and conveys it to the promisee, the latter will have 
an easier time deciding on the optimal amount of her reliance expenditure.223 Thus, if 
communication costs are outweighed by the benefits resulting from taking efficient 
precautions, respectively from relying optimally, disclosing such private information to the 
other party is socially desirable.224  
Generally, in contract law parties are induced to disclose information not through remedies 
for breach of contract but through rules on fraud, misrepresentation and nondisclosure. Thus, 
it is argued that constant and restrained damage measures, which are considered capable of 
optimising the promisee's selfish investment decision,225 cannot incentivise the promisor to 
communicate truthfully the likelihood of his performance. The promisor is rather motivated to 
achieve a higher price, so he does not give information that is perfectly accurate but such that 
would make the promisee perceive the contract as more profitable. If the constant damage 
measure is set below the expectation one, the promisor has the incentive to make performance 
look more probable. If the constant damage measure exceeds the expectation measure, he has 
the incentive to make performance seem less likely as to the promisee breach appears the 
more valuable option. The promisor, in other words, has no stimulus to tell the truth. 
Consequently, if rules policing his statements for misrepresentation, fraud or nondisclosure 
are absent and he is only liable for breach of contract under a constant or restrained damage 
measure, the promisee will not have optimal reliance incentives since she will not receive 
credible information about the likelihood of performance. To put it differently, the mentioned 
                                                 
221 For the promisor's decision to take precautions, see supra Section B. of this Chapter. 
222 For the promisee's decision to make selfish investment in reliance, see supra Section C. of this Chapter. 
223 In this sense, see also Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 113. 
224 Lucian Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, ‘Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The 
Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale’ (1991) 7 The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 284, 286, 288. 
225 Recall that restitution and no liability can optimise the promisee's selfish investment in a second-best sense. 
In addition, liquidated damages and restrained damage measures can optimise both the promisor's perform-or-
breach and promisee's selfish reliance decisions. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 77-78, 82, 97-99 in 
Section C. of this Chapter. 
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damage measures produce optimal effect if the promisee has perfect information but they 
themselves do not guarantee that she is perfectly informed.226  
Nevertheless, all three legal systems under comparison contain a remedial default term 
incentivising the promisee to disclose accurate information about her value of performance. 
This is the effect generated by the Anglo-American rule of Hadley v. Baxendale227 and the 
Bulgarian provision of Art. 82 of the Contracts Act,228 both denying full compensation to non-
breachers who at the time of contracting have not revealed the extraordinary harm they will 
suffer in the event of breach. By limiting promisors' liability to the foreseeable damages, this 
"penalty default"229 induces promisees with unusually high losses to convey their special 
circumstances and thus alert promisors about the higher level of precautions that need to be 
taken to ensure performance. Assuming this type of promisees is a minority, in a competitive 
market such a legal rule is efficient as the potential breacher, in fact, gets to know the 
valuation of all promisees (those who do not identify themselves must value performance as 
usual) but the socially desirable information transfer occurs at minimum transaction costs. 
Conversely, in the absence of such limitation to liability, promisees may still disclose their 
value of performance; yet, the communication process will entail more transaction costs as it 
will be the majority of ordinary promisees, driven by a desire to achieve a lower price, who 
will be motivated to reveal information.230  
In addition, there is yet another reason for which the present foreseeability rule is argued to be 
preferable in a competitive market.231 Since in such a market price equals cost, Buyers with 
extraordinary losses capture all the gain in surplus resulting from their disclosure. 
                                                 
226 This outcome results under several assumptions: that the information about the probability of performance is 
private and the only way for the promisee to obtain it is if the promisor discloses it; that the promisor cannot 
prove in any way the reliability of the information he discloses; that parties always contract when it is efficient. 
Craswell, ‘Performance, Reliance and One-Sided Information’, 373-382. Constant damage measures are also 
shown not to induce the promisor to disclose accurate information if renegotiation is possible. Ibid 388-393. 
227 Hadley v Baxendale, see supra footnote 160 in Section E. of this Chapter. 
228 Art. 82 Contracts Act, see supra footnote 160 in Section E. of this Chapter. 
229 Ayres and Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’. 
230 Bebchuk and Shavell 286-289; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 337. The same reasoning pointing at the 
conservation of transaction costs justifies the superiority of the present limiting-liability rule, if information 
disclosure is not socially desirable, but nonetheless occurs. Conversely, if no communication occurs, the present 
rule will be inferior since unlike the unlimited liability rule, it will lead promisors to take low instead of average 
precautions, the latter being the optimal behaviour in case distinguishing between promisees is not possible. 
Bebchuk and Shavell 290-292.  
231 Bebchuk and Shavell 289, 297-298; Ayres and Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules’ 108. Parties are also assumed to be risk-neutral as risk-aversion may affect the 
promisee's incentive to disclose information. See Bebchuk and Shavell 306. 
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Consequently, as long as this gain is sufficiently large, they always reveal their type though 
this inevitably means they also have to pay a higher price. Conversely, under a rule requiring 
payment of full expectation damages, no disclosure may occur whatsoever. Indeed, in these 
circumstances low-value Buyers may have an incentive to identify themselves; yet, if, being 
the majority, their benefit is too little compared to the communication costs, they may simply 
find self-identification worthless.232 High-value Buyers, on the other hand, will be unwilling 
to reveal their type as they would face a price increase despite the fact that the Seller's liability 
will not expand any further. In other words, although disclosure will result in efficient 
adjustment of precautions, promisees with large losses will prefer not to divulge information 
for strategic reasons.233 The superiority of the present limitation on liability, then, lies in 
disallowing such strategic motivation to prevent efficient information disclosure. To reiterate, 
however, this result is contingent on the underlying assumption of a competitive market 
where high-value Buyers' self-interest perfectly corresponds to the social interest since they 
extract the entire surplus increase resulting from their disclosure. 
While inducing promisees to convey important information at the time of contracting, the 
present penalty default does not encourage promisors to act likewise after the agreement is 
already signed. This is not an issue in spot contracts for which costly ex post readjustments 
are not typical even if the moment of performance may differ from the moment of 
contracting. Yet, in the case of long-term contracts where circumstances may change 
substantially before performance, a promisor may significantly reduce promisee's losses from 
breach by communicating to her relevant information that he obtained only subsequently. 
Such information may rescue the contractual partner, but may also make her regret she has 
entered into the contract at all. For this reason, having once struck the bargain, the promisor 
who cannot easily resell his customised performance, has no incentive to make ex post 
disclosures that may endanger the contract completion. This natural absence of motivation is 
additionally aggravated by the foreseeability rule which fixes the time of contracting as the 
relevant moment determining the scope of promisor's liability.234 Such exclusion of the time 
                                                 
232 Note that the gain of low-value Buyers from disclosing their type depends on the number of Buyers facing 
extraordinary losses. Thus, where the latter are too few, the price decrease achieved by low-value Buyers may be 
very little while the communication costs they bear are not insignificant. Ayres and Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ 110-111. 
233 Bebchuk and Shavell 297-301; Ayres and Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules’ 108-111. 
234 Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 1012-1015. 
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period between contracting and performance, a period which in long-term contracts is fairly 
extensive and rich in information accumulation, does not induce cooperation between the 
parties and consequently does not alleviate the information asymmetry between them. 
In any case, any consideration of the incentives to disclose information, be they ex ante or ex 
post, implies a non-homogeneous population of market players: promisors differing with 
regard to the likelihood of their performance, promisees differing with regard to how much 
they value a particular contract. Where parties are diverse, however, damages are important 
not only as a source of motivation to reveal one's type but also as a method of distinguishing 
contracting parties.  
I. Damages and party heterogeneity 
Where market players are heterogeneous and information is asymmetric, parties can use 
damage clauses to collect information about their contractual partners or to inform them of 
their own type. If a promisor deals with both high and low-value promisees, his expected cost 
of damages varies depending on the type of the promisee he contracts with. Not knowing to 
which category each Buyer belongs, an uninformed Seller cannot simply price discriminate 
among his contractual partners. However, if he has market power, he can engage in second-
degree price discrimination and distort non-price contractual terms, including remedial terms, 
to distinguish his counterparties and boost his profits.235 For example, by offering a whole 
menu of contracts, incorporating different liquidated damages clauses, the Seller can screen 
the common pool of Buyers and separate them into different types. Conversely, damage 
clauses can also be used by informed parties to convey information. For example, a Seller 
may promise to pay high liquidated damages in order to signal his trustworthiness to a 
hesitating Buyer and thus distinguish himself as a party whose performance is virtually 
certain.236 In other words, contractual damage clauses can also be analysed as devices used to 
sort a heterogeneous population of market players.237 
                                                 
235 For using the warranty term to distinguish among different classes of Buyers, see Steven Matthews and John 
Moore, ‘Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional 
Screening’ (1987) 55 Econometrica 441. 
236 Signalling games are first studied by Spence, see Michael Spence, ‘Job Market Signaling’ (1973) 87 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 355. 
237 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics 322, 304; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 114. 
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When actors are unable to classify their contractual partners by screening or identify 
themselves by signalling, the default foreseeability limitation on expectation damages also has 
the effect of separating different types of contracting parties.238 As discussed in the previous 
section, even in a competitive spot market high-value Buyers may refrain from signalling for 
strategic reasons and low-value Buyers – simply because it is cost-ineffective. In such a 
market, the Seller, too, will commonly find screening prohibitively costly and will 
consequently charge all Buyers an average price calculated to reflect his expected liability 
costs to both types of promisees. As a result, heterogeneous Buyers remain pooled together, 
with low-value Buyers paying a price exceeding the one they would pay if they were 
distinguished and high-value Buyers paying a price lower than the one they would pay if they 
bore the expected cost of their own damages. In other words, low-value Buyers cross-
subsidise high-value ones. The higher cross-subsidised price may even surpass the value some 
of them place on performance leading them eventually to leave the market. The foreseeability 
rule can thus be viewed as thwarting such adverse selection.239 By limiting damages to the 
ordinary, foreseeable losses, it forces high-value Buyers to distinguish themselves, thus 
reducing cross-subsidisation and precluding low-risk parties from being driven out of the 
market. This suggests setting limits on full expectation damages and compensating only the 
losses commonly experienced by all promisees. It should not be forgotten, however, that such 
curbing of the recoverable damages may also incentivise the promisor to take suboptimal 
precautions as well as to breach too often.240  
In short, from the standpoint of efficiency damages below the perfect expectation measure 
may be desirable to incentivise promisees to take precautions241 as well as to prevent adverse 
selection. Another reason that may call for compensating less than the promisee's full 
expectation interest may be contracting parties' risk aversion.242 
                                                 
238 Gwyn Quillen, ‘Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization’ (1988) 61 California Law Review 1125. 
239 Akerlof. 
240 Quillen; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 113-115. For the promisor's decisions to perform or breach and to take 
precautions, see respectively supra Section A. and B. of this Chapter.  
241 See supra Section E. of this Chapter. 
242 In this sense see also Quillen 1126, footnote 5. 
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J. Damages and risk allocation 
Even if damages affected none of the incentives discussed above, they allocate the risk of 
contract breach between the parties. This effect is irrelevant if both parties are risk neutral;243 
yet, if one or both of them is risk averse, the way the remedy distributes risk between the 
contractual partners also matters in terms of efficiency.244 The importance of this remedial 
effect can be appreciated better if considering that renegotiation cannot simply rectify an 
undesirable risk allocation. Indeed, where a very large risk is imposed on a risk-averse party, 
his possibility to renegotiate the contract tends to lessen the risk as he can make a side 
payment to avoid performing his obligation. Still, the magnitude of this payment being 
uncertain, upon renegotiation the risk is only tempered and not eradicated, so it is only the 
choice of a different remedy that can significantly improve risk-sharing between the parties 
and not renegotiation of the initial contract.245     
To avoid complicating the analysis of remedies with additional risk insurance considerations, 
economists, however, commonly assume that parties are risk neutral. In case the reader has 
followed carefully the preceding discussion of the various parties' decisions, he must have 
noticed that economic scholars simply set the issue of risk allocation aside in order to focus 
only on the effect of damages on the particular incentives they wish to study.246 Still, in a 
world in which insurance is so widespread, the automatic assumption of risk-neutrality seems 
too strong.247 Bearing in mind that parties have different attitudes toward risk, it appears more 
plausible to speak of their relative risk aversion rather than their risk indifference.248 In this 
sense, if contracting parties are risk averse to a different degree, it is efficient that they share 
the risk in a way that reflects their relative risk aversion. 
                                                 
243 As shown by Polinsky, if both parties are risk neutral, all remedies are equally efficient as far as allocation of 
risk is concerned. A. Mitchell Polinsky, ‘Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies’ (1983) 12 Journal 
of Legal Studies 427, 431, 442 Table 4. 
244 Ibid; Steven Shavell, ‘The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach’ (1984) 99 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 121, 146; Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 351.  
245 Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 318, 366-367; Craswell, ‘Contract Remedies, 
Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach’ 645. 
246 See supra the introduction of this Chapter as well as footnote 205 in Section H.1. and footnote 212 in Section 
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Economic Analysis’ 91.  
248 For a good and very concise explanation of risk aversity, see ibid 91 as well as Cooter, ‘Unity in Tort, 
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Expectation damages, however, do not achieve such fine-tuned risk sharing. Assuming the 
uncertainty relates to Seller's production cost or Buyer's valuation, or to the appearance of a 
higher outside bid, perfectly calculated expectation damages allocate the entire risk to the 
breaching party. While his profit varies depending on whether the risk materialises, the non-
breaching party receives her benefit from the contract irrespective of its performance or 
breach. Such allocation of risk is optimal if the breacher is risk neutral and the non-breacher is 
risk averse.249 Assuming, however, the uncertainty relates to the possibility of a higher outside 
bid, where the third party can make an offer not only to the Seller but also to the Buyer, 
perfectly computed expectation damages allocate the risk entirely to the non-breacher. The 
reason is that in this situation they, having to put the Buyer in the position she would have 
occupied if she herself had recontracted with the outsider, amount to the third-party bid. 
Consequently, it is the Buyer's (i.e. the non-breacher's) profit that is uncertain as she is better 
off if a third party comes along while the Seller's profit remains the same: the difference 
between the contract price and his cost. Hence, in the event when the Buyer would have been 
able to resell to the outsider, expectation damages are optimal only if the breacher (the Seller) 
is risk-averse and the non-breacher is risk neutral.250 In any case, the expectation measure is 
not optimal if contracting parties wish to share the risk because they are both risk-averse. In 
terms of risk allocation it is desirable only when one of the parties, being risk-neutral, acts as 
a perfect insurer of the other.251 
Efficient risk sharing according to the parties' relative risk aversion can be achieved by a 
damage payment falling in between the damage measures that prove to be optimal in the two 
polar cases where either the promisor, or the promisee is risk-neutral.252 However, in the case 
of a risk of a higher third party offer reliance damages and restitution always remain outside 
the optimal range since they are lower than the Buyer's benefit both when she is able to resell 
to the third party and when she cannot avail herself of the outside bid.253 As a result, instead 
of leading to optimal risk sharing between the parties, reliance damages and restitution in fact 
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heighten the risk. Of the two, the restitution measure is inferior since being lower than 
reliance damages, it makes parties' profits even more varying and unstable.254 Nevertheless, 
where the risk is one of extraordinary production cost and both the promisor and the promisee 
are risk averse, reliance damages and restitution may prove to be optimal since they fall 
within the range of the optimal damage payment. In the event of production cost uncertainty, 
this range is determined by a payment amounting to the Seller's normal production cost 
(leaving him with unvarying profit, equalling the difference between the contract price and 
the normal production cost irrespective of any cost increase) and a payment amounting to the 
Buyer's benefit (leaving her with unvarying profit, equalling the difference between her 
benefit and the contract price). With a damage payment within this range, the risk is absorbed 
by the Seller so far as the payment surpasses his normal production cost, and by the Buyer so 
far as it falls below her benefit. Sure enough, damages recovered under the reliance or the 
restitution measure may happen to coincide precisely with the intermediate transfer that 
shares optimally the risk between the two risk-averse parties. Yet, this would not necessarily 
be so, since the reliance and restitution payments depend on the parties' relative bargaining 
power and not on their relative risk aversion.255 In any case, whatever the risk, when both 
parties are risk-averse, the optimal amount of compensation is below perfect expectation 
damages. 
When it comes to allocation of risk, there is yet another reason that supports lowering 
damages below the perfect expectation measure. Even if the breaching party is risk neutral, 
when breach results in non-pecuniary loss, it may be optimal that the recovered damages do 
not recompense for it. Unless the promisee is risk-preferring, she may not be willing to pay a 
higher price in order to be insured against non-pecuniary losses that are not fully replaceable 
by money.256 In this sense, compensating non-pecuniary losses will have an effect similar to 
that of punitive damages (in the event of only pecuniary losses) which are optimal if the non-
breacher is risk-loving and hence ready to pay more upfront for the possibility to make a 
larger profit if breach occurs.257 And since an assumption that promisees generally have a 
preference for risk would be equivalent to an assumption that they are motivated to contract 
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by an unlikely desire to gamble,258 it may be better that non-pecuniary losses remain excluded 
from expectation damages as they generally are. 
In fact, whatever parties' taste for risk, the only damage measure that can always allocate risk 
optimally is liquidated damages, provided, of course, that it is set by the parties only in view 
of risk distribution.259 To reiterate, if both parties are risk averse, the optimal liquidated 
damage payment will be less than full expectation damages, so courts may refrain from 
intervention.260 Yet, the more important point is that with the optimal damage payment 
greatly dependent on contractual partners' characteristics, courts have to be able to verify and 
evaluate them in order to award compensation that optimises risk distribution. In this sense, 
parties are in a better position to find out the factors that determine their relative risk aversion 
and to agree on damages that allocate risk optimally between them.261  
In sum, this short peek into the risk averse world reveals that damages also play an important 
risk distribution function. However, the damage payment that may be optimal in terms of risk 
sharing may not be optimal from the standpoint of some of the parties' decisions, discussed 
above. Thus, compensation below perfect expectation damages that may distribute risk 
between contractual partners in accordance with their relative risk aversion will compromise 
the promisor's incentive to perform and to take precautions. In this sense, risk allocation 
considerations complicate the choice of the efficient damage measure even further. 
As is evident from the above account, remedies, and in particular damages, can be used to 
pursue different goals. Although efficient risk allocation may be important in many situations, 
contract law may also seek to stimulate optimal decision making with regard to breach, 
reliance, precautions, information gathering or disclosure, etc., thus there is not one single 
damage measure that can achieve all of these objectives sucessfully.262 As shown, expectation 
damages, regularly imposed by courts in all three legal systems under comparison, induce 
efficient breach but also too early termination of the contract. They motivate efficient 
precautions on the side of the promisor but need to be reduced to ensure efficient precautions 
and mitigation on the side of the promisee. They incentivise selfish overreliance and 
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cooperative underreliance, as well as hardly optimising parties' information-related incentives. 
Damages, less than the expectation measure, are desirable when contractual partners are 
heterogeneous and when both of them are risk averse. In other words, expectation damages 
are not the best choice in all possible states of the world; yet, often when they do not optimise 
a party's decision, the reliance or restitution measures do not fare any better, either, or if they 
do, it is only coincidentally. Thus, ultimately there is not a first-best default measure of 
damages that can be favoured unconditionally. 
Conclusion 
In a nutshell, if damages are viewed in terms of the effects they produce, optimal damages are 
those that induce the optimal combination of all of the incentives elaborated above. Roughly 
speaking, any weakening of some incentive must be offset by an improvement in another 
incentive. 263 All these trade-offs considered, however, the optimal damages in the majority of 
circumstances would prove to constitute an amount that is neither of the three interest-based 
damage measures. Thus, the upshot from the above consequentialist rationalising of the 
remedy is that the damages that produce the optimal joint effect may turn out to be any figure. 
For this reason, the most recent economic scholarship envisages damages not as a set of 
measures, each protecting a particular interest, but as a continuum, on which the first-best 
remedy could possibly lie at any point.264 With such an indeterminate result, however, one 
could say that a new set of legal rules improving the way courts award damages cannot be 
devised, so the choice of remedy should always be left in the hands of the parties who know 
best how to distribute the risk and balance their conflicting incentives. In this sense, the 
economic model could easily lead to the conclusion that liquidated damages represent the 
quick fix to all the tensions described above and that parties should simply be incentivised to 
always stipulate a damage payment with contract law mechanically enforcing their agreement 
as it is. 
Such a universal normative recommendation, however, would be nothing else but mimicking 
a world which remains to a great extent frictionless and thus practically impossible to 
reproduce. Recall that the economic model above is only a normative construction, which 
though educational if one wants to view damages in instrumental terms, still largely assumes 
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a perfect-information, perfect-enforcement nirvana. In this world damages are always 
perfectly calculated and investment is not always strictly unverifiable. If transaction costs are 
assumed, this is done without investigating their sources and only for the purpose of 
excluding renegotiation. Once, however, we start accounting for transaction costs in a more 
disciplined way, it appears that results may turn out different. Thus, for example, liquidated 
damages may not be preferable in many situations since they require parties to bargain over 
them each and every time a contract is signed while the default damage measures generate 
costs only upon breach.265 Also, in a context of information asymmetry and party 
heterogeneity, parties' unlimited freedom to stipulate damages entails the danger of huge 
efficiency losses, resulting from undesirable cross-subsidisation and adverse selection.266 In 
fact, reducing the issue of remedial efficiency to the single solution of party-stipulated 
damages makes default damage measures futile at one stroke. Implicitly, it rules out not only 
the proposition that under some conditions it is efficient for default terms to regulate, it also 
wipes out the most conventional justification of defaults as facilitating gap-filling devices. 
Thus, once positive transaction-cost reality enters the model in a more complete manner, one-
size-fits-all solutions begin to look fairly unconvincing. 
To put it differently, rationalising damages as a legal instrument that affects contracting 
behaviour, the economic model evaluates the efficiency of the three interest-based damage 
measures with respect to ten identified incentive effects and shows that none of them is 
optimal in all circumstances. The model, however, has two important limitations. First, it does 
not represent a positive theory since it does not explain when courts actually use one or 
another damage measure. In fact, besides being anchored in the contractual interests, 
protected in all three jurisdictions, and besides touching briefly on some remedial default 
terms that are common for the selected legal systems, the model tells us very little about the 
way contract law is actually applied in the jurisdictions under comparison. It says nothing 
about how courts calculate compensation in concrete contractual disputes, how they deal with 
the challenge of asymmetric information, whether they discern opportunistic from cooperative 
behaviour. Thus, the model does not provide a truthful description and a valid explanation of 
reality.  
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The inadequate positive relevance of the model logically leads to its second limitation: the 
model also fails as a normative theory. Its restricted normative value stems from the fact that 
it does not systematically account for transaction costs and, consequently, does not identify 
the damage measure that is the most cost-economising in particular situations. To reiterate the 
significance of transaction costs it is enough to say that joint profitability alone cannot 
determine the efficiency of contractual performance.267 In fact, even if the contract creates a 
joint surplus, where the latter is exceeded by contracting costs, the contract should not have 
been concluded at all. Or even if the contract produces a joint loss, it should still be performed 
where enforcement costs surpass the resulting waste.268 In addition, as we move along the 
contractual continuum from spot to long-term contracts, rising ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs lead to increasing contractual incompleteness.269 Informational asymmetry, which 
though assumed away in the economic model, is particularly grave in long-term contracting, 
motivates strategic behaviour, which in itself raises transaction costs. Thus, being inattentive 
to the significance of transaction costs as well as to their sources and magnitude according to 
the type of contract, the model does not permit adequate appreciation of default damage terms 
and of their ability to perform not only as facilitative but also as regulatory devices. For this 
reason, the model also fails in normatively justifying how courts should choose among the 
different damage measures in order to encourage efficient contracting behaviour. 
In other words, once we have learned about the instrumental potential of remedies, we have 
reached the limits of the above economic model. As argued in Chapter II, the correct 
procedure now is not to jump to the conclusion that the most efficient remedial solution is the 
one to which the above largely frictionless construction points but to search for the basis of 
further normative conclusions by comparing the real-world remedies granted in similar 
factual situations across jurisdictions. Hence, in the following chapter I rush back to reality 
and embark on the comparative economic analysis of existing remedial alternatives supplied 
by the law in action in the selected legal systems. 
The following chapter explores the availability of Buyer's termination as granted by US, 
English and Bulgarian courts in case of defective goods and construction work. Although 
                                                 
267 Recall that the performance of a contract is efficient only if the promisee's value exceeds the promisor's cost, 
i.e. only if the contract produces a joint profit. See supra Section A. of Chapter III.  
268 In this sense, see George Cohen, ‘Fault Lines in Contract Damages’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 1225, 
1242-1244. 
269 See supra Section A.2. Increased incompleteness of Chapter IV. 
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turning away from damages, the comparison does not simply discard the lessons of the 
economic model regarding incentives. On the contrary, it uses them to develop the argument 
that, in allowing the non-breacher to walk away from what would be a losing contract, 
termination is normally chosen by the latter when it is more favourable to her than 
expectation damages and, thus, can be analysed as a remedy that is more generous to the 
promisee.270 In this sense, it increases Seller's incentive to perform but also incentivises the 
Buyer to behave opportunistically. Thus, having demonstrated how to rationalise remedies as 
incentives, the thesis asks whether termination can be made available to an extent that 
resolves the conflict between optimal Seller's and Buyer's behaviour. In this respect, the 
emphasis is on the capacity of termination to discourage strategic conduct and reduce the 
costs associated with the latter. Or, put differently, the emphasis is on the regulatory function 
of termination.  
                                                 
270 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 124-125; Andrew Kull, ‘Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract’ 
(1994) 67 Southern California Law Review 1465. 
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Chapter VI Termination or Damages within the Contract? 
This chapter relates termination and quality. To the reader it may seem surprising and even 
somewhat incoherent that after such a long and detailed account of the effects produced by 
damages, the thesis abruptly turns to another remedy – termination. The choice, however, is a 
logical consequence of the author's stubborn determination to start in her empirical analysis 
from the existing legal institutions (and not from the imaginary world created by economists), 
as well as of the main research question driving the thesis.   
In fact, the previous chapter could easily leave an innocent reader with the misconception that 
it is all about damages and that by tweaking their measure legislators and courts can and, 
perhaps even do, fine-tune every single aspect of the parties' behaviour. Having gone over the 
chapter, experienced lawyers, however, remain generally sceptical that all ten parties' 
decisions can be adjusted solely by damages and express concerns about vesting too much 
hope in one single remedy.1 Indeed, one should constantly bear in mind, that damages became 
the focal point of contract law and economics largely due to the parochialism of US scholars 
who have naturally directed most of their efforts to the principal contractual remedy in their 
home country legal system.2 Yet, ultimately, damages are not the only legal remedy for 
breach of contract and should not be seen as the solution which inevitably leads to the desired 
result. Thus, where in this thesis, the chief purpose of the elaborated economic model is to 
spotlight remedies as incentives, the acquired knowledge about the ways in which damages 
affect parties' motivation can readily be used to explore other remedies.3 In this relation, it is 
useful to remind that upon breach a promisee often has several forms of relief at her disposal 
and that the manner by which her choice is structured also influences parties' behaviour.4 
Little, however, is done by neoclassical economists in researching precisely the effect of the 
availability of such choices among different remedies,5 so this chapter can also be read as a 
modest contribution in this direction. 
                                                 
1 I am indebted for this point to Professor George Triantis. 
2 See supra footnote 74 in Section C. and footnote 120 in Section D. of Chapter II as well as the text 
accompanying them. 
3 In a similar sense, see Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 125. 
4 On the choice between specific performance and damages, on one hand, and between specific performance and 
termination of the contract, on the other, in Bulgarian contract law, see supra Section A. of Chapter III. 
5 On Buyer's choice between specific performance and termination with restitution, see Stremitzer. On Buyer's 
choice between termination with restitution and damages within the contract, see Brooks and Stremitzer. 
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To be entirely correct, the termination remedy is not completely absent from the economic 
model in the previous chapter; yet, it is featured only with one of its elements – the monetary 
recovery. To blame economists alone for this half-hearted inclusion would be unfair. The 
term "rescission" has for long been disliked by the US legal doctrine,6 which led to the 
subsuming of promisee's right to undo the contract under the term "restitution for breach", the 
latter emphasising only the restoration-of-the-price element of the termination remedy.7 This 
attitude culminated in the Restatement which makes no mention of "rescission" (or any 
synonym) and uses the word solely with respect to "an agreement of rescission".8 It is also not 
unusual for modern monographs on contract law to study restitution as a remedy for breach 
without accounting for "termination" as a separate remedy in its own right.9 This, coupled 
with neoclassical economists' infatuation with damages, explains why termination entered 
their models mainly through its monetary component. Such neglect of the rescission building 
block, however, remains unfortunate as it masks the promisee's choice between enforcing and 
avoiding the bargain and dissipates the most characteristic feature of the remedy: the 
unwinding of the transaction. The obscuring of this effect hampers the efforts of making 
economic analysis more engaged with the real world as it makes it difficult to see the 
transaction costs that are specific to the complete reversing of the contract: transportation and 
de-installation costs related to returning the goods, costs related to their deterioration, costs 
related to shifting the risk. As it will be shown below, such costs may very well exceed the 
administrative costs of calculating damages, saved by nullifying the bargain and restitution of 
the price. In this sense, splitting the remedy and focusing only on one of its elements 
                                                 
6 UCC § 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part., comment 1. For the objections to the use of the 
term "rescission", see Kull, 1491-1492.  
7 To be correct, in all three legal systems termination entails putting an end to the contract, the latter followed 
either by returning of the goods (in case of a sale-of-goods contract) and restitution of the price (as well as a right 
to recover expectation damages), or, in case of buyer's cover, by her receiving expectation damages. For the US, 
see UCC § 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods.; § 2-712. Cover. 
Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.; § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation. (sale-of-
goods contract); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373 Restitution When Other Party Is in Breach; Scott and 
Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 909-910 (construction contract). For England, see Sale of Goods Act 1979 
Section 51 Damages for non-delivery.; Section 54 Interest, etc.; Francis Dawson, ‘Chapter 17. Remedies of the 
Buyer’ in Michael Bridge (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods (Eighth edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson 
Reuters 2010) 1108-1110 (sale-of-goods contract); Uff and Moran, ‘Chapter 37. Construction Contracts’ 817 
(construction contract). For Bulgaria, see Art. 195(1)(2) Contracts Act; Art. 323 Commercial Act (sale-of-goods 
contract) as well as Art. 265(2) in relation to Art. 88 and Art. 82 Contracts Act (construction contract). Section 
B. of this Chapter focuses on the case in which the buyer terminates the sale-of-goods contract and receives back 
the price paid upfront or (in the absence of advance payment) refuses to pay it, at all. 
8 Id. § 283 Agreement of Rescission. In this sense, see also Kull 1491-1492. More generally, on the development 
of the components of the termination remedy (quasi-contract and rescission) in US law, see ibid 1484-1497. 
9 Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts. 
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impoverishes the economic analysis and does not allow in-depth examination of the issue 
when a promisee should be given the right to terminate. 
Still, although dwarfed by the existing research on damages and marked by controversial 
results, one strand of the law-and-economics literature strives to analyse the remedy of 
termination in its entirety, accounting for its elective nature and with greater focus on 
transaction costs.10 It is this literature that the current chapter aims at extending by focusing 
on the Buyer's choice between termination of the contract and damages within the contract in 
case of the Seller's defective performance. The very framing of the choice opens room for 
objections to the analysis for being skewed toward common law legal systems in which the 
remedies of repair and replacement are not provided for by default in case of defective 
performance.11 Admittedly, to the extent that, when remaining on the contract, the Bulgarian 
Buyer may, in principle, also elect to request one of the mentioned performance-oriented 
remedies, the economic analysis still remains limited.12 But as time and space constraints 
exerted pressure, the thesis could not cover the entire remedial system, so preferences strayed 
away from the more extensively researched forms of specific performance and went to the 
much less studied; yet, highly controversial termination remedy. The boundary drawn is by no 
means arbitrary. The choice between termination and damages within the contract is at the 
core of the development of the seller's liability for defective performance from an entirely 
subjective, caveat emptor system, reflecting the pure spot contract, to an objective system, 
based on certain standards, set by law, and reflecting the executory contract, necessitated by 
the speeding of trade.13 Whether this transformation took place on the basis of the aeditilian 
remedies (the Roman model) or of the concept of contractual term (the common law model), 
it was grounded in the election of seeking substitutionary relief within the contract or 
                                                 
10 Alan Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’ (1975) 16 Boston College 
Industrial and Commercial Law Review 543; George Priest, ‘Breach and Remedy for the Tender of 
Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach’ (1978) 91 Harvard Law 
Review 960; Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’; 
Kull; Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 124-126; Gerhard Wagner, ‘Termination and Cure under the Common 
European Sales Law: Consumer Protection Misunderstood’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 147. 
11 Cf. UCC § 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods. (the US) and 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 11(3) in relation to Section 13 Sale by description., Section 14 Implied terms 
about quality or fitness. and Section 15 Sale by sample. (England), on one side, with the Bulgarian Art. 195(1) 
and Art. 265 Contracts Act, on the other side. 
12 See supra footnote 16 in Section A. of Chapter III and the text accompanying it. 
13 Where in spot contracts, executed mainly in local markets and fairs, buyers were able to examine the goods 
and assure themselves of their quality first hand, the "buyer beware" maxim made sense. Yet, with the spread of 
executory contracts, caveat emptor became too harsh a policy. In a similar sense, see Zimmermann 306-308. 
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abandoning it.14 In fact, it was the performance-oriented remedies of repair and replacement 
that gained ground only later, after the industrial revolution had hit the pace and flooded the 
markets with manufactured goods.15 And, although the specific performance principle was 
fetishised during the socialist period in Bulgaria, it has waned with the transition to market 
economy16 making it important to study not only how specific relief relates to damages and 
rescission, but also how the latter two remedies correlate to each other. From this perspective, 
it is interesting how useful it is sometimes to return to the origins in order to see more clearly 
where law is going today. As it will be shown below, the choice between termination and 
damages within the contract continues to be a very relevant choice that merchants face, 
irrespectively of under which of the compared legal systems they do business.17 More 
importantly, it is also a choice, the structure of which has seen substantial changes throughout 
the 20th century in all three jurisdictions and which permits a very close look at the changing 
ratio between the facilitative and the regulatory function of contractual remedies. For all these 
reasons, the decision was made to save performance-oriented remedies for another research 
indulgence and to concentrate on termination as opposed to damages within the contract.  
Since the chapter, however, centres on the termination limb of the choice, a few words on the 
damage measures for accepted goods, used in the three jurisdictions, might at this point 
appear useful. Again, as law-and-economics writings are commonly based on US contract 
law, it is usually said that the promisee chooses between termination and expectation 
damages, the latter remedy normally being preferable (provided damages are calculated 
accurately)18 since it gives the Buyer the value from performance instead of bringing her to 
the status quo ante.19 Termination, followed by restitution, the argument goes, becomes 
favoured only when the contract turns out to be a losing one, as it permits the promisee to 
save considerable losses by walking away from the agreement.20 Indeed, where the seller 
                                                 
14 For a clear and concise account of this transformation of sales law, see Peter Huber, ‘Comparative Sales Law’ 
in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Compartive Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2006) 955-960. For a greater focus on the aedilitian remedies: termination followed by 
restitution of the price (actio redhibitoria) and price reduction (actio quanti minoris), and their importance for 
the modern civil law tradition, see Zimmermann 305-337. 
15 In this sense, see Wagner 148. See also Huber 961. 
16 See supra Section A. of Chapter III. 
17 See infra the text accompanying footnotes 322-330 in Section B.1. of this Chapter. 
18 See supra the text accompanying footnote 31 in Section A. of Chapter V. 
19 On the ranking of expectation damages, reliance damages and restitution, see supra Chapter III and especially 
the text accompanying footnote 135 in Section C.3. 
20 Hermalin, Katz and Craswell 124; Kull. See also supra the text accompanying footnote 137 in Section C.3. of 
Chapter III. 
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delivers defective goods, both UCC and the Sale of Goods Act 1979 set out diminution in 
value as the prima facie measure for calculating damages,21 leaving it open to courts to also 
resort, where the market thins or where the good is repaired, to other bases of assessment such 
as the cost of cure.22 As for construction contracts, the typical basis for measuring damages in 
the event of defective or unfinished work is the reasonable cost of completing performance or 
remedying the defects, unless such cost proves to be clearly disproportionate to the loss in the 
property market value, in which case courts commonly constrain damages to the diminution 
in value.23 In other words, in the US and English contract law, the promisee's damage claim is 
always for her expectation losses.24 The position under Bulgarian contract law is, however, 
not quite the same. Whether defective performance is rendered in the context of a sale-of-
goods or construction contract, the Buyer may, on her own choice, claim expectation 
damages, measured by the cost of repair/completion,25 or price reduction, based on 
restitution.26 It is this latter remedy that remains unrecognised in the common law legal 
systems under comparison27 and is, thus, not taken into account in the above argument 
concerning the Buyer's choice between termination and damages within the contract. Price 
                                                 
21 UCC § 2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods. (2). In addition, UCC § 2-714.(1) 
provides for the way to calculate damages in case of "any non-conformity of tender". Subsection (1), however, is 
generally deemed to be relevant to non-conformity that does not relate to quality, but to other aspects of the 
tender, e.g. delay or the manner of delivery. In this sense, see Scott and Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 948. 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 53 Remedy for breach of warranty. (3).   
22 For the US, see Wagner Tractor Co. v Shields 381 F2d 441 (CAOr 1967), at 444; Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co. 
430 FSupp 1290 (EDMo 1977) at 1294. For England, see Charterhouse Credit Co. v. Tolly [1963] 2 QB 683. On 
the formulae for calculation of damages, see supra the text accompanying footnotes 132-141 and footnotes 160-
171 in Section A.4. of Chapter IV. 
23 For the US, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348(2) Alternatives to Loss in Value of Performance; 
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent 129 NE 889 (NY 1921). For England, see Peel 1011.  
24 This chapter does not consider consequential damages. Neither of the legal devices elaborated on in Section B. 
is intended to solve problems related to such losses.   
25 On the way a promisee's right to repair commonly boils down to damages, see supra the text accompanying 
footnotes 38-49 in Section A. of Chapter III. 
26 Art. 195(1); Art. 265(1) Contracts Act.  
27 The closest analogy under US and English law is the Buyer's right to set off the damages to which she is 
entitled in case of Seller's defective performance against the price. See UCC § 2-717. Deduction of Damages 
from the Price.; Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 53(1)(a); Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd. [1951] 1 KB 422 
(sale-of-goods contract); Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd. v. Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. [1974] AC 689 
(construction contract). On several occasions UCC mentions the buyer's right to accept non-conforming goods 
with an "allowance". See UCC § 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement. (2); § 2-
613. Casualty to Identified Goods. (2). In compliance with the EU consumer legislation, in 2002 the English Sale 
of Goods Act introduced price reduction as a consumer remedy. See Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 48A 
Introductory (2)(i). It remains unclear, however, whether in these cases price reduction would be calculated on 
the basis of common law damages or on the basis of the civil law price reduction principle. See also  Peter 
Huber, ‘Price Reduction’ in Basedow Jürgen and others (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European 
Private Law, vol II (First edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 1314; Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for 
Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 42-43; Reynolds 643-645. 
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reduction, however, cannot be simply bypassed in a comparative study, that includes a civil 
law legal system. 
Unlike in the common law tradition, the Buyer, resorting to adjustment of the price, is entitled 
neither to the cost of cure, nor to the diminution in value. Her claim is to have the price 
reduced by the ratio of the value of defective performance to the value of conforming 
performance, multiplied by the contract price, thus seeking to restore the balance between 
performance and counterperformance established by the parties in the first place.28  Despite 
the different method of calculation, however, price reduction leads to much the same results 
as those realised by common law damages.29 The outcome may differ only if the value of 
performance changes between the date of contracting and the date of delivery. Thus, if the 
value of performance falls, the amount of the price reduction may very well be higher than the 
amount of common law damages, with this effect being additionally augmented by the fact 
that the proportion is determined with reference to the contracting time and not to the time of 
delivery (as in the case of damages).30 Such a result naturally undermines the above argument 
about promisee's opportunistic incentive to elect termination simply because she has failed to 
                                                 
28 Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts 93-94; Krasen Stoychev, ‘Price Reduction’ [1984] Legal 
Thought 60; Decision №612 of 21.06.2011, app. comm. c. №631/2011 of District Court-Varna (sale-of-goods 
contract); Decision №137 of 01.10.2012, comm. c. №59/2012 of District Court-Pazardjik (sale-of-goods 
contract); Decision №501 of 07.11.2013, app. c. c. №686/2013 of District Court-Pazardjik (sale-of-goods 
contract); Decision №79 of 05.06.2009, app. c. c. №161/2009 of District Court-Varna (construction contract). 
29 Jan Kropholler, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: Studienkommentar (Ninth edn, Taschenbuch 2006) § 281 (citing 
Drucksachen und Protokolle 14/6040 (2001) 226); Huber, ‘Price Reduction’ 1314-1315. For those who would be 
more convinced by mathematics, here is the following example. Imagine that the conforming good has a value 
(purchase price) of 100 euros while in its defective state, it is worth only 90 euros. The diminution-in-value 
formula used in the common law tradition (value of conforming good – value of defective good) tells us that 
damages will amount to 10 euros (100 - 90 = 10). In the civil law tradition the price will be reduced by 10 euros, 
too (100 - 90/100 x 100 = 100 – 90 = 10). 
30 In the hypothetical supra in footnote 29 of this Chapter, imagine that at the time of delivery the market price 
of the good has fallen to 80 euros and in its defective state, the good can fetch a price of 75 euros. Damages in 
the common law tradition will amount to 5 euros (80 - 75 = 5) and the net price paid by the buyer will be 95 
euros (100 - 5 = 95). In Bulgarian contract law, which determines the price reduction with reference to the 
contracting time, the price will, however, be reduced by 10 euros (100 – 90/100 x 100 = 100 – 90 = 10), the 
buyer paying a net price of 90 euros (100 – 10 = 90). If the relevant time for determining the price reduction was 
the time of delivery (as it is in the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods), the amount of price 
reduction would be (100 – 75/80x100 = 100 - 93.75 = 6.25), yielding a net price of 93.75 euros (100 – 6.25 = 
93.75). Note that the price reduction method produces a better result for the buyer when the relevant time for 
fixing the ratio is the contracting time. In any case, provided the price has fallen since the contracting time, the 
price reduction method always produces results that are more favourable to the buyer than damages. As to the 
relevant time for determining the amount of the price reduction in Bulgarian contract law, see supra footnote 28 
of this Chapter. As to the time of delivery being the relevant time for determining diminution-in-value damages 
in the US and English contract law, see UCC § 2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted 
Goods. (2) and Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 53(3). See also Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd. at 439-440.      
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predict the market. After all, where the price reduction remedy produces a better result for the 
Buyer than common law damages, the Buyer may choose to preserve the contract. 
Nevertheless, although in comparison to common law damages, price reduction decreases the 
promisee's motivation to exit the contract, it does not eliminate it completely. On one hand, 
the Buyer still has the option to elect to convert her right to repair into expectation damages 
equal to the cost of cure. On the other hand, not so rarely, either due to absence of information 
about the value of the defective performance, or due to incompetence, Bulgarian courts 
simply lessen the price by the cost of repair31 or by the diminution in value,32 thus practically 
reducing the price reduction remedy to expectation damages. As it will be shown further, even 
though the former is a default remedy under Bulgarian law, Bulgarian courts still adjudicate 
disputes in which the Buyer has resorted to termination for strategic reasons and merchants 
still take care to limit the possibilities for walking away from the contract by providing for 
rates of price allowance in their standard form contracts.33 In fact, what this chapter 
demonstrates is that whether Buyer's damages within the contract are calculated as common 
law damages or as civil law price reduction, an automatic right to terminate per se motivates 
the Buyer to end the contract opportunistically. In this sense, the differences in calculation of 
Buyer's damages across jurisdictions by no means make the issue of availability of 
termination irrelevant. 
Neither is there any accident in the choice of examining termination precisely in the case of 
defective performance. Quality captures the essence of the problem of asymmetric 
information, which causes markets to produce inefficient allocations and calls for regulation. 
It suffices to remind that Akerlof's famous "lemons" article provides an analytical framework 
                                                 
31 Decision №1163 of 1953 of the Supreme Court, II c.d., I p. (where the lower court had simply reduced the 
price for the two machines by the value of the delivered unusable machine, thus conflating the claim for the cost 
of cure and the claim for price reduction); Decision №10 of 05.05.1981, c. c. №83/1979, General Assembly of 
the Civil Chambers of the Supreme Court (saying that on account of defects the price of apartments was to be 
reduced according to the prices set for repairs by state organisations); Decision №1324 of 17.12.1985, c. c. 
№608/85 of the Supreme Court, I c. d. (where the court, conflating buyer's claim for reduction of the price and 
her claim for the cost of cure, denied the buyer's claim for reduction of the price on account that the sum 
necessary for correction of the defects did not lessen the lodging's value substantially); Ruling №482 of 
27.07.2010, comm. c. №1009/2009 of the Supreme Cassation Court, II comm. d.; Decision №157 of 08.11.2010, 
comm. c. №1135/2009 of the Supreme Cassation Court, II comm. d. 
32 Decision №338 of 21.11.2014, comm. c. №470/2012 of District Court – Bourgas (where the newly built 
apartment was furnished with furniture of much lower quality than required by the contract, the court classified 
the breach as total and awarded compensation equal to the difference in value). 
33 See infra the text accompanying footnote 329 in Section B.1. of this Chapter. 
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of asymmetric information precisely with regard to quality.34 Where goods have different 
grades, Akerlof points out, where high and low-quality items are offered on the market, the 
costs of information asymmetries augment.35 It is from this emphasis on the aggravation of 
information problems that this chapter takes off, but while discarding perfect information, it 
also does not adopt the rigid economic assumption of absolute non-contractibility of 
investment.36 On the contrary, striving to remain close to the real world, it takes as a starting 
point actual institutional arrangements (standardisation, form contracts, trade custom, 
warranties), used by the parties to deal with information asymmetries. Rooted in such an 
intermediate informational environment and assuming that high quality is a relevant objective, 
the chapter explores the efficiency of Buyer's termination right for defective performance in 
discrete and long-term contracts.   
Indeed, quality of performance, whether delivery of good or service, is an important issue for 
contract law. Only five years after Akerlof published his article, the US enacted a federal 
"lemon" act, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, governing warranties on consumer goods.37 
In Bulgaria legal scholars paid much attention to the regulation of quality of output in the 
1980's38 when quality improvement was proclaimed a goal of primary importance in the 
process of building a "mature" socialist society.39 Most of the law-and-economics research, 
however, centres on removing advertising restraints, correction of misleading information, 
mandating disclosure of quality information, warranties and design of product labels.40 
Studies on the role of contractual remedies, and in particular damages, for stimulating 
investment in quality have picked up only since 1999 and have so far produced a number of 
                                                 
34 Akerlof. 
35 "… even worse pathologies can exist" ibid 490. 
36 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 146-149 in Section D. of Chapter V. 
37 15 U.S.C.A. Chapter 50. Consumer Product Warranties. 
38 Chudomir Goleminov, ‘Business Contracts and the Struggle for Quality of Production’ (1984) 2 Legal 
Thought 5; Georgi Petkanov, ‘Finance Law Instruments for Regulating the Quality of Industrial Production’ 
(1984) 2 Legal Thought 12; Hristo Nikolov, ‘Regarding Legal Regulation of Quality of Production’ (1984) 3 
Legal Thought 98;Valentin Braykov, ‘Issues of the Liability under Art. 193 ff. of the Act on Obligations and 
Contracts as an Instrument for Influencing the Quality of the Lodgings Sold’ (1984) 3 Legal Thought 83; Filip 
Rachev, ‘Issues of Legal Regulation of Quality of Production’ (1985) 2 Legal Thought 74. 
39 Todor Jivkov, Quality - Key Issue for Building a Mature Socialist Society. Speech at the National Conference 
of the Party, State, Economic and Society Most Active Members, Varna, 30.05.1983 (Sofia: Partizdat 1983); 
Long-Term Programme of the Party for Quality Improvement. National Party Conference 22-23 March 1984; 
Martin Ivanov, ‘Socialist Welfare State and the "Consensus of Hypocrisy"’ [2011] Sociological Problems 235. 
40 Sanford Grossman, ‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality’ 
(1981) 24 Journal of Law and Economics 461; Matthews and Moore; Wesley Magat, ‘Information Regulation’ 
in Peter Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol II (New York: Stockton 
Press 1998) 307. 
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conflicting results, fuelling the general scepticism of legal scholars about law and 
economics.41 Another neoclassical study, with which this account ultimately disagrees, 
concentrates on the relation between termination and quality.42 Although framing the issue in 
a very similar manner, this chapter explores it, as promised, by rejoining comparative law not 
with Chicagoan but with New Institutional Economics.43  
The chapter does not recount the story about the path from caveat emptor to an objective 
system of seller's liability, which is usually told when it comes to buyer's remedies for 
defective performance.44 Instead it picks up from there and asks the question of when 
termination should be available to the Buyer. The Buyer's termination right constitutes the 
point of intersection of conflicting interests: on one hand, the interest of the Buyer to have an 
effective remedy which would ensure the quality of performance she bargained for and, on the 
other hand, the interest of the Seller to preserve the contract. Limiting the Buyer's termination 
right would spur the Seller's cavalier attitude toward his obligation to perform conformingly, 
thus increasing the so-called evasion costs (the costs resulting from the Seller's attempts to 
escape his obligation as to quality and from the Buyer's striving to counter these attempts). 
Expanding the Buyer's termination right would incentivise the Buyer to end the contract for 
her own selfish purposes, thus augmenting the so-called opportunism costs (the costs 
associated with the Buyer's strategic behaviour and the Seller's efforts to neutralise it).45 The 
chapter explores these trade-offs in sale-of-goods and construction contracts. It argues that 
contract law in all three compared jurisdictions has developed in a way that is sensitive to the 
risk of strategic behaviour of any of the parties and, in this sense, is imputed with substantial 
regulatory function. 
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section A. takes a bird-eye view on Buyer's termination 
remedy for defective performance in sale-of-goods (Section A.1.) and construction contracts 
(Section A.2.) and then discusses the economic rationale behind a broad and, respectively, 
                                                 
41 Che and Hausch, ‘Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting’; Che and Chung, ‘Contract 
Damages and Cooperative Investments’; Schweizer; Stremitzer. See also supra Section D. of Chapter V. 
42 Brooks and Stremitzer. 
43 For the defence of this methodological approach, see supra Chapter II and especially Section C. of Chapter II. 
44 Ernst Rabel, ‘The Nature of Warranty of Quality’ (1960) 26 Tulane Law Review 273; Friedrich Kessler, ‘The 
Protection of the Consumer under Modern Sales Law (1964). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2725. ’ 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2725/> ; Zimmermann 305-307;  Huber, ‘Comparative Sales 
Law’.  
45 I borrow the designations of the costs from Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General 
Theory of Contractual Obligation’. 
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restricted right to terminate regarding each kind of contract (Section A.3). Section B. goes 
more in depth and rather focuses on termination followed by restitution. The section centres 
on sale-of-goods contracts and develops with the aggravation of the information asymmetry 
from raw materials, agricultural products and foodstuff ("commodities") to differentiated 
goods. Section B.1. takes a historical perspective, identifies trends in the development of the 
remedy in each of the jurisdictions and claims that these trends are generally efficient. 
A. Common Choices of the Compared Legal Systems  
Whether a party to a sale-of-goods or to a construction contract, the Seller in all three legal 
systems is responsible that his performance is in conformity with the contract. A buyer who is 
tendered a defective good, however, does not have the same remedies as a client who is 
delivered a defective building. While in all three compared jurisdictions the buyer is entitled 
to reject defective goods outright, the client may not refuse to accept and pay for non-
conforming work unless the defect materially impairs the performance she expected under the 
contract. This section, therefore, juxtaposes the Buyer's termination remedy in sale-of-goods 
and construction contracts and discusses the economic rationale behind the restriction on the 
client's right to terminate, common to the compared legal systems. 
1. The contract for sale of goods 
During the nineteenth century common law developed the so-called "perfect tender" rule, 
which empowered the buyer to reject the goods for any non-conformity and terminate the 
contract.46 Variations of this rule were adopted in the English Sale of Goods Act 189347 and 
the American Uniform Sales Act.48 Today, to the extent that UCC allows the buyer to reject 
goods, failing in any respect to conform to the contract, it still preserves the perfect tender 
rule.49 By classifying the implied terms, requiring conformity of the goods, as "conditions", 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 also conserves the general solution of regarding delivery of non-
                                                 
46 For the earliest authorities, see Bowes v. Shand 2 App Cas 455 (HL 1877) for England and Norrington v. 
Wright 115 US 188 (1885) for the US. Under the rule perfection was required not only with respect to the 
quality of the goods, but also with respect to their quantity and shipment details. See Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts, vol II (Third edn, New York: Aspen Publishers 2004) 494.  
47 Section 13 Sale by description. and Section 14 Implied conditions of quality and fitness. (1) and (2). 
48 Uniform Sales Act § 69(1) (1906). 
49 See UCC § 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery. and Ramirez v. Autosport 440 A2d 1345 (NJ 1982) at 
1349.  
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conforming goods as breach of an essential obligation, which entitles the buyer to choose to 
treat the contract as terminated and reject the goods.50 In other words, even if subject to some 
qualifications,51 the perfect tender rule is still retained by English and American sale-of-goods 
law, which permits the buyer to refuse to accept goods that are not in exact conformity with 
the contract and, thus, allows her to seek to end her contractual obligations.  
As for Bulgaria, the buyer's right to reject defective goods has always been recognised by 
statutory law52 and has been consistently upheld by courts.53 When it comes to sale-of-goods 
agreements, the Contracts Act abandons the policy of rescission constituting a remedy of last 
resort. Recall that under general contract law termination is not simply one of the alternative 
courses of action open to the promisee upon breach.54 By contrast, in case of the sale of 
defective goods, rescission is one of the several options that are equally available to the buyer: 
she can reject and claim the expenses made for the sale; she can keep the defective goods and 
demand price reduction or the expenses for their repair, or she can demand replacement.55 The 
choice among these remedies is entirely within the discretion of the buyer.56 Termination is 
available to her even if the defect is remediable.57 Compared to general contract law, sale-of-
goods law also makes access to termination easier by permitting the buyer to simply reject 
                                                 
50 See Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 13(1A) Sale by Description., Section 14(6) Implied terms about quality or 
fitness. and Section 15 (3) Sale by sample. For the classification of the terms of contract in English law and the 
difference between conditions and warranties, see Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 61(1) Interpretation. and A. 
G. Guest, ‘Chapter 12. Classification of Terms’ in H.G. Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts General Principles, vol I 
(Thirty-First edn, London: Sweet&Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2012) 917. Note that the term "warranty" has a 
different meaning in English and in US law. While in English law it denotes a "collateral" contractual term, the 
breach of which entitles the promisee only to claim damages but not to treat herself as discharged, in the US it 
means any guarantee or promise, which provides assurance to the other party that specific facts are true or will 
happen.  
51 For the means by which UCC and the Sale of Goods Act 1979 mitigate the severity of the perfect tender rule, 
see infra Section B of this Chapter.  
52 See Art. 195(1) Contracts Act. For the express recognition of the buyer's right by the previously effective 
contracts act, see Art. 271 of Act on Obligations and Contracts, promulgated State Gazette №268 of 01.01.1892, 
repealed State Gazette №275 of 22.11.1950.  
53 See e.g. Decision №24 of 11.01.1982, c. c. №3194/1981, I c. d. of the Supreme Court (upholding the buyer's 
right to reject the defective good irrespectively whether the defect is removable or not); Decision №1231 of 
10.07.1995, c. c. №2192/1994, V c. d. of the Supreme Court (saying that the buyer is not obliged to accept and 
pay for the goods when they are not in conformity with the agreed quality). 
54 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 19-21 in Section A. of Chapter III and Ordinance №3 of 
29.03.1973, c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the Supreme Court. 
55 Art. 195(1) Contracts Act. 
56 Interpretative Decision №33 of 01.11.1973, c. c. №3/1973, General Assembly of the Civil College of the 
Supreme Court; Interpretative Decision №88 of 28.02.1984, General Assembly of the Civil College of the 
Supreme Court. 
57 Decision №24 of 11.01.1982, c. c. №3194/1981, I c. d. of the Supreme Court; Decision №136 of 15.07.2005, 
c. c. №118/2003 of District Court - Bourgas; Decision №870 of 09.06.2014, comm. c. №4088/2012 of Sofia 
City Court. 
 246 
without requiring her to first give the promisor reasonable time to cure.58 In other words, in 
case of delivery of defective goods, the remedy of termination is put on a par with damages 
within the contract.59 Undoubtedly, this contrasts with the general position of Bulgarian 
contract law that, if possible, the contract should be kept alive. 
Generally, it is safe to say that the starting point of all three legal systems is that buyers 
cannot be compelled to accept defective goods and should have the option to terminate if the 
seller does not perform in conformity with the contract. No doubt, such a solution has a 
disciplining effect on sellers, motivating them to deliver goods, which meet the contractual 
requirements as to quality. 
2. The construction contract 
All national laws under comparison, however, constrain the client's right to terminate the 
construction contract for defective performance. In the US and England, a client may not 
bring the contract to an end if the work is "substantially" performed, even though in some 
respects it is not in accordance with the contract.60 In such cases the client is obliged to pay 
the price (if agreed as a lump sum) or the unpaid balance of it (if the parties have agreed on 
progress payments) and only has a claim for damages which can be deduced from the still 
outstanding accounts. What constitutes substantial performance depends on the particular 
circumstances; yet, a survey of the case law suggests that US and English courts have distilled 
very similar criteria to determine the issue: whether the constructor's breach is inadvertent,61 
                                                 
58 Cf. Art. 87(1) with Art 195(1) Contracts Act. Under Art. 87(2) ibid, the promisee may not give the promisor 
additional time to cure before termination only if performance has become impossible, if, because of promisor's 
delay, it has become futile or when time is of the essence. See also Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific 
Contracts 93; Decision №595 of 11.06.2004, c. c. № 2700/2008, of the Supreme Cassation Court, V comm. d. 
59 Recall also that although the Bulgarian legal doctrine considers repair of the good at the expense of the seller a 
form of specific performance, the remedy in fact boils down to damages. See supra the text accompanying 
footnotes 38-49 of Chapter III.  
60 For the US, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Render 
Performance; Della Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Developers, Inc. 380 A2d 627 (Md 1977); O.W. 
Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope. For England, see H. Dakin & Co., Limited v. Lee [1916] 1 KB 566; 
Hoenig v. Isaacs [1952] 2 All ER 176; Bolton v. Mahadeva [1972] 1 WLR 1009 (where the contractor could not 
recover because it was found he had not substantially performed); Lawson v. Supasink (1984) 3 TrL 37.  
61 For England, see Sumpter v. Hedges [1898] 1 QB 673 (where the constructor was found to have abandoned the 
contract, he not only did not perform substantially but could not recover on quantum meruit, either); H. Dakin & 
Co., Limited v. Lee (where the constructor has refused to complete the work, he cannot be said to have 
substantially performed). For the US, see Della Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Developers, Inc. 
("The courts… will allow recovery under the contract, less allowance for deviations, where a party, in good 
faith, has substantially performed his obligation."); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent at 891 ("The willful 
transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression…"); O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope at 262, 
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whether the work done is entirely different from the work contracted,62 whether the defects 
are structural,63 whether they are remediable,64 the ratio between the cost of rectifying the 
defects/the money value of the work done and the contract price.65 Undoubtedly, the doctrine 
of "substantial performance" contrasts sharply with the strict compliance requirement of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
citing Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers 270 SW 848 (Tex Comm App 1925) at 851 ("…the contractor must have in 
good faith intended to comply with the contract… Such performance permits only such omissions or deviations 
from the contract as are inadvertent and unintentional, are not due to bad faith…"); Material Movers v. Hill 316 
NW 2d 13 (Minn 1982) (where the court decided that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that a 
contractor who willfully or intentionally deviates from the terms of a contract cannot be said to have 
substantially performed); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 Circumstances Significant in Determining 
Whether a Failure Is Material (e). 
62 For England, see H. Dakin & Co., Limited v. Lee; Hoenig v. Isaacs ("On any lump sum contract, if the work is 
not substantially performed and there has been a failure of performance which goes to the root of it, as, for 
instance, when the work … is entirely different in kind from that contracted for, then no action will lie for the 
lump sum."); Bolton v. Mahadeva (there was no substantial performance where the installed heating system was 
giving off fumes and was unable to heat adequately the house); Cf. with the Bulgarian Decision №1786 of 
02.07.1970, c. c. 1148/1979, I c. d. of the Supreme Court (where the residential building was delivered with 
unfinished heating system and faulty elevator system, this was not a ground to terminate the contract). For 
England, see also Lawson v. Supasink (no substantial performance where the kitchen installed was not the one 
planned but a kitchen extemporised on the spot by the fitter and it was installed in a shocking and shoddy 
manner). For the US, see Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent a  891 ("Nowhere will change be tolerated, … if it is so 
dominant or pervasive as in any real or substantial measure to frustrate the purpose of the contract."); O.W. Grun 
Roofing & Construction v. Cope at 261 ("The deficiency will not be tolerated if it is so pervasive as to frustrate 
the purpose of the contract in any real or substantial sense."), at 262 ("…important factors, such as the purpose 
which the promised performance was intended to serve and the extent to which the nonperformance would 
defeat such purpose…"), at 262 citing Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers ("To constitute substantial compliance … in 
the sense that the defects are not pervasive, do not constitute a deviation from the general plan contemplated for 
the work…"); Shaeffer v. Kelton 619 P2d 1226 (NM 1980) at 1230 ("A building is substantially completed when 
all of the essentials necessary to the full accomplishment of the purpose for which the building has been 
constructed are performed."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 Circumstances Significant in 
Determining Whether a Failure Is Material (a). 
63 For England, see H. Dakin & Co., Limited v. Lee at 575, 578 (where the concrete depth was less than required, 
but safe, there was substantial performance); Hoenig v. Isaacs ("…if a man tells a contractor to build a ten foot 
wall for him in his garden …, it would not be right that he should be held liable for any part of the contract price 
if the contractor builds the wall … of a totally different material from that which was ordered…"). For the US, 
see O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope at 262, citing Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers ("… such omissions 
or deviations … do not impair the structure as a whole…"); Haymore v. Levinson 328 P2d 307 (Utah 1958) 
(where the house had no structural defects, the clients could not deny "satisfactory completion of the work").  
64 For England, see Bolton v. Mahadeva t 1014 ("…if the putting right of those defects is not something which 
can be done by some slight amendment of the system, then I think that the contract is not substantially 
performed."); Lawson v. Supasink (no substantial performance where the remedial action was out of question on 
account of the poor design of the kitchen and poor workmanship). For the US, see O.W. Grun Roofing & 
Construction v. Cope at 262, citing Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers ("To constitute substantial compliance … in the 
sense that the defects … are not so essential that the object of the parties in making the contract and its purpose 
cannot, without difficulty, be accomplished by remedying them. Such performance permits only such omissions 
or deviations from the contract as … are remediable without doing material damage to other parts of the building 
in tearing down and reconstructing."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 Circumstances Significant in 
Determining Whether a Failure Is Material (d). 
65 For England, see Bolton v. Mahadeva s per Cairns L.J. (there was no substantial performance where the cost 
of remedying the defects was between one quarter and one third of the contract price); Hoenig v. Isaacs 
("…[where] a sum of £ 55 18s 2d only was required to put right … defects in the work [done under a £ 750 
contract]…, the defendant's contention [that he was not liable for the price] would appear on the face of it to be 
somewhat harsh"). For the US, see O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope at 262 ("Also influential in many 
cases is the ratio of money value of the tendered performance and of the promised performance."). 
 248 
perfect tender rule,66 which, if applied to construction contracts, would result in the 
constructor being deprived of his right to payment for any defect, no matter how minor.67 In 
fact, what the doctrine does is to state the principle of "material" (the US)68 or "substantial" 
(England)69 failure of performance in converse terms. The constructor's performance is 
substantial if it is a performance with no "material"/ "substantial" failure, capable of justifying 
termination of the contract. 
Similarly to US and English law, Bulgarian contract law also limits the client’s right to 
terminate in case of defective performance of construction agreements. In contrast to sale-of-
goods contracts where rescission is simply one of the alternative remedies available to the 
buyer, the client in a construction contract has the right to terminate only if the deviation or 
the defects are so substantial that they render the work completely unfit for its ordinary or 
contemplated purpose.70 Only then is the constructor's defective performance considered not 
to be immaterial with a view to the client's interest and to justify rescission.71 In this sense, 
with respect to construction contracts, Bulgarian contract law returns to its general position, 
following from the underlying principle of specific performance,72 that contract termination is 
an extreme remedy, allowed only when the breach defeats the very purpose of the contract.73  
                                                 
66 See supra footnote 46-50 of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
67 To explain this harsh result: Under the default terms developed by common law courts the client's obligation 
to pay is conditional on full performance by the constructor. Thus, the client is entitled to refuse any request for 
payment by the constructor until the latter has performed his "entire" obligation. In this sense, see for the US: 
Stewart v. Newbury 220 NY 379 (Ct App 1917) at 384-385; Coletti v. Knox Hat Co. 169 NE 648 (NY 1930) at 
649-650; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 Order of Performances (2), comment e, and for England: 
Sumpter v. Hedges at 674; Appleby v. Myers at 660. Hence, if the issue of what constitutes full performance were 
resolved in accordance with the perfect tender rule, the client's payment obligation would become due only after 
the constructor has performed to the letter of the contract.  
68 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Render Performance, 
comment d; Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 518.  
69 Peel 866. This general principle goes back to Boone v. Eyre 126 Eng Rep 160(a) (KB 1777) and to a whole 
line of later cases, in which it was discussed, among which Glazebrook v. Woodrow (1799) 8 Term Reports 366, 
at 373-374, 375.  
70 Art. 265(2) Contracts Act. 
71 Art. 87(4) ibid. See Decision №1106 of 20.04.1957, c. c. № 2125/1957, IV c. d. of the Supreme Court (where 
relying on Art. 87(4) the court confirms that in case of constructor’s defective performance the client has a right 
to rescind the construction contract only if the breach is material with a view to the client's interest). See also 
supra the text accompanying footnotes 19-21 in Section A. of Chapter III and the text accompanying footnote 54 
of this Chapter. 
72 See supra Section A. of Chapter III. 
73 In this sense, see Ordinance №3 of 29.03.1973, c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the Supreme Court (where the 
dispute arose precisely because the construction work deviated substantially from the plan) Cf. with cases supra 
in footnote 62 of this Chapter: for England, Hoenig v. Isaacs, (according to which the contract is substantially 
completed and, hence, cannot be terminated when the failure of performance does not go to the root of it) and for 
the US, Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent a  891 and O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope at 261-262 
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To evaluate the fitness of the construction for its ordinary or contemplated purpose, courts 
inquire as to whether the structure delivered is in essence what is agreed upon under the 
contract;74 whether it conforms to the project designs, approved by the public administration, 
and to the mandatory rules and requirements provided with respect to construction work;75 
whether the defects are remediable (meaning i.e. whether their remedying entails serious 
difficulties, is technically possible or expedient from an economic perspective);76 or whether 
                                                                                                                                                        
(according to which the extent to which the nonperformance frustrates the purpose of the contract is a factor 
when considering whether the contract is substantially completed).  
74 Ordinance №3 of 29.03.1973, c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the Supreme Court (where the obligation was to 
construct a lodging and the client was delivered a lodging that could satisfy his needs, the court denied the client 
the right to terminate even though the walls inside the lodging were misplaced, resulting in rooms of the same 
number and kind as per the plan, each fit for its purpose, but each having a size different from the plan) Cf. with 
Plante v. Jacobs 103 NW2d 296 (Wis 1960) at 297-298 (where the court decided that there was substantial 
performance since performance met the essential purpose of the contract, construction of a house, even though 
the house suffered from a number of defects, among which misplacement of the wall between the kitchen and the 
living room, which narrowed the living room in excess of one foot). Both courts found that the wall 
misplacement did not affect the value of the lodging. See also Decision №87 of 04.08.2010, c. c. №76/2010 of 
District Court – Smolyan (where since the constructed breeding pool was leaking and was unable to hold water 
at all, it was not fit for its purpose and the client had the right to terminate). 
75 Currently the mandatory rules and requirements to construction work are provided for in Art. 169 Spatial 
Development Act, promulgated State Gazette №1 of 02.01.2001, in force as of 31.03.2001, last ammended State 
Gazette №80 of 14.11.2011. See Decision №48 of 31.03.2011, c. c. №822/2010, II c. d. of the Supreme 
Cassation Court (where the court stated expressly that in order for the client's payment obligation to become due, 
the construction had to be in conformity with the approved project design and with the mandatory rules and 
requirements of the Spatial Development Act); Ordinance №3 of 29.03.1973, c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the 
Supreme Court (where the incorrect construction of some of the foundations of the building was remedied in the 
course of the court proceedings and the irremediable deviations from the plan did not affect the solidity of the 
building, the court denied the right to terminate the contract); Decision №87 of 04.08.2010, c. c. №76/2010 of 
District Court – Smolyan (where the breeding pool was unable to hold water because the constructor had 
deviated from the plan, used poor quality construction materials, had not adhered to the construction 
requirements for such structures and had not observed the proper technological order of building the pool, the 
client had the right to terminate). Cf. with the absence-of-structural-defect factor, determining substantial 
performance under English and US law (see supra cases in footnote 63 of this Chapter) as well as with the 
requirement that the construction does not deviate from the general plan (see O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction 
v. Cope at 262, citing Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers supra in footnote 62 of this Chapter). 
76 Ordinance №3 of 29.03.1973, c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the Supreme Court (where most of the deviations 
from the plan were remediable, the court denied termination of the contract); Decision №157 of 8.11.2010, 
comm. c. №1135/2009, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court (where the unevenness of the asphalt 
covering could be remedied without affecting its weight-carrying ability, the covering was not unfit for its 
purpose and the contract could not be terminated); Decision №348 of 04.04.2014, app. comm. c. №2090/2013 of 
District Court – Varna (where the constructed ventilation system could function even if it deviated from the plan 
and the deviation was remediable, the system was not unfit for its purpose and the client did not have the right to 
terminate); Decision №431 of 07.06.2006, comm. c. №1025/2005, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court 
(where the hydroisolation made could not be remedied and had to be entirely replaced, the court recognised the 
client’s right to terminate); Decision №49 of 23.06.2011, comm. c. №7/2011 of District Court – Smolyan (where 
the client had the right to terminate since to make the pool fit for its purpose, the constructor first had to 
demolish it entirely). Recall that to determine whether the contract is substantially performed, US and English 
courts also inquire whether the defects are remediable. See supra cases in footnote 64 of this Chapter. See also 
Decision №87 of 04.08.2010, c. c. №76/2010 of District Court – Smolyan (where remedying the defects of the 
breeding pool was technically possible, but inexpedient from an economic viewpoint since the monetary value of 
the defective work exceeded half of the price for building the entire pool, the court recognised the client's right to 
terminate). Cf. with English and US cases supra in footnote 65 of this Chapter where the courts look at the cost 
 250 
the work done is actually used.77 Unlike in the US and England, the issue does not depend on 
whether the breach is wilful or inadvertent. In the case of defective performance, the 
breacher's fault determines the magnitude of the damages for which he is liable, but not his 
liability per se or the availability of the termination remedy.78 Defects that do not make the 
construction completely unfit for its purpose do not extinguish the obligation of the client to 
pay the price; they only give her the rights to demand correction of the work for free or to 
demand damages.79 In this sense, the right of the client to refuse to pay, the so-called "protest 
against breach of contract",80 is only a right to withhold her own performance, not termination 
of her contractual obligation. It is an instrument to pressure the constructor to rectify defects, 
but if in the end he does not remedy them81 and files a suit to claim payment, he will be 
awarded the (outstanding balance of the) price, less the amount necessary to compensate the 
client for the defective work.  
In other words, in the context of construction contracts Bulgarian contract law, just like 
English and US law, allows contractual termination only for a material, grave deviation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of remedying the defects or at the monetary value of the work done and compare it with the contract price. Cf. 
also the client's right to terminate with that of the buyer under Bulgarian contract law. Recall that termination is 
available to the buyer irrespectively of whether the defect is remediable or not. See supra the text accompanying 
footnote 57 of this Chapter. 
77 Decision №157 of 8.11.2010, comm. c. №1135/2009, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court (that the 
asphalt covering was actually used was emphasised by the court as a fact indicating that the covering was not 
completely unfit for its purpose); Decision №186 of 30.10.2013, comm. c. №820/2012, II comm. d. of the 
Supreme Cassation Court (where the court stated that the functioning of the constructed ventilation system and 
its use for its purpose indicated, in principle, acceptance of the work done, meaning that the client’s obligation to 
pay had become due, subject to deductions for defects, and that the client did not have a right to terminate the 
contract. Following the instructions of the Supreme Cassation Court, District Court – Varna pointed out that by 
using the ventilation system, the client had accepted it as constructed and, therefore, her contractual obligation to 
pay was not terminated. See Decision №348 of 04.04.2014, app. comm. c. №2090/2013 of District Court – 
Varna.  Cf. with H. Dakin & Co., Limited v. Lee at 569; Hoenig v. Isaacs (where the fact that the work done was 
used by the promisee and she had had the benefit of it was one of the factors taken into account by the court in 
deciding that the contract was substantially performed). 
78 Art. 193(3) in connection with Art. 265 in connection with Art. 82 Contracts Act. In this sense, see also 
Kalaydjiev 337; Decision №595 of 11.06.2004, c. c. №2700/2008, V comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court 
(the right to terminate does not depend on the seller's fault; despite the fact that the concrete case concerns a 
contract for sale of goods, this is a general principle with respect to defective performance in Bulgarian contract 
law, including when it comes to defective performance of construction contracts). Cf. with English and US cases 
supra in footnote 61 of this Chapter. 
79 In this sense, see Ruling №482 of 27.07.2010, comm. c. №1009/2009, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation 
Court; Decision №157 of 8.11.2010, comm. c. №1135/2009, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; 
Decision №186 of 30.10.2013, comm. c. №820/2012, II comm. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court; Art 265(1) 
Contracts Act. 
80 Art. 90(1) ibid; Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. Specific Contracts 176. 
81 It is not unlikely that the constructor resists remedying the defects since he knows that even if the client 
obtains a judgment directing him to correct them, at the execution stage, the most she can achieve is to force him 
to pay her in advance the amount necessary for making the corrections. See supra the text accompanying 
footnotes 52-54 in Section A. of Chapter III. 
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Compared to sale-of-goods contracts, this is a significant limitation to the client's right to 
terminate. Such obliging of the client to accept deficient performance together with damages 
naturally incentivises the constructor to take less care of perfect performance. Is law less 
concerned with quality when it comes to construction as opposed to sale contracts? 
3. The economic rationale 
Indeed, what makes the construction contract so different from the sale-of-goods one that all 
three legal systems choose to limit the promisee's access to the termination remedy and to 
award damages within the frames of the contract? The explanation for this similar result can 
be looked for in the greater danger of Buyer's opportunism in the construction context. 
Even though the US and English sale-of-goods law has moved to accommodate contracts 
falling in the long-term range,82 the starting point of contract law in all three jurisdictions is 
that in a sale agreement delivery of the good and payment of the price occur concurrently.83 
Simultaneous performances are, however, by definition unfeasible in the construction, as well 
as in every service contract. The necessarily sequential character of economic activity 
naturally extends the duration of the contract and brings in uncertainty. Usually, construction 
is also a fairly complex economic activity, involving much risk and requiring specific skills. 
The greater the uncertainty and/or complexity, the more incomplete is the parties' construction 
agreement. And consequently, the smaller is parties' ability to foresee change in conditions 
and provide for it, the greater is the peril of ex post opportunistic attempts to revise the 
agreement. 
In addition, where, as in construction contracts, performances are sequential simply because 
the performance of one of the parties requires some time, the constructor, who has to perform 
first,84 runs the risk that once he has done the work, the client may refuse to perform. Since in 
                                                 
82 See supra Section B.1. of Chapter IV about US and English law which, unlike Bulgarian law, accommodate 
specifically manufactured goods within the sale-of-goods contract. 
83 For the US, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 Order of Performances (1); UCC § 2-507. Effect of 
Seller's Tender; Delivery on Condition. (1); § 2-511. Tender of Payment by Buyer; Payment by Check. (1). For 
England, see Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 28 Payment and delivery are concurrent conditions. For Bulgaria, 
see Art. 200(2). 
84 For the "work before pay" rule in the US, see Stewart v. Newbury at 384-385; Coletti v. Knox Hat Co. at 650 
("When the performance of a contract consists in doing (faciendo) on one side, and in giving (dando) on the 
other side, the doing must take place before the giving."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 Order of 
Performances (2). For England, see Sumpter v. Hedges, at 674; Appleby v. Myers at 660. For Bulgaria, see Art. 
266(1) Contracts Act. 
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construction agreements performances are not due at the same time, contract law cannot give 
parties the assurance it provides in sale-of-goods contracts by allowing each of them to refuse 
performance if the other demands it without offering performance in return.85 Thus, the 
constructor is by definition exposed to a hazard,86 which the seller may avoid by agreeing, 
when feasible, on concurrent performances. Imagine now, an agreement, involving the 
construction of a building, and not involving only…, let's say, the painting of several rooms 
with materials of the client, which would also come under the broad definition of a 
construction contract, adopted by this thesis.87 With payment due on completion, for this 
constructor the hazard is even greater as he cannot take the building back in case, once 
finished, the client refuses to pay. Being aware of this, the client can use some minor defect of 
the erected structure as an excuse as to why she would not perform her part of the bargain. 
The constructor, in other words, is at the mercy of the client – the latter can easily force him 
to lower the price even if the defect is not really there or even if it is worth much less than the 
demanded price reduction. Thus, the necessarily sequential order of performances coupled 
with specific investment opens plenty of room for opportunistic behaviour.88 On its own turn, 
the threat of hold up discourages the constructor from investing in high quality performance. 
By contrast, in sale contracts where there is an available market for the goods in question, it is 
much less likely that the buyer will behave opportunistically even if performances do not 
exactly overlap in time. In the absence of specific investment by the seller, the contract does 
not generally represent an opportunity for strategic gains unless some change of 
circumstances transforms it into one. After all, it implies contractual surplus comparable to 
that of the other contracts on the market. In case the buyer rejects the goods, the seller can 
always reduce her losses by reselling them. If they are really deficient, he can repair them and 
offer them elsewhere at a similar price or he can simply resell them at a price reflecting their 
                                                 
85 For the US, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 238 Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Offer 
Performance and § 234 Order of Performances, comment a. For England, see Paynter v James (1866-67) LR 2 
CP 348. For Bulgaria, see Art. 90(1) Contracts Act.  
86 Even an agreement stipulating progress payments instead of payment due on completion would only mitigate a 
constructor's risk as he will still have to perform the relevant part of the structure first and then receive the 
respective instalment. 
87 See supra the text right after footnote 112 of Chapter I. 
88 In fact, a hypothetical including a construction contract is the scholars' favourite example for opportunistic 
conduct. For law-and-economics scholars using such an example, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law  93; 
Victor Goldberg, ‘Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts’ in Victor Goldberg (ed), Readings 
in the Economics of Contract Law (First edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989) 17. For the same 
example used in a legal handbook not from the law-and economics field, see Farnsworth, Farnsworth on 
Contracts 488. 
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defective condition. In this sense, it is the market itself that deters the buyer's opportunistic 
conduct. For this reason, instead of seeking to engage in strategic games, which would 
increase her costs and hardly bring much benefit, upon defective delivery, the buyer would 
rather choose the least costly option, available to her. Out of the two remedies: acceptance of 
the goods together with damages or termination of the contract together with damages, she 
would most likely prefer the one that entails fewer losses, since these losses would be 
compensated to her only if the seller actually pays for the damages suffered.89 Such 
motivation is in line with the common interest of minimising joint costs (or equivalently 
maximising joint benefits) and, thus, sharply contrasts with the motivation, directed toward 
appropriation of a bigger share of the contractual surplus, described in the construction 
context. In the latter context, the dependence of the Seller will incentivise the Buyer to use 
termination as a strategic move, threatening to impose on him significant costs, which the 
Seller would find difficult to recoup. Thus, where the market thins, it is no longer capable of 
curbing the Buyer's opportunism. Taking on this role, contract law in all three jurisdictions 
sets limits on the primary tool the client has to hold up the constructor. Whether by relaxing 
the Seller's standard of performance (the US and England) or by requiring a particularly grave 
defect (Bulgaria), it restricts the destructive termination remedy to situations where the Seller 
has deviated from his obligation to such an extent that the Buyer's desire to end the contract is 
most likely non-strategic. Contract law, in other words, regulates. 
The propensity of parties to communicate relevant information is another manifestation of the 
problem of opportunism that arises in the context of construction contracts. In principle, once 
the contract is signed, the promisee does not have much incentive to readjust in order to 
reduce the promisor's suddenly increased costs.90 Yet, where both parties have a readily 
available market for their performance, it is not so unlikely that they share information in 
order to find the most cost-effective way to adapt to a regret contingency.91 If the seller is not 
afraid of buyer's opportunism, he would not be reluctant to explore the possibilities of 
modifying the contract. Thus, if the buyer's costs of cover are smaller than the seller's costs of 
procuring substitute non-deficient goods92 or if the seller's costs of repair are smaller than the 
                                                 
89 Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’, 996. 
90 For the incentive of the insured promisee to take suboptimal precautions, see supra Section E. of Chapter V. 
91 In this sense, see also Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ 987-988. 
92 Both seller's and buyer's costs of purchasing substitute goods comprise two kinds of costs: the administrative 
costs of effectuating the substitute transaction and the difference between the price of the substitute goods and 
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costs of purchasing substitutes, then the seller would prefer to pay the buyer to readjust 
respectively instead of perform his original obligation at a higher cost or breach and pay 
damages. After all, it is always him who bears the bill, so why not communicate with the 
buyer to see whether there is a possibility to pay less.93 In the absence of strategic 
opportunity, the buyer would also not be so unwilling to reveal the cost of her readjustment 
options. And when compensated for this, it is not unlikely that she actually agrees to readjust, 
thus saving the administrative and error costs associated with calculating her damages in case 
of seller's breach. In other words, in thick markets parties' renegotiation is not unlikely to be a 
cooperative action resulting in minimising transaction costs and not a means of exploiting the 
vulnerability of the contractual partner. In this sense, law prohibiting it is useless and even 
harmful. In addition, the right to terminate is likely not used as a tool for hold up. Rather, the 
potential for conflict it implies motivates the seller to take precautions against defective 
delivery and to approach the buyer looking for cost-effective modification of the contract. 
From this perspective, a broad right to terminate in sale-of-goods contracts appears optimal.  
Conversely, being in the middle of a strategic situation, in case of renegotiation parties to a 
specialised construction contract would be reluctant to disclose pertinent information and 
would rather use the existing information asymmetries to their advantage. Exploiting the 
constructor's inability to verify the cost of her readjustment options, the client may very well 
sell her cooperation at much more than its market value. Not to mention that her methods of 
"bluffs, threats and games of 'chicken'"94 in achieving this would be nothing but deadweight 
losses, consuming the joint benefits the contract could produce.95 From this perspective, the 
described restriction of the right to end the contract and seek compensation out of it does at 
least three things. Firstly, the requirement that the client accept a defective structure together 
with damages (measured on the basis of objective criteria) expands her duty to mitigate96 and 
prevents her from misrepresenting her mitigation costs in order to extract a higher price 
                                                                                                                                                        
the resale price of the defective ones. The buyer's costs of cover may be smaller because, for example, the buyer 
(unlike the seller) knows the other sellers in the business and does not have to incur search costs or because she 
can cover at a lower price due to already established good commercial relationships with other sellers. 
93 In this sense, see also Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ 977, 979-980. 
94 Goetz and Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracting’, 1101, footnote 26. 
95 In this sense, see also Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ 982-983, 984-985. 
96 In this sense, see also ibid 1009-1010. Indeed, this requirement to the client's ex post behaviour is additional to 
the promisee's general mitigation duty, provided in all of the compared legal systems. See supra footnote 174 in 
Section F. of Chapter V.  
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discount from the constructor. Secondly, the restriction restrains the strategic behaviour that 
would obstruct potential beneficial readjustment and inflate renegotiation costs. Thirdly, 
allowing termination only where the substantial performance standard is not satisfied (the US 
and England) or where the structure is unfit for its purpose (Bulgaria) stimulates idiosyncratic 
clients to bargain for higher protection at the time of contracting and, thus, forces them to 
reveal information about the magnitude of the losses they anticipate.97 In this sense, the limits 
set on the client's right to terminate encourage parties to share (truthful) information, which is 
part of contract law's regulatory function of deterring opportunism.    
One could say that where law curbs the Buyer's termination remedy, it does not care about 
ensuring quality of performance since deterrence of client's opportunism is attained at the 
expense of increasing the risk of Seller's moral hazard. Indeed, allowing termination only for 
substantial, material non-conformity naturally gives the constructor less incentive to make 
sure that his performance is flawless. Yet, recall that if a promisor expects to be held up in 
renegotiation, he has very weak incentive to invest cooperatively at all. The problem goes 
beyond reduction of the average quality of performance and affects the very size of the 
market.98 In other words, where to perform promisors, just like constructors, need to make 
cooperative investment, the issue, first, is how to incentivise (more of) them to invest and 
only then how to incentivise them to invest efficiently. From this perspective, the restriction 
on termination still concerns quality of performance. But rather than focusing on ex ante 
investment inefficiencies, it centres on minimising the potential of hold-up in order to kick off 
the promisor's motivation for investment in quality.99  
This is, in fact, the very essence of the regulatory function of contract law. It confines the 
worst threat the client can make, the threat to terminate, by assigning to her the liability for 
untoward ending of the contract. Thus, it decreases her short-term gains from opportunism 
and turns preservation of the contractual relationship into the more profitable line of 
behaviour. In this sense, contract law does not assign liability to the party that can prevent 
breach at the lowest cost (the constructor is still the one best able to take precautions against 
                                                 
97 In this sense, see also ibid 985, footnote 43. 
98 Akerlof. 
99 In view of Klein this is also the role of contractual terms in incomplete contracts. Klein, ‘The Role of 
Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships’ 62-64. 
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failure of performance),100 but to the one that, by not taking precautions, destroys a larger 
share of the surplus (recall that the client's mitigation, which in case of wrongful termination 
is simply absent, is also a form of precaution).101 So where law restricts the Buyer's right to 
end the contract, minimising transaction costs takes place not by mimicking the market (i.e. 
facilitating), but by making non-cooperative behaviour costly in order to curtail the losses 
resulting when the market fails (i.e. regulating).102  
One could also say that where costs from the client's opportunism are decreased but costs 
from the constructor's evasion are increased, the overall reduction of transaction costs is rather 
questionable. Yet, at least in the case in which the client attaches market value to 
performance, it is fairly unlikely that the increase of costs, resulting from the constructor's 
higher chance to escape his contractual obligations, is greater than the reduction of costs, 
following from the client's diminished opportunity for strategic behaviour. If the greater part 
of the work is done and, overall, follows the plan, if defects are not structural, but only minor 
and remediable, then the promisee essentially receives what she bargained for and can be 
compensated for the deficiencies by sufficient damages. In this sense, the restriction on 
termination does not increase significantly the risk for constructor's defective performance. 
Such restriction, on the other hand, substantially reduces the risk of the constructor being 
either subjected to forfeiture (if he rejects the extortionate offers and the client really 
terminates), or deprived of almost all of the benefit (if he, after all, renegotiates with the 
client). This suggests that on balance the increase of losses from the constructor's shirking 
would be smaller than the reduction of losses from the client's opportunism.103   
It is possible that the balance turn out differently where clients are idiosyncratic parties who 
value performance more than the market and whose losses are hard to measure. In such case 
deviations that might otherwise appear petty may actually destroy much of the client's value 
                                                 
100 In the construction context, entailing customisation and heterogeneity, the decision to take precautions against 
breach is also a decision about investing cooperatively (in quality). It could be said, however, that the value of 
the investment on the continuous interval determines which aspect of the decision dominates. Until the threshold 
determining that performance occurred (in legal terms: until the threshold of "substantial performance" or 
"immaterial non-performance") the decision is primarily (though not only) precautionary. Once this threshold 
has been passed, the cooperative investment aspect, i.e. the aspect determining quality enhancement, dominates. 
See also supra the text right after footnote 104 in Section D. of Chapter V.  
101 See supra Section F. of Chapter V and the text accompanying footnote 166. 
102 According to Cooter, this is the way contract law should allocate liability under the so-called "Hobbes 
Theorem", as opposed to the way, suggested by the Coase Theorem. Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’, 18-19. See 
also supra footnote 82 of Chapter IV as well as Hviid 57. 
103 In this sense see also Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ 1010. 
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and at the same time give her considerable difficulty to prove her losses. This explains why 
when it comes to homeowners, US and English courts may sometimes consider personal taste, 
preference or fancy controlling. Unlike Bulgarian courts, which traditionally relate the client's 
right to terminate only to the fitness of the lodging to satisfy her residential needs,104 US and 
English courts may be slow to find substantial performance where consumer clients receive a 
structure, which though meeting the objective standard of operative fitness, offends their 
aesthetic sensibility.105 If under such circumstances clients are compelled to accept, there is 
significant risk that they remain undercompensated. Termination then appears the better 
choice as the client's restitution interest in any instalment payments made in advance is much 
                                                 
104 See Ordinance №3 of 29.03.1973, c. c. № 2/1973, Plenum of the Supreme Court (where the court expressly 
stated that the judgement regarding the client's right to terminate depends not on her subjective attitude but on 
the objective fact of whether she actually receives a lodging, as contracted, and, if yes, whether the defect is such 
that the lodging cannot satisfy the client's residential needs; consequently, in the case at bench the court rejected 
termination because despite the defects, the lodging could satisfy the residential needs of the client). Cf. with 
Tolstoy Construction v. Mamie Minter 78 CalApp3d 665 (Cal 1978) (where the US court found there was no 
substantial performance since the accumulation of many defects, anyone of which standing alone would be 
minor in character, made the building and the carport so poorly constructed that it would take substantial 
amounts of money to make the dwelling reasonably tenantable). The explanation for this attitude of the 
Bulgarian courts can be found in the significant difficulties of the State during the socialist period to satisfy the 
residential needs of the fast-growing population in the cities. To allow termination of the contract for unsightly 
appearance where families waited for years, sometimes even more than a decade, to purchase a home, seemed to 
be waste. Thus, in 1984 the Act on Territorial and Settlement Development provided what was already accepted 
in the legal doctrine and court practice – that the contract could be terminated if the defect was irremediable and 
made the lodging impossible to use. See Art. 119(3) p. 4 Act on Territorial and Settlement Development, 
promulgated State Gazette №29 of 10.04.1973, in force since 01.06.1973, repealed State Gazette №1 of 
02.01.2001, in force since 31.03.2001. Regarding the view taken in the legal doctrine, see Vladimir Petrov, 
Prerequisites for Liability and Methods for Settling the Relations between Sellers and Buyers in Case of Sale of 
Newly Constructed Lodgings with Defects (Sofia: "St. Kliment Ohridski" Press 1989) 151-152. That Bulgarian 
courts do not take into account subjective value in case of defective home construction is also evidenced by the 
fact that they do not award non-pecuniary damages. See Decision №1786 of 02.07.1970, c. c. 1148/1979, I c. d. 
of the Supreme Court; Decision №948 of 07.07.1998, c. c. 605/1998, V c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court. 
This may change in the future as the Supreme Court has recently proclaimed that awarding non-pecuniary 
damages is admissible in case of contractual breach. See Interpretative Decision №4 of 2012 of the General 
Assembly of the Civil and Commercial Chambers of the Supreme Cassation Court. For the development of the 
legislative, court and doctrinal attitude toward non-pecuniary damages in Bulgaria, see supra footnote 156 of 
Chapter II.  
105 For the US, see Smith v. Brady 17 NY 173 (NY 1858) at 186 ("I suppose it will be conceded that every one 
has a right to build his house, his cottage or his store after such a model and in such style as shall best accord 
with his notions of utility or be most agreeable to his fancy. … If the owner prefers a plain and simple Doric 
column, and has so provided in the agreement, the contractor has no right to put in its place the more costly and 
elegant Corinthian."); O.W. Grun Roofing & Construction v. Cope (where the client received a weatherproof 
roof, which, however, was not of uniform colouring and could be remedied only if completely redone, there was 
no substantial performance); Haymore v. Levinson at 309 ("…where the undertaking is to do something of such a 
nature that pleasing the personal taste, fancy or sensibility of the other, which cannot be readily determined by 
objective standards, must reasonably be considered an element of predominant importance in the performance."). 
For England see Lawson v. Supasink (where the defects in the kitchen, consequence of poor design and 
workmanship, could be rectified, but the kitchen was not going to be "as good as it would have been in the first 
place", there was no substantial performance). 
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more clear-cut. Such restitution may be increased by damages for inconvenience (England),106 
or diminished by the quantum meruit claim of the constructor (the US),107 but where the client 
is additionally entitled to non-pecuniary losses or the burden of proof is on the constructor, 
the error seems more likely to be in her favour.108 Thus, if inadequate measurement of the 
Buyer's expectation damages may give a significantly suboptimal performance incentive to 
the Seller, making it questionable whether the Buyer's opportunism decreases by more than 
the Seller's evasion increases, US and English courts tend to allow clients in construction 
contracts to terminate. A test entailing only objective standards for habitation, such as the one 
applied by Bulgarian courts, prevents consumers from exaggerating their losses but it also 
stimulates constructors to lower quality and to invest less in satisfying the consumer's 
subjective preferences.  
To put it briefly, the choice made by all three legal systems between a broad termination right 
of the Buyer and damages awarded to her within the contract is roughly optimal. In sale-of-
goods contracts where the market is thick, law is plainly concerned with motivating Sellers to 
perform conformingly and, hence, makes the termination remedy available to Buyers. By 
contrast, in construction contracts, law stimulates Sellers to invest in quality performance 
somewhat indirectly. Where the market is thin and there is significant danger of Buyers' 
opportunism, law limits Buyers' right to terminate, requiring them to mitigate. Thus, reducing 
the risk of Buyers' strategic claims, it spurs the Sellers' unprecedentedly weak incentive to 
invest cooperatively.  
                                                 
106 Lawson v. Supasink; Bolton v. Mahadeva; Beale 1846. US courts generally do not award damages for 
emotional distress in case of defective home construction. See Elrich v. Mezenes 981 P2d 978 (Cal 1999). For 
unusually generous decisions, see B&M Homes v. Hogan 376 So2d 667 (Ala 1979); Salka v. Dean Homes of 
Beverly Hills 22 Cal Rptr2d 902 (App Ct 1993). See also Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 291-293 and 
especially footnotes 13 and 14. 
107 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Render Performance, 
comment d. By contrast, in England the rule of Sumpter v. Hedges ( ee supra footnote 61 of this Chapter) is still 
valid and a constructor who has failed to complete performance of his "entire" obligation does not have rights 
even in restitution against the client. See Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd v Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd [2010] 
EWCA Civ 139 at [118]-[138]. 
108 Even though the court may not estimate perfectly the client's damages for inconvenience, where, instead of 
awarding expectation damages which do not account for the client's subjective value and thus substantially 
undercompensating her, the court recognises her non-pecuniary interest in addition to her pecuniary restitution 
one, the calculation error is still in favour of the client.  
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B. Differences between the Legal Systems 
Contract law has grappled with the problem about the circumstances under which to permit 
the promisee to terminate the contract for centuries. Under general contract law in all three 
jurisdictions, the right to terminate for breach arises when the deficiency of performance has 
assumed a certain degree of gravity. In the US, a promisee is entitled to terminate only after 
the promisor's material breach continued long enough to amount to the non-occurrence of a 
condition that can no longer occur.109 In England, too, the failure of performance must be 
sufficiently serious or "substantially" deprive a party of what she bargained for.110 The 
Bulgarian Contracts Act, on the other hand, provides when termination is not allowed, yet to 
the same effect: where the promisee may not end the contract if non-performance is 
immaterial with a view to her interest,111 only material, substantial breach justifies 
termination. From this perspective, the client's right to terminate constrained by the doctrine 
of substantial performance (the US and England) or by the requirement for complete unfitness 
(Bulgaria) is in accordance with the position of general contract law. Rather, it is the sale-of-
goods law giving the buyer a free choice between ending the agreement and damages within 
the contract that establishes an exception to the general principle.  
Having drawn the picture of an expansive termination remedy in sales contracts, however, I 
am keen to stress that the above description is to some extent reductionist. In fact, a national 
lawyer, proficient in the details of contract law of any of the jurisdictions, may even argue 
that my report is highly misleading and inaccurate. Indeed, in the US White and Summers 
submit that "little is left of [the perfect tender rule]".112 In England, too, Peel, points at a 
statutory restriction of the right to reject,113 as well as at "some judicial reaction against the 
authorities which give [it] a wide scope".114 The account with respect to Bulgarian sale-of-
goods law also conveniently omits that, though broader than in construction contracts, the 
                                                 
109 Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 509-511, 525; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 Effect on 
Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Render Performance, comment a; § 225 Effects of the Non-Occurrence of a 
Condition (2). 
110 Peel 866. This general principle goes back to Boone v. Eyre and to a whole line of later cases. Among them 
see e.g. Glazebrook v. Woodrow, at 373-374, 375.  
111 Art. 87(4) Contracts Act. See also supra footnote 21 in Section A. of Chapter III and the accompanying text.  
112 James White and Robert Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform Commercial Code (Second edn, 
St. Paul: West Piblishing Company 1980) 304-305. 
113 Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 15A Modification of remedies for breach of condition in non-consumer 
cases., inserted by Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, Section 4(1) in response to recommendations of the Law 
Commission in Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission №160 (1987), para. 4.21. 
114 Peel 881. 
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buyer's right to terminate is still limited by a requirement that the defect be "substantial".115 
Admittedly, since the goal was to contrast termination in sales and construction contracts, as 
well as its role regarding quality, the text saw neither to the qualifications of the right to 
terminate in the field of sale of goods, nor to the differences between the legal systems 
regarding these qualifications.  
This section then goes beyond the common starting point of sale-of-goods law that buyers 
cannot be compelled to accept defective goods and illuminates different legal devices that the 
three legal systems have developed to narrow the buyer's broad termination right. It then 
discusses the factors that affect the efficiency of termination in sale of goods and draws a line 
to separate cases where a right to end the contract as extensive as described in the previous 
section is no longer optimal. 
1. Executory contracts for sale of commodities 
One could hardly think of commercial contracts standing closer to the spot end of the 
spectrum than contracts for sale of commodities (raw materials, agricultural products, 
foodstuffs). Where different quality grades are well understood and reflected in market prices, 
as it is in the case of such, commonly standardised, goods, information problems are also the 
smallest. Yet, since the market value of commodities is unstable in the short run, as soon as 
the time of performance parts from the time of contracting, the issue of when to permit the 
buyer to terminate becomes a difficult one.   
Although in case of delivery of defective goods, sales law in all three jurisdictions provides 
the buyer with a choice between claiming damages within the contract and putting the latter to 
an end, there is a notable difference in approach. Under the Anglo-American perfect tender 
rule, still preserved in the UCC and the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the buyer has an absolute 
right to reject for any non-conformity. This, according to English case-law, is the distinctive 
property of conditions, such as the obligations as to conformity of goods:116 every breach of 
them, "whatever the gravity", entitles the buyer to terminate.117 In the US, the sweeping 
language, giving the buyer the right to reject for any breach related to conformity, found its 
                                                 
115 Art. 193(1) Contracts Act. 
116 See supra footnote 50 of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
117 Lombard North Central Plc. v. Butterworth [1987] QB 527 at 535. 
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way directly into the Uniform Sales Act and then carried on to the UCC.118 Under the 
Bulgarian Contracts Act, however, the buyer can elect to terminate only for a substantial 
defect, i.e. for a defect that substantially decreases the price or the fitness of the good.119 
Thus, it seems that under Bulgarian contract law it takes a higher level of inexactness in 
seller's performance in order for the buyer to be permitted to end her contractual obligations.  
The de minimis exception 
In fact, to the extent that all three legal systems bear the idea of ignoring trifling defects, the 
perfect tender rule and the Bulgarian provision regarding defective performance overlap. 
Even if requiring strict performance, American and English courts sometimes disregard 
insignificant variations on the basis of the maxim De minimis non curat lex.120 Thus, English 
judges took the view that "microscopic"121 deviations were not sufficient to permit rejection 
since the deviation needed to be "capable of influencing the mind of the buyer".122 The latter 
formula strikingly resembles the test of the Bulgarian 1892 Contracts Act requiring the defect 
to be capable of affecting the buyer's decision about purchasing the good or about the 
                                                 
118 Uniform Sales Act § 69(1) (1906) provided for the buyer's remedies "[w]here there is a breach of warranty" 
while simultaneously extending the term "warranty" to include not only the implied warranties as to 
merchantability and fitness, but also "any affirmation" and "any promise" of the seller regarding the goods on 
which the buyer relied; such affirmation and promise giving rise to an express warranty. See also UCC § 2-601. 
Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery. 
119 Art. 195(1) in relation to Art. 193(1) Contracts Act. 
120 For the US, see Van Clief v. Van Vechten 29 NE 1017 (NY 1892) at 1019 ("While slight and insignificant 
imperfections or deviations may be overlooked, on the principle of de minimis non curat lex, the contract in 
other respects must be performed according to its terms."); Frankel v. Foreman & Clark 33 F2d 83 (2d Cir 1929) 
at 87 ("…if the goods in dispute were indistinguishable from the samples for mercantile purposes, trifling 
variations would not count."); Intermeat v. American Poultry 575 F2d 1017 (2nd Cir 1978) (where the court 
denied the buyer the right to reject a meat shipment marked "Tasmeats" rather than "Richardson Production" 
because the contract did not call for any particular marking on the cartons and because it was common 
knowledge in the trade that they were equivalent). 
121 Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son [1933] AC 470 at 479 ("No doubt there may be microscopic deviations which 
business men and therefore lawyers will ignore."). 
122 Shipton, Anderson & Co. v. Weil Bros. & Co. 1 KB 574 (where under a contract for the sale of wheat, the 
sellers tendered a cargo weighing 55 lbs. more than the maximum quantity of 4950 tons and never claimed the 
sum payable thereof, which would have been about 4 s., the buyers could not reject the whole cargo under 
Section 30(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the latter allowing the buyer to reject if the seller delivered a 
quantity of goods larger than he contracted to sell). Per Lush J. at 577: "I think that the question is whether there 
has been a substantial departure from the contract. ... The tender of a wrong quantity …, in my opinion, must 
mean an excess or deficiency in quantity which is capable of influencing the mind of the buyer. … the doctrine 
of de minimis cannot, I think, be excluded merely because the statute refers to the tender of a smaller or larger 
quantity than the contract quantity as entitling a buyer to reject.". This was the case from which the judges in 
Arcos Ltd. v Ronaasen & Son derived the meaning of de minimis as "microscopic". See supra footnote 121 of 
this Chapter. See also Ronaasen & Son v. Arcos Ltd. [1932] LlLRep 163, at 169-170 ("… some microscopic 
variation may conceivably be permitted under the principle of de minimis."); Ronaasen & Son v. Arcos Ltd. 
[1932] LlLRep 1 at 5, per Scrutton LJ ("Then came an instance of what could be treated as microscopic, … 
"Microscopic differences the court will shut its eyes to.""). 
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purchase price.123 The word "substantial" in today's Contracts Act equally embraces the 
notion that an insignificant defect, not affecting the possibility to fully use the good or its 
price, is irrelevant.124 In this sense, whether employing a bright-line rule or a vague standard, 
all three legal systems deny the buyer the right to terminate the contract for wholly trivial 
imperfections. 
To limit termination under such circumstances appears optimal. Note that rejection imposes 
on the seller the costs of retrieving the goods, which, depending on the goods and the 
distance, may be considerable. The non-conformity, on the other hand, is a trifle. It is so 
negligible that it would not inflict costs on the buyer at all (either costs to adapt the good for 
use or losses at reselling it) or if it would, they would be so minute that damages would most 
probably be nominal.125 Such damages do not imply any noteworthy error costs, related to 
their ascertaining, or risk, related to seller's solvency.126 Both parties then would be better off 
if the buyer accepts the goods, possibly with damages, which would save the shipping-back 
costs that would otherwise reduce the contractual surplus.127 Consequently, in such a scenario 
termination entails only economic waste and its constraining is optimal.   
Under the Contracts Act, however, substantiality is not just a limitation to termination but a 
criterion that defines the very breach of defective performance. As a result, it is the seller's 
                                                 
123 Art. 268 Act on Obligations and Contracts, promulgated State Gazette №268 of 01.01.1892, repealed State 
Gazette №275 of 22.11.1950. The article literally reproduces Art. 1641 of the French Civil Code. 
124 In this sense, see Decision of 03.03.1973 under c. №137/1973 of the State Arbitration Court. Consulting the 
French Civil Code, the 1942 Italian Civil Code and the German Civil Code, one can clearly see how Art. 193(1) 
Contracts Act came to be a product of the combined influence of both the French and the German legal tradition. 
The concept of "defect" as a non-conformity that decreases the price or the fitness of the good for its ordinary or 
contemplated use constitutes a direct reception of Art. 459 of the German Civil Code. In Art. 459, the 
requirement of the French Art. 1641 that the defect be capable of influencing the buyer's decision on making the 
purchase or on the purchase price appears as a straightforward statement that immaterial diminution in value or 
fitness is not to be taken into consideration. The Bulgarian Art. 193(1), however, omits that statement; yet, only 
to capture it in the word "substantially", the latter perfectly corresponding to the term apprezzabile, used by the 
1942 Italian Civil Code. On reception by Bulgarian contract law, see supra the text accompanying footnotes 
126-129 of Chapter I. For the State Arbitration Court as a substitute for today's commercial courts during the 
period of socialist development of Bulgaria, see supra footnote 130 of Chapter I.  
125 In Shipton, Anderson & Co. v. Weil Bros. & Co., for example, the excess quantity of wheat was valued at 
about 4 s. 
126 John Honnold, ‘Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Study in the Impact of Codification upon a Commercial 
Problem’ (1949) 97 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 457, 469. 
127 For a detailed and very enlightening analysis of the costs imposed by termination and acceptance together 
with damages in relation to a defective tender, see 127 For a detailed and very enlightening analysis of the costs 
imposed by termination and acceptance together with damages in relation to a defective tender, see Priest, 
‘Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An 
Economic Approach’, 963-968. For a similar analysis, though with an emphasis on buyer's adaptation costs, see , 
963-968. For a similar analysis, though with an emphasis on buyer's adaptation costs, see Schwartz, ‘Cure and 
Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’, 547-551. 
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liability in general, and not only the buyer's right to reject, which arises if the defect 
"substantially" impairs the buyer's interest, be it the interest in the use of the good or in its 
price.128 This already makes the substantiality qualification in Bulgarian contract law different 
from the de minimis exception, used to constrain only the termination remedy. The reason for 
this difference can be found in the dissimilar conception for breach in the common law and 
the civil law tradition.129 While, as typical for the common law tradition, US and English 
contract law adopt a unitary concept of breach, Bulgarian contract law, belonging to the civil 
law tradition, distinguishes different forms of breach and determines remedies with respect to 
each of these forms. Consequently, in case of a substantial defect, the buyer can resort either 
to termination, or to damages within the contract, but in case of insubstantial deviation, she 
has recourse to neither of them. As the buyer is left without any remedy at all, not even 
compensation, one may logically conclude, that an insubstantial defect can mean nothing but 
a defect, which is a trifle, and even then the limitation would go further than the de minimis 
exception to the perfect tender rule. 
If Bulgarian courts  were interpreting insubstantial defects to be only such that did not affect 
the fitness or the price of the good, denying seller's liability altogether might not be much of a 
problem since, as mentioned, in such cases the buyer's damages would be nominal anyway. 
Yet, although using the substantiality requirement with self-restraint and without generally 
permitting sellers to deliver goods of lower grade,130 sometimes courts characterise the defect 
as "insubstantial" when the deviation, even if minor, does exist and decreases buyer's value 
from performance.131 Normally these are cases in which the buyer knew of the defects at the 
                                                 
128 Art. 193(1) in relation to Art. 195(1) Contracts Act.  
129 See supra footnote 104 and the text accompanying it as well as footnote 110 of Chapter III. 
130 Decision №881 of 21.05.2009, c. c. № 296/2009 of District Court - Plovdiv, 8 c. p. (where a part of the 
delivered wheat was not fit for bread-producing at all, the buyer was entitled to return it to the seller); Decision 
№1910 of 23.11.2001, c. c. №538/2001 of the Supreme court, V c. d. (where the maize delivered was of lower 
grade, the buyer was entitled to return it but her right was precluded since she did not notify the seller 
immediately of the defect). See also in this sense Hristo Kostov, ‘Some Basic Questions Related to the Receipt 
of Defective Output in Contracts for Supply of Goods’ [1959] Socialist Law 36; Goleminov, Civil Liability for 
Defective Goods 48, 58-59.  
131 Decision №3032 of 15.12.1973, c. c. №1437/1973, I c. d. of the Supreme Court (where it was proven that at 
the time of purchase the car did not have most of the defects claimed by the buyer and that the defects it had 
concerned only two car components, which could be substituted for less than 1% of the car price, these defects 
were considered insubstantial and the buyer's claim for termination or replacement denied); Decision №540 of 
14.06.1985, c. c. №123/1985 of the Supreme Court, II c. d. (where the buyer had lived in the lodging for three 
years and obviously knew of its defects, but nevertheless purchased it without, as required by law, notifying the 
seller of them, the court denied the buyer's claim for the sum necessary to correct the defects, all the more that, 
the court stated, the defects did not affect the lodging's fitness for habitation and, having a value of 6.75% of the 
purchase price, did not lessen the lodging's value substantially); Decision №1324 of 17.12.1985, c. c. 
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time of contracting or in which the court suspects the buyer of wanting to return the good 
simply because her preferences have changed, but they open room for sellers to escape 
liability in general and, thus, bear the danger of significantly undermining the seller's 
incentive to meet his obligation as to quality. It is one thing if the buyer may remain 
undercompensated or may not go to court or may have difficulty collecting the compensation 
awarded, and it is another thing if she may be left without any course of action, at all. Indeed, 
it would save ex post costs if parties resolved petty troubles through negotiation, without 
bothering courts, but where sellers see a rising possibility to underperform without even 
having to pay damages, this may have a particularly demoralising effect on their motivation to 
perform conformingly. Note that under such conditions even out-of-court renegotiation could 
be rendered meaningless, so it is also not so unlikely that the gains from economising 
litigation costs be offset by the losses from systematic non-conforming performance which, 
however, is only narrowly below the required quality and is consequently characterised, in the 
spirit of previous court decisions, as "insubstantially" defective. In this sense, conditioning not 
only termination but also the remedy of damages on the presence of a substantial defect is not 
unproblematic.  
It would be wrong to say that the disproportionality of giving the buyer all or nothing was not 
felt within the system of Bulgarian contract law. Indeed, in one 1970 case the Supreme Court 
stated that the buyer could ask for reduction of the price irrespectively of whether the defects 
were substantial or not and that the substantiality consideration was important only with 
                                                                                                                                                        
№608/1985 of the Supreme Court, I c. d. (where the buyer had lived in the lodging for six months and obviously 
knew of its defects at the time of purchase, the court denied  the buyer's claim for the sum necessary to correct 
the defects, all the more that, the court stated, the defects did not affect the lodging's fitness for habitation and, 
being repairable for a sum equal to 1.53% of the purchase price, did not lessen the lodging's value substantially); 
Decision №4454 of 27.06.2011, app. c. c. №2069/2011 of Sofia City Court (a 4-mm tear of the lining of the 
cover of an expensive handbag did not give rise to seller's liability for defective performance at all because it 
was not considered a defect that substantially decreased the price or the fitness of the bag for use); Decision of 
10.08.2011, c. c. №31689/2009 of Sofia Regional Court (where the buyer wanted to return a TV set on account 
of an irreparable defect more than two years after the purchase, the court said that the defect was insubstantial 
because even if it had existed at the time of contracting, the fact that it had not been noticed for more than two 
years showed that it did not decrease the fitness of the TV set for use); Decision №121 of 18.07.2012, comm. c. 
№67/2012 of District Court – Pazardjik (where the tomato paste delivered had all quality certificates and was 
conforming to all food safety requirements, but around 40 of the thousands of cans delivered had a bad 
commercial guise and the seller had already handled the breach as provided in the contract – by replacing the 
cans or by reducing the price accordingly, this was not a substantial defect, justifying buyer's rejection of the 
entire delivery or her alternative demand for 75% price reduction). 
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respect to the claim for termination.132 But this decision remains a rare example in the context 
of a statutory language in the opposite sense as well as a whole line of court decisions that 
rely on the substantiality requirement to determine that the breach of defective performance 
did not occur at all, thus tacitly leaving promisees without any protection for defects, 
considered to be insubstantial. From this perspective, instead of using the significance of the 
non-conformity to delineate a particular form of breach, which entitles to certain remedies, the 
better approach appears to be adoption of a unified concept of breach, upon the occurrence of 
which damages are always available, but the right to terminate is limited where deviations are 
only trivial. 
Absolute termination right in England v. flexible termination right in Bulgaria 
Although all three legal systems appear to preclude the buyer from ending the contract in case 
of a trifling defect, the dissimilar legal technique by which they choose to provide for a broad 
termination right in sale-of-goods contracts – a clear-cut rule (England and US) and a vague 
standard (Bulgaria), makes a difference with respect to the risk of buyer's opportunism. 
Indeed, as said in Section A. of this chapter, in the absence of the promisor's specific 
investment, strategic behaviour by the buyer is much less likely than in construction 
contracts.133 Renegotiation also appears feasible since information asymmetries are smaller 
and any significant exaggeration of administrative costs by the buyer may easily instigate 
seller's suspicion and raise renegotiation costs high enough to offset any strategic gains from 
the overstatement.134 Still, even in executory contracts it is enough that a change of 
circumstances occurs, which makes the buyer regret the contract, so that opportunistic 
incentives arise. Needless to say, the longer the time period between performance and signing, 
                                                 
132 Decision №2579 of 1970, c. c. №1842/1970 of the Supreme Court, I c. d. Cf. with Decision №540 of 
14.06.1985, c. c. №123/1985 of the Supreme Court, II c. d. and Decision №1324 of 17.12.1985, c. c. №608/1985 
of the Supreme Court, I c. d. (see supra footnote 131 of this Chapter).  
133 See supra the text accompanying footnote 89 of this Chapter. 
134 If the buyer accepts the defective goods, she would have to either repair them (adaptation costs), or resell 
them (administrative resale costs) and cover (administrative costs of effectuating the cover as well as costs equal 
to the difference between the cover and the resale price). In a competitive market the seller can approximate the 
cost of repair and the difference between the cover and resale price. What he does not know is buyer's 
administrative costs, so it is these costs that the buyer can exaggerate to extort a higher price reduction. In fact, to 
the extent the seller knows whether the buyer is a merchant or consumer and the nature of the buyer's business, 
he can also make an educated guess about the buyer's resale costs. Yet, he cannot know the buyer's search 
(administrative) costs in relation to cover as they depend greatly on the value the buyer assigns to her own time. 
In a similar sense, see Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’ 557-558. 
See also supra the text accompanying footnote 91-93 of this Chapter. 
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the higher the chance that some undesired contingency transforms the transaction into a less 
profitable one. Generally in such a situation, the buyer prefers to escape the bad bargain, so 
she tends to use any slight defect of the good to reject although her real motive is by no means 
related to the alleged imperfection. She may also prove to be particularly creative about the 
alleged of defects, even inventing them, or inflate the significance of real discrepancies even 
if they are only minor deviations from contractual details that were initially not important to 
her. From this perspective, a right to reject for any breach, as entailed by the perfect tender 
rule, only encourages the buyer to exploit slight non-conformities in order to evade the 
contract. 
The issue of buyer's potential opportunism is particularly acute in the volatile markets of 
commodities where the buyer can easily find herself in a losing contract because of an 
unfavourable price fluctuation in between the time of signing and the time of performance. In 
principle, the very purpose of a contract for future delivery at a fixed price is to allow the 
buyer to avoid the risk of price increase, in exchange for which she assumes the risk of price 
decline. In a falling market, however, the buyer is eager to terminate forcing the seller to bear 
not only the loss from the reversed contract but also the loss from the price swing. She, on the 
other hand, gains from the contract more than if it was performed or, equivalently, if she was 
compensated for the alleged defects of the goods.135 Permitting the buyer to take advantage of 
her termination rights and to upset the initial allocation of risks for such strategic reasons 
reduces the joint value not only of the respective contract, but also of similar contracts in the 
future.136 
In this respect, English law reveals perfectly how an inflexible approach to termination 
incentivises the buyer to behave opportunistically. Once the 1893 Sale of Goods Act labelled 
the implied terms regarding conformity of the goods as conditions, it gave them the status of 
essential obligations which gave rise to the buyer's termination right regardless of the 
magnitude of the breach.137 This naturally provided certainty as parties were clear about their 
rights, but it also encouraged courts to apply the law rather rigidly and permit cancellation of 
                                                 
135 Once she has rejected, the buyer may purchase goods at the current lower price and fulfil her obligations in 
any resale contract, already made, or use the goods in her manufacturing process, thus gaining a windfall from 
the larger price difference between the sale and resale transaction or from the lower production cost. 
136 In this sense, see also Priest, ‘Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the 
Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach’ 966-968. 
137 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 46-47, 50 in Section A.1. of this Chapter. 
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the contract irrespectively of the consequences of the deviation.138 The stringency of such a 
position was particularly evident in the context of sale of goods by description, where the 
implied term as to conformity, unlike that requiring merchantable/satisfactory quality,139 was 
itself devoid of any elasticity.140 The courts adopted so stern a view regarding the seller's 
obligation that even the de minimis exception seemed to make no difference in case of 
deviation from the contractual description.141 If the seller had not performed to the letter, 
English courts allowed the buyer to terminate even if she wanted to do it for an ulterior 
motive. 
Two cases are particularly representative of the problem. In Arcos v. Ronaasen142 the buyers 
had contracted for timber of a thickness of half an inch, but were delivered staves, most of 
which were 9/16 of an inch thick. The court held the buyers were entitled to terminate as the 
goods were not conforming to the description. There was no elasticity built into the 
specification as to thickness, the reasoning went, and unless the parties stipulated for a 
margin, the condition had to be strictly complied with.143 The buyers had the right to receive 
goods that answered perfectly the description, not just something that was "commercially 
within and merchantable under the contract specification".144 Neither did it matter that the 
                                                 
138 In this sense, see also Michael Bridge, The Sale of Goods (First edn, Oxford: Clanderon Press 1997) 151. 
139 In response to the transformation of the standard from one applicable only between merchants into one that 
also ensures acceptable quality to consumers, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 substituted "merchantable quality", 
used in the Sale of Goods Act 1893, with "satisfactory quality". Cf. Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 14(2), 
14(2A) and 14(2B) with of Goods Act 1893 Section 14(2).  
140 In this sense, see also Reynolds, ‘Chapter 10. Classification of Statements as to Goods’ 523. In Cehave N.V. 
v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44, for example, the cargo was not 
damaged in a minor way, but the various factors comprising the merchantable quality standard provided the 
judges with some leeway to escape the effect, prescribed by the statutory classification of the merchantability 
requirement. On this aspect of the case, see infra the text accompanying footnotes 178-184 of this Chapter. 
141 Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son at 479-480, referring to the sections as numbered under the 1983 Sale of Goods 
Act ("… it is necessary to remember that description and quantity are not necessarily the same: and that the legal 
rights in respect of them are regulated by different sections of the code, description by s. 13, quantity by s. 30. It 
will be found that most of the cases that admit any deviation from the contract are cases where there has been an 
excess or deficiency in quantity which the Court has considered negligible. But apart from this consideration the 
right view is that the conditions of the contract must be strictly performed. If a condition is not performed the 
buyer has a right to reject."). Recall that Shipton, Anderson & Co. v. Weil Bros. & Co. where the de minimis rule 
was applied concerned deviation in quantity. See supra footnote 122 of this Chapter and the text accompanying 
it.  
142 [1933] AC 470. 
143 Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son at 479. The case was distinguished from Vigers Brothers v. Sanderson 
Brothers [1901] 1 QB 608 where the purchased laths were stipulated to be of "about the specification stated 
below". The magic word "about" allowed "some departure from the strict figures of the specifications". Ibid at 
611. Yet, no such word appeared in the contract in Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son. Ibid at 474-475. Per Lord 
Atkin at 479: "A ton does not mean about a ton, or a yard about a yard." 
144 Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son at 473. See also ibid at 474 ("it was those goods, and not their commercial 
equivalent, that the buyers were entitled to demand. … If the article they have purchased is not in fact the article 
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discrepancy did not in any way prejudice the fitness of the timber for the manufacture of 
cement barrels, the particular purpose for which the staves were purchased and of which the 
sellers had been informed.145 Similarly in Re Moore and Landauer146 the buyers were 
permitted to reject a consignment of Australian tinned peaches and other canned fruits 
because the contract required them to be packed in cases containing 30 cans each, while part 
of the cases tendered contained only 24 tins. The non-compliance with the description of the 
goods, the packing being part of it, might, the court said, cause the buyers considerable 
difficulty if they had resold under the same description. Yet, it was not established whether 
this was actually the case147 or whether the packing requirement was of any importance in the 
trade.148 It was also irrelevant that there was nothing wrong with the fruits or with the tins and 
that their market value was not in any way affected.149 In other words, although in both cases 
the non-conformities caused little, if any, hardship to the buyers, the courts did not preclude 
termination. The judges were conjecturing that it was the falling market that triggered the 
disputes and that the buyers were in fact searching for an excuse to throw the risk of price 
decline back on the sellers.150 Nevertheless, the law said that the buyers were entitled to 
terminate and the courts enforced it, thus permitting them to exercise their rights strategically 
and stimulating them to also do it in the future. 
By contrast, if Arcos v. Ronaasen151 and Re Moore and Landauer152 had been resolved under 
Bulgarian contract law, the requirement for a substantial defect would have most probably 
brought exactly the opposite outcome. Recall that in order for the seller to be liable for 
defective performance, the non-conformity must substantially decrease the price or the fitness 
                                                                                                                                                        
that has been delivered, they are entitled to reject it, even though it is the commercial equivalent of that which 
they have bought."). There was evidence that the excessive thickness of the staves was partly caused by their 9-
month exposure to weather, for which the buyers were also responsible as they examined the timber only after 
they had not succeeded to reject it on another ground in previous arbitration proceedings. In other words, at the 
time of shipment the staves' thickness was closer to half an inch. Ibid 478-479. 
145 Ibid at 480. 
146 Re Moore and Landauer [1921] 2 KB 519. 
147 Ibid 525. 
148 Ibid 523. 
149 Ibid 524. 
150 Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son at 480 ("No doubt, in business, men often find it unnecessary or inexpedient to 
insist on their strict legal rights. In a normal market if they get something substantially like the specified goods 
they may take them with or without grumbling and a claim for an allowance. But in a falling market I find that 
buyers are often as eager to insist on their legal rights…"). 
151 [1933] AC 470. 
152 [1921] 2 KB 519. 
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of the good for its ordinary or contemplated use.153 In Arcos v. Ronaasen, however, the 
discrepancy in thickness made the staves no less fit for manufacturing cement barrels and no 
less valuable.154 Similarly in Re Moore and Landauer, neither the fitness, nor the market 
value of the tinned peaches was in any way impaired. Where the deviation related only to the 
transportation packing (the number of cans in the cases) and by no means resulted in damage 
of the goods (goods, meaning the peaches and the tins in which they were canned), the seller 
performed his obligation as to quality.155 If the seller's breach as to the packing of the goods 
had caused the buyer some other harm, unrelated to the quality of the goods, e.g., as in the 
hypothesis of the court, it had given rise to the buyer's liability under a resale contract, the 
buyer would have had the remedies under general contract law. This means she would have 
been allowed to terminate only if the seller's breach was material to her interest,156 which on 
the facts of the case seems fairly unlikely. Rather, under general contract law, the buyer, 
unless she claimed specific performance, would have been entitled to expectation damages 
and these in case of liability under a resale contract would have been, subject to foreseeability, 
damages for lost profits. Or to put it briefly, in both cases the court would have very likely 
found there was no substantial defect and would not have permitted the buyers to end the 
agreement. This also means that it would have refused to award damages for defective 
performance and would have granted compensation only if such could be substantiated under 
general contract law.157 Yet, this does not change the cooling effect that the requirement for a 
                                                 
153 See supra the text accompanying footnote 119 of this Chapter. Unlike the Sale of Goods Act and the UCC, 
which were drafted with the goal of remaining faithful to the technical distinctions, made by judges, the 
Bulgarian Contracts Act, drafted in the context of the civil law tradition, did not adopt a detailed catalogue of 
implied warranties (in the language of the English Sale of Goods Act "conditions"), but a unitary and flexible 
concept of defect. Thus, in disputes in which, according to English and American courts, the issue is one of 
conformity with description, Bulgarian courts would still apply the same test of substantial decrease in price or 
fitness for use to decide on a seller's liability for defective performance. For the US, see in the former Uniform 
Sales Act (1906) Section 12 on express warranties by affirmation and promise, Section 14 on the implied 
warranty of description and Section 15 on the implied warranty of merchantability. In the current UCC, see § 2-
313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample.; § 2-314. Implied Warranty: 
Merchantability; Usage of Trade.; § 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose. For England, see 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 13(1A) Sale by Description. (Section 13 in the Sale of Goods Act 1893), 
Section 14(6) Implied terms about quality or fitness. (Section 14(1) and (2) in the Sale of Goods Act 1893) and 
Section 15(3) Sale by sample. (Section 15 in the Sale of Goods Act 1893). For Bulgaria, see Art. 193(1) 
Contracts Act. 
154 Ronaasen & Son v. Arcos Ltd. at 170. 
155 Regulation 4/1980 of the General Assembly of the State Arbitration Court; Goleminov, Civil Liability for 
Defective Goods 59; Kostov, 37. 
156 Recall that under general contract law termination is a remedy of last resort. See Art. 87(4) and (1) Contracts 
Act as well as supra footnotes 19-21 and the text accompanying them in Section A. of Chapter III. 
157 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 128-129 of this Chapter. 
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substantial (and not just any) non-conformity has on the buyer's incentive to reverse the risk 
allocation of price changes, contemplated by the contract. 
England. On the path to flexibility 
It would be wrong, though, to leave the impression that Arcos v. Ronaasen158 and Re Moore 
and Landauer159 describe completely the current state of English law with respect to 
termination in sale-of-goods contracts. On the contrary, the risk of buyer's opportunism has 
led English courts to develop a new doctrine, which limits the right to terminate to cases in 
which the non-conformity causes substantial harm to the buyer and, thus, precludes her from 
ending the contract for her own selfish reasons. Since the buyer's right to terminate depended 
entirely on the classification of the breached term as condition, the courts shrank the number 
of contractual undertakings which could be categorised as such by introducing a new class of 
terms that did not fit the sharp condition/warranty dichotomy of the Sale of Goods Act.  
The seeds of change were, indeed, planted in a service case, a time charter, but the dispute 
once again painfully revealed how in the context of market decline a rigid judicial attitude 
toward breach of the Seller's quality obligation does not produce an efficient result. Where in 
Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha160 during the first four months of the 24-
month charterparty, the ship could be at sea only for approximately half of the time and was 
then detained for some more months for further substantial repairs, the shipowner was in 
breach of his obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. Yet, the fact that the charterer's true 
motive for insisting on termination was the "catastrophic fall in the freight market" was fairly 
transparent and this undoubtedly influenced the court.161 By escaping the contract, the 
charterer was going to shift the market risk, lying in principle on her, on the shipowner and 
cause him great losses. At the same time despite the delays and the repairs, the ship was still 
available for the remaining 17 (out of 24) months under the charterparty, so the charter's 
purpose for entering the contract was not really frustrated.162 It could even be argued that the 
charterer benefited rather than lost from the default as while the ship was being off hire on 
                                                 
158 [1933] AC 470. 
159 [1921] 2 KB 519. 
160 Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB 26. 
161 Ibid 39 ("I appreciate also that there was a catastrophic fall in the freight market between February and June, 
1957, and that it would only be natural in these circumstances for the charterers to wish to escape from the 
charterparty if they lawfully may."). 
162 Ibid 40, 65. 
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account of unseaworthiness, she was released from paying the high rate of hire, set by the 
agreement.163 Under these circumstances, the court denied that the obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel was a condition, a breach of which permitted the charterer at once to 
terminate and attributed it to a third, large category of intermediate terms, one breach of 
which might give rise to a termination right and another breach of which might give rise only 
to a right to damages.164 The obligation, the court reasoned, could be broken by the presence 
of trivial, easily remediable defects, such as a missing nail from one of the timbers, as well as 
by defects that inevitably resulted in a complete loss of the ship.165 The legal consequences of 
the breach of such a complex undertaking, then, depended on the gravity of the default and its 
impact. It was only when the breach of the intermediate term deprived the promisee of 
substantially the whole benefit of the contract that she could terminate and thus bring the 
same effect as that ascribed to a breach of condition.166  
Any doubts that the more flexible approach in Hongkong Fir was applicable to contracts for 
sale of goods were eradicated in Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The 
Hansa Nord).167 Had it not been for the arrogant behaviour of the buyers, the case, who 
knows, might well have gone the other way, but the court seemed scandalised by the blatantly 
opportunistic scheme fabricated in the context of the falling market.168 Shortly after the buyer 
had rejected the whole shipment of citrus pulp pellets because part of it had been overheated, 
she repurchased the cargo through an intermediary at the distress sale for a price, far below its 
then market value even as damaged.169 She then used all of the pellets, only in smaller 
percentages, as initially contemplated – for compounding cattle food. In other words, the 
buyer not only threw the risk from the steeply falling market back on the seller, but she also 
made substantial profit from the judicial sale and, in the end, by her own conduct, showed that 
                                                 
163 In this sense, see also Peel 871, footnote 196. 
164 Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha at 71. 
165 Ibid 62, 71. 
166 Ibid 70-71. 
167 [1976] QB 44. 
168 Ibid. at 55-56 ("Now comes an astonishing sequence of events. … So the ubiquitous Mr. Baas had helped 
them greatly. … That is a devastating comment [of a comment made in the award of the board of appeals of the 
London Cattle Food Trade Association]. The buyers must have known the truth. But they did not tell it to the 
board of appeal. At any rate, not the whole truth."). 
169 The contract price was £100,000. At the time of delivery the market price for sound goods had already fallen 
to £86,000. A price allowance for the damaged goods was quantified in the region of £20,000. The intermediary, 
however, purchased the goods from the agents of the court for £33,720 and on the same day resold them to the 
buyer at the same price. In other words, ultimately the buyer had the citrus pulp pellets for about 30% of the 
contract price. Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)at 55-56, 65, 68, 78. 
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had the strategic opportunity for extra benefit not been there, she would not have rejected but 
would have been satisfied with damages. 
In court the buyer contended that the seller broke the express contractual requirement as to 
shipment "in good condition", any breach of which entitled her to terminate. Assisted by the 
absence of case-law labelling any similar clause as a condition170 and relying on Hongkong 
Fir ,171 the judges, however, unanimously concluded that this contractual term was an 
intermediate stipulation which gave rise to the right to reject only if the breach "went to the 
root of the contract".172 All arguments that Hongkong Fir did not apply as the wording of the 
Sale of Goods Act made the condition/warranty classification comprehensive173 were rejected 
on the ground of Section 61(2) of the Act,174 which allowed the rules of the common law, 
including the law merchant, that were not inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act, 
to still apply to sale-of-goods contracts.175 In addition, a clause in the form contract providing 
for price allowance in case of certain percentages of contamination (but mentioning nothing 
of overheating)176 was, according to the court, indicative as to the intention of the parties to 
qualify the buyer's right to reject only in cases of serious and substantial damage. And since 
the whole cargo was ultimately used for its intended purpose as animal feed, the breach of the 
intermediate term as to quality could not be deemed to go to the root of the contract; hence, 
the buyer was not entitled to reject but only to damages.177 Thus, extending the Hongkong Fir 
approach to sale-of-goods contracts, the court took a major step toward mitigating the split 
between sales law and general contract law with respect to termination.   
It is also necessary to point briefly at another aspect in which Hansa Nord178 is important: the 
fairly inventive approach used by the court in order to find for the seller on the point of 
merchantability. In reality, the cargo was significantly damaged: the evidence suggested it lost 
                                                 
170 Ibid at 61, 70. 
171 [1962] 2 QB 26. 
172 Or put differently "deprived [the buyers] of the whole of the benefit of the contract" or "destroyed the 
consideration which the buyers gave". See Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa 
Nord) at 73. Cf. with Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha: see supra the text accompanying 
footnote 166 of this Chapter. 
173 Sale of Goods Act 1893 Section 11(1)(b), presently Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 11 When condition to be 
treated as warranty. (3). 
174 Sale of Goods Act 1893 Section 61(2), presently Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 62(2) Savings: rules of law 
etc. 
175 Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)at 60, 68-73, 82-83. 
176 Clause 5 of the then used Form 100 of the Cattle Food Trade Association, now GAFTA №100. 
177 Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)at 60, 73, 83. 
178 [1976] QB 44.  
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approximately 20% of its contract price and a reasonable seller would have hardly resold it 
without a "with all faults" or similar label.179 The defect not being trivial at all, it appeared the 
court should decide the overheating rendered the goods unmerchantable.180 Yet, the judges 
wanted to prevent the buyer's windfall and pointing that the citrus pulp pellets were 
reasonably usable and ultimately used for their common purpose, they held there was no 
breach of the implied condition of merchantable quality.181 Lord Denning went as far as to say 
that the test should be whether a commercial man, having regard to all relevant circumstances, 
including a clause giving the buyer a price allowance for some deficiencies, would have 
thought the buyer should be able to reject.182 Surely, there is value in this approach since it 
introduces context as a pertinent consideration when determining merchantable quality. But 
such an interpretation of the implied term in practice supplemented the standard form 
contract, which, recall, said nothing about overheating. Moreover, because of the status of the 
merchantability term as condition, in order to bar rejection, the court was forced to find that 
there was no breach, and consequently deny the buyer any remedy on this ground. In the 
particular case this was not so troublesome as she was awarded damages for breach of the 
shipment-in-good-condition clause. But the court created a precedent which binds lower 
courts and, therefore, opened the possibility that future buyers, having no such express clause 
in the contract, remain without remedy at all.183 In this sense, such an escape from the 
consequences of the rigid classification by means of interpretation hides the danger of 
watering down the seller's incentive to perform conformingly.184     
To find a Bulgarian court case with the peculiar factual situation of Hansa Nord185 in order to 
make a perfect comparison is unfortunately impossible. Yet, it is highly unlikely that a 
Bulgarian court would permit the buyer to terminate where she rejected the goods but 
afterwards repurchased them and used them for their initial purpose in her manufacturing 
process. Firstly, where the dispute centres on whether the goods suffered from any 
deficiencies at the time of tender, Bulgarian courts are less inclined to find they were 
                                                 
179 Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)at 68. Cf. with Jones v. Just (1867-68) 
LR 3 QB 197 where the Manilla hemp lost 25% of their market value and was held unmerchantable. It was sold 
by auction as "Manilla hemp, with all faults". See ibid at 200.  
180 For such an assessment, see also Bridge 300. 
181 Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)at 63, 79. 
182 Ibid at 63. 
183 In this sense, see also Bridge 300-301. 
184 For a similar danger created by the Bulgarian courts' interpretation of the requirement that the defect be 
substantial, see supra the text accompanying footnotes 128-132 of this Chapter. 
185 [1976] QB 44.  
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"substantially" defective and allow termination if the buyer after all used (some of) them in 
production.186 Now, the goods in Hansa Nord were not insignificantly damaged and one 
cannot contend with certainty that a Bulgarian court would have found that the overheating 
was not a substantial defect. But, still, the point is that courts tend to interpret the fact of the 
processing of the goods as a proxy of opportunism of the buyer and to bar termination. In this 
sense, one could expect that in a case like Hansa Nord where the buyer, too, eventually used 
the goods, courts would not remain indifferent to her strategic behaviour. Secondly, in case 
the buyer has processed the defective goods, the Contracts Act straightforwardly restricts her 
rights to price adjustment (and other damages).187 Indeed, this provision has been applied only 
to scenarios in which the buyer seeks to terminate after she accepted and processed the goods 
(and not to such in which she first terminates but then acquires the goods and uses them) as in 
such case their return to the seller, if possible at all, is likely to entail significant costs of 
unembedding, unfixing or uninstalling188 while the goods themselves would have lost a 
substantial portion of their value. Yet, this statutory provision also reflects the increased risk 
of strategic termination by the buyer once she has accepted the goods.189 From this 
perspective, it is sensitive to opportunism and despite that the circumstances of Hansa Nord 
are not exactly the factual scenario to which it is applied, a more resourceful court, faced with 
such a case, could use it as an argument against permitting the buyer's strategic termination. 
Thirdly, where, as in Hansa Nord, the buyer's rejection was part of an entire plan meant to 
enable her to acquire the goods at below the market price and make an extra profit, the buyer 
clearly violated her duty to perform her contractual obligations in good faith.190 In this sense, 
a Bulgarian court, which takes the view that the substantiality requirement is not the proper 
                                                 
186 Decision №136 of 08.04.2014, c. c. №1063/2013 of Regional Court-Dimitrovgrad (where the buyer sought to 
terminate long after acceptance of the goods and it was difficult to establish whether the goods were really 
defective at the time of tender, the court did not limit itself to rejecting the buyer's claim on the ground that it 
was filed after expiry of the statute of limitations, but also pointed that where the buyer had used the goods in her 
production process, she did not manage to provide undisputable evidence that the goods were not of the required 
quality). 
187 Art. 196(2) Contracts Act; Decision №4716 of 03.12.2013, c. c. №2347/2013 of Regional Court-Plovdiv 
(where the buyer had already planted the diseased plants, she could ask only for price reduction). 
188 On the magnitude and relevance of such costs, see also Wagner 156. 
189 Once the buyer has accepted the goods, she has them for a longer period of time than if she rejects them 
immediately upon tender. During this time the risk that she wants to terminate because of a regret contingency 
other than the defect (change in the market or discovery that the goods are not fit for her purpose) increases. In 
this sense, see also Priest, ‘Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: An Economic Approach’ 972. The same rationale underlies the higher standard for buyer's 
revocation of acceptance, established by the UCC. Cf. UCC § 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in 
Part. (1) with § 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery.  
190 Art. 63(1) Contracts Act. 
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legal basis to disallow buyer's termination in this case, could plainly discourage her 
opportunism by finding her in breach of her duty of good faith. In a case like Hansa Nord, the 
latter legal institution would, in my view, be exactly on point and a court decision grounded 
on it would produce the desired deterrent effect while avoiding a stretch of other legal 
provisions, not intended to cover such extreme situations. 
In this respect, it is worth pointing out that in the law and economics literature the good faith 
standard, requiring policing of the mental state of a party, is usually criticised as one which is 
very costly to enforce. The Hansa Nord case,191 however, is a good example of how assuming 
a priori that bad faith is simply impervious to accurate proof (unverifiable) is far from 
reality.192 On one hand, the case reveals that in some instances it is not so difficult to 
recognise bad faith behaviour. On the other hand, it shows the screening devices used by 
courts (a falling market combined with repurchase of the same good at below the market 
price, arrogant behaviour, use of the good) to discern undesirable conduct. Indeed, 
enforcement of the good faith standard is generally more costly than enforcement of the 
substantiality requirement, normally used in Bulgarian law, but the costs saved from 
preventing bad faith, which may otherwise not be captured by the substantiality requirement, 
are likely to exceed the increased enforcement costs. As for comparing the good faith standard 
(Bulgaria) and the standard, introduced by means of the intermediate terms doctrine 
(England),193 where the latter is underlain by a bad faith element and, to apply it, English 
courts still have to first construe the intention of the parties, the difference in terms of ex post 
costs does not appear to be significant.  
Still, to sum up the main point, two different approaches to termination compete in English 
commercial sale-of-goods law: on one hand, an approach, represented by cases like Arcos v. 
                                                 
191 [1976] QB 44. 
192 On verifiability of standards, see supra Section A.3. Rules and standards of Chapter IV. With respect to the 
good faith standard, see Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ 1007, footnote 106. 
193 English scholars disagree whether the doctrine of substantial performance and the intermediate term doctrine 
imply standards that are different or not. At least one English scholar flatly equates the two standards. See David 
Campbell, ‘Arcos v Ronaasen as a Relational Contract’ in David Campbell, Linda Mulcahy and Sally Wheeler 
(eds), Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (First edn, Houndmills, Basingtoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 152. Edwin Peel also does not hesitate to join the substantial performance 
standard, the intermediate term doctrine standard ("substantially deprive a party of the benefit of the contract") 
and the Reardon Smith standard (the two-tier approach narrowing the scope of the implied condition as to 
correspondence with description) under a common term/principle, which he calls: "the requirement of 
"substantial failure" in performance". In other words, he seems to think the three tests are close enough to be 
unified under a common concept. Treitel, The Law of Contract 823, 866, 881. For the Reardon Smith test, see 
infra Section B.2..England of this Chapter. This is also the way this thesis approaches the matter. 
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Ronaasen194 and Re Moore and Landauer,195 which favours termination by permitting it for 
every and any breach, and, on the other hand, another approach, pushed forward by Hansa 
Nord,196 which makes termination dependent on the gravity of the breach and is, hence, much 
more hostile to ending the contract. The "more modern doctrine"197 of "intermediate or 
innominate terms"198 was approved by the House of Lords, with Lord Wilberforce 
characterising some of the early authorities, among them Re Moore and Landauer, as 
"excessively technical and due for fresh examination".199 It was also applied in a whole line of 
later court decisions.200 This does not come to say that judges are always unanimous over 
whether a particular term should be interpreted as innominate or as condition.201 But where 
they consistently emphasise that "a court should not be over ready, unless required by statute 
or authority so to do, to construe a term in a contract as a "condition"",202 it will not be 
exaggerated to speak of a tendency toward "leaning in favour"203 of categorising contractual 
stipulations as intermediate terms.204 From this perspective, to the extent the doctrine of 
intermediate terms constitutes an instrument against buyer's strategic behaviour, which 
English courts seem inclined to use, English sale-of-goods law has moved closer to Bulgarian 
                                                 
194 [1933] AC 470, at 479-480 as per Lord Atkin ("If the seller wants a margin he must and in my experience 
does stipulate for it…. in a falling market I find that buyers are often as eager to insist on their legal rights as 
courts of law are ready to maintain them."). 
195 [1921] 2 KB 519. 
196 [1976] QB 44, at 71 as per Lord Roskill ("In principle contracts are made to be performed and not to be 
avoided according to the whims of market fluctuation and where there is a free choice between two possible 
constructions I think the court should tend to prefer that construction which will ensure performance and not 
encourage avoidance of contractual obligations."). 
197 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989, at 998 (as per Lord Wilberforce). 
198 Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711, at 714 (as per Lord Wilberforce). 
199 Surprisingly, Lord Wilberforce did not mention Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son. Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. 
Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 998. See also Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export SA at 715-716.  
200 Tradax Internacional SA v. Goldschmidt SA [1977] 2 LlLRep 604 (where the provision as to impurities in a 
contract for sale of barley was construed to be an intermediate term and the excess of  foreign matter by 0.1 
percent was not a breach substantial enough to entitle rejection); Bremer Handelgesellschaft mbH v. Vanden 
Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 LlLRep 109, at 113; Federal Commerce & Navigation v. Molena Alpha [1979] 
AC 757.  
201 B.S.&N. Ltd. v. Micado Shipping Ltd. (Malta) (The "Seaflower") [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep 341 (where the lower 
court judge held that the guarantee given by the owners to obtain Exxon approval was an innominate term, but 
the Court of Appeal characterised the term as condition). 
202 See Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)at 70 (as per Lord Roskill); Bunge 
Corp. v. Tradax Export SA at 715-716 (as per Lord Wilberforce) and at 727 (as per Lord Roskill). In ibid the 
court only moderated somewhat the doctrine of intermediate terms without rejecting it.  
203 Tradax Internacional SA v. Goldschmidt SAat 612.  
204 In this sense, see also Peel 884, 886-887. When it comes to contracts for the supply of services, statutory 
terms are also said to belong to the class of intermediate terms. Such are the implied terms, providing that 
services will be carried out with due care and skill within a reasonable time, to which the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982 refers as "terms" while defining as "conditions" the implied terms in contacts for the supply of 
goods. Cf. Section 13 and Section 14 with Sections 3-5 in the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. See also 
in this sense ibid 882.  
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sales law, which, as shown, has ab initio regulatory safeguards against buyer's self-interested 
termination of the contract. 
Furthermore, the aspiration to prevent buyer's opportunistic rejections on purely technical 
grounds, which triggered the explained development in common law, also motivated a 
modification to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which confined the buyer's termination remedy 
in the cases when the breached contractual term is not classified as intermediate but as a 
condition.205 The common law and the statutory limitation, however, do not overlap. On the 
facts of Hongkong Fir206 and Hansa Nord,207 the doctrine of intermediate terms drastically 
constrained the buyer's right to reject, permitting it only for a very serious breach.208 In this 
sense, the doctrine implicitly precludes rejection for defects, which, even if more than de 
minimis,209 are only minor. By contrast, the statutory restriction covers a narrower part of the 
breach spectrum, entailing precisely minor deviations. Under Section 15A,210 when the seller's 
breach of the implied conditions as to description, quality and fitness, and sample211 is so 
"slight" that it would be "unreasonable" for the buyer to reject, her remedy will be only in 
damages within the contract. Section 15A, it is argued, would give courts a means to disallow 
buyer's strategic termination without stretching the meaning of "merchantable" (now, 
"satisfactory") quality and holding that there was no breach of this implied condition at all, as 
the court in Hansa Nord was forced to do.212 It may also affect the early excessively technical 
authorities such as Arcos v. Ronaasen.213 In other words, although the section was said not to 
change the general position of English sale-of-goods law that the buyer's motive for rejection 
                                                 
205 Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum №58 (1983). 
206 [1962] 2 QB 26. 
207 [1976] QB 44. 
208 Reynolds, ‘Chapter 12. Remedies in Respect of Defects’ 600. 
209 As for the de minimis exception to the perfect tender rule, see supra footnotes 120-122 of this Chapter and the 
text accompanying them. 
210 Section 15A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 was inserted by Section 4(1) of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 
1994. Section 7(1) and Sch. 2, paras 4 and 6 of the same act also introduced similar statutory restrictions as 
regards other contracts for the supply of goods: see Section 11A of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973 and Section 5A of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.  
211 Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 13 Sale by description., 14 Implied terms about quality or fitness., and 15 
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212 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 179-184 of this Chapter. In this sense, see also Bridge 156, 
footnote 56. In view of the Law Commission, if the Sale of Goods Act 1979 did not give the implied term as to 
quality and fitness the status of a condition, an English court, nowadays, in light of the development of the 
common law doctrine of intermediate terms, would not classify it in this way unless there is a clear indication 
that this was the intention of the parties. , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. 
Scottish Law Commission Consultative Memorandum №58, para. 2.30. 
213 [1933] AC 470. In this sense, see Bridge 156; Reynolds, ‘Chapter 11. Terms as to Description and Quality 
Implied by the Sale of Goods Act’ 543, footnote 98. 
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is irrelevant,214 its enactment is part of the more general trend of limitation of the buyer's 
absolute right to reject, which infuses English sale-of-goods law with regulatory function. 
Expansion of the termination right in Bulgaria 
Interestingly, after the fall of communism in Bulgaria in 1989, the opposite trend of 
increasing the scope of the buyer's equal choice between termination and damages within the 
contract can be observed in Bulgarian sale-of-goods law. The trend is not just related to the 
enhanced position of the right to terminate as a result of revocation of the legislation which 
barred putting an end to any contract, executed on the basis of the plan, even if under this 
contract the seller delivered goods with incurable defects.215 It entails widening the scope of 
seller's liability for defective performance under sale-of-goods law at the expense of his 
liability under general contract law where, recall, the right to terminate is a remedy of last 
resort.216  
Thus, for a long time according to the Bulgarian legal doctrine and court practice, the breach 
of defective performance implied a defect which reduced the fitness of the good for its 
purpose but did not render it absolutely unfit.217 Such a grave non-conformity led to total 
breach and not simply to defective performance; consequently, the buyer had the remedies 
under general contract instead of under sale-of-goods law.218 In this respect, recall, that 
unfitness for purpose is also the test, used to confine termination in construction contracts, in 
case of which, as explained, the position of the right to end the agreement is in line with the 
                                                 
214 , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission №160 para. 4.19. It was considerations about letting elements 
of subjectivity into the law that motivated the Law Commission to confirm the irrelevance of the buyer's motive. 
Ibid footnote 23. 
215 Art. 17 and Art. 44(1) Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations. See also supra the text 
accompanying footnotes 30-34 in Section A. of Chapter III. 
216 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 19-21 in Section A. of Chapter III and Ordinance №3 of 
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217 Goleminov, Civil Liability for Defective Goods 51, 53. For the opposite view, see Kostov 36. 
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13.08.1970, c. №445/1970 of the State Arbitration Court (where part of the glass delivered was broken, the court 
decided this part was not delivery of defective but of completely unfit goods and applied general contract law). 
For the different forms of breach in Bulgarian contract law, see supra the text accompanying footnote 128-129 
of this Chapter as well as footnotes 104 (with the accompanying text) and 110 of Chapter III. 
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general policy of Bulgarian contract law envisaging it as an extreme remedy.219 Where the 
non-conformity triggered the seller's liability for total breach under general contract law, the 
buyer was entitled to terminate (since delivery of an unfit good was a breach, material with a 
view to her interest); yet, she was not able to end to the contract immediately but only if the 
seller had not cured within the additional time given.220 Granting buyers with different 
remedies depending on whether the goods delivered were defective or completely unfit was, 
however, severely criticised by some legal scholars. They pointed out that where unfit goods 
could also often be put to some other use, the distinction, determining the applicable remedial 
regime, was based on a very uncertain criterion.221 It appears, however, that since the 1990s 
courts have started to take a different view considering that in case of non-conforming goods, 
all forms of breach, including total breach, are encompassed by the seller's liability for 
defective performance.222 Even in the event of delivery of absolutely unfit articles, judges 
treat them as defective, so the buyer has the right to terminate under sale-of-goods and not 
under general contract law.223  
In other words, when it comes to contracts for sale of goods the trends in Bulgarian and in 
English contract law go in the opposite directions. Despite the deeply entrenched perfect 
tender rule, English courts now lean toward limiting buyer's choice between termination and 
damages within the contract. By contrast, Bulgarian courts currently tend to permit the buyer 
to make such a choice in cases in which until recently they applied the general contract rule 
                                                 
219 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 70-73 in Section A.2. of this Chapter. Cf. with the English 
doctrine of intermediate terms under which the test for a discharging breach is very close to, if not equivalent 
with, the test under English general contract law, applicable to construction contracts.  
220 Art. 87(4) and (1) Contracts Act. 
221 For example, castor oil which was unfit for use in the transportation sector, was fit for use in the 
manufacturing process of another state enterprise. See Decision under a. c. №5268/1956 of the State Arbitrage of 
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expressly denied that the seller was liable for total breach under general contract law and grounded his liability 
on sale-of-goods law for defective performance). 
223 Decision №585 of 29.10.1992, V c. d. of the Supreme Court (where the concentrated syrup delivered was 
proven to be completely unfit, the court took the view that the buyer terminated on the ground of defective 
performance in sale-of-goods law); Decision №1246 of 16.10.2003, V c. d. of the Supreme Cassation Court 
(where the ice cream machine could not be put into operation and did not start functioning even after seller's two 
attempts to repair it, the court classified the breach as one for defective performance); Decision №73 of 
13.06.2014, app. comm. c. № 221/2014 of District Court – Shumen (where the milk delivered was completely 
unfit for human consumption, the court treated the breach as one of defective performance).  
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restricting termination. Yet, even if opposite, these trends lead to similar outcomes. Where in 
Bulgarian sale-of-goods law seller's liability for defective performance embraces delivery of 
unfit goods and in English contract law the doctrine of intermediate terms constrains the 
buyer's right to reject only in breaches that would deprive her of the whole of the benefit of 
the contract, the ultimate result in both jurisdictions is that in the event of a very serious, 
material breach as to quality the buyer has a free choice between ending the contract and 
seeking damages within its frames. In this sense, even though the English trend is directed 
toward restricting while the Bulgarian trend is geared toward relaxing the right to terminate, 
the two legal systems converge with respect to the seller's gravest breaches concerning 
quality. One can only think that in the process of creation of market economy in Bulgaria, 
courts naturally responded to the speeding up of commercial exchange and the increasing 
availability of substitutes, so they became more willing to liberate parties from contractual 
relationships. Simultaneously, making it easier for promisees to break free and seek other 
opportunities, courts themselves promoted further contracting and thus encouraged the very 
process of market creation. 
Generally, the tendency of expanding seller's liability for defective performance in Bulgarian 
sale-of-goods law seems to have a positive effect in terms of efficiency. It increases legal 
certainty and reduces the level of ex post enforcement costs. Courts now need to decide solely 
whether the good is non-conforming, without in addition having to worry about the vexing 
question of whether the non-conformity results in defective performance or total breach. In 
this respect, the trend only confirms the advantages of a unified concept of breach, under 
which the issue of distinguishing between a defective and an absolutely unfit good does not 
arise, at all. What is more important for the purposes of this chapter, however, is that while 
expanding the scope of the buyer's equal choice between termination and damages within the 
contract, the tendency increases seller's incentive to perform conformingly without sacrificing 
the regulatory potential of the Bulgarian remedial regime, implied in the substantiality 
requirement. It was indeed paradoxical that by applying general contract law and requiring 
that the seller be given an additional chance to cure, Bulgarian courts impeded the buyer's 
right to terminate precisely in the cases in which the seller's breach was most serious (it did 
not render the good less fit but completely unfit). In fact, in cases like these it is least likely 
that the buyer is opportunistic, so it is better that the law focuses on enhancing the seller's 
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motivation to perform his obligations as to quality.224 From this perspective, the trend of 
granting the buyer with a free choice between termination and damages in the event of 
delivery of unfit goods powerfully deters sellers' evasion. Simultaneously, as the tendency by 
no means eliminates the requirement that the defect of the good be substantial, the latter can 
still be used by courts to bar buyer's termination when it is strategic.  
The US. On the path to flexibility   
In the context of this complex picture of legal developments in English and Bulgarian sale-of-
goods law, the question logically arises whether US law, while giving the buyer an absolute 
right to reject defective goods,225 has also cultivated mechanisms to thwart the buyer's 
opportunistic incentive, spurred by this right. As it was already hinted, similarly to English 
law, US law has also moved toward mitigating the rigid perfect tender rule.226 Yet, since, 
unlike in England and Bulgaria, in the US, the legal system's responsiveness to the risk of 
buyer's opportunism has led to the introduction of the intermediate remedy of the right to 
cure, US sale-of-goods law, as well as the changes characterising it, are looked at separately. 
In fact, a trend toward a more flexible approach can be identified as early as the first US 
codification of sales law: the Uniform Sales Act. Indeed, as a reaction to the English 1893 
Sale of Goods Act, whose technicalities were considered to rob parties of legal certainty,227 
the Uniform Sales Act proclaimed the perfect tender rule in a simple, clear-cut manner. It 
released the right to terminate from its limitation in case of sale of "specific goods, the 
property in which had passed to the buyer"228 as well as from its dependency on the judicial 
determination of the breached contractual term as a condition or as a warranty.229 The buyer 
was given the right, at his election, to accept the defective goods and recover damages or to 
rescind the contract for any "breach of warranty", where "warranty" referred to all obligations 
                                                 
224 Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’, 972. See 
also supra Section A.3. of this Chapter. 
225 See supra the text accompanying footnote 46-49 in Section A.1. as well as footnote 118 and the text 
accompanying it in Section B.1. of this Chapter. 
226 See supra the text accompanying footnote 51 of this Chapter. 
227 For more details on the reasons which produced the statutory language of the Uniform Sales Act (1906), 
setting out the perfect tender rule, see Honnold, 458-460. 
228 Sale of Goods Act 1893 Section 11 When condition to be treated as warranty. (1)(c). 
229 See Sale of Goods Act 1893 Section 11(1)(b) which provided that whether a contractual stipulation was a 
condition or a warranty depended in each case on the judicial construction of the contract. Thus, a stipulation, 
even though called a condition in the contract, might be classified as a warranty. 
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of the seller regarding the goods.230 Such a clear, bright-line rule, correspondingly, gave rise 
to uncompromising judicial statements denying "[any] room in commercial contracts for the 
doctrine of substantial performance".231 Nevertheless, in the decade following the First World 
War, US courts were already showing some sensitivity to surprise rejections, motivated by 
post-war market volatility.232 
One should not fail to notice that at approximately the same time when English courts 
displayed the utmost strictness in Arcos v. Ronaasen233 and Re Moore and Landauer,234 US 
courts were not so disinclined to bar termination where the deviation from the contractual 
description, though existing, was too minor to impair the value of seller's performance, so the 
buyer most likely exploited it strategically.235 Thus, in Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning,236 
a buyer, who purchased dry Karachi hides as ranging between 13 and 20 pounds (13/20) but 
discovered, after the market had changed, that they were in fact between 12 and 20 pounds, 
was not permitted to terminate. To be correct, the sale agreement was not an executory one, so 
the buyer was able to examine the goods before making the contract and in fact did (even if 
not with respect to weight).237 In similar cases at the time, judges often found that the seller 
complied with the contract on the ground that, having inspected the good, the buyer did not 
rely on its description, such reliance deemed necessary, even in the absence of explicit 
statutory requirement as to it, in order for a description to amount to a warranty that could be 
breached in the first place.238 Yet, although emphasising that the buyer had been given an 
                                                 
230 Uniform Sales Act (1906) Section 69(1). For the different meaning of the term "warranty" under US and 
English law, see supra footnote 50 in Section A.1. of this Chapter.  
231 Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. J. Aron 16 F2d 185 (2 Cir 1926). 
232 In this sense, see Honnold 461-462. 
233 [1933] A.C. 470. 
234 [1921] 2 KB 519. 
235 In a similar sense, see Honnold 462-463. 
236 152 NE 630 (Mass 1926). 
237 Ibid at 632 ("‘The plaintiff was given unrestricted opportunity to examine the hides before making the 
contract, and it did, by an expert in hides, make an examination thereof, for the purpose of discovering whether 
there were winter hair in the lot. …’ The hides were delivered and the purchase price paid."). Consider that the 
warranty of description first grew precisely in contracts for future delivery where the goods were not available 
for inspection at the time of dickering and the buyer needed assurance that the goods would be as contracted. 
Karl Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society’ (1936) 36 Columbia Law Review 699, 740-741. For an 
argument that where the buyer cannot examine the goods before contracting, strict performance is vital, see Le 
Roy Dyal Co. v. Allen 161 F2d 152 (4th Cir 1947) at 154 (in an f.o.b. contract for the sale of potatoes where 
inspection certificates were to be furnished "on each car as shipped", the buyer claimed that the fact that the 
inspection certificates were dated from one to three days prior to the date of shipment was a breach that entitled 
her to terminate because the very rationale of this contractual stipulation was to assure her as to the condition of 
the goods on the day of shipment when she also had to pay the draft). 
238 Kraig v. Benjamin 149 Atl 687 (1930); Hellman v. Kirschner 191 NY Supp 202 (Sup Ct 1921) at 203. Indeed, 
the provision of the Uniform Sales Act concerning the implied warranty as to correspondence with description 
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ample opportunity to examine the hides, the court in Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning did 
not limit itself to pointing out the absence of the buyer's reliance in order to sustain 
enforcement of the contract. On the contrary, it recognised that the 13/20 description gave rise 
to a warranty and went on to inquire into the seriousness of the breach, ultimately deciding 
that the hides were "fairly and substantially of the character and description, contemplated by 
the contract".239 In this sense, by taking an approach which could very well be applied to 
contracts for future delivery, the court pushed the flexible treatment of the clear-cut statutory 
language one step further. Where, the reasoning went, the difference between 13/20 and 12/20 
hides was so slight that the trade did not consider them different in terms of the practical 
purposes for which they could be used, the hides delivered were in fact identical with the 
hides contracted to be sold.240 With evidence suggesting that the fitness of the hides for use 
was not in any way diminished and in the absence of any indication that the price of the hides 
was affected, a Bulgarian court would have decided there was no substantial defect and 
rejected the buyer's claim, too. Contrast, however, Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning with 
Arcos v. Ronaasen,241 the latter case indeed entailing an executory contract but one under 
which, in the context of a falling market, the seller again delivered goods with minor non-
conformity that did not really prejudice the buyer. Just as the 9/16 staves in Arcos were 
                                                                                                                                                        
did not contain any express requirement for buyer's reliance. Reliance was necessary in order for seller's 
affirmation or promise to amount to express warranties but not, at least on the face of it, with respect to the 
implied warranty as to description. Cf. Uniform Sales Act (1906) Section 12 with Section 14. Even in the 
absence of explicit language, however, the reliance test was imputed in the implied warranty as to 
correspondence with description to avoid inconsistency with the overlapping provision on express warranties. In 
this sense, see Honnold 462, footnote 26. 
The origin of this overlap can be found in the case-law of "express warranties" which grew from 1873 on and 
gave the buyer in executory contracts remedies beyond acceptance. To prevent negation of the warranty of 
description, the Uniform Sales Act removed it from the field of "express warranties" and made it an immutable 
"implied" warranty. On this case-law and on the change, effected by the Uniform Sales Act, see Karl Llewellyn, 
‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II’ (1937) 37 Columbia Law Review 341, 355-368, 384-387. UCC, 
however, reverted to the older case-law to the extent that it reunited "description" with "affirmation" and 
"promise" under the category of "express" warranties. See UCC § 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, 
Promise, Description, Sample., comment 1. Since in England acceptance has always barred rejection (see Sale of 
Goods Act 1893 Section 11 When condition to be treated as warranty. (1)(c), presently Sale of Goods Act 1979 
Section 11(4)), once compliance with description had been shifted from the category of "express" to the category 
of "implied" obligations, the issue of redesignating it as "express" obligation has never arisen. On these 
conceptual developments in English law, see Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society’, 724-726 and 
footnote 80.  
239 Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning 152 NE 630 (Mass 1926) at 632. 
240 Ibid at 632 ("…other tanners used indiscriminately 12/20's and 13/20's … 12/20's were just as good as 
13/20's.’ … the leather trade does not think there is any difference between 13/20's and 12/20's dry Karachi 
hides; there is no practical difference between 12/20's and 13/20's dry Karachi hides; …hides in bulk baled in 
India as 13/20's or as 12/20's are indiscriminately described and are for all practical purposes of the trade 
identical."). 
241 [1933] A.C. 470. 
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commercially within the half-an-inch contract specification, in Schmoll Fils the leather trade 
considered a sale of hides in bulk as 13/20's to be satisfied by delivery in bulk of 12/20's. And 
just as the staves in Arcos were still fit for making cement barrels, there was "no practical 
difference" between 13/20 and 12/20 hides.242 Yet, while the English court decided there was 
a breach warranting buyer's termination,243 the US court did not allow the buyer to rescind the 
contract and impose on the seller her losses from the falling market. In other words, in 
contrast to their English colleagues at the time, US judges were not unwilling to restrict the 
buyer's termination where the risk of her being opportunistic was high. 
Another way, used by US courts to compensate for the unwelcome effect of buyer's unlimited 
right to terminate under the Uniform Sales Act, was the doctrine of "waiver", by which they 
constrained buyers only to the objections raised at the time of rejection.244 More importantly, 
however, unlike English judges who viewed the motive behind the buyer's resort to 
termination irrelevant,245 US judges were carefully scrutinising the evidence to identify the 
buyer's real reason for wanting to exit the contract when she wished to do so in the context of 
market decline.246 The buyer's demands that the seller reduces the price as well as her outright 
                                                 
242 Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning  at 632. 
243 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 142-145 of this Chapter. To see that the reasoning of a Bulgarian 
court, faced with the factual situation of Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning and with that of Arcos v. Ronaasen, 
would have been the same, see supra the text accompanying footnote 151-154 of this Chapter.   
244 See e.g. Griffin Grocery v. Richardson 10 F2d 467 (8 Cir 1926) at 472-473. For a thorough analysis of the 
cases in which the waiver doctrine was invoked, see Lawrence Eno, ‘Price Movement and Unstated Objections 
to Defective Performance of Sales Contracts’ (1935) 44 Yale Law Journal 782. In his article, published in 1935, 
Eno was arguing that in two thirds of the cases, there had been a decline in price between the time of contracting 
and the time of performance, which led him to the conclusion that the doctrine was employed by courts mainly 
to prevent buyer's opportunism. See also Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society’ 707, footnote 25; 
Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II’ 392 as well as Honnold 463-464, both referring to Eno. For 
today's version of the waiver doctrine but with limitations, see UCC § 2-605. Waiver of Buyer's Objections by 
Failure to Particularize. Cf. the US waiver doctrine with the English rule that a buyer, who, having become 
entitled to refuse performance of his contractual obligations, gives a wrong reason for his refusal, does not 
deprive herself of a justification which in fact existed, whether she was aware of it or not. Taylor v. Oakes, 
Roncoroni & Co. (1922) 38 TLR 517. 
245 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 142-150 of this Chapter. 
246 See e.g. Griffin Grocery v. Richardson at 471 (where the buyer accepted two cars and rejected three cars of 
sorghum cane seed in the context of a declining price of the seed, the court did not hesitate to admit evidence as 
to the fact whether the seed in all cars was of the same quality since this, according to it, had a material bearing 
upon the reason for the buyer’s rejection); Colorado Milling & Elevator v. Rapides Grocery 142 So 626 (Lou 
1932) (where the court analysed in detail the testimony and the actions of the manager of the buyer company to 
justify its conclusion that the real reason the buyer did not comply with the contract was not the grade of the 
flour, but the fact that the seller did not give her the benefit of the reduction in price to which she thought she 
was entitled); Consolidated Flour Mills v. Di Marco 136 So 657 (La App 1931) at 658 (where besides pointing 
at the evidence which showed that the flour was not below the required quality, the court also emphasised that 
the shipment "was never given a fair trial by the defendant" who refused to receive it without even looking at it); 
McNeff v. White Eagle Brewing Co. 13 NE2d 493 (Ill App 1938) (where the court again analysed the buyer's 
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rejection of shipments without any examination were commonly interpreted as proxies for 
strategic conduct.  When judges believed that the buyer's motivation in rejecting the goods 
was to escape the bargain, rather than to avoid acceptance of a tender which in some respect 
impairs the value of the bargain to her, the buyer generally lost.247 In the more recent cases, 
tried under the UCC, this attitude culminated in judicial statements, qualifying the buyer's 
right to reject the goods by a requirement of good faith.248 Recall that in Bulgarian law the 
duty of good faith represents an additional safety-valve against buyer's opportunism besides 
the substantiality requisite.249 Still, as the good faith standard is generally difficult to 
enforce,250 the dicta of a US court pointing out that objective factors, such as rejection of 
goods on account of a minor defect in a falling market, would in some instances be sufficient 
to support a finding of buyer's bad faith behaviour, does not come as a much of a surprise.251 
Such dicta immediately brings to mind Section 15A of the English 1979 Sale of Goods Act: 
where "the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable" for the buyer to reject, she is 
limited to the remedy of damages within the contract. The section was adopted on account of 
the absence of a general doctrine of good faith in English law252 and although the Law 
Commission stressed that the buyer's motive in seeking to reject the goods continued to be 
irrelevant, her right to terminate was restricted precisely because of the possibility that she 
uses it abusively.253 Section 15A, however, has never given rise to such a consistent trend of 
impatience with rejection in a falling market as that in US case-law.254 Having started as early 
                                                                                                                                                        
demand for renegotiation as well as her other statements made upon refusing to take any more hops in order to 
conclude that she did not live up to her contract because of the market price drop). 
247 In this sense, see also Honnold 472; Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of 
Bargains’ 541, footnote 47.  
248 Printing Center v. Supermind Publishing 669 SW2d 779 (Tex App 1984) at 784; Neumiller Farms v. Cornett 
368 So2d 272 (Ala 1979) at 275. The courts relied on the obligation of good faith in performance of the contract, 
proclaimed by UCC § 1-203. For the obligation of good faith in the current UCC, see § 1-201. General 
Definitions. (20) and § 2-103.  Definitions and Index of Definitions. (1)(b). Recall that under US law good faith 
is one of the criteria justifying substantial performance. See supra footnote 61 and the text accompanying it in 
Section A.2. of this Chapter.   
249 See supra the text accompanying footnote 190 of this Chapter. 
250 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 191-193 of this Chapter. 
251 Printing Center v. Supermind Publishing at 784. 
252 , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum №58 para. 4.57; , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission №160 para. 4.18. 
253 , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission №160 para. 4.19. See also supra footnote 214 of this Chapter 
and the text accompanying it. 
254 Intended not to be "a major alteration in the law", Section 15A of the 1979 Sale of Goods Act remains of 
infrequent application. As to the desire of the Law Commission for only a modest reform, see ibid paras 4.17, 
4.19, 4.21. As to the narrow scope of Section 15A, see Peel 888-889. I have not been able to find a single 
reported court decision applying the section in case of sale of commodities. For a rare occasion of its application 
in the event of the sale of industrial equipment, see Fiobake Ltd v. Rondo Ltd [2004] EWHC 695 (TCC). Neither 
has the section created pressures at common law directing it towards deterrence of bad faith termination for 
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as the 1920s, this trend slowly but surely wended its way through US courts and was 
expounded in Le Roy Dyal Co. v. Allen.255 The decision of whether a slight breach in prior 
performance excused the subsequent performance by the buyer, the court stated, depended on 
the importance and materiality of the prior breach, that materiality, on its own turn, depending 
on whether it was more just to free the buyer or to require her to perform and give her the 
right to damages within the contract. As the court itself emphasised, this retreat from the strict 
rule brought "the law of sales in closer harmony with the law of contracts generally",256 an 
effect which English courts attained only in the 1970s by means of Hansa Nord.257   
In a way, what the draftsmen of the UCC could do to ameliorate the concern with buyer's 
opportunism was simply to express as a written rule the above flexible approach, adopted by 
US courts. In fact, this was the line, in which fell Llewellyn's proposal of replacing the perfect 
tender rule with a standard of "commercial performance",258 the latter similar to substantial 
performance but rooted in trade custom. Yet, although the commercial performance standard 
was discarded as apt to cause uncertainty and promote seller's moral hazard, the severity of 
the perfect tender rule, eventually retained,259 was significantly mitigated by other methods. 
The buyer's ability to reject strategically was contained by providing the seller with a right to 
cure his defective performance.260 Thus, under UCC the buyer is still entitled to reject goods 
                                                                                                                                                        
breach of a condition. In this sense, see Michael Bridge, ‘Freedom to Exercise Contractual Rights of 
Termination’ in Louise Gullifer and Stefan Vogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives on Contract 
and Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale (Oxfrord: Hart Publishing 2014) 90; David Hay, 
Siobhan McKeering and Mohini Tulloch (eds), Halsbury's Laws of England. Contempt of Court. Contract, vol 
22 (Fifth edn, London: Lexis Nexis 2012) 544.    
255 161 F2d 152 (4th Cir 1947) at 155. To be correct, Le Roy Dyal Co. v. Allen was not about sale of defective 
goods. The deviations from the contract concerned the time of shipment and the date of the inspection 
certificates. Nevertheless, when one reads the court decision, it is clear that in the dicta, referred to above, the 
court speaks of a more general tendency that is not limited only to these particular departures from the strict 
terms of the contract.  
256 The court itself put it: "amelioration of the strict rule". Ibid at 155. 
257 [1976] QB 44. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 196-204 of this Chapter. 
258 Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II’ 378, 398, footnote 146. 
259 For a more detailed history of Llewellyn's proposal, its implementation in the 1941 draft of the Code as well 
as its faith, see Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’ 555, footnote 37 
and Priest, ‘Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
An Economic Approach’ 971, footnote 27. See supra footnote 49 and the text accompanying it in Section A.1. of 
this Chapter. 
260 UCC § 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement. There was no right to cure under 
the Uniform Sales Act and the principal merit of UCC lies in recognising and resolving any doubts about the 
existence of such liberty of merchant sellers. White and Summers 318-319; Farnsworth, Farnsworth on 
Contracts 522. For an example of courts' willingness to grant sellers with a right to make amends in case of a 
non-conforming tender before the adoption of UCC, see Lowinson v. Newman 194 NYS 253 (App Div 1922) at 
269 ("… where there has been a defective tender of goods contracted to be sold and delivered, and where the 
position of the buyer has not been altered by reason of such faulty tender, the seller may, within the contract 
period, rectify his mistake and make delivery of the goods covered by the contract."). For the motivation, which 
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for any non-conformity, but because of the seller's right to correct the deviation in the tender, 
her rejection does not automatically discharge the contract.261 The Code gives the seller an 
absolute right to cure within the time set for performance.262 After the expiration of that time, 
the seller may still substitute a conforming tender within "a further reasonable time"; yet, on 
the condition that he "had reasonable grounds to believe" the original tender would be 
acceptable "with or without money allowance".263 Provided the seller corrects the non-
conformity, the buyer cannot rightfully terminate; she is bound to accept the goods. It is 
precisely this opportunity of the seller to avoid forfeiture of his contractual rights which 
makes cure a deterrent against buyer's opportunism. Giving the seller a second chance to 
perform conformingly reduces the buyer's ability to escape a contract which the fall in market 
prices or some other contingency has turned into a bad bargain. In this sense, the right to cure 
represents a seller's entitlement to prevent termination even if this is exactly the remedy the 
buyer prefers.264 
Especially praised for its potential to discourage surprise rejections was the truly innovative 
second subsection of the Code's provision on cure, which allowed the seller to correct his 
performance beyond the contract period.265 However, the flexible standard, constituting the 
condition under which the section afforded protection to the seller, raised considerable doubts 
about the true case in which Section 2-508(2) could be invoked. When can the seller be 
deemed to have acted with "reasonable" expectations that the original goods will be 
acceptable? Is he entitled to be "surprised" when in a falling market the buyer requires strict 
                                                                                                                                                        
led to introducing the seller's right to cure in the UCC, see T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New 
York 57 NY2d 574 (NY 1982) at 582 ("…a seller's right to cure a defective tender, as allowed by both 
subdivisions of section 2–508, was intended to act as a meaningful limitation on the absolutism of the old perfect 
tender rule, under which, no leeway being allowed for any imperfections, …"). See also White and Summers 
324. 
261 UCC § 2-106., comment 2; Ramirez v. Autosport. 
262 UCC § 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement. (1). 
263 UCC § 2-508. (2). 
264 Antonia Apps, ‘The Right to Cure Defective Performance’ (1994) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 525, 554-555; Mak 149, 187; Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action 
Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 136. Even if cure commonly takes place by repair or replacement, it should be 
distinguished from the buyer's rights to repair or replacement, being sub-forms of the remedy of specific 
performance, normally available in civil law systems, including the Bulgarian one. Like them, cure is also a 
remedy oriented toward performance of the contract, but, unlike them, it is a right of the seller and the buyer 
cannot compel him to exercise it. In this sense, see Mak 149, 187. See also supra footnote 16 and the text 
accompanying it in Chapter III; Apps 555; Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of 
Action Open to a Party Aggrieved)’ 136. 
265 See Ellen Peters, ‘Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two’ (1963) 73 The Yale Law Journal 199, 210 and comment 2 to 
UCC § 2-508. 
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compliance with the terms of the contract to which he agreed? Does he have to be ignorant of 
the defect or may he also satisfy the section requirement of "surprise" when he was aware of 
the non-conformity? And how serious is the non-conformity upon which the seller can claim a 
legitimate "surprise"? Indeed, despite the directions given by the official comments, it took 
substantial work on the side of courts to settle the multitude of issues that Section 2-508(2) 
gave rise to. It is clear from the case-law that the seller may know of the non-conformity and 
still have "reasonable" causes to think that the buyer will accept the goods.266 Moreover, the 
reasonability of his expectations may be derived not only from trade custom and usage of 
trade. In fact, goods that failed to answer the precise specifications of the contract, but 
conformed to custom and usage of trade were generally held to be "conforming" even before 
the enactment of UCC,267 and with the latter, expressly adopting usage of trade as a method of 
ascertaining the meaning of the parties' agreement,268 courts continue to be fairly attentive to 
commercial practices.269 Comment 4 to Section 2-508 also explicitly states that existing trade 
usages permitting variations without rejection but with price allowance become part of the 
agreement itself as contractual limitations of termination and are thus not covered by the 
section. The seller's right to cure after the contract time, therefore, extends to deviations that 
go beyond the leeway permitted by the commercial understanding adopted in the relevant 
trade. The seller's "reasonable grounds" can lie in prior dealings, course of performance, even 
in "particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract".270 Thus, where in a 
falling market the seller tendered oil with sulphur content of 0.92%, in deviation from the 
contract describing the oil to be sold as 0.5%, the court held that the seller had reasonable 
expectations that the buyer would accept the tender and, hence, could avail himself of the 
right to cure beyond the contract date, because in the course of negotiations he learned that the 
buyer was authorised to burn oil of sulphur content of up to 1%.271 The tender, in other words, 
was undoubtedly defective and yet the seller was deemed to be legitimately surprised by the 
buyer's rejection. The legitimacy of this surprise stemmed, however, not from the rejection 
                                                 
266 T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (where the court held that Section 2-508. (2) could 
apply to cases in which the seller knowingly tendered non-conforming goods as well as to cases in which he 
tendered such goods in good faith and without knowledge of the defect). 
267 Electric Reduction  Co. v. Colonial Steel Co. 276 Pa 181 (1923) (where it was held that the words “free from 
tin” in a contract of sale of ferro-tungsten powder had the meaning recognised by the established custom in the 
trade, i.e. that the powder was to be free from tin in a quantity sufficient to impair the quality of finished steel). 
268 UCC § 1-303. Course of Performance, Course of Dealing, and Usage of Trade. (d). 
269 Wakerman Leather Co. v. Irvin B. Foster Sportswear Co. 34 AD2d 594 (NY 1970) (where it was held that in 
view of the usage and custom of the trade the leather was merchantable). 
270 UCC § 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement., comment 2. 
271 T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York. 
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per se but from the fact that the buyer was able to make use of the oil, it was offered to her 
with price reduction compensating for the difference in sulphur reading,272 and she still 
refused to take it.273  
From this perspective, in comparison to the devices serving as limitations to buyer's 
termination in the other jurisdictions, the US right to cure puts great emphasis on the 
communication of information between the parties. On one hand, the flow of information 
determines the availability of the seller's right to correct his misperformance beyond the 
contract date. Thus, while any signals by the buyer that she requires strict compliance are 
considered relevant in defining the precision of seller's obligations,274 in the absence of such 
signals, the seller, presumably, has reasonable cause to believe that the goods will be 
acceptable even if they deviate from the letter of the contract.275 On the other hand, precluding 
immediate termination, cure stimulates parties to communicate and to try to find the most 
cost-effective way to resolve the problem.276 In this sense, it encourages ex post cooperation 
where the traditional view is that the most efficient legal solution should endorse conflict.277 
Despite the fact that the emphasis seems to be on information, the reasonability of the seller's 
expectations (and, hence his right to cure) is not unrelated to the nature and effect of the non-
conformity, these, recall, being the basis on which Bulgarian and English sale-of-goods law 
restrict the buyer's right to terminate. Truly the wording of Section 2-508(2) offers no hint in 
this direction, but neither the legal doctrine, nor case-law remained indifferent to this criterion 
as a method of constraining the buyer's opportunism. It has generally been maintained that 
while cure within the contract period is unfettered by any limitations as to the magnitude of 
                                                 
272 Ibid at 578. It is apparent from the case that the buyer's rejection was a means of extortion. Although the 
buyer had the practice of mixing oils to ensure that the sulphur content was no more than 1%, she wanted to take 
advantage of the rapidly falling price and refused all readjustment offers: the offered price adjustment as well as 
the offer to cure with a substitute shipment. Instead, she tried to renegotiate the contract and insisted on paying 
no more than the price prevailing at the time of performance, which was 25% lower than the price at the time of 
contracting.  
273 For a similar argument, see Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation’ 998-999. 
274 UCC § 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement., comment 2. 
275  In a similar sense, see White and Summers 321. 
276 T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York at 586 (""… the code, …, seeks to discourage unfair or 
hypertechnical business conduct bespeaking a dog-eat-dog rather than a live-and-let-live approach to the 
marketplace… Overall, the aim is to encourage parties to amicably resolve their own problems"); Ramirez v. 
Autosport ("Underlying the right to cure in both kinds of contracts is the recognition that parties should be 
encouraged to communicate with each other and to resolve their own problems."); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, Chapter 10. Performance and Non-Performance, Introductory Note. 
277 See supra Section A.3. of this Chapter. 
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the defect,278 the seller's right to correct his misperformance after this period has expired 
concerns minor deviations, representing "sudden technicalit[ies] on the buyer's part".279 That 
the Code distinguishes substantial impairments, yet only as a ground for buyer's rescission 
after acceptance280 is further pointed to as an argument supporting the view that the cases 
falling under Section 2-508(2) are those entailing slight non-conformities that do not affect 
seriously the practical purposes for which the goods could be used.281 In line with this 
position, courts, too, have shown unwillingness to permit sellers to cure after the time set for 
performance where the defect proved to be substantial.282  
Right to cure. England and Bulgaria 
Although not mentioned until now, a doctrine of cure does operate in English sale-of-goods 
law.283 The old common law rule that the seller is entitled to retender conforming goods 
within the contract time in which case the buyer is bound to accept them has recently been 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Motor Oil (Hellas) Corinth Refineries S.A. v. Shipping 
Corp. of India.284 Arguably, by stating in its Section 11(3) that breach of a condition only may 
give rise to a right to treat the contract as discharged, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, too, 
                                                 
278 Peters 210. 
279 UCC § 2-106., comment 2. See also ibid 210, footnote 42 as well as T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. 
of New York at 585, both citing William Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(1958), 120-122 ("… the policy of the code to prevent buyers from using insubstantial remediable or price 
adjustable defects to free themselves from unprofitable bargains …"). For a more recent scholarly position in the 
same sense, see White and Summers 321. 
280 UCC § 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part. 
281 Peters 211, footnote 42; Ramirez v. Autosport ("Although the Code permits cancellation by rejection for 
minor defects, it permits revocation of acceptance only for substantial impairments."). 
282 Cf. Wilson v. Scampoli 228 A2d 848 (DC 1967) (where the picture produced by a colour TV set had a reddish 
tinge, the seller was held to have "reasonable grounds") and Appleton State Bank v. Lee 148 NW2d 1 (Wis 1967) 
(where the sewing machine sold was of different brand but not of lesser value, the seller was deemed to have 
"reasonable grounds") with Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith 240 A2d 195 (NJ 1968) (where the transmission of 
a perfectly new car was so defective that the car was practically inoperable, the seller was not permitted to cure). 
See also Ramirez v. Autosport ("… the remedy available to a buyer who rejects goods with insubstantial defects 
that the seller fails to cure within a reasonable time. … Because a buyer may reject goods with insubstantial 
defects, he also may cancel the contract if those defects remain uncured. Otherwise, a seller's failure to cure 
minor defects would compel a buyer to accept imperfect goods...", emphasis added). 
283 The earliest authority is perhaps Tetley v. Shand (1871) 25 LT 658 (where the court held that by making, after 
rejection, a subsequent tender, within the time for performance, of another 200 bales of cotton, conforming to the 
description, the seller did perform the contract because he immediately remedied the mistake). 
284 (1990) 108 NR 280, as per Lord Goff at 288 ("If the time for delivery has not yet expired, the seller is still 
entitled to make a fresh tender which conforms with the contract, in which event the buyer is bound to accept the 
goods so tendered"). See also Apps 525. 
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recognises that, in the absence of other repudiatory conduct,285 the seller's defective tender 
does not necessarily confer the right to terminate and, thus, opens room for the seller's right to 
cure.286 Nevertheless, compared to its US counterpart, cure in English law remains 
considerably less developed, its scope defined by the legal doctrine mainly on the basis of a 
certain amount of case-law concerning tender of goods without proper documents and not 
exactly tender of defective goods.287 The period within which the seller of unascertained 
goods288 is permitted to make a fresh tender in the event of breach of a condition (or 
sufficiently serious breach of an intermediate term)289 as to quality of the goods is limited by 
the contract date where time is of the essence.290 This is the respect in which the right to cure 
in the US is wider than in England since under the UCC the buyer's immediate termination, 
without giving the seller a second chance, may be held wrongful even if in the particular sale 
contract time is of the essence.291 Where time is not of the essence (i.e. the time provision is 
not a condition), it is submitted that the seller may also cure beyond the contract period, with 
opinions differing as to whether he can do it within "reasonable time"292 or within such time 
                                                 
285 If the seller's defective tender amounts to anticipatory breach, the buyer is entitled to accept the seller's 
repudiation, thus terminating the contract and extinguishing the seller's right to cure. See Ashmore & Son v C. S. 
Cox & Co. [1899] 1 QB 436, at 443. On the seller losing his right to cure before the contract time on account of 
his anticipatory breach, see Apps 547-552. 
286 Reynolds, ‘Chapter 10. Classification of Statements as to Goods’ 523; Reynolds, ‘Chapter 12. Remedies in 
Respect of Defects’ 604. 
287 Borrowman, Phillips & Co. v. Free & Hollis (1878) 4 QBD 500 (rejection of tender because of absence of 
shipping documents); Ashmore & Son v C. S. Cox & Co., at 440 (bad declaration of shipment); E. E. & Brian 
Smith (1928), Ltd. v. Wheatsheaf Mills, Ltd. [1939] 2 KB 302 (tender of provisional invoice which did not 
represent the contract goods), at 314-315; Getreide Import GmbH v. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. [1979] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 592 (a declaration of shipment applied by a stale notice); SIAT di del Ferro v. Tradax Overseas SA [1980] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 53 (bad bills of lading). Despite the doubts, expressed by the Law Commission, as to whether the 
courts would be prepared to extend the cure doctrine, illustrated by these cases, to breach of an express or 
implied condition of quality, legal scholars consider them sufficiently similar to serve as a basis for outlining the 
seller's right to cure in the event of tender of non-conforming goods since the issue in them also boils down to 
the effect of buyer's refusal. Cf. , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law 
Commission Consultative Memorandum №58, para. 2.38 with Bridge, The Sale of Goods 199; Reynolds, 
‘Chapter 12. Remedies in Respect of Defects’ 605; Apps. 
288 There is no English authority sustaining the position that the seller has the right to cure when it comes to sale 
of specific goods. Treitel, ‘Chapter 16 Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party 
Aggrieved)’ 136; Bridge, The Sale of Goods 199. 
289 Apps 532-533. 
290 , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum №58 34; Apps 535; Bridge, The Sale of Goods 197. 
291 Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 528. Although not expressly discussed in the case, it appears that in 
T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, time was of the essence since the contract for sale of oil 
was executed on a volatile market and in the midst of a fuel shortage. Nevertheless, the court held that the seller 
had the right to cure beyond the contract time. See supra footnotes 271-273 of this Chapter and the text 
accompanying them. 
292 , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum №58 34-35; McDougall v. Aeromarine of Emsworth Ltd. [1958] 1 WLR 1126, at 1132. 
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until the delay amounts to a substantial failure in performance.293 And although it seems the 
prevailing view is that as long as the delay does not deprive the buyer of substantially the 
whole benefit of the contract, she is not entitled to terminate, and so during this period seller's 
late cure is permissible,294 this does not change the fact that in English law the institute of 
cure is generally clouded by a great deal of uncertainty.295 The Law Commission in England 
did not put the matter on a more sound footing, either, as it rejected the statutory introduction 
of a seller's right to cure in sale-of-goods contracts.296 Recognising the problem of 
opportunistic termination for minor non-conformities but fearing the number of issues, 
produced by the cure regime under the UCC, the Commission recommended the enactment of 
Section 15A of the 1979 Sale of Goods Act instead.297 In this relation, the desire was rather to 
stimulate parties themselves to negotiate on cure since a buyer whose rescission may be held 
wrongful on account of too slight a defect will be more willing to agree on seller's amends.298 
The same function is vested in the substantiality requirement in Bulgarian sale-of-goods law.   
Unlike in the US and in England, there is no seller's right to cure under Bulgarian contract 
law.299 Even in the absence of an express legal provision in this sense, however, there seems 
to be no reason to deny the seller the liberty to substitute a conforming delivery within the 
time set for performance. Such time periods are by default in favour of the promisor,300 
meaning that the seller may deliver before the agreed date, in which case the buyer cannot 
                                                 
293 Peel 913-914. Reasonable time is a period shorter than that required for the delay to "go to the root" or to 
"frustrate the object" of the contract. See Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati, at 435 (as per Lord Devlin). 
294 It is said that courts accept the "reasonable time" test only when it is shown to be the same as the "frustration" 
yardstick. See Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati at 434 (as per Lord Devlin). In fact, McDougall v. 
Aeromarine of Emsworth Ltd., the authority supporting the view that the seller has a right to cure within 
reasonable time after the specified date, is completely in line with this conclusion of Lord Devlin. On the facts of 
the case, where the contract was for the sale of a pleasure yacht to be used during the yachting season and the 
buyer terminated at a time when four-fifths of the season had passed, it is fair to say that she, too, terminated 
when she had already been deprived of substantially the whole benefit of the contract. More generally on Lord 
Devlin's position requiring breach of a warranty to assume frustrating proportions in order for the termination 
right to arise, see also Lord  Devlin, ‘The Treatment of Breach of Contract’ (1966) 24 Cambridge Law Journal 
192, 202-203. See also Apps 535-537 and Bridge, The Sale of Goods 198, both supporting the stance that late 
cure is permissible if taking place before the delay amounts to substantial failure in performance. 
295 In this sense, see , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law 
Commission Consultative Memorandum №58, para. 2.38. 
296 With respect to commercial sale-of-goods contracts, see , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission №160 
paras 4.16 and 4.17; , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law 
Commission Consultative Memorandum №58 paras 4.51 – 4.55, footnote 231. 
297 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 265-266 of this Chapter. 
298 , Sale and Supply of Goods. Law Commission Working Paper №85. Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum №58, para 4.55. 
299 In this respect Bulgarian contract law does not differ from French law. See Solène Rowan, Remedies for 
Breach of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 105. 
300 Art. 70(1) Contracts Act. 
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refuse acceptance on account of the early performance, but the buyer herself cannot demand 
that the seller deliver earlier.301 In other words, before the contract time has gone by, the 
buyer's right is not exigible, yet; any claim on her side will be refused, so within that time, 
there seems to be no obstacle that the seller makes a fresh conforming delivery. Such 
reasoning is also reinforced by the fact that, in accordance with the specific performance 
principle,302 the Bulgarian buyer does not have the right to terminate in advance on account of 
some seller's behaviour that contradicts the terms of the contract.303 It is far more difficult, 
however, to argue that, without a specific legal provision, a seller's cure may also be 
permissible beyond the contract time. In light of the courts' continuous emphasis that the 
choice of remedy in case of defective performance is solely in the hands of the buyer,304 it is 
fairly doubtful that the seller would be allowed to redeliver after the contract date even if time 
in the particular sale contract is not of the essence. After all, such liberty of the seller would 
limit the buyer's full discretion.305 It is also important not to forget that, unlike under general 
contract law, in a sale-of-goods contract, the buyer does not have to give the seller additional 
time to perform in order to terminate.306 In this sense, a right to cure beyond the contract time 
would go against the very rationale of the current legal regime which permits buyers to exit 
the sale contract immediately. In any case, it must be admitted that all of the above attempts 
to accommodate a seller's right to cure in the present Bulgarian sale-of-goods law remain 
purely theoretical since neither the Contracts Act, nor case-law recognise such liberty of the 
seller. 
Nevertheless, if one goes back to socialist times, it may come as a surprise to discover that a 
right to cure did exist under the then effective in Bulgaria Act on Contracts between Socialist 
Organizations. Thus, where the seller offered to substitute a new conforming good even 
                                                 
301 Art. 70(2) ibid; Kalaydjiev 256-257; Goleva 82; Kojuharov, Law of Obligations. General Theory of 
Obligations 165. 
302 See supra Section A. of Chapter III. 
303 See supra footnote 177 of Chapter V. Again, in this respect Bulgarian contract law follows French law. As 
for French law, see Rowan 92-93. 
304 See supra footnote 56 in Section A.1. of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
305 Of course, it may also be argued that permitting the seller to cure beyond the contract time is in line with the 
principle for specific performance under which, even if the contract time has already expired, the promisor may 
offer the initial performance, provided the promisee still has interest in it, together with damages for the delay. 
See Art. 79(2) Contracts Act. See also supra footnotes 22-27 in Section A. of Chapter III and the text 
accompanying them. But where, in terms of remedies, courts have repeatedly contrasted the case of delivery of 
defective goods with the position in general contract law, it seems unlikely that, in the absence of an explicit 
legal provision, they would justify a new remedy in this case by relying precisely on general contract law 
principles.  
306 See supra footnote 58 in Section A.1. of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
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though the buyer rejected or demanded price adjustment or repair of the defect, she could not 
refuse to accept the fresh delivery unless it was unduly delayed.307 That is, under the act, 
governing the trade relations between organisations which had a role similar to that, 
performed by merchants in a capitalist economy, the seller was entitled to cure even beyond 
the contract time. On one side, this liberty of his tamed the discretion of the buyer in choosing 
between the available remedies, on the other side, it limited her right to refuse acceptance by 
requiring her to give the seller a chance to correct his misperformance. At that time, the 
Contracts Act applied mainly to consumer sale contracts between a socialist organisation and 
a natural person or between natural persons308 and the buyer's free choice between remedies in 
case of defective performance was intended to serve as an instrument for enhancing quality.309 
Yet, in the process of transition towards market economy in Bulgaria, the Act on Contracts 
between Socialist Organizations, setting out the seller's right to cure, was revoked and, since 
the Commercial Act did not provide otherwise, the remedial regime of the Contracts Act with 
respect to delivery of non-conforming goods extended to commercial contracts, too.310 Thus, 
Bulgarian contract law lost a device by which it could constrain strategic terminations by the 
buyer precisely when it entered the world of volatile markets and price instability. 
In short, as a result of concerns with buyer's opportunism, both the US and the English legal 
systems have moved away from the perfect tender rule and have found ways to limit the 
buyer's right to terminate. In England, courts lean toward classifying terms as intermediate, 
thus practically restricting termination to cases in which the breach is very serious. In 
addition, a more narrow statutory limitation of buyer's termination right was adopted, which 
similarly to the substantiality requirement in Bulgarian sale-of-goods law, gives courts a 
considerable margin of discretion to determine whether the buyer can end the contract where 
the implied conditions as to quality are only slightly breached. By contrast, in the US, buyer's 
right to terminate was curtailed by means of the standard of good faith and seller's right to 
cure. Yet, despite the different devices employed, the consequence of this common restrictive 
tendency is that in both jurisdictions sale-of-goods law is now closer to general contract law, 
which, recall, provides the basis for the constrained position of the termination remedy in 
                                                 
307 Art. 44(4) Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations; Decision of 25.03.1983 under sup. c. 98/1983 of 
the State Arbitration Court; Decision of 03.03.1973 under c. 137/1973 of the State Arbitration Court. 
308 Stalev, ‘Characteristic Features of the New Legal Regime of the Sale Contract’, 164-166. 
309 Interpretative Decision №88 of 28.02.1984, General Assembly of the Civil College of the Supreme Court. 
310 As for the Contracts Act and the Act on Protection of Consumers currently providing alternative sets of 
remedies to consumers, see supra footnote 277 of Chapter IV. 
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construction contracts. Bulgarian contract law, on the other hand, has shifted towards 
expanding the buyer's ability to end the contract: the commercial buyer is liberated from the 
iron grip of the state plan, his claims related to non-conformity are more readily relegated 
under sale-of-goods than under general contract law, the seller no longer has a right to cure. 
Nevertheless, legal instruments such as the substantiality requirement and the good faith 
obligation of the parties still allow courts to curb strategic termination by the buyer.311 Thus, 
when one takes a closer look, it seems that what is really going on in the legal systems under 
comparison contradicts the conclusion of Section A. of this chapter that permitting the buyer 
to have a wide choice between termination and damages within the contract is optimal. 
Table 1312 
Device\Jurisdiction the US England Bulgaria 
de minimis yes yes 
no substantial failure to 
perform 




yes – where the 
breached term is 
intermediate 
-- where the breach of 
condition is too slight – S. 
15A SGA 
yes - no substantial 
reduction of the 
price or of the 
fitness of the good 
good faith yes no yes 
right to cure yes yes no 
The economic rationale 
It is important that while reading Section A.3., one remain attentive to the disclaimers therein: 
first, that the economic analysis is correct, in the absence of a contingency which transforms 
                                                 
311 For the legal devices used to curb opportunistic termination by the buyer in each of the jurisdictions, see infra 
Table 1. 
312 Table 1 is meant to indicate the legal devices used to restrain opportunistic termination by the buyer in each 
of the jurisdictions but does not purport to say that where the same device is available in more than one 
jurisdiction, it implies absolutely the same standard across jurisdictions. 
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the contract into an occasion for making opportunistic profit313 and, second, that the buyer's 
broad termination right is only roughly optimal. The present section takes a closer look at 
these disclaimers. 
Indeed, the limitations on termination, identified above, suggest that sale-of-goods law is 
vested with regulatory function with respect to contracts, which even if executory are signed 
on a thick market and entail no relation-specific investment. These contracts have surely 
moved away from the purely discrete, present exchange but despite the element of futurity, 
they do not imply a relationship more valuable than any other on the market and have as their 
subject an easily monetised commodity.314 Depending on the time period of the contract and 
the communication between the parties involved, these contracts may be situated at different 
points of the discrete range, but they have not yet landed in the long-term part of the 
continuum.315 The steady recommendations of economic theory with respect to transactions, 
having such characteristics, whether they are occasional or recurrent, are that they are left to 
market governance where competition will police opportunism.316 This is then interpreted as a 
prescription for adoption of the least interventionist legal rules possible, which in the case of 
the termination remedy translates into a right to end the contract for any deviation. One must 
be cautious, however, when confronted with theoretical normative predictions. Generally, 
authors do not assume away opportunism but take the stance that either because of the 
relatively short duration of the contracts,317 or because of the thickness of the market,318 
opportunities for strategic gains are not likely to arise. Truly, taking a bird-eye view on 
discrete (in the case at hand – sale-of-goods) versus long-term (in the case at hand – service, 
construction) contracts, opportunism in sale contracts appears a lot less likely. Yet, price 
swings constitute precisely such opportunities for making strategic profit, which are generally 
seen as unlikely. Thus, where the market is volatile and the buyer has failed to predict it, court 
                                                 
313 Read supra the paragraph accompanying footnote 89 in Section A.3 of this Chapter. 
314 Macneil himself defines a fixed-price contract for future delivery of a commodity for which there is a ready 
market both at the time of contracting and at the time of delivery as one lying closer the extreme spot pole. 
Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ 744-745. 
315 For the definition of spot contracts, see supra Section A.1. of Chapter IV. On the relevance of duration and 
contact between the parties for placing the contract along the continuum, see ibid 748-749. 
316 Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 241, 248-249, 253 
Figure II; Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 31-32, 
Table 1-1. 
317 Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 249, footnote 54; 
Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and 
Relational Contract Law’, 860. 
318 Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 255; Goetz and Scott, 
‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’. 
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disputes in which the buyer tries to exit the contract, motivated by the adverse market 
movement, are not difficult to find, at all. In such cases the availability of market alternatives 
turns out not to be a panacea, either. Indeed, the possibility to easily arrange new contracts 
does protect sellers against opportunistic buyers, but, in the event of a market fall, these 
alternative arrangements, even if available, prove to be very bad substitutes since the seller 
can only resell at a dramatically lower price. As shown, where in such case the absolute 
termination right, implied by the common law perfect tender rule, enhances the buyer's 
incentive to undo the contract by providing her with a convenient excuse to disguise her real 
reason to reject, it does not yield optimal results. Precisely due to the available, and now 
cheaper, market alternatives, buyers are not inclined to accept the goods at a price higher than 
the one prevailing at the time of performance.319 As a result, even if the contract does not fall 
apart because the seller submits, the renegotiation costs, inflated by the buyer's opportunism, 
constitute nothing but losses decreasing the total value of the contract.320 In addition, the 
buyer's absolute right to terminate works as supracompensatory damages. Anticipating the 
buyer's opportunism and striving not to provide the buyer with any occasion to end the 
contract, the seller overinvests in precautions.321 The same motivation will drive similarly 
situated sellers in the future, increasing their ex ante costs, reducing the contractual surplus 
and eroding their general willingness to contract. From this perspective, a remedial solution 
more oriented toward preservation of the contract appears to be a better choice. 
In fact, when it comes to sale of commodities, traded on volatile markets, there is abundant 
evidence that commercial people tend to dislike termination and to prefer damages within the 
contract. It is sufficient that one turns to rules of commodity exchanges and standard contracts 
of trade associations to see that commodity markets have developed sophisticated systems of 
grading goods, with each grade characterised by permissible ranges of certain quality 
parameters within which buyers may claim only price allowances. Such governing of 
commodity trade by detailed self-regulation setting forth careful tolerances of quality, for 
which the buyer's right to reject is excluded, can be observed in all three jurisdictions under 
comparison. As early as 1949, Honnold reported that in the US, rules and regulations of 
commodity exchanges and trade associations normally prescribed price adjustment to make 
                                                 
319 T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (see supra footnote 272 of this Chapter); Neumiller 
Farms v. Cornett ("‘I'm not going to accept any more of your potatoes. If you load any more I'll see that they're 
turned down.’ . . . ‘I can buy potatoes all day for $2.00.’"). 
320 Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 982-983. 
321 On the seller's incentive to take precautions, see supra Section B. of Chapter V. 
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up for quality deficiencies within a certain grade as well as for delivery of goods of different 
grade, permitting rejection only for deviations outside the specified tolerances.322 No different 
is the situation in England as revealed by the standard forms of trade associations.323 Recall, 
for example, that in Hansa Nord324 the GAFTA 100 form contract, used for the sale of the 
citrus pulp pellets, set a maximum percentage of contamination of the goods, up to which 
rejection was precluded. Taking a look at the GAFTA 100 form as effective of 1 January 
2006,325 one notices that besides the caps set with respect to certain quality parameters, it also 
meticulously stipulates the rates of price allowance per units or percentages of deviation 
within the permissible tolerances. Clauses excluding the right to reject seem also to frequently 
appear in non-form commercial contracts.326  
In Bulgaria despite the persistent emphasis on specific performance during the period of 
socialist planned economy, in sale-of-goods contracts between socialist organisations, the 
same tendency to curtail rejection and to substitute price adjustment existed, although directed 
by the ubiquitous State. The limits, within which rejection was not allowed and quality issues 
were resolved only by means of price allowances, were set forth by means of mandatory state 
standards, which entered the sale contracts between socialist organisations even in the 
absence of explicit reference to them.327 Commodities with their relevant quality parameters 
varying within the permissible range were ab initio considered fit for use. Only deviations 
exceeding the specified tolerances could result in defective performance, giving the buyer the 
                                                 
322 Honnold, 464, footnote 35. For even more evidence reported in 1975, see Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for 
Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’ 561-562, footnote 49, footnote 50, footnote 53. 
323 Michael Bridge, ‘The Evolution of Modern Sales Law’ (1991) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 52, 58, 55. 
324 [1976] QB 44. See supra footnote 176 of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. See also Tradax Export 
SA v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd. [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 100, at 103 (where the court recounted the 
clarification of the GAFTA Board of Appeal that in the trade of soya bean meal, fibre in excess of 7% and 
protein and fat deficiency below 44% were treated as matters of price allowance and not rejection). 
325 http://www.mega-tierernaehrung.com/upload/Gafta.pdf. Last accessed on 30/05/2015.  
326 Reynolds, ‘Chapter 13. Exemption Clauses’ 687. In Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Ltd., for 
example, the contract contained a clause providing: "The goods to be taken with all faults and defects, damaged 
or inferior, if any, at valuation to be arranged mutually or by arbitration." Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v. 
Christopher Hill Ltd. at 470. 
327 The parties could certainly agree on higher quality characteristics of the goods sold but as long as they 
remained silent the required quality was determined by the standard. Nikolov and Panova, ‘Requirements to the 
Liability for Defects of the Output under the Supply Contract with a View to the Arbitration Practice’, 105; 
Kostov 37-38; Chudomir Goleminov, ‘Price Reduction on Account of Defects (in the Quality of Output) in 
Supply Contracts Between Socialist Organizations’ (1960) 11 Bulletin of the Legal Institute 207, 213, footnote 
1. 
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right to reject the good (or to claim damages within the contract or to demand correction).328 
Currently, in the context of market economy, price adjustment remains the preferred remedy 
when it comes to quality of commodities. The standard futures contracts for sale of grain of 
the Sofia Commodity Exchange, for example, provide for rates of price adjustment for 
deviations from certain base quality specifications. Prices vary either on the basis of quantity 
bonification (correction of the weight of the shipment, by reason of dampness or foreign 
material), or on the basis of value bonification (correction of the price by a certain percentage 
per each percentage departure from the base index).329 In case of proven deviations from the 
contractual frames of the quality specifications, the buyer, besides price adjustment, may also 
request correction of the discrepancy or replacement of the commodity, but she may terminate 
the contract only if the claim chosen has not been satisfied.330 In other words, when it comes 
to sale of commodities, merchants on all three markets show a similar affinity for constraining 
termination and substituting it with price adjustment. 
This does not mean to say that there are no commercial buyers who attach special value to 
perfect performance and would like to have the right to terminate for any non-conformity. The 
problem is that where such right is given by default, it is less likely that the seller receives 
information about the type of buyer he deals with and, consequently, adjusts his level of 
precautions to the optimal level. Under an absolute termination right, the high-risk buyers, 
those who are likely to exercise it, would not have an incentive to distinguish themselves 
since they would have to pay more without gaining additional protection. Low-risk buyers, 
those who are not so fussy about quality and are inclined to take the goods with some 
discrepancies, may have an incentive to reveal their type, but being the majority, they may 
very well not do it because their benefit would be too small relative to the communication 
costs they would incur. In other words, strategic reasons (high-risk buyers) and transaction 
                                                 
328 Art. 48 Act on Contracts between Socialist Organizations; Decision of 14.11.1970, c. №613/1970 of the State 
Arbitration Court; Decision of 10.07.1971, c. №245/1971 of the State Arbitration Court. See also Boris Burov, 
‘Civil Law Methods in the Struggle for Quality’ in Boris Burov (ed), Law in the Struggle for Quality of the 
Industrial Goods (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Publishing House 1958) 105-106; Nikolov and Panova, 
‘Requirements to the Liability for Defects of the Output under the Supply Contract with a View to the 
Arbitration Practice’, 104. 
329 For the practice of bonification, see Chudomir Goleminov, ‘Bonification Issues in Arbitration Case-law’ 
[1960] Legal Thought 93. 
330 Sofia Commodity Exchange standard contracts for sale-purchase of grain are available on http://www.sce-
bg.com/?pid=41&l=en. Last accessed on 01/06/2015. See also Decision №121 of 18.07.2012, comm. c. 
№67/2012  of District Court – Pazardjik (where the contract between the parties provided that if the shipment 
contained defective goods (pepper puree and tomato puree in jars), they would either be replaced, or the price of 
the shipment would be adjusted). 
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costs (low-risk buyers) would deter conveyance of socially desirable information which 
would allow sellers to take optimal precautions with respect to each group. By contrast, a 
limitation to termination would require meaningful bargaining about an automatic right to end 
the contract, which high-risk buyers would be motivated to engage in as in a competitive 
market they would gain the entire surplus from the information disclosure. And since those 
buyers who do not divulge information about the group to which they belong must be low-
risk buyers, the seller would be able to recognise the type of each buyer, fine-tune the 
precautions he takes and thus increase the gains from trade. In addition, not only would a 
limited termination right lead to more communication, allowing the seller to optimise his 
preventive measures against breach, it would also lead to less costly communication, since it 
would be the minority type of buyers, the high-risk ones, that would distinguish 
themselves.331   
More importantly, where an absolute termination right prevents disclosing of information, it 
promotes inefficient cross-subsidisation. Insofar as buyers do not signal their type and 
screening is prohibitively costly, the different type of buyers would remain pooled together 
with the seller charging all of them an average price. This average price is higher than the 
price low-risk buyers would pay and lower than the price high-risk buyers would pay if they 
separated from the common pool. Low-risk buyers, in other words, would be effectively 
subsidising high-risk buyers who by strategically withholding information avoid bearing the 
full costs of their absolute termination right. An adverse selection may even ensue as the low-
risk buyers who find the expansive termination right too expensive may drop out of the 
market. Conversely, by encouraging information communication and a separating 
equilibrium, a limited termination right would operate as a screen that prevents cross-
subsidisation and falling out of the market of the marginal, presumably the small and less 
moneyed, businesses.332 
The common preference of commercial people toward reining in termination may also be 
explained even if one ignores the risk of buyer's opportunism and takes a purely facilitative 
approach. Merchants purchase goods either to resell them, or to use them in their 
manufacturing process and in both cases damages within the contract are more likely to 
                                                 
331 For the limitation of promisors' liability to the foreseeable damages having the same function, see supra 
Section H.3. of Chapter V. 
332 For the foreseeability limitation on expectation damages thwarting adverse selection, see supra Section I. of 
Chapter V. 
 301 
minimise costs than termination. A buyer, who has purchased the commodities for resale, is, 
similarly to the seller, proficient in the trade and has, like him, information about potential 
customers, so more often than not, she is in just as good a position as the seller to dispose of 
subgrade or defective goods. Damages within the contract, then, will most probably be the 
cheaper remedy as it saves the costs of returning the goods to the seller and the buyer's costs 
of cover, which additionally encumber the remedy of termination. Of course, there may be 
cases in which because of the nature of the defect or the specialisation of her resale business, 
the buyer's costs of disposing of the non-conforming goods are higher than the seller's,333 but, 
generally, if the buyer is a commodity broker, termination is less likely to maximise the 
contractual surplus.334 Termination seems less unattractive when the commodities are 
purchased for use in the buyer's manufacturing process. In such case the buyer, unlike the 
seller, does not have distribution channels already available to her, so her costs of reselling 
the deviating goods may be considerably higher than the seller's, high enough to outweigh the 
costs of sending back the goods and covering.335 Yet, again, where the non-conforming goods 
are commodities deviating from some quality parameter within reasonable commercial limits, 
buyers are often still able to make use of them.336 The costs associated with termination (the 
costs of returning the goods, the seller's costs of reselling them and the buyer's costs of cover) 
are then again likely to offset the adaptation costs to the buyer, making termination the more 
expensive remedy. It may not be so where the buyer plans to manufacture a fine product and 
the substandard material will compromise its high quality.337 But note that it is such buyers 
that are the idiosyncratic bargainers, so it is more cost-efficient if they need to negotiate ex 
ante a right to terminate for certain deviations, thus informing the sellers of their special 
interest.338 Put shortly, the devised permissible ranges of deviations, within which claims are 
                                                 
333 Suppose, for example, that the seller sends to a wine shop brandy instead of wine. 
334 Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II’, 389; Honnold 469; Priest, ‘Breach and Remedy for the 
Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach’ 963-965, 971, 
974; Wagner, 155-156. 
335 Honnold 469; Priest, ‘Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: An Economic Approach’ 965. 
336 Recall that even though the citrus pulp pellets in Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The 
Hansa Nord) were substantially damaged, the buyers used them as initially planned by eking out smaller 
quantities of them when compounding the cattle food. See also Tradax Export SA v. European Grain & Shipping 
Ltd. (where despite the delivery of soya bean meal with fibre content higher than contracted, the buyers could 
still use it as an ingredient in animal feeding stuffs) as well as Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society: 
II’ 389. 
337 Tradax Export SA v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd. (where the court found that the buyer deliberately 
specified lower than usual maximum fibre content because she intended to depart from the usual practice and to 
use only the highest quality soya bean meal). 
338 In this sense, see also Llewellyn, ‘On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II’ 388-389. 
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settled only by price adjustment, are a method to expand a buyer's duty to mitigate. Where 
upon delivery of deviating commodities, the buyer broker or manufacturer is typically the 
better mitigator, the seller's autonomous readjustment, forced on him by termination will, 
more often than not, reduce the net benefits of contracting. In this sense, by making use of the 
buyer's relative advantage in decreasing losses, parties attempt to minimise costs from 
readjustment. Since a risk-averse seller, who anticipates bearing such excess costs less often, 
is able to offer a lower price, both parties gain from a more cooperative scheme of rights and 
obligations. 
Comparing termination and damages within the contract in terms of costs, one should not 
forget that the latter also entails calculation costs as well as a risk of error. Yet, in reality, 
termination is also accompanied by awarding damages to the buyer, which in case she covers 
are no less costly to measure.339 There is only a difference in calculation costs when upon 
termination the buyer requests solely to be given back the price,340 but even then the costs of 
measuring buyer's damages within the contract are not dramatically higher. Where 
commodities are traded on thick markets, which readily provide price information, including 
information on prices of subgrade or defective goods,341 such ex post costs do not appear 
decisive. They may be crucial where there is no market for the non-conforming good, which 
can supply a benchmark for ascertaining damages, or where the buyer is a consumer and his 
diminished utility is very subjective. However, on the active market of commodities, the risk 
                                                 
339 In all three jurisdictions, upon termination the buyer may claim the difference between the market and the 
contract price of the good. In the US if the buyer justifiably rejects the goods, she may cancel and in addition to 
the price paid may recover damages under the UCC section concerning "cover" or damages for non-delivery. See 
UCC § 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods.; UCC § 2-712. 
“Cover”; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.; UCC § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or 
Repudiation. In England, too, a buyer who justifiably rejects goods may sue for damages for non-delivery. See 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 51 Damages for non-delivery. (3) and Reynolds, ‘Chapter 12. Remedies in 
Respect of Defects’ 631. For Bulgaria, see Art. 323 Commercial Act.  
340 The buyer retains this possibility in all three jurisdictions. In England instead of suing for damages, a buyer, 
who justifiably rejects goods, may recover any money he has paid in restitution as upon total failure in 
consideration. See Reynolds, ‘Chapter 12. Remedies in Respect of Defects’ 631-632 and Sale of Goods Act 
1979 Section 54 Interest, etc. Although under UCC the buyer can recover damages in addition to the price paid, 
nothing impedes her to limit herself to a restitution claim. See UCC § 2-711. as well as Dobbs 794-795. In 
Bulgaria instead of claiming damages under Art. 323 of the Commercial Act, upon termination a commercial 
buyer may claim only the price paid as well as his expenses related to conclusion and performance of the sale 
contract. See Art. 195(1) and (2) Contracts Act. 
341 Recall that in Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord)it was established that 
the overheating resulted in the loss of 20% of the purchase price of the citrus pulp pellets. See supra footnote 
179 of this Chapter and the text accompanying it. In Jones v. Just the wetted hemp realised 75% of the price it 
would have fetched if undamaged. See ibid at 200. In this sense, see also Honnold 469. 
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of undercompensation is too low to endow termination with a critical advantage over damages 
within the contract. 
It appears then that in contracts for sale of commodities both the facilitative and the 
regulatory viewpoint point to curbing the buyer's right to terminate. Nevertheless, both law-
and-economics and mainstream scholars in the common law tradition have levelled strong 
criticism at the enacted limitations on the buyer's ability to put an end to the contract.342 Even 
when admitting that such limitations will prevent the economic waste arising from her 
opportunism, they shrink away from any clear approval, fearing the generality and 
unpredictability of the new rules.343 Appearing, however, in different versions, the invariable 
argument of the need for certainty deserves unpacking.  
Many times the argument unfolds as a lamentation over the burden thrusted on the buyer. 
Since sale contracts often require payment upon delivery of the goods, constraining the 
buyer's right to terminate entails limiting her ability to avoid financing the seller when he 
delivers non-conforming goods worth less than the contract price. In the face of his breach, 
the argument goes, the buyer is left with the consolation of recovering damages only at a later 
date, until which she is forced to bear the risk of deterioration of the seller's 
creditworthiness.344 In addition, a limited termination right deprives the buyer of the 
possibility to know where she stands at the moment when she needs to take the decision to 
reject. If she can be confident of the legal effect of her actions only in hindsight, she can 
easily accrue liability by interpreting erroneously the seller's breach as sufficiently material 
and making an attempt to terminate, which is eventually qualified by a court as wrongful.345 
In this way a buyer who honestly believes she is entitled to end the contract may incur great 
losses, especially on commodity markets where goods change hands quickly and actors have 
many ongoing contracts simultaneously.346 Thus, since an absolute termination right entails 
                                                 
342 Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’; Goetz and Scott, ‘The 
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 995-1000; Peel 888-889. 
343 Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’ 563-565; Goetz and Scott, ‘The 
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 999-1000. 
344 Honnold 467. 
345 Goetz and Scott call this "the breacher-status problem". Goetz and Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a 
General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ 983. 
346 This concern is pervasive in English court cases. For only two examples, see Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. 
Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 998 (where Lord Wilberforce, while criticising earlier authorities concerning 
conformity with description as "excessively technical", pointed at "unascertained future goods (e.g. 
commodities)" as a possible exception, regarding the description of which "a strict and technical view" may still 
need to be taken); Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export SA at 718, 720. 
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neither the risks of an advance payment, nor the difficulties related to predicting one's own 
legal position, its undisputable advantage of certainty is asserted as a strong argument against 
constraining the termination remedy. 
The conviction that sales law is different from the law concerning service contracts because it 
is called upon to ensure certainty347 seems to originate in its ability to offer maximum security 
by providing for simultaneous performances.348 If delivery of the goods and payment of the 
price are concurrent conditions, neither of the parties is forced to finance her contractual 
partner in case the latter is not able to fulfill his obligations in full.349 Yet where, having 
started as a rule concerning the order of performances, the doctrine of conditions developed 
into a doctrine as to the effect of breach of particular contractual terms, the idea of certainty in 
sales law quickly extended to defective performance,350 leading to genuine infatuation with 
the absolute right to terminate. Williston, the draftsman of the Uniform Sales Act, even went 
as far as to submit that the right of the buyer to reject goods not corresponding to description 
necessarily followed from the nature of her promise.351 Indeed, as already mentioned, behind 
the buyer's absolute right to terminate, one can read the same policy against burdening her 
with extension of credit to the breaching seller.352 But while recognising this, one should also 
not fail to acknowledge that when he uses this certainty rationale to justify the buyer's strict 
right to end the contract, he already applies it not to her obligation to pay but to her obligation 
to accept the goods.353 In this sense, where the buyer's absolute right to terminate seems to 
have been determined to a large extent by path dependence, we should be careful not to 
endorse it as optimal simply out of inertia. To say the least, in today's commercial world it is 
fairly frequent that the buyer pays only after delivery, so she can avoid financing the seller 
and pursuing him for reimbursement by simply withholding from the price a sum which 
corresponds to the deviation of his performance. Neither does she bear the risk of the advance 
                                                 
347 See also Schwartz, ‘Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains’ 565 referring to the 
function of sales law "to provide the parties with clear guidance as to what they can and cannot do.". 
348 Recall that all three legal systems endorse such a solution. See supra footnote 83 in Section A.3 of this 
Chapter and the text accompanying it. 
349 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 Order of Performances, comment a. 
350 Kingston v. Preston (1773), unreported but discussed in detail in Jones v. Barkley (1781) 2 Dougl 684, at 689-
691; Boone v. Eyre; Duke of St. Albans v. Shore (1789) 1 H Bl 273. For a concise explanation of the 
development of the doctrine, see Bridge, The Sale of Goods 148-150. 
351 See Honnold 466, citing Williston, Sales § 225. Williston also considered the approach of the English 1893 
Sale of Goods Act as fraught with unpredictability, which was the other reason that led to the clear-cut, simple 
rule of the Uniform Sales Act (1906). See supra the text accompanying footnotes 227-230 of this Chapter.  
352 Ibid 467. 
353 Ibid 466. 
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payment when she is immediately granted a price allowance or has the good substituted.354 In 
addition, the buyer considered is not a consumer: for her, receiving some non-conforming 
goods is usually a normal business risk, measurable in monetary terms, at the realisation of 
which she is typically able to take routine steps to mitigate losses. Her interest in certainty can 
be countered with the seller's, also legitimate, interest in not having his contractual rights 
forfeited in volatile markets. From this perspective, instead of automatically granting the 
buyer an absolute termination right, it would be better to ask the question of whether giving 
the buyer such a harsh remedy is worth the price. 
Undoubtedly, a termination right, not dependent on the materiality of seller's breach, provides 
the buyer with clarity about her rights immediately, as the events unfold, and not only later, in 
hindsight. In fact, it is fair to say that it carries the benefit of predictability for both parties 
since a seller may also misinterpret his obligation and, contesting its scope, be characterised 
as a breacher. In this sense, when worrying about the burdens placed on the buyer, one should 
have in mind that a similar risk is also born by the seller. Of course, any limitation to the 
termination remedy compromises to some extent the advantage of certainty. Yet, one should 
be plainly aware about the cost at which this advantage comes. To summarise it all: an 
absolute termination right entails costs of inefficient autonomous readjustment by the seller 
and costs of buyer's opportunism (both concrete – for the particular transaction, and long-term 
– for the entire market) without at the same time avoiding any undercompensation risk worth 
of consideration. Thus, if the certainty advantage of strict termination is juxtaposed to the 
difficult-to-neglect inefficiencies the latter implies, the balance of benefits and costs does not 
speak in favour of endowing the buyer with unconditional protection. In this sense, an 
absolute termination right could be justified only if ensuring maximum quality performance is 
the one and only goal pursued irrespectively of the price it entails. A desire to optimise all 
parties' decisions, however, requires constraining of the termination remedy. 
                                                 
354 Ibid 468. See supra the text accompanying footnotes 322-330 of this Chapter. See also for the US: T.W. Oil, 
Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York; Neumiller Farms v. Cornett (where in both cases upon the buyer's 
objections about quality, the seller immediately offered price allowance); for England: Hi-Flyers Ltd. v. Linde 
Gas U.K. Ltd. [2004] EWHC 105 (QB) (where a few of the many cylinders of helium supplied were found to be 
nearly empty, they were not charged for and the problem was promptly remedied by a further delivery); for 
Bulgaria: Decision №121 of 18.07.2012, comm. c. №67/2012 of District Court – Pazardjik (where upon 
complaint by the buyer that some of the pepper/tomato puree jars had bad commercial guise, the seller 
immediately replaced them or adjusted the price). For the sake of good order, all these court cases were litigated 
under a softened right to terminate and in all of them the court eventually found for the seller. In this sense, it 
cannot be claimed that sellers were willing to resort to price adjustment and cure only because they had the threat 
of an absolute termination right pending over their heads. 
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Indeed, balancing the risk of buyer's opportunism and the risk of seller's evasion is a difficult 
task, with which, as is evident from the historical account above, all the legal systems under 
comparison struggle. An inattentive curbing of the buyer's option to end the contract may 
increase the seller's moral hazard by more than it reduces the buyer's strategic behaviour. But 
once opportunism is taken seriously, and once it is admitted that a strict right to terminate in 
fact constitutes a substantial part of the trouble, the issue rather becomes in what way and to 
what extent to limit termination and not whether to limit it at all. From this perspective, where 
the seller's breach is inadvertent and upon the buyer's complaints he offers cure or price 
reduction, or where the buyer attempts to exit the contract in the context of price decline while 
the defect is only minor and the goods remain useable (or are even used), denying termination 
appears to significantly reduce the risk of buyer's opportunism while only slightly increasing 
the risk of seller's shirking. It is all too easy to fall back on the same old perfect tender rule 
claiming that parties normally prefer clear-cut, categorical rules, especially when such an 
assertion is difficult to be tested.355 Such firm faith in one's own knowledge of parties' 
preferences could very well be countered with the submission that, on the contrary, it is the 
rule's insensitivity to commercial practices that has caused the actors in the timber trade, and 
generally merchants, to massively flow out of courts, referring their disputes mainly to 
arbitration.356  
In fact, what underlies the economic argument insisting on bright-line rules is the binary, 
exogenous concept of unverifiability, which approaches the matter by proclaiming quality as 
entirely unverifiable.357 Parties, the argument goes, are averse to vague standards, 
conditioning their rights on unverifiable factors, because such standards create uncertainty 
and invite courts to rewrite their contracts. Yet, even the most detailed standard form sale 
contracts contain ambiguous terms as to quality.358 In fact, it is fair to ask how much certainty 
                                                 
355 Robert Scott, ‘The Rise and Fall of Article 2’ (2002) 62 Lousiana Law Review 1009; Schwartz and Scott, 
‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’; Scott, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts’, 
2050. 
356 Wioletta Konradi, ‘The Role of Lex Mercatoria in Supporting Globalised Transactions: An Empirical Insight 
into the Governance Structure of the Timber Industry’ in Wolmark Gessner (ed), Contractual Certainty in 
International Trade (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009); Reynolds, ‘Chapter 11. Terms as to Description and 
Quality Implied by the Sale of Goods Act’ 543, footnote 98. 
357 On the economic concept of verifiability and its connection to vague terms, see George Triantis, ‘The 
Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of UCC Article 2’ (2002) 62 
Lousiana Law Review 1065. See also supra Section A.3. Rules and standards of Chapter IV. 
358 See Clause 5 of GAFTA №100: "Shipment shall be made in good condition." at http://www.mega-
tierernaehrung.com/upload/Gafta.pdf.; Clause 5 of GAFTA №64: "(fair average quality) of the season's 
shipments at time and place of shipment." at http://www.gtradesystem.com/commodities_files/gafta%2064.pdf. 
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an absolute termination right ensures where some deviations from the exact words of the 
contract did not prevent courts to hold for the seller even under the bluntest perfect tender 
rule, as formulated under the Uniform Sales Act.359 In this respect, certainty can be achieved 
by courts endorsing commercial custom, usages of trade, standardisation, all of which are 
conventions invented by and known to business people, and not by adopting a strict right to 
terminate. After all, neither commodities, nor even manufactured goods of the same kind are 
uniform and it takes only sufficiently accurate measurement tools to demonstrate that a seller 
is not perfect in his performance. When it comes to quality the very idea of absolute precision 
is fairly deceptive.360 
In addition, (re)negotiating is likely to be cheaper when taking place around a vague standard 
than around a precise term. A buyer, who knows that it is only probable (but not certain) that 
a court will decide in her favour, may be considerably more accommodating.361 In this 
respect, a study on the true effect of Section 15A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is still 
missing. Indeed, litigation on the grounds of this statutory modification is scarce but this is 
precisely where the success of Section 15A might lie. A healthy dose of uncertainty might 
simply stimulate parties to resolve minor issues without going to court. 
2. Contracts for sale of customised goods 
When it comes to sale contracts, the issue of buyer's opportunism does not end with the world 
of commodities traded on volatile markets. A falling price is by no means the only 
                                                                                                                                                        
Last accessed on 17/08/2015. See also Clause 2.1. of the Standard Contract for Sale/Purchase of Feed Wheat of 
the Sofia Commodity Exchange: "As regards its quality, the wheat shall be a robust, standard commercial good, 
consumable at the very moment of delivery, …, having outward look, colour and odour that are characteristic of 
fresh and well preserved wheat…" at http://www.sce-bg.com/?pid=41&l=en. Last accessed on 17/08/2015. See 
also the other standard contracts for sale/purchase of grain of the Sofia Commodity Exchange. 
359 Schmoll Fils v. L. S. Agoos Tanning (see supra the text accompanying footnote 236 of this Chapter, where 
12/20 Karachi hides were decided to be equivalent to 13/20 Karachi hides); Electric Reduction  Co. v. Colonial 
Steel Co. (where the court decided that ferro-tungsten powder "free from tin" meant free from tin in a proportion 
that would impair the quality of finished steel). 
360 Truax v. Corrigan 257 US 312, 342 as per Justice Holmes ("Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy 
throughout the law."). In a similar sense, see Honnold 472. 
361 For studies which suggest that a probabilistic entitlement reduces parties' incentives to lie and increases the 
likelihood of efficient bargaining, see Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, ‘Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1027; Jason Johnston, ‘Bargaining Under 
Rules Versus Standards’ (1995) 11 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 256. For the opposite 
suggestion, see Lisa Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724, 1732-1734. For contracting around 
default standards being cheaper than contracting around a default precise rules in corporate law, see Ian Ayres, 
‘Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel’ (1992) 59 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1391, 1404-1407. 
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contingency that motivates buyers to walk away from a now disfavoured deal. Often in the 
period between contracting and tender the buyer realises that the purchased good is not 
suitable for her purposes362 or that she has been overly optimistic about the added value it 
would bring to her business363 and seeks to escape what has now become a bad bargain for 
her. Such strategic acting on her changed preferences is especially problematic when the 
contract envisages the sale of customised goods since where in these cases the buyer rejects 
for her own selfish reasons, the seller loses practically all of his investment (work and 
materials) specific to the contract. In other words, the same reason that justifies a constrained 
termination right in case of construction contracts also applies to contracts for sale of 
specifically manufactured goods. To what extent then is termination available in the three 
jurisdictions under comparison? 
Bulgaria 
In this respect Bulgarian contract law is very straightforward. It lumps contracts for the 
manufacturing of specialised goods together with construction contracts364 in a common legal 
category, termed in this thesis "contracts for services", and thus limits the Buyer's right to 
terminate to cases in which the good made is completely unfit for its ordinary or contemplated 
purpose.365 Where the good delivered generally conforms to the requirements and 
                                                 
362 For the US, see Beco v. Minnechaug Golf Course 256 A2d 522 (Conn 1968) (where the buyer attempted to 
return the custom-made coffee shop equipment because she realiszed she needed equipment which that is 
arranged differently); Sal Metal Products Co. v. Rennert 5 UCC RepServ 826 (NY 1968) (where the buyer 
refused to pay for the hardware items produced according to her precise specifications because she found them 
unsuitable for the intended purpose); Stephens Industries v. American Express Co. 471 SW2d 501 (Mo 1971) 
(where the taping machine was produced according to buyer's specifications but then she attempted to reject it 
since she had not specified that the machine had to place tape on the back of the cards); R. R. Waites Co. v. E. H. 
Thrift Air Conditioning 510 SW2d 759 (Mo 1974) (where the buyer attempted to return the air cabinets 
conforming to her plans and specifications since on account of an architectural mistake they were of no use to 
her). For Bulgaria, see Decision №247 of 04.08.2008, c. c. №638/2007 of the Appellate Court – Plovdiv as well 
as Ruling №61 of 04.02.2009, comm. c. №812/2009 г., II comm. dep. of the Supreme Court (where the buyer 
attempted to terminate on account of the custom-made machine not reaching the desired productivity, the reason 
for this being that she had not agreed to the increase in power, as recommended by the seller). 
363 Decision №318 of 27.06.1994, c. c. №177/1994 of the Supreme Court (where the seller produced spare parts 
for the buyer's machinery according to buyer's specifications, yet the buyer rejected them because she had a lot 
"in storage"). 
364 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 179-184 in Section B.1. of Chapter IV. 
365 Art. 265(2) Contracts Act. Decision №586 of 21.06.2007, c. c. №227/2007 of the Supreme Court (where the 
jib crane did not conform to the specified parameters and could not serve the purposes for which it was made, the 
Buyer had the right to terminate); Decision №247 of 04.08.2008, c. c. №638/2007 of the Appellate Court – 
Plovdiv as well as Ruling №61 of 04.02.2009, comm. c. №812/2009 г., II comm. dep. of the Supreme Court 
(where the machine could not reach the required productivity with the specified power and the Seller had 
informed the Buyer that an increase in power is needed, there was no total breach of the Seller which could 
justify termination of the contract by the Buyer, see supra footnote 362 of this Chapter); Decision №348 of 
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specifications of the Buyer,366 where the defects are remediable,367 or where the Buyer uses 
the good in her manufacturing process or business albeit with some corrections,368 courts 
normally hold that the Buyer has no right to end the contract.369 Before terminating the Buyer 
also needs to give the Seller an additional period of time to correct his performance.370 Thus, 
unlike in sale contracts but consistently with the general contract law principle, in contracts 
for delivery of custom-made goods termination is available only as a remedy of last resort. In 
other words, by the very classification it adopts, Bulgarian contract law recognises that on the 
contractual continuum contracts for manufacturing of specialised goods stay much closer to 
construction than to discrete sale contracts. This is not the case, however, in English and US 
                                                                                                                                                        
04.04.2014, app. comm. c. № 2090/2013 of District Court – Varna as well as Decision №186 of 30.10.2013 of 
the Supreme Cassation Court, II comm. dep. (where the ventilation system was defective but the Buyer corrected 
the defects and eventually used the system, the Buyer had a claim for the expenses for correction of the defects 
but not the right to terminate the contract). 
366 Decision №318 of 27.06.1994, c. c. №177/1994 of the Supreme Court (where the produced spare parts 
conformed to the agreed specifications, the buyer was liable for the price, see supra footnote 363 of this 
Chapter); Decision №586 of 21.06.2007, c. c. №227/2007 of the Supreme Court (where the jib crane did not 
have the required lifting height and microspeed, had asymmetric stops, a longer hook and an unsuitable electric 
hoist, it materially diverged from the agreed specifications, so the Buyer had the right to terminate, see supra 
footnote 365 of this Chapter); Decision №247 of 04.08.2008, c. c. №638/2007 of the Appellate Court – Plovdiv 
as well as Ruling №61 of 04.02.2009, comm. c. №812/2009 г., II comm. dep. of the Supreme Court (where the 
Seller made the machine in conformity with the technical terms of references, provided by the Buyer and the 
latter did not agree to the alteration suggested by the Seller, the Buyer was not entitled to terminate, see supra 
footnote 365 of this Chapter); Decision №348 of 04.04.2014, app. comm. c. № 2090/2013 of District Court – 
Varna as well as Decision №186 of 30.10.2013 of the Supreme Cassation Court, II comm. dep. (where the 
ventilation system deviated from the plan only in its part outside the building, the defect was not so substantial 
that to make the work unfit and to justify termination, see supra footnote 365 of this Chapter). 
367 Decision of 26.06.1964, c. №340/1964 of the General Assembly of the State Arbitration Court (where the 
court expressly stated that the Buyer might have been entitled to terminate if the defects were irremediable); 
Decision №348 of 04.04.2014, app. comm. c. № 2090/2013 of District Court – Varna as well as Decision №186 
of 30.10.2013 of the Supreme Cassation Court, II comm. dep. (see supra footnote 365 of this Chapter).     
368 Decision №247 of 04.08.2008, c. c. №638/2007 of the Appellate Court – Plovdiv as well as Ruling №61 of 
04.02.2009, comm. c. №812/2009 г., II comm. dep. of the Supreme Court (where the Buyer used the machine in 
her manufacturing process for more than four months after delivery, she was not entitled to terminate, see supra 
footnote 365 of this Chapter); Decision №348 of 04.04.2014, app. comm. c. № 2090/2013 of District Court – 
Varna as well as Decision №186 of 30.10.2013 of the Supreme Cassation Court, II comm. dep. (see supra 
footnote 365 of this Chapter); Decision №9 of 10.09.2010, comm. c. №150/2009 of the Supreme Cassation 
Court, II comm. dep. (where the Seller remedied the defects of the three custom-made squirts and they were used 
in the Buyer's manufacturing process, the Buyer was liable for the price and had the right only to damages for 
the delay). 
369 The criteria are essentially the same as those used by courts to evaluate the fitness of construction. Cf. supra 
with the text accompanying footnotes 74-77 of this Chapter. 
370 Decision №1917 of 15.10.2013, app. comm. c. №1221/2013 of the Sofia Appellate Court (where the 
termination notice sent by the Buyer did not give the Seller any additional time to correct his performance, the 
Seller, by sending the missing technical documentation for the machine, cured while the contract was still 
effective). 
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law where contracts entailing the creation of a new good especially for the Buyer are outright 
sale contracts.371 
England 
Surely in English contract law the doctrine of intermediate terms and Section 15A can very 
well be used to curb termination when it comes to sale of specifically manufactured goods, 
too. But what begs to be discussed here is the House of Lords' concern that the law on 
description with respect to goods other than commodities keeps pace with the wind of change 
brought by Hongkong Fir372 and Hansa Nord.373 Indeed, the dispute in Reardon Smith Line 
Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen374 did not arise out of a sale contract but out of an agreement 
for sub-charter of a tanker, yet the dictum by which Lord Wilberforce, speaking for the 
majority of the House of Lords, limited the scope of the implied condition as to description 
seems to have a much more general meaning and to be relevant to sale contracts, too. At the 
time of concluding the charter party the ship was still under construction and not yet named, 
so it was referred to in the contract as "Yard No. 354 at Osaka …" (the name of the 
shipbuilding company). By the time the vessel was completed and ready for delivery, 
however, the market had collapsed and the charterer sought to reject it375 on the ground that it 
did not conform to the description because it was built at an Oshima yard (a shipbuilding 
company in which Osaka had 50% interest) where it had a serial number 004 (though still 
referred in the Osaka books as 354). Since the ship complied in all respects with the 
contractual requirements as to tonnage, equipment and performance, the House of Lords 
decided the charterer was not entitled to refuse to take delivery. Yet, how did English judges 
reach this result?  
To be fully precise, in a previous case, Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Ltd.,376 
the House of Lords had already trimmed down the definition of description by taking away 
                                                 
371 See supra Section B.1. in Chapter IV. 
372 [1962] 2 Q.B. 26. 
373 [1976] Q.B. 44. 
374 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989. 
375 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 993 (Per Lord Wilberforce: "By the time the tanker was 
ready for delivery the market had collapsed, owing to the oil crisis of 1974, so that the charterers' interest was to 
escape from their contracts by rejecting the vessel."), at 1000 (Per Lord Wilberforce: "If the market had risen 
instead of fallen, it would have been quite impossible for Osaka … to refuse to tender the vessel … on the 
ground that it did not correspond with that contracted for. No more on a falling market is there, in my opinion, 
any ground on which the charterers can reject the vessel. In the end I find this a simple and clear case."). 
376 [1972] A.C. 441. 
 311 
words indicating quality characteristics.377 There was no misdescription, the court decided, 
since the fact that the herring meal sold contained a substance poisonous to mink did not 
render it erroneous to describe as herring meal.378 In addition, the description by which the 
goods were sold was limited to the words "Norwegian herring meal", with the words "fair 
average quality" and the minimum, respectively maximum, percentage of protein, fat and salt 
not constituting part of it.379 "Description", therefore, represented only those words which 
were intended "to identify the kind of goods" to be supplied.380 However, while Ashington 
Piggeries distinguished between description and quality, the "identification" terminology the 
court used to do this presented a problem in Reardon Smith Line.381 After all, the words, 
which became the bone of contention in the latter case, "Yard No. 354 at Osaka …", were 
used precisely to identify the ship, subject to the charter party. To sort out the conflict 
between the two cases, Lord Wilberforce drew a line between words whose purpose was "to 
state (identify) an essential part of the description of the goods" and words which simply 
provided "one party with a specific indication (identification) of the goods so that he can find 
them and if he wishes sub-dispose of them."382 Only words in the first sense provided 
essential elements of the description and had the contractual force of conditions. Words in the 
second sense merely provided a means of identifying the good and hence could be construed 
                                                 
377 The case concerned two connected contracts. In one contract, the plaintiffs, who were feeding-stuff 
compounders, agreed with the defendants, who were mink breeders, to compound for and deliver to them an 
animal foodstuff for minks prepared according to a formula provided by the defendants. Under the terms of 
another contract, the plaintiffs purchased from a third party "Norwegian herring meal fair average quality of the 
season, expected to analyse not less than 70 per cent. protein, not more than 12 per cent. fat and not more than 4 
per cent salt." However, the herring meal, which was an ingredient in the animal foodstuff, turned out to be 
contaminated by a poisonous chemical and caused the deaths of thousands of mink. 
378 Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Ltd. at 467 (Per Lord Hodson). 
379 Ibid, at 503, 511 (Per Lord Diplock: "Where a contract contains an express statement about the quality of the 
goods to be supplied the prima facie inference is that this was intended by the parties not as an identification of 
the kind of goods that are alone the subject-matter of the contract, but as an express stipulation as to the standard 
of quality to which goods of that kind supplied under the contract shall conform. Such an express stipulation 
may be intended as a condition or as a warranty. Which it is, depends upon the construction of the contract."). 
380 Ibid at 503-504 (Per Lord Diplock: "The "description" by which unascertained goods are sold is, in my view, 
confined to those words in the contract which were intended by the parties to identify the kind of goods which 
were to be supplied. … ultimately the test is whether the buyer could fairly and reasonably refuse to accept the 
physical goods proffered to him on the ground that their failure to correspond with that part of what was said 
about them in the contract makes them goods of a different kind from those he had agreed to buy. The key to 
section 13 is identification."), at 475 (Per Lord Guest: "description" implies a specification whereby the goods 
can be identified by the buyer. … Neither f.a.q. nor the expected analysis provision identifies the goods. They 
prima facie indicate the quality of the goods"), at 489 (Per Lord Wilberforce: "The test of description, … is 
intended to be a broader, more common sense, test of a mercantile character. The question whether that is what 
the buyer bargained for has to be answered according to such tests as men in the market would apply, leaving 
more delicate questions of condition, or quality, to be determined under other clauses of the contract or sections 
of the Act."). 
381 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989. 
382 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 999. 
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much more liberally.383 Thus, where the yard number and the shipbuilding company had no 
special importance to the parties at the time of contracting, where the phrase used in the 
particular contract was merely a substitute for a name that served no function but to enable the 
charterer to identify the ship, where eventually the ship tendered was the ship contracted for, 
the charterer failed to bring the case within the strictest rules as to "description" and could not 
refuse to take the vessel.384 In other words, by adopting a two-tier approach – a strict one to 
words related to the essential nature of the goods and a flexible one to words not concerning 
their essence, the court practically built the test of substantial failure of performance into the 
definition of "description", thus restricting the range of this implied condition.385 In this 
respect, Lord Wilberforce emphasised, the law relating to sale of goods (other than 
commodities) and their correspondence with description should be in line with the general 
law of contract and the "more modern doctrine" of intermediate terms it had developed.386 
Thus, when it came to specifically manufactured goods, courts were presented with yet 
another means to confine buyer's termination right. 
It would be wrong, however, to think that Reardon Smith Line387 does not have implications 
for contracts for sale of commodities. One should not overlook that while characterising some 
description cases, such as Re Moore and Landauer,388 as "excessively technical", Lord 
Wilberforce still doubted whether "a strict and technical view" was not appropriate regarding 
description of commodities.389 In this sense, he thought commodities deserve a special 
mention even if Reardon Smith Line itself concerned unascertained future goods. Yet, his 
dictum should be properly understood. Although in contracts for sale of commodities a strict 
attitude might be necessary with respect to the kind of goods sold, their geographical origin 
and grading,390 nothing in Reardon Smith Line implies that in such contracts phrases like "fair 
average quality" or "in good condition" should be considered descriptive and construed 
                                                 
383 Ibid at 999. 
384 Ibid at 998-1001. 
385 Bridge, The Sale of Goods 287; Peel 881. 
386 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 998. 
387 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989. 
388 [1921] 2 K.B. 519. 
389 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 998. 
390 Berger and Co. v. Gill & Duffus SA [1984] AC 382, at 394 (per Lord Diplock); Tradax Export SA v. 
European Grain & Shipping Ltd. (where "max. 7.5% fibre" was decided to be part of the description of the 
goods); Toepfer v. Warinco [1978] 2 LlLRep 569 (where the words "fine-ground" were decided to be part of the 
description of the soya bean meal). Cf. with Tradax Internacional SA v. Goldschmidt SA(where it was conceded 
by the buyers that the provision "4% foreign matters" was not part of the description). 
 313 
strictly.391 Certainly, commodities may also require more extensive descriptions than specific 
goods,392 but this does not mean that words not related to their essential nature do not deserve 
a more relaxed interpretation. Moreover, what is important here is that while in Arcos v. 
Ronaasen393 the court required compliance to the letter of the contract, in Reardon Smith Line 
Lord Wilberforce sought to bring the requirement of substantial failure in the law on 
decsription.394 In this sense Reardon Smith Line is yet another drop in the bucket of 
precedents which raise suspicions as to whether Arcos is still good law. 
The US 
Even under the bright-line perfect tender rule of the Uniform Sales Act,395 US courts were not 
wholly insensitive to the seller's strong interest in acceptance when he had invested in making 
a specialised good. In some cases they limited termination by applying the substantial 
performance standard despite the absence of any legal basis. Thus, in Harrild v. Spokane 
School District396 where the seller undertook to manufacture and deliver drawing tables and 
desks made in accordance with plans and specifications furnished to him, the court decided 
that substantial compliance was all that was required from the seller and, therefore, the buyer 
had no right to refuse to accept and pay. The court considered that little differentiated the 
contract in dispute from construction contracts since although the seller could carry away the 
chattel, he could not resell it as it was made to meet the buyer's requirements. Hence, the same 
grounds that made the substantial performance doctrine applicable to construction contracts, 
justified its application to contracts for manufacturing chattels for special use. Thus, referring 
                                                 
391 In this sense, see Bridge, The Sale of Goods 288. 
392 Ibid 288. 
393 [1933] A.C. 470. 
394 Cf. Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen & Son at 479 (Per Lord Atkin: "It was contended that in all commercial contracts 
the question was whether there was a "substantial" compliance with the contract: there always must be some 
margin: and it is for the tribunal of fact to determine whether the margin is exceeded or not. I cannot agree.") 
with Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen at 998 (Per Lord Wilberforce: "… in my opinion is, 
right to treat other contracts of sale of goods in a similar manner to other contracts generally so as to ask whether 
a particular item in a description constitutes a substantial ingredient of the “identity” of the thing sold, and only 
if it does to treat it as a condition … I would respectfully endorse what was recently said by Roskill L.J. 
in Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. [1976] Q.B. 44 , 71: … The general law of contract has 
developed, along much more rational lines (e.g., Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.
[1962] 2 Q.B. 26 ), in attending to the nature and gravity of a breach or departure rather than in accepting rigid 
categories which do or do not automatically give a right to rescind, and if the choice were between extending 
cases under the Sale of Goods Act 1893 into other fields, or allowing more modern doctrine to infect those cases, 
my preference would be clear."). 
395 See supra the text accompanying footnotes 227-230. 
396 192 Pac. 1 (Wash. 1920). 
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to the specific investment that characterised the contractual relationship and noting the 
already emerging tendency of relaxing the rigour of the rule that required literal performance, 
the court did not hesitate to bar the buyer from forfeiting the seller's right to compensation.397 
Under the UCC US courts exhibit the same tendency to strengthen buyer's obligation of 
acceptance when it comes to specially manufactured machinery and equipment. Not so rarely, 
when the court concludes that the buyer is uncooperative and attempts to avoid her payment 
obligation, the court finds that she failed to make an effective rejection because of an 
untimely notice.398 In this way, the court can either treat the issue as revocation of acceptance 
and, consequently, charge the buyer with the heavier burden of proving that the non-
conformity substantially impaired the value of the good to her,399 or can infer that acceptance 
has occurred and the buyer is liable for the price. Thus, in Beco v. Minnechaug Golf Course400 
the court arrived at the conclusion that the buyer had not rejected the goods within reasonable 
time although upon delivery and setting up the equipment the buyer had stopped the works 
and complained of defects. The seller agreed to correct the nonconformities as well as to see 
whether the equipment could be converted from a "wall" type to an "island" type but the 
buyer refused to deal any further with the seller and in a month attempted to return the 
equipment. Now, there really were defects and the court could decide that by its very 
objections and dissatisfaction the buyer had rejected right there on the spot. To compare, in 
another case, Alliance Tractor & Implement v. Lukens Tool & Die,401 in which, however, the 
court considered the seller's performance slovenly, the court found that the buyer did not at 
any time accept the machine, although it was in her possession, she used it and produced 
articles that were in fact sold. But in Beco402 the seller's willingness to rectify the defects and 
the buyer's sharp refusal to allow such curative tender made the court interpret the buyer's 
                                                 
397 But see Corbett v. Freedman & Sons 161 NE 415 (Mass 1928) (where in an action for the price of a 
remodelled second-hand shoe lasts, not retained by the buyer, instruction authorising seller's recovery on 
substantial performance was erroneous as inapplicable). 
398 White and Summers 304. 
399 UCC § 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part. (1); § 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of 
Breach; Burden of Establishing Breach After Acceptance; Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable 
Over. (4). See also Axion Corp. v. GDC Leasing Corp. 269 NE2d 664 (Mass 1971) (where notice of rejection 
was given after 14 months, the court treated it as notice of revocation of acceptance but decided there was 
insufficient evidence that the alleged nonconformity substantially impaired the value of the machine to the 
buyer). Where the policy behind the rejection and revocation-of-acceptance notice requirement is to give the 
seller an opportunity to cure or permit him to assist in minimiszing the buyer's losses, courts can become very 
demanding about the technicalities. See Desilets Granite Co. v. Stone Equalizer Corp. 340 A2d 65 (Vt 1975). 
400 256 A.2d 522 (Conn. 1968).  
401 233 NW2d 299 (Neb 1975). 
402 256 A.2d 522 (Conn. 1968). 
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behaviour as evidence of election to accept and decide that she was obliged to pay the price 
less the cost of correcting the defects. Thus, by manipulating the procedural requirements for 
rejection, the court effectively achieved the outcome that would have resulted from 
application of the substantial performance standard and imposed a duty to deal on the buyer. 
Where the goods were specially manufactured and could not be resold at reasonable prices, 
the buyer should have permitted the seller to eliminate the defects. 
While in Beco v. Minnechaug Golf Course403 the court constrained the buyer's right to 
termination in a somewhat roundabout way, in Alliance Tractor & Implement v. Lukens Tool 
& Die,404 it was explicit in applying the standard of substantial performance despite the fact 
that the contract was one for sale. Alas the seller could not benefit from the more generous 
rule as the court found his performance to be shoddy. The buyer had the right to receive at 
least approximately what she bargained for, the court said, but where the machine never 
reached the required productivity, broke down repeatedly, and manufactured products that did 
not conform to the specifications, this was not the case. The court, in other words, found no 
substantial performance; yet, the point is that where the dispute arose out of a contract for the 
construction of a specialised good, it was prepared to stray away from the perfect tender rule 
and not to turn the seller away if he in good faith had substantially complied with the contract. 
The economic rationale 
To put it briefly, it appears that all legal systems under comparison respond to sale contracts' 
crossing over to the long-term range. The adaptation to the specialised context is most 
pronounced in Bulgarian contract law, where customisation of performance determines the 
grouping of contracts for production and delivery of bespoke goods together with construction 
contracts and thus limits the Buyer's termination right to for particularly grave defects. 
Sensitive to the character of the market, English and US contract law also find ways to drift 
from the perfect tender rule. Whether by limiting the scope of the implied condition as to 
description (England), manipulating the procedural requirements for effective rejection or 
outright substitution of the performance standard (the US), English and US law manage to 
introduce the requirement for "material"/"substantial" breach and curb the Buyer's termination 
to an extent similar to that in construction contracts.  
                                                 
403 256 A.2d 522 (Conn. 1968). 
404 233 NW2d 299 (Neb. 1975). 
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The parallel made with construction contracts is by no means accidental. If contracts exhibit 
similar characteristic features (extended duration, higher incompleteness, specific 
investment), as it is the case with contracts for sale of customised goods and construction 
contracts, the same economic analysis applies,405 so to the reader, who is by now used to the 
economic rationalising of legal rules, the pointed confining of the Buyer's right to terminate is 
perfectly sensible. Where the market for substitute performance thins and the complexity of 
performance gives rise to ever present grounds for alleging default, an unlimited option to 
terminate would give the Buyer an excellent opportunity to act on her reversed preferences 
and hold up the Seller. The Seller would either be left with a customised good that has little, if 
any, value to him outside the particular contract, or, at best, would lose a substantial part of 
the purchase price if the Buyer uses her leverage to sell her cooperation at a premium. Such 
gloomy prospects would naturally undermine the Seller's incentive to invest cooperatively in 
high quality performance (as the surplus resulting from his efforts would most likely be 
appropriated by the Buyer) and even to contract at all. To reduce the Buyer's potential 
strategic behaviour, contract law in all three jurisdictions withdraws her termination right 
whenever the risk of her opportunism is most likely – when the good, although suffering from 
some minor and remediable infirmities, generally conforms to the plan and to the Buyer's 
specifications (the US and Bulgaria) or when the good is in its essence the same (England). 
Or put otherwise, contract law contains the worst threat of the Buyer exactly when it is most 
destructive – when the Seller has produced a good fit for its purpose; yet, with some slight 
deficiencies (the US and Bulgaria) or when the discrepancy concerns only words identifying 
the good (England). The Buyer is then liable for the price (less the losses brought about by 
Seller's breach) not because she is the better insurer against defective performance but 
because her non-cooperation causes more net damage than the Seller's imperfect performance. 
What we observe, in other words, is the regulatory function of contract law in its prime. In 
English and US law, however, such regulation of opportunism takes place at the price of 
higher uncertainty and error costs than in Bulgarian law. After all, where in sale-of-goods 
contracts courts may grant either a broad, or a restricted termination right, insecurity and the 
probability of error rise.    
Still what is the lesson that can be drawn from all this? 
                                                 
405 Cf. with the economic rationale of construction contracts supra in Section A.3. 
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Conclusion 
One of the aims of this thesis was to provide a methodology for understanding shifts 
in contract law from facilitative to regulatory. Chapter II develops the comparative 
law and economics method which, in the following chapters, is extended to remedies. 
Chapters III, IV and V supply the building blocks necessary to perform a meaningful 
comparative law and economics analysis. Chapter III strengthens the comparative 
limb of the methodology. Ensuring that the economic model of incentives, employed 
in Chapter VI of the thesis, is not based on a taxonomy that is incompatible with a 
civil law jurisdiction, Chapter III shows the ability of the functional method to bridge 
different legal traditions and, thus, presents a lesson for the comparative lawyer. 
Chapters V and VI are rather directed to the law reformer. They critically reconstruct 
the economic theory that helps perform the analysis and point at two major themes 
that should be considered by the law reformer when seeking to improve an existing or 
designing a new contract law system: the classification of different types of contract 
(Chapter IV) as well as the way parties' motivation is affected by remedies (Chapter 
V). Chapter VI represents an exemplary application of the so-developed method to 
contractual termination. The chapter contextualises the acquired economic knowledge 
in the contract law systems of three jurisdictions and demonstrates how one can trace 
and evaluate ongoing transformations of contract law. 
It might seem that the thesis pulls in too many directions. Indeed, having spent so 
much time and so many pages to damages (Chapter III and Chapter V), the account 
abruptly directs the reader to another remedy: termination. Admittedly, the author 
could not resist the temptation to tell precisely this story of the Buyer's right to end 
the contract, as from the start it seemed to fit so well with the hypothesis with which 
this research started.1 Yet, if the thesis also purported to make a methodological 
contribution, Chapter V could not be omitted. If one is to adopt a consequentialist 
outlook on remedies, one needs to be conscious of the different incentives a remedy 
generates. For better or for worse, damages is the remedy on which economic analysis 
centred. In fact, the path of its development constituted the identification of an ever 
growing number of incentives created precisely by damages. Indeed, while becoming 
                                                 
1 See supra the text accompanying footnote 109 of Chapter I.  
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acquainted with the economic literature, one may think at times that law has at its 
disposal no other remedy but damages. Yet, there are no other reasons for this 
expansion of economic analysis but its origins in a common law jurisdiction for which 
damages is the principal remedy as well as the susceptibility of damages to be 
measured, the latter naturally corresponding with economists' affinity to numbering 
and mathematical calculation.2 In this sense, if one is to learn to predict the 
consequences from adopting a given remedy, one needs to pass through the economic 
model of incentives as induced by damages but does not need to stop there. There is 
nothing to impede the adaptation and application of the knowledge, so densely 
concentrated in the economic model, to other remedies. From this perspective, the 
value of Chapter VI also lies in it extending the understanding, steadily built in the 
previous chapters, to a different remedy: termination. 
More importantly, aside from this economic model, there is hardly any other tool that 
demonstrates so well the very essence of the economic approach to law. An economist 
does not start his analysis by enquiring what the prescribed legal remedy is and which 
interest (expectation, reliance, restitution) it protects. Rather, he asks which the 
desired effect is and from there reasons backwards to fine-tune the remedy (in the 
model: the remedy of damages) which would produce such an effect. This thesis, for 
example, focused on the curbing of strategic behaviour and asked how this can be 
achieved by tweaking the termination remedy. Economists' fine-tuning, however, 
remains a largely theoretical construction, difficult, if at all possible, to apply. 
Resolving legal issues on a daily basis, judges, on the other hand, are the masters of 
adjusting remedies. Starting from a bright-line rule that allows a free choice between 
termination and damages, US and English courts curb the Buyer's right to end the 
contract whenever the breach is not substantial enough. Bulgarian courts, on the other 
hand, apply a vague standard; yet, they use it with self-restraint to deny termination. 
That judges continuously fine-tune the remedy does not mean that they always get it 
right or that they even think in instrumental terms. We have no reason to believe that 
they adopt such a conscious consequentialist view; yet, this does not change the fact 
that their decisions produce effects that are relevant from an economic perspective. It 
                                                 
2 In a way, it is much easier to determine that the optimal amount of damages, all incentives 
considered, is "x"% of expectation damages; yet, how do you limit the right to terminate by "x"%? 
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is for academics then to bridge the two skills, the economist's skill to rationalise 
remedies as instruments to achieve certain goals and the lawyer's skill to constantly 
tweak remedies, and it is for lawmakers to translate the results of academic studies 
into concrete policies. This, however, requires that, having understood the economic 
issues (Chapter IV and Chapter V), scholars leave their comfortable theoretical world 
to relentlessly study reality and then reconstruct it in economic terms (Chapter VI) in 
order to see where the distance from efficiency can be shortened. 
The thesis commenced with the hypothesis that all national contract laws under 
comparison have been progressively re-oriented to perform efficiency-driven 
regulatory function. Having tested the claim in only one contract law area, the 
availability of the Buyer's termination right, I hasten to emphasise that the findings in 
this regard can be only tentative and further research is needed to confirm or refute 
them. Still, at the end of this humble research exercise, I am prepared to revise the 
hypothesis and state it more subtly: the compared national contract laws converge in 
charging the termination remedy with regulatory function. They converge in that all 
three of them regulate Buyer's strategic behaviour by restricting her right to terminate 
to a similar extent (Chapter VI). In contracts entailing customised performance 
(construction contracts and contracts for manufacturing and delivery of customised 
goods) a Seller who has substantially performed is plainly guaranteed his contractual 
gains less the losses caused by his breach. In contracts for sale of standardised goods 
national courts, too, struggle to find the balance between adhering to the principle that 
buyers should not be compelled to accept defective performance and preventing 
buyers from using a minor breach to coercively rewrite the contract. Indeed, 
convergence there is. But to reach a common meeting point, national contract laws 
start from opposite positions. While the common law legal systems move to 
emphasise deterrence by containing the buyer's unlimited option to terminate, 
Bulgarian contract law, having experienced a transition from planned to market 
economy, makes termination more readily available to the buyer and thus has become 
more facilitative. In this sense, it is difficult to speak of one unitary trend toward more 
regulation. The mentioned convergence is rather underlain by different tendencies in 
the legal systems going in different directions. 
In fact, if there is something to be learned from the messy reality described in the last 
chapter, it is that the efficiency of the legal rule largely depends on the institutional 
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framework to which it refers. Notice how the different legal devices restricting the 
Buyer's right to terminate depend on the deep structure of the respective national legal 
regime. This can be traced best in the last century's development of the availability of 
buyer's termination in contracts for sale of standardised goods. Where, consistently 
with the specific performance principle, the Bulgarian general contract law posits 
termination as a remedy of last resort, in sales contracts courts use the substantiality 
criterion as a way to deny the buyer her, otherwise equally available with the other 
remedies, right to end the contract. The common law legal systems, on the other hand, 
would not part easily with the buyer's free choice between termination and damages. 
Clinging to the perfect tender rule, the drafters of the UCC did not abandon it 
altogether but eroded it by introducing the intermediate remedy of cure. In England 
where the buyer's right to terminate has always depended on the status of the 
contractual term, courts introduced flexibility in the rigid condition/warranty 
distinction by inventing the new category of intermediate terms. There is not, then, 
one single efficient legal institution but a host of institutions implementing trends in 
the legal systems which are generally efficient. 
Surely, not everything is perfect and many would pose the question about 
recommended changes to the legal regimes. "It all depends." I would answer 
lawyerishly, with a wink. A right to cure could be integrated in Bulgarian contract law 
without much friction, all the more that the legal regime used to employ it in the past. 
A seller would exercise his liberty to cure only if this is less costly than the 
termination remedy chosen by the buyer. Simultaneously a right to cure would not 
noticeably reduce the seller's incentive to tender conforming goods as it would always 
be cheaper to the seller to perform conformingly from the start rather than breach and 
cure later.3 In the US, the section on cure could be spelled out more clearly and, in 
this respect, it is a pity that the 2003 amendments to the UCC were withdrawn. In 
England, if ousting the condition/warranty categories appears as too excessive a 
measure, a more limited adjustment can be made by not treating breach of the section 
on correspondence with description as a breach of implied condition. The efficient 
legal reform, in other words, would again depend on the institutional background and 
the issues faced by each contract law system.  
                                                 
3 Wagner, 163. 
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This thesis can also be read as a plea that contract law reforms, including new 
integrated contract law instruments on the European level, reflect the differences 
between types of contracts (spot v. long-term) with the status of the parties 
(businessmen v. consumers) introduced only as a second order variable. As limited as 
the current study is, Chapters IV and VI demonstrated that national contract laws can 
be rethought within this frame. In this relation the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
also deserves a mention as it conceptualised service contracts, the construction 
contract being one of them, as continuous relationships that require legal rules 
different from those that govern one-shot exchange.4 This move was lost when the 
DCFR was scaled down to the Commission's Proposal for Common European Sales 
Law. As for the CESL, the Commission's efforts to push it forward have so far been 
unsuccessful. How the Member States will receive the promised "modified" proposal 
of the Commission concerning online sales only is yet to be seen.5 And although this 
thesis does not express any opinion on the need of such a European measure, it raises 
another more general point. With its Proposal for CESL, the Commission attempted to 
slip in a good deal of general contract law rules. Whether it will feel brave enough to 
try something similar with the new "policy mix" it plans to put forward is at this point 
unclear. Yet, this research suggests that there is a new, important shift going on in 
contract law. While the sale-of-goods contract used to serve as the paradigm of 
contracts in general and its case-law laid the foundation assisting the development of 
the general law, the tendency now seems to go in the opposite direction. This seem to 
be the heyday of the service contract as legal rules invented in service contract cases 
now inform the sales case-law6 and governance mechanisms typical of continuous 
relationships of cooperation, such as services, are now applied to the increasingly 
                                                 
4 In this sense, see also Möslein 1551. 
5 Eric Clive, ‘Proposal for a Common European Sales Law withdrawn’ 
<http://www.epln.law.ed.ac.uk/2015/01/07/proposal-for-a-common-european-sales-law-withdrawn/> 
accessed 23.09.2015; Paul Caddy, ‘Online sales law: out with the old, in with the … ?’ 
<http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/comet/online-sales-law-out-with-the-old-in-with-the/> accessed 
23.09.2015; ‘Common European Sales Law proposals to be replaced as new consultation is opened on 
online sales barriers’ <http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/june/common-european-sales-law-
proposals-to-be-replaced-as-new-consultation-is-opened-on-online-sales-barriers/> accessed 
23.09.2015. 
6 Recall Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha and Cehave N.V. v. Bremer 
Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. (The Hansa Nord). 
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long-lived sales contracts.7 Should not then service contracts be the paradigmatic case 
on which to build general rules on remedies? 
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